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 1
1 Introduction
The subject matter of this thesis revolves around cartel regulation in Europe. 
By way of example the current Finnish Competition Act prohibits agreements 
between undertakings that fix prices, limit production and share markets 
in the Section 5 of the Act. The Finnish prohibition is closely modeled on 
Article 101 TFEU. Price-fixing for instance leads to higher prices, which 
are then extracted from the consumers who will have to pay the cartel price. 
Cartels do not tend to carry redeeming virtues. There is indeed 
a compelling case to make the fight against cartels effective in terms of 
detection, sanctions and remedies. The OECD has recommended to its 
member countries that they see to the realization of this objective.1 
Indeed, increasingly high and punitive fines against infringing 
companies and a growing tendency of holding individuals accountable 
have been witnessed around the world.2 Nonetheless there appears to be 
a disagreement over the appropriate measures employed against cartel 
conduct. Such measures may include inter alia custodial sanctions, director 
disqualification orders, fines and private actions.
1.1 THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
It appears that the egregious nature of cartels is recognized to the extent that 
criminalizing cartels as a trend has emerged.3 One of the main objectives of 
1  See to this effect OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action 
against Hard Core Cartels. 1998.
2  OECD, Roundtable on Promoting Compliance with Competition Law, 07-Oct-2011. 
p. 2; Harding points out that [g]enerally there has been a clear shift towards increasingly 
incursive legal process and more severe sanctions, but the more detailed method of 
criminalisation has been varied and very much subject to local factors.’ See Harding 
2010, p. 48.
3  In Europe, the UK has imprisoned three individuals in relation to the Marine Hose 
cartel, see to this effect the discussion in this work under the section ‘[t]he Marine Hose 
Cartel’, in Ireland bar the case where one individual failed to pay a fine, which brought 
about an unsuspended prison sentence, the Irish judges have handed down suspended 
prison sentences, see Whelan 2012d, p. 178; The US seems to be in a league of its own, 
since worldwidely the US holds a record of actually sending executives to prison on a 
regular basis, followed by Israel with ‘closer normative ties to U.S. antitrust policy.’ It 
may be noted that within the EU Austria (concerning bid-rigging), Belgium, Denmark, 
Estonia, France, Germany (concerning bid-rigging), Greece, Hungrary, Ireland, Italy, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and the UK criminally prohibit 
cartels – outside the EU cartels are subject to criminal prohibitions in Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, 
Thailand and the United States, see Shaffer and Nesbitt 2011, p. 1, 8, 12, 15, 18, 26, 
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this research endeavor is to answer whether European anti-cartel regimes 
could benefit from a mode of enforcement, which inter alia by means of 
custodial sanctions criminally holds responsible the individuals who have 
brought about hard-core cartels. 
For example, under the current Finnish administrative antitrust 
enforcement regime individual perpetrators get off scot-free as enforcement 
heavily relies on corporate fines that may ultimately target the wrong people, 
namely the shareholders and other stakeholders. 4 The same lack of individual 
accountability plagues EU anti-cartel enforcement. 
This study seeks to compare the pros and cons of the introduction 
of individual criminal liability in Europe. Arguably this also requires the 
evaluation of the benefits of adopting criminal sanctions through an EU 
harmonization, since it may be argued that the EU is better placed to pursue 
such a project than individual EU member states. This then could affect 
any national consideration on the matter. 
The assessment of the pros and cons is conducted by way of a 
comparatively oriented analysis. Several arguments have been advanced 
both in favor and against the cartel criminalization project.5 The author has 
sought to single-out the most compelling arguments in relation to all the 
jurisdictions subject to a comparison, and sets out to discuss them one by 
one. Each one of the arguments presents one with sub questions. Such a 
treatment of the matter at hand inherently requires tackling the arguments 
separately which has occasionally resulted in unavoidable overlaps between 
the chapters, but is necessary for the purposes of this study. 
In the following the reader will be made aware of the outline of the 
thesis. Thus while the main research question is whether European anti-
cartel regimes would profit from the criminalization of cartels, several sub-
questions require examination prior to any answer to the main research 
question. 
The natural starting point for such a discussion is the optimal deterrence 
theory, which has been cited as a robust argument in favour of introducing 
custodial sanctions, as it tends to indicate the necessity of individual 
accountability. While the comparative part takes note of the fact that several 
27, 28, 29; In the UK the collapse of the British Airways case underlined the absence 
of successful criminal prosecutions in that jurisdiction. Joshua 2011, pp. 154-155; In 
Germany the fraud-related bid-rigging prosecutions are not a rarity: between 1998 
and 2008 184 convictions were handed down and and the prosecutions totaled 264, 
there was also one individual who actually served prison time, see Wagner-Von Papp, 
2011, Under the heading ‘F.Statistics on the Bid Rigging Offence section 298’, at para. 
2, and ‘ii. The Pipes Cartel Case’ at para 3; Harding noted that [t]he sharp end of the 
criminalisation debate is in relation to individual criminal liability, and the application 
of severe criminal sanctions to such human cartelists.’ See Harding 2010, p. 48.
4  The matter has received scarce attention in the Finnish scholarly discussion, though 
Olli Wikberg has touched upon similar questions, see to this effect, Wikberg 2009. 
5  For such a list of arguments, see Wagner-Von Papp, 2011, pp.173-174
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jurisdictions have used the optimal deterrence argument in their reasoning 
to introduce a criminalized regime, one of the main purposes of the chapter 
is to determine what sort of weight the optimal deterrence theory carries.
 Another weighty argument has to do with the moral content of cartels: 
one of the fundamental underpinnings of any criminalization contains an 
analysis of the moral qualities of the conduct possibly subject to a criminal 
prohibition. The book subsequently looks into the academic discussion on 
the matter and cites the positions that various jurisdictions have adopted. 
This is done in an attempt to determine how the moral qualities of cartel 
activity are perceived – the answer may to a significant degree dictate 
whether cartels merit criminal sanctions. 
Instead of criminalizing cartel conduct at the national level there is 
room to argue that first and foremost such a criminal prohibition should 
occur at the EU level or at the national level through a harmonization 
measure. The implications of such a move by the Union are relevant and 
will be touched upon. 
The Director Disqualification Orders (DDOs) could arguably be an 
alternative to individual criminal liability and custodial sanctions. The 
assessment of the DDOs is undertaken by way of a comparison with a 
focus on the materials derived from Sweden and the UK. Especially the 
detractors of a cartel criminalization project may commend an attempt to 
use instead the DDOs. Whether the DDOs represent a true alternative will 
be subject to scrutiny. 
Regarding the national level the study will look into the rationale 
behind the administrative mode of anti-cartel enforcement particularly in 
Finland and Sweden and whether the reasoning reflects a rational choice 
with respect to the system of sanctions as a whole.
The Swedish Contemplation elaborated on the possible scope of the 
criminal cartel offence,6 the mens rea and actus reus elements of the offence. 
In light of the Swedish position a discussion of a comparative nature is 
pursued in order to outline the desirable design of the offence. 
What is more, the Swedish deliberation considered the role of the 
competition authority under a criminalized anti-cartel regime – something, 
which has a link to the parallel existence of criminal and administrative 
regimes and information exchange as provided under regulation 1/2003. 
A related question is the possibility that parallel enforcement could give 
rise to a situation where the ne bis in idem principle would be infringed.  
The UK experience of its criminal cartel offence and case law, notably 
the remarkable failure of the British Airways case will be examined. Since the 
underlying reasons that brought about the collapse of the prosecution in the 
British Airways case have been discussed fairly widely, it seems appropriate 
6  See, for instance, the Swedish Green Paper, SOU 2004:131.
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to engage in a discussion regarding the lessons that can be derived from 
the debacle.  
Another matter is how Regulation 1/2003 affects national criminal 
anti-cartel enforcement.
To some extent the underlying questions related to parallel criminal 
and administrative anti-cartel enforcement regimes serve as a leitmotiv in 
the book. It has been noted both in the UK and Sweden that parallel 
enforcement in this context could possibly compromise anti-cartel 
enforcement. Subsequently it would supposedly provide a reason to reject the 
introduction of a criminalized regime. The parallel enforcement argument 
may relate inter alia to the operation of the leniency program. Further, 
the right against self-incrimination and higher standards of proof under a 
criminalized anti-cartel regime as possible disadvantages of a criminalized 
cartel regime will be explored to determine the robustness of the claims. 
Arguably the introduction of a criminal regime could translate into a 
situation where due to heavier procedural safeguards or higher standards 
of proof it might be more difficult to secure convictions. On the other hand 
more robust investigative powers are available under a criminal regime and 
could be portrayed as an advantage of a criminalization project. 
A very strong argument against criminalizing cartels in Finland and 
Sweden has been the absence of a crownwitness system. The corporate 
leniency applications appear to be currently an important detection tool 
of the Competition Authorities in cracking secretive cartels. 
The first company to report the cartel benefits from full immunity 
under the current administrative regime in Finland. Such immunity under a 
criminal regime would raise controversies in the Nordic context. However it 
seems that such immunity against criminal penalties would be indispensable 
in order to maintain the integrity of the leniency program as a detection tool. 
Furthermore, the lack of a system of plea-bargaining may be problematic 
and needs to be touched upon. The Author seeks to determine whether an 
overhaul of the system is called for in this respect. 
Finally, besides the DDOs, by strengthening private enforcement one 
could seek to corroborate anti-cartel enforcement, but whether it is the 
panacea in the fight against cartels is a matter of scrutiny. 
1.2 THE COMPARATIVELY ORIENTED APPROACH
Under the comparatively oriented approach employed the anti-cartel 
enforcement regimes of especially the UK, Sweden, Finland and Ireland 
will be subject to a comparative analysis while occasional observations will 
be derived from other jurisdictions such as Denmark and Norway – the 
jurisdictions will be compared in an attempt to produce conclusions with 
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regard to the viability of criminalizing cartels in Europe. It should be noted 
however that it would not serve the purposes of this study to compare 
at equal length each of aforementioned jurisdictions in terms of space 
devoted. Rather the aim is to explain the material derived in relation to each 
jurisdiction to the extent that it sheds light on the ultimate research question 
at hand: whether individual criminal liability and custodial sanctions would 
be viable in the European anti-cartel context. The discussion concerning 
the UK experience and the extensive Swedish elaboration play a major role, 
whereas the smaller amount of material available in relation to Finland and 
Ireland sets certain limits. Among the aforementioned jurisdictions Finland 
is the only one to lack all individual accountability in terms of hard-core 
cartels.
The aforementioned jurisdictions are close enough to one another in 
terms of the antitrust rules –  apart from Norway, all are EU Member States 
and enforce the EU competition law rules and have domestic anti-cartel 
regimes modeled on Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to varying degrees and are 
parties to the European Human Rights Convention – yet the jurisdictions 
are still distant enough to provide a fertile ground for a comparison.
The appropriate way to determine the jurisdictions subject to a 
comparative treatment crucially depends on the research questions.7 While 
from a historical point of view the first known cartel prohibitions belong to 
the distant past,8 more recently the first European modern Competition Act 
was passed in Germany in 1923,9 namely the Regulation Against Abuse of 
Economic Power Positions. The Act sought to catch only a certain number of 
the existing cartels, rather than all of them. Further, the 1957 Act provided 
for a more active enforcement regime than most other contemporary 
European countries.10  Germany’s enforcement however relied on the 
administrative mode of enforcement for decades to come. 11  Yet Germany 
is not at the core of the comparison conducted in this study due to the 
resemblance between its enforcement and the one in Finland currently – 
for instance price-fixing in Germany does not give rise to criminal liability. 
The predominant mode of enforcement is administrative in Germany and 
would therefore not provide a fecund ground needed for a comparison, as 
it does not provide sufficiently different solutions from the Finnish ones. 
7  Zweigert and Kötz 1998 p. 41
8  It appears that already Aristotle acknowledged the detriments of excessive market 
power by coining the term ’monopoly,’ and the late Roman Republic saw the lex Julia 
de Annona, a predecessor of modern competition laws, whereas the constitution of 
Zeno banned trade combinations in 483 AD, for further treatment of the truly ancient 
nature of cartel prohibitions, see (in Finnish) Kuoppamäki 2012, p. 20ff.
9  Kuoppamäki 2012, p. 22.
10  Alkio and Wik 2009, p. 28.
11  See Harding and Joshua, 2010, pp. 105-106.
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It should be noted that Germany has explicitly criminalized bid-rigging 
cartels in 1997, but does not provide whistle-blower protection, which 
may be deemed to be a crucial cartel-cracking tool.12  Indeed the absence 
of a crown witness system and whistle-blower protection under criminal 
law was in Sweden an important reason for the government to reject the 
introduction of a criminalized anti-cartel regime.13 
It may be said that a number of the criminal big-rigging convictions 
under the German law have occurred under the general criminal offence of 
fraud and not under the bid-rigging offence.14 Such criminally condemning 
judgments in bid-rigging cases may remain a possibility under the Finnish 
fraud rules as well, albeit perhaps a remote one.15 
Ireland on the other hand is a forerunner in Europe in terms of its 
criminal antitrust enforcement in the sense that it has a record of actually 
prosecuting and convicting the perpetrators. Its criminal regime dates back to 
the late 1990s.16 The UK is a notable European country to have criminalized 
cartels in 2003 by the Enterprise Act and thus provides important insights. 
What is more, the UK, unlike Germany, operates a whistle-blower program, 
which grants immunity against criminal prosecution to the first leniency 
applicant. 
Sweden on the other hand shares close legal and cultural ties with 
Finland and is therefore a natural part of a comparatively oriented approach 
as a fellow country in the Nordic community. Furthermore, notably in 2008 
the new Swedish Competition Act introduced individual liability in the form 
of the director disqualification orders (DDOs) under the administrative 
regime. The viability of the DDOs as the primary tool in establishing 
individual liability is a matter of interest.
Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote in 1897 that ‘[f ]or the rational study of 
the law the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of 
the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics.’17 Similarly 
the current author believes that the comparatively oriented approach looks 
into the future and provides one of the most illuminating ways of addressing 
the research questions at hand. 
The comparatist should, after he has made his inquiry into the subject-
matter, proceed to the phase where he assesses the varying solutions offered 
12  See Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy, The Competition Act 2010, 
Competitiveness 4/2009 p. 51; Wils 2008a, p. 146; See Wagner-Von Papp, 2011, 
under the title’ iii. Mandatory Prosecution v Principle of Expediency – Leniency and 
Immunity’.
13  See Prop. 2007/08:135 p. 151.
14  Wagner-Von Papp, 2011, pp. 164-168.
15  Ministry of Employment and the Economy, The Competition Act 2010, 
Competitiveness 4/2009 p. 47.
16  See to this effect Massey and Cooke 2011.
17  Holmes 1897, p. 1001.
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by the jurisdictions. Based on his evaluations he may devise a new solution, 
which reflects a combination of the solutions that the legal systems subject 
to scrutiny provide. The comparatist may also conclude that no solution is 
better than the other or that one is superior to other solutions. 18 
Employing a comparative approach, but not extensively, is popular 
among the competition law scholars.19 The comparative approach is helpful 
in the evaluation of the soundness of the regulation.20
Zweigert and Kötz noted the criticism directed towards purely nationally 
oriented legal science. Indeed preferably the legal science should more often 
take stock of what happens in the real world. The legal science should not 
limit itself to the national doctrinal analysis.21 
Eser offered a bit more sobering views on the prospects of a comparative 
approach especially in the field of criminal law. Eser rather pessimistically 
pointed out the possibility of dilettantism when the comparatist is not 
sufficiently knowledgeable about the foreign law.22 Furse who compared 
the criminalized anti-cartel regimes of Ireland, the UK and the US also 
noted ‘the dangers of making simplistic comparisons across regimes’ and 
that ‘(c)omparative legal literature is replete with criticism of the dangers 
of inappropriate comparisons.’ 
However as the chosen jurisdictions in this study are still part of the 
common tradition shared by the EU member states the aforementioned 
dangers do not appear imminent. 23  The jurisdictions subject to a comparison 
may be different to a certain extent as long as there are a sufficient number 
of shared qualities.24 Still a comparative approach particularly between 
Finland and Sweden both belonging to the civil law legal families and the 
UK and Ireland, both common law jurisdictions, is beneficial, since it may 
raise questions that have not been previously tackled. This is especially so, 
because Finland has been strongly influenced by the German tradition.25
As Zweigert and Kötz note: ‘…one can almost speak of a basic rule 
of comparative law: different legal systems give the same or very similar 
solutions, even as to detail, to the same problems of life, despite the great 
differences in their historical development, conceptual structure, and style of 
operation.’26  The similarities are evident also in the difficulties that antitrust 
enforcement faces: inter alia the burden of proof, the states intervention’s 
18  See Zweigert & Kötz 1998 p. 46-47. 
19  Kuoppamäki refers to ’a light comparison’ (author’s translation), see Kuoppamäki 
2003. p. 9.
20  Kuoppamäki 2003, p. 9. 
21  Zweigert & Kötz 1998. p. 45; Kuoppamäki 2003. p. 10.
22  Eser Albin 1998 pp. 102-103
23  See Simonsson 2009, p. 53.
24  Hahto, Vilja. ’Rikosoikeustiede ja oikeusvertailu.’ Lakimies 8/2001. pp. 1303-1304.
25  See ibid. p. 1306.
26  Zweigert and Kötz 1998, p. 39.
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effects and the extent to which information exchange should be allowed 
between competing firms all puzzle both within the EU and in the US.27 
Actually it might be preferable to drop all limitations in the comparative 
investigation of foreign legal systems.28 
The comparative approach saves one from the typical narrow perspective 
that jurists tend to entertain and protects against ‘absolute truths.’29 It 
is important to bear in mind that the basic premise of a comparison is 
functionality. Only the laws that that have comparable purposes may be 
subject to a comparison. As Zweigert and Kötz put it ‘incomparables cannot 
usefully be compared.’30  
According to Zweigert & Kötz the legal solutions found in various 
jurisdictions should be treated without the burden of doctrine and context 
and evaluated entirely based on the task assigned to them.31 The current 
author, while mindful of the aforementioned limitations, is convinced that 
a comparatively oriented approach serves exceptionally well the chosen 
research endeavor – a fact, which is reflected in the layout of the book. 
While the Chapters concerning for instance Sweden or the UK specifically 
discuss criminalized anti-cartel regimes in the aforementioned contexts, 
they may also observe points of discussion that have arisen in other 
jurisdictions to either reinforce or refute positions taken in the jurisdiction 
subject to scrutiny – this type of treatment adheres to the underpinning of a 
comparative approach that inherently requires juxtaposing the standpoints 
of the chosen countries.
This thesis draws inter alia on the government documents and 
committee contemplations that have been available in particular in the 
UK and Sweden. The legal draft work will be used wherever it sheds light 
on the policy choices. 
In addition statutory texts and case law are made use of where it serves 
to illuminate the research questions. Another source of great value has been 
the international legal literature in relation to the cartel criminalization 
project. All of the aforementioned sources will be used throughout the 
book, whenever it benefits the discussion.
27  Simonsson 2009, p. 52.
28  Zweigert and Kötz 1998, p. 35.
29  Eser 1998. pp. 107-108.
30  Zweigert K & Kötz, 1998. p. 34.
31  Zweigert & Kötz 1998. p. 44.
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2  Is Individual Accountability  
 needed in the Area of    
 Competition Law?
With regard to cartels, it has been indicated that recidivism may be rampant 
in Europe. In a study of 389 recidivists over a period of 20 years, Connor 
identified a particularly high concentration of recidivists in Northern Europe 
and Japan.1 This could mean that the current sanctioning system does 
not have the potential that is needed to prevent the infringements. The 
European Union’s sanction system does not take into account the fact that 
individuals act in lieu of the company. This has prompted commentators 
to argue in favour of individual liability, which may include imprisonment, 
but also director disqualification orders or personal fines.2 Crucially it is 
the managers who initiate the collusion and the members of the board or 
other superiors who failed to ensure the lawful operation of the firm. 3
As Polinsky and Shavell have pointed out, even when corporate fines are 
levied, the firm may not be capable of controlling its employees responsible 
for infringements. For instance sacking employees is not sufficient as the 
employees will come across new opportunities. Further, the viability 
of bringing legal action against the employee is tied to the assets of the 
employee.4 It is also possible that once the infringement comes to daylight 
the employee has already left the company. Employees may be just induced 
to act in the interests of their employer in the absence of personal sanctions. 
Also the credibility of the competition law may suffer due to the lack 
individual accountability.5 Indeed a UK survey indicated that the people 
surveyed were not at all eager to reveal their employer’s cartel activities – 
actually 14% would not become whistleblowers even if they were rewarded 
with a sum amounting to one year’s salary. Further the anonymity of the 
1  Connor 2010, p. 101; Harding noted that ‘[t]here is now a body of evidence of 
cartel recidivism, the same actors continuing or repeating their cartel infringements, 
sometimes in the very same markets. More systematic surveys of legally established 
prohibited cartel activity are beginning to appear and serve to verify repeat offending 
on the part of some major players in certain markets, confirming a hitherto 
impressionistic reading of reported cases’, see Harding 2011, p. 369.
2  See Öberg 2011 p. 308; Khan 2012 p. 78.
3  Ginsburg and Wright 2010, p. 17, 22.
4  Polinsky and Shavell 1993, p. 240.
5  Whelan 2007 p. 24.
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whistle-blower should be ensured – if the condition of anonymity is met 
almost half of the people would become informants.6
The condemnation conveyed does not appear to be sufficient since the 
administrative sanctions are directed against the company, not the individual 
directly responsible for the infringement, and in hopes of profits the firm 
may not even be induced to discipline its employees, this is at least what 
the employees assumed in a study, ‘The Enforcement and Effects of European 
Competition Policy: Results of a Survey of Legal Opinion’ by Robert. M. 
Feinberg in 1985. Additionally the study results suggested the importance 
of individual sanctions due to the assumed deterrent effect, an effect more 
powerful than what corporate fines could create.7 
While the ECJ has put forward that the competition law fines have 
both retributive and deterrent goals,8 it may be argued that neither goal is 
sufficiently achieved, as condemnation for former or latter purpose is not 
fulfilled.9 Werden and Simon argued that the condemnation by society of 
price-fixing alone would greatly deter, and would send a clear signal. As 
a general rule business people are scrupulous and condemnation would 
affect their views regarding price-fixing, even if they could rest assured of 
not being detected. Deterrence could also be improved since some may be 
swayed by the possibility of public mockery rather than by the personal 
sense of right and wrong.10 
The introduction of a punishment could alter the perceptions of the 
graveness of the infringement and as white-collars typically read newspapers 
they would learn of tough penalties due to their newsworthiness.11 Arguably 
as the prison sentences would be publicized they would also raise the 
awareness regarding the competition laws.12 The Swedish 2006 committee13 
noted inter alia that several studies indicate that negative publicity is likely 
to deter managers and owners and referred to a study comprising a sample 
of 38 firms between 1928 and 1981, indicating that previous sanctions 
diminished the likelihood of recidivism to some extent.14 
A number of commentators acknowledge that criminal sanctions may 
deter although measuring the deterrent effect is extremely difficult, thus 
6  Stephan 2008a, p. 145.
7  For the study see, Feinberg 1985, p. 377, 380; Whelan 2007 p. 28.
8  C-41/69 ACF Chemiefarma, 1970, para 173. 
9  See Whelan 2007 p. 27.
10  Werden and Simon 1987 p. 933; on the signal sent see also Baur’s paper where he 
opines that criminal prosecution is integral to compliance, Bauer 2004, p. 307.
11  Baker and Reeves 1977, p. 625.
12  Liman 1977 p. 632.
13  SOU 2006:99 pp. 547-548.
14  Simpson and Koper 1992, p. 347.
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making some commentators more skeptical than others.15 Therefore below 
will follow an overview of some of the arguments used in this context.
2.1 DETERRENCE – A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW
The UK white paper, ‘A World Class Competition Regime’, argued in favor 
of criminal threat against infringing individuals since then ‘individuals 
are more likely to think very carefully before engaging in cartels’ and if 
instructed to enter cartel by the management are more likely to become 
whistle-blowers under a criminal regime.16 Prior to the mentioned White 
paper a government commissioned peer review, which had been conducted 
with a sample of more than 100 experts in the fields of law and economics, 
indicated that criminal penalties would enhance the competition law regime, 
with 83% of UK experts in favor of such sanctions.17
The Swedish Governmental report noted as an advantage of a 
criminalization of cartels that it would be especially deterrent against 
individuals who may enter cartels, and fines alone against companies would 
not always be deterrent enough against such individuals.18 Similarly the 
Finnish memorandum prior to the enactment of the Competition Act 2011 
acknowledged that the deterrent effect could be improved if natural persons 
were also held accountable.19 In Ireland the working group in 2002 decided 
in favor of retaining the criminal penalties, principally due to the view that 
deterrence would be created.20 
The Danish committee highlighted that while there is a lack of empirical 
evidence regarding the general preventive effect, it should not be interpreted 
to mean that such an effect is absent, one just cannot measure it. Further, it 
seems that the general preventive effect would not be different from what 
it is when targeting other white-collar crimes.21
The Danish 2012 committee, echoing the optimal deterrence theory, 
assumed that economically speaking the corporate fines up to 10% of 
15  See Öberg 2011, p. 308; Parker 2011, p. 256; Wils 2005a, p. 143; Frese 2006, p. 
208; Reindl 2006, p. 117; Whelan 2007, p. 33.
16  Department of Trade and Industry, ‘A World Class Competition Regime’, July 2001. 
p. 40
17  Price Waterhouse Coopers, ‘Peer Review of the UK Competition Policy Regime’, A 
report to the Department of Trade and Industry, 18 April 2001. p. 2, 25; See also A 
report prepared for the Office of Fair Trading by Sir Anthony Hammond KCB QC 
and Roy Penrose, ‘Proposed criminalization of cartels in the UK’, November 2001. 
p. 33
18  SOU 2006: 99 pp. 537-539
19  Publications by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, ‘Kilpailulaki 2010 
–työryhmä’ Competitiveness 4/2009. p. 50
20  The Competition and Mergers Review Group 2000, pp. 77-78.
21  ’Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 35.
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the preceding year’s turnover are not sufficient to create a deterrent effect 
and that due to the graveness of the cartel violations custodial sentences 
besides fines should be available. The committee also pointed out that while 
substantial fines seem to deter mostly the company management, custodial 
sanctions would deter the employees as well and make it easier for the 
company to establish compliance at all levels of the firm.22
The committee envisaged that custodial sanctions in conjunction with 
an improved risk of detection and publicizing the risk of detection would 
create a general preventive effect.23 As a result of the introduction of custodial 
sanctions, firms could view compliance as more significant due to increased 
consciousness of the antitrust laws. Moreover the seriousness of the offence 
would be better reflected. 24 
In Norway too in terms of deterrence the retention of individual 
liability in parallel with the corporate liability was seen as important.25 
The 2006 committee acknowledged that it is possible to assume that 
preventive effect is created in terms of the law-abiding people who exercise 
rational decision-making. Also the consulted practicing lawyers had told 
the 2006 committee that corporate people appeared to perceive individual 
criminal liability reflecting a tightening of the system of penalties. 26 The 
Norwegian Committee had also referred to a Norwegian study that surveyed 
lawyers’ opinions who were of the view that prison sanctions are the most 
deterrent tool against directors. The Norwegian committee further pointed 
out that international experiences supported the effectiveness of a mixture 
of corporate and individual sanctions in terms of deterrence. 27
However the 2006 committee argued that the creation of the preventive 
effect however would depend for instance on whether the criminalization 
brings about an undermining impact on cartel investigations – something 
which might translate into a situation where at first the general preventive 
effect is boosted but soon subsides to an even lower level than was the case 
prior to the introduction of the criminal prohibition.28 
One may note however that three Danish committee members who 
were well versed in criminology, while pointing out that there is no evidence 
that the separate introduction of custodial sanctions reinforces anti-cartel 
enforcement, concurred with nine other committee members in that it is 
incoherent that custodial sanctions are not available since other comparable 
22  ibid. p. 40
23 ’Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 39.
24  ’Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 39.
25  Prop. 75 L (2012-2013) Proposisjon til Sortinget (forslag til lovvedtak) Endringer i 
konkurranseloven, at para. 4.1.2.
26  SOU 2006:99 p. 563
27  See the Norwegian Committee Report under para 6.3.2.
28  SOU 2006:99 p. 564
 13
offences are subject to custodial sanctions. This fact alone indicated in the 
committee’s view that custodial sanctions should be adopted.29
In an attempt to assess the preventive effect in relation to the severity of 
the sanction in the area of white-collar crimes, the Danish Ministry of Justice 
reviewed inter alia 155 articles and books. The literature review supported 
the idea that a more robust risk of detection affects the general preventive 
effect. On the other hand there was not sufficient evidence available to 
support harsher sanctions in the pursuit of an increased deterrent effect.30 
However it was highlighted that while there is not sufficient empirical 
evidence available which would support harsher sanctions from a deterrence 
point of view, it may not be inferred the deterrent effect is absent: the only 
thing that one may gather is that it is impossible to give a conclusive answer 
regarding the existence of a deterrent effect. 31 
Indeed the problem regarding the optimal deterrence theory is 
presented by the fact that it is difficult to show what is the full extent of 
cartel activity. 32 Richard Posner has argued that in light of the low number 
of imposed prison sentences, the deterrent effect may not be significant.33 
Werden argued that the recent statistics do not support such a view.34 The 
argument may be made however that a low number of convicting judgments 
could indicate also that the criminal penalties do deter and conversely that 
the high number of penalties could be indicative of a low deterrent effect - 
as Kanniainen and Määttä point out, this is pure speculation either way.35 
Although there exists no conclusive evidence as to the decrease of 
cartels, it is still not accurate to draw the conclusion that criminal sanctions 
would not reinforce compliance.36 The scholars who have questioned the 
reliability of the deterrence theory have still conceded that criminal sanctions 
may have an educative function by shaping the normative landscape thus 
contributing towards compliance. As Reindl puts it ‘sanctions can induce 
compliance with the law not only because of immediate deterrence-based 
value-maximizing considerations, but also indirectly by contributing to a 
subtle change in social norms.’37
There is anecdotal evidence from the United States indicating that 
sending people to prison attracts attention which then arguably creates 
29  ’Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 38.
30  ’Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 203.
31  ibid. p. 203; See also Harding 2012, p. 152.
32  See Stucke 2011, pp. 263, 287, 288; Harding 2011, pp. 358-360.
33  Posner 2001, p. 270.
34  Werden 2009, footnote 22.
35  Kanniainen Vesa and Määttä Kalle,  ’Kartellit teoriassa ja käytännössä’ Published in 
Edilex 18th of Octorber 2011. p. 110
36  Reindl 2006, p. 117.
37  Reindl 2006 p. 117.
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deterrence:38 The OECD has cited in its report the US experience that 
individuals have offered to pay significant fines in order to escape a prison 
sentence, but no one has ever preferred prison over fine.39 Further, in the 
case of United States v. McDonough a defendant had committed suicide 
as he was convicted of price-fixing to prison for a short period.40Arguably 
the deterrent effect of criminal penalties against the white-collar offenders 
is unique, especially when compared to the narcotic addict. Bryan Allison, a 
convicted cartel offender, told that while in shackles after the arrest, ‘one of 
the other guys whispered to me, “This is so extreme”’.41 One can also imagine 
how the incarceration of the deep-pocketed Alfred Taubman, the chairman 
of Sotheby as a result of price-fixing may have affected the potential price-
fixers and what message they got.42 
The Danish report noted that the OFT43 commissioned report prepared 
by Deloitte, indicated that firms regarded prison sentences as the number 
one deterrent, followed by director disqualification orders.44 The Danish 
committee referred also to a study by the Humboldt Viadrina School of 
Governance, which surveyed 223 experts on corruption who indicated by 
a majority of approx. 70% that imprisonment is ‘one of the most effective 
mechanisms to penalize business representatives for not adhering to anti-
corruption principles’.45
One may seek to determine and measure deterrence of antitrust 
enforcement by identifying the number of potential offenders abstaining from 
cartel activities as a result of antitrust enforcement. The cartel abandonment 
rate may then be used to indicate the benefit that the enforcement activity 
brings, and such an endeavour was the aforementioned study made by 
Deloitte for the UK Office of Fair Trading. Based on interviews with lawyers 
and companies the company survey indicated that for every OFT decision 
16 cartels were abandoned and the survey of lawyers suggested that 5 cartels 
were abandoned every time the OFT reached a decision.46 The OFT made 
38  Baker 2012, p. 13.
39  The OECD report  however admits that systematic evidence as to the deterrent 
effect of criminal sanctions is absent , see OECD, Hard Core Cartels: Third Report 
on the Implementation of the 1998 Recommendation. 15.12.2005. p. 27
40  Werden and Simon 1987, p. 936.
41  Furse 2012, p. 44-45; O’Kane 2011a, p. 486.
42  See Wils 2005a, pp. 143-144; Reindl 2006, p. 117.
43  Office of Fair Trading (hereinafter OFT).
44  OFT, ’The deterrent effect of competition enforcement by the OFT, a report 
prepared for the OFT by Deloitte’, November 2007. OFT 962; ’Rapport fra 
udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 203.
45  Humboldt-Viadrina School of Governance, ‘Motivating Business to Counter 
Corruption, A Global Survey on Anti-Corruption Incentives and Sanctions’ 2012. p. 
2, 3, 6, 7; See ’Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 
203.
46  For an in depth analysis of measuring deterrence with regard to cartels see, Harding 
2011, p. 361; OFT, The Deterrent Effect of Competition Enforcement by the OFT, A 
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also another study concerning the construction industry, which suggested 
that respondents could have been better informed of the criminal sanctions 
and that improving the information on these sanctions would be beneficial 
in terms of deterrence.47 
Another indication of deterrence is if the illegal activities are transferred 
to another country as a result of enforcement. Clarke and Evenett studied 
the US and EU enforcement of the Vitamins Cartels and indicated that 
’the vitamins cartel raised prices more in nations without active cartel 
enforcement regimes.’48 Anecdotal evidence corroborates such results, for 
instance that cartel meetings were held within jurisdictions regarded as 
‘safe’.49 
Repeat offenders may offer another perspective on deterrence. Evidence 
of repeat offenders has been provided by Connor and Helmers who found 
174 cases of recidivism in a sample of cartels from 1990 to 2005. As already 
mentioned, perhaps tellingly, the worst recidivists came from the EU.50 
All in all, measuring deterrence is difficult and it tends to be a crucial 
factor in anti-cartel enforcement. Thus further research on the deterrent 
impact is needed. Yet the available evidence seems to support the introduction 
of individual accountability into an anti-cartel enforcement regime. It 
may also be noted that to a varying extent all the jurisdictions subject 
to comparison appreciated the possible added value that the individual 
accountability would bring about in terms of deterrence.
2.2  THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENT IN RELATION TO 
DETERRENCE
Introduction
Ginsburg and Wright have underlined that managers and shareholders may 
not abstain from price-fixing as it is profitable.51 Fines alone as a sole form of 
sanction are problematic due to the infeasibility of levying the optimal fines 
(insolvency cap).52  In Ginsburg and Wrights’ view there should be a shift 
toward individual sanctions from corporate fines to increase deterrence in a 
Report Prepared for the OFT by Deloitte (OFT 962, November 2007).
47  Office of Fair Trading, ‘Evaluation of the impact of the OFT’s investigation into 
bid rigging in the construction industry’, a report by Europe Economics, June 2010 
OFT 1240, p. 55; Harding 2011, p. 365.
48  Clarke and Evenett 2003, p. 692.
49  Harding 2011 p. 367.
50  Connor and Helmers 2007, p. 23.
51  Ginsburg and Wright 2010, p. 17; See also The Economist, ‘Boring can still be bad’, 
March 29th 2014. 
52  Wils 2008a, p. 56.
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cost-effective way.53 Moreover the possible deterrent effect gives incentives 
for the cartelists to become whistle-blowers thus supporting the functioning 
of the leniency programs. 54
Consequently, the foregoing economic argument supports the 
effectiveness of imprisoning individual cartel offenders,55 and substantial 
corporate fines. 56 This line of argument may be traced to Becker’s seminal 
paper in 1968 where he put forward the idea that it is better to rely on 
monetary sanctions than incarceration as the former is less resource 
intensive.57 Notably Werden and Simon contested this view in case of hard-
core cartels, arguing that the optimal sanction for price-fixers is a prison 
sentence.58 The optimal fine would be so high that neither companies nor 
natural persons would be able to pay it: 59 the likelihood of the cartelist 
getting caught is likely to be low60 and the harm caused by the cartel 
considerable, which would make the optimal Beckerian fine beyond the 
ability of most defendants to pay it.61  
2.2.1  The Deterrence Theory as a Justification for a   
 Criminalization 
The deterrence theory as a justification for criminal law emanates from 
the utilitarian point of view. Punishment under such an approach may 
be warranted if a positive social result may be identified – for instance the 
deterrence of crimes.62 The moral quality of a conduct is not important 
under this approach, whereas the utility derived from the punishment 
53  Ginsburg and Wright 2010, p. 17, 22.
54  Harding 2011, p. 345.
55  Furse 2012, p. 41.
56  Harding 2011, pp. 358-359.
57  Becker 1968 p. 169-217.
58  Werden and Simon 1987, pp. 917-937.
59  Furse 2012, p. 41.
60  The rate of detection has been estimated to be between 10%-20%. See Bryant and 
Eckhard 1991, p. 535.
61  Furse 2012, p. 41; It may be mentioned however that Buccirossi and Spagnolo 
have made the argument that while criminal sanctions could boost deterrence, the 
bankruptcy argument regarding optimal fines does not seem to be such a compelling 
reason to advocate criminal sanctions, since the leniency programs have brought 
about a situation where the fine required for deterrence ‘falls to extremely low levels 
(below 10% of the optimal “Beckerian” fine)’, See Buccirossi and Spagnolo 2005. 
p. 1.
62  Whelan 2007 p. 10; Utilitarianism as a doctrine allows certain measures to be taken 
when this is useful and with a view to greatest happiness is supportive. The detractors 
say that such an approach emphasizes the consequences and omits to pay attention to 
the inherent value of a certain conduct and ignores justice and equality perspectives. 
See “Utilitarianism.” The Oxford English Dictionary 2005.; See also Mill, J.S. On 
Liberty First published in 1859, see Chapter 1.
 17
is.63 The economic argument makes the case to boost efficiency. Welfare 
maximization is sought through the allocative efficiency. When the costs are 
greater than benefits, and inefficiency is the outcome, under the economic 
argument, such conduct merits prohibition.64
Becker has evaluated deterrence through the economic analysis, 
subsequently further developing the utilitarian argument. He replaced the 
traditional happiness concept with the notion of wealth maximisation. 
Under such an approach it is assumed the individual acts rationally to get 
the best outcome in terms of wealth and refrains from certain behavior when 
the costs exceed the benefits65 – individuals are maximizers of self-interest 
and will engage in unlawful activities if the expected utility is greater than 
the anticipated cost.66 An optimal punishment would change the expected 
utility of the offence and make the potential perpetrator to refrain from 
acts that do not benefit the society.67 
For instance, the 2006 Guidelines on setting fines the European 
Commission refers to ‘specific increase for deterrence.’68 Thus having as its 
objective the creation of a sufficient deterrent effect through fines. Indeed the 
fines imposed by the European Commission have been record high over the 
recent years.69  However as Whelan points out the supporters of a criminal 
ban on cartels tend to rely on the optimal deterrence theory arguing that 
supposedly only custodial sanctions would bring about the desired level of 
deterrence.70  In light of the foregoing it seems an account of the optimal 
punishment is required.
63  Whelan 2007 p. 11.
64  Whelan 2007 p. 11.
65  Whelan 2007 p. 11; See also Becker 1968 p. 193
66  Wils 2002. p. 13. 
67  Wils 2002, p. 13
68  Already in 1970 in the Case 41/69, Chemiefarma NV v Commission of the European 
Communities, said regarding the fines levied in paragraph 173 that the ‘object is to 
suppress illegal activities and to prevent any reference’. Wils 2002 pp. 12-13.; See 
Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of 
Regulation No 1/2003, (2006/C 2010/02) at para 4
69  Regarding the level of fines, see The Economist, ’Just one more fix’, March 29th, 
2014. 
70  Whelan 2013 p. 3; Whelan refers to the works of Wils 2005a, p. 138ff.
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2.2.2 The Optimal Fine in case of hard-core competition law  
 infringements
In Becker’s view the optimal fine consists of the harm caused to the 
victims. 71 This has been referred to as the harm based approach72 or the 
internalization approach.73 When the price-fixers compensate for the harm 
that the society has incurred, it would translate into a situation where only 
efficient offenses took place, as the benefits of the act would exceed the harm. 
74 This approach could be said to be more aligned with the Chicago School 
which sees the most important aim of cartel laws to be in the maximization 
of total economic efficiency.75 
Landes argued based on Becker’s work that the optimal fine for antitrust 
activity would be the ‘…equal net harm (which includes enforcement costs 
per case) divided by the probability of apprehension and conviction.’76 
However as Furse notes this approach assumes that an efficient violation 
exists which should be allowed. However Werden and Simon were of the 
view that hard-core price-fixing is almost never efficient, with no redeeming 
effects.77
Wils argued however that the primary meaning of cartel laws is to 
hinder the transfer of wealth from consumers to producers in the form 
of higher prices. He calls this the deterrence approach: it seeks to deter 
also infringements that may produce gains above the level of the harm to 
the consumers and would thus not be targeted under the internalization 
approach. Wils reasons that fines will only deter antitrust violations if the 
expected fine is more than the expected gain derived from the infringement.78
It could be said that while the internalization or the harm approach 
only puts a price tag on a violation, the deterrence or the gain approach 
prohibits the violation.79 Wils says that the harm/internalization approach 
undermines the moral effect, because the competition law fine may rather 
be viewed as the price for conduct that is allowed, rather than as a penalty 
resulting from prohibited conduct.80 
Similarly Husak has pointed out that in case of theft, which conflicts 
with the common values of a society, compensation may restore the situation 
71  Becker 1968 p. 192.
72  See Simonsson 2009, p. 370.
73  Wils 2008 p. 56-57.
74  Werden and Simon 1987 pp. 919-920.
75  Wils 2008 p. 57.
76  Landes 1983, p. 657.
77  Furse 2012 p. 32; Werden and Simon 1987 p. 932.
78  Wils 2008 p. 56.
79  Wils 2008 p. 58.
80  Wils 2008 p. 59.
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to what it was prior to the theft, but criminal punishment against thieves 
should be used to address the wrongfulness, not only the loss.81 Husak argues 
that if the wrong is to be negated, compensation is not enough – adding 
public condemnation seems to be called for, even when the rational offender 
had the sufficient resources to indemnify and thus could be deterred by 
such a possibility.82 
Moreover, the internalization approach is in practice more difficult 
due to reasons related to the determination of the harm done, as it includes 
both the transfer of wealth from consumers and the deadweight loss and 
the probability of the fine being levied.83 
While Becker argued that social welfare is improved if fines are employed 
every time that it is practical,84 what is relevant in the anti-cartel context, is 
that Becker acknowledged that when the perpetrator cannot compensate for 
the infringement prison would have to be added to the array of sanctions.85 
Drawing on this argument Werden and Simon pointed out that most firms 
would not be able to bear the optimal antitrust fine and thus prison would 
actually be the only option.86 
With regard to antitrust penalties Elzinga and Breit have argued that 
prison sentences can be measured in money and that prison sentences are 
not efficient. Arguably a given period of time in prison has its equivalent in 
a fine in the amount that deterrence is being created. As prison sentences 
and their incremental use requires more resources, whereas the imposition 
of heavier fines does not, Elzinga and Breit argue that fines should be 
preferred always to prison sentences. ‘Whenever any penalty can give the 
same amount of deterrence at less cost, or additional deterrence for the same 
cost, that option is economically superior’.87 Lande and Connor estimated 
that the deterrence value of one year in prison would be 2 million dollars.88 
However as Furse has pointed out, also the imposition of fines may involve 
81  Husak 2008, p. 186.
82  Husak 2008 pp. 186-187.
83  Wils 2008 p. 58.
84  Becker 1968, p. 193.
85  Becker 1968, p. 196.
86  Werden and Simon 1987 pp. 928-929; Whether offenders are risk-neutral or risk-
averse will not be discussed here, but it may be mentioned that the crux of the matter 
is that if offenders are risk-averse the optimal sanctions is arguably a little lower. See 
Werden and Simon 1987 p. 920; Werden and Simon further surmised that prison 
sentences should not be lengthy as the marginal deterrent effect is considerable with 
regard to white-collars for relatively short periods of incarceration. Due to stigma 
already attached to a prison sentence, adjustment to the prison environment and 
a lower likelihood of being able to enjoy one’s money indicated that the marginal 
deterrence wanes with the passage of time. See Werden and Simon 1987 p. 935.
87  Elzinga and Breit 1976, p. 123.
88  Connor and Lande 2011 p. 28.
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significant transaction costs as the spectre of substantial fines could result 
in attempts to hide assets.89 
It should be noted however that Elzinga and Breit did not recommend 
the imposition of fines on managers since it would be difficult due to 
problems relating to the identification in large firms and due to the 
possibility that the infringing managers would be compensated by the 
firm in the hopes of large gains derived from the violation.90
2.2.3 Could the Optimal Fine be imposed?
Wouter Wils has been a staunch proponent of criminal penalties against 
natural persons responsible for hard-core cartels due to normative reasons 
and the deterrent effect. Especially his calculations on the sufficiently high 
fines are noteworthy as they explain well the economic rationale behind 
the viability of criminalizing of cartels.91
Wils has argued that effective deterrence would require fines that 
are unbearably high. In his view the expected fine should be more than 
what would be gained through the violation.92 ‘The expected fine is the 
fine imposed if the violation is detected and punished, multiplied by the 
probability of detection and punishment.’93 The gain from the infringement 
divided by the probability of detection is the threshold below which the 
punishment tends not to deter. Wils illustrates this in the following way:  if 
the gain is 100 and the probability of conviction is 20% or 1/5, fines below 
100/(1/5)=500 would not tend to deter.94 
Wils has calculated that if a 10% increase in prices is assumed, and 
thus a 5 % increase in profits for a period of 5 years and a 16% likelihood 
of conviction, the fines fail to be deterrent unless they amount to 150/% 
of the annual turnover with regard to the products affected by the cartel.95 
Connor has studied cartels and argued that the median overcharges are 
between 17% and 21%.96 In the area of branded consumer goods the median 
overcharge is above 40 %.97 The rate of detection is presumably not high, 
it has been suggested to range from 10% to 20%.98 In relation to the sub-
89  Furse 2012 p. 32.
90  Elzinga and Breit 1976 p. 133.
91  Wils 2012, p. 25; See also the discussion in Wils 2005; Werden 2009.
92  Wils 2002 p. 199.
93  Wils 2002 p. 199.
94  Wils 2002. p. 199; Wils 2008 p. 56.
95  Wils 2002 p. 201.
96  Connor 2009, p. 100.
97  Connor, Foer and Udwin 2010, p. 200.
98  See Connor, Foer and Udwin 2010, p. 203; Bryant and Eckhard 1991, p. 535; Wils 
2005b, p. 28.
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optimal fines, it may be pointed out that the optimal fines could actually 
be more than 150% of annual turnover, when the interest payments are 
added to the fine and considering that Wils used conservative estimates as 
to the mark-up and detection rate in Europe.99
Wils has listed reasons why such fines cannot be imposed: firstly the 
imposition of such fines is prevented by the turnover cap of 10% set out 
in regulation 1/2003 article 23. Importantly, they would exceed the firm’s 
ability to pay and repercussions would ensue, and collecting fines requires 
substantial resources possibly too. Finally such fines would contradict the 
principle of proportionality. 100 
A bankruptcy would have enormous social consequences to stakeholders 
such as the suppliers, customers, creditors and tax authorities.  Even lower 
fines that are still payable by the firms are problematic, as stakeholders, 
such as bondholders and creditors may see a diminution in the value of 
their securities. Employees’ salaries may be cut, tax revenues diminished 
and consumers may end up paying the fines in the form of higher prices. 
What is more, due to possible fierce litigation the collection of a fine is also 
a costly business.101 Bankruptcy itself is very undesirable due to repercussions 
to employees who would be made redundant. The employees have not 
been able to diversify their risk the way that shareholders for instance can, 
and therefore would arguably suffer a comparably larger damage than the 
shareholders.102 Further, the market would become more concentrated as a 
result of the exit of the bankrupted company.103
The profits made from price-fixing are smaller than the actual fine, due 
to the deadweight loss and since the profits would have been used to pay 
taxes, wages and dividends.104 A study by Craycraft et al. had a sample of 386 
companies responsible for price-fixing between 1955 and 1993 and showed 
that 58% of the companies could not have survived the imposition of the 
optimal fine without a technical bankruptcy.105 Thus even the liquidation of 
a company’s assets would not often suffice to pay the optimal fine – arguably 
it would be only big corporations with considerable assets that could bear 
such a fine.106 
99  Whelan 2007 p. 26.
100  Wils 2002 p. 202; The same 10 % turnover cap on fines is being employed in 
Finland as set out by article 13 of the new Competition Act, the Finnish Act refers to 
the turnover which took place during the last year of the infringement.
101  Wils 2002 p. 205-206; Regarding the firm’s ability to pay fines, Craycraft et al.  used 
a sample of 386 companies indicating that many firms could survive the Beckerian 
fine. For further details see Craycraft et al. 1997, p. 182.
102  Kraakman 1984, p. 882.
103  Calvani and Calvani 2011, p. 192.
104  Werden and Simon 1987 p. 928.
105  Craycraft et al. 1997, p. 180.
106  Werden and Simon 1987 pp. 928-929.
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2.2.4 The Value of the Optimal Deterrence Theory as an   
 Argument to Support Cartel Criminalization
Besides Wils, for instance Whelan has pointed out that to remedy the 
insolvency problem with the optimal fines, the custodial sanctions could 
be adopted, as the repercussions to the innocent stakeholders would not 
be of a similar scale.107 Since imposing optimal fines in the Beckerian sense 
appears to be beyond reach, in the spirit of Werden and Simon, it may 
be noted that the economic argument strongly supports prison sanctions 
against persons responsible for hard-core competition law infringements.
A shadow of doubt has however been cast over the underpinnings of 
the above theory: behavioral economists have argued that the argument 
about optimal deterrence accompanied by the assumption of rational actors 
is limited in its ability to explain why people act a certain way.108 As Stucke 
argues ‘it makes little sense to assume that executives behave as rational 
profit maximisers who readily respond to incremental changes in criminal 
penalties’. Informal norms may have a strong impact on behavior.109 For 
instance the concern that peers will disapprove may trump the inclination 
to fix prices – in the opposite case, the argument goes, where peers approve 
the unlawful behaviour the deterrent effect of penalties may be undermined. 
Stucke acknowledges however the usefulness of the optimal deterrence 
theory in cases where individuals are not induced to refrain from unlawful 
conduct by informal norms.110 That said it may be concluded that the 
optimal deterrence model is vulnerable to criticism and cannot be exclusively 
relied upon to support a criminalization of cartels.
107  Whelan 2007 p. 32.
108  Harding 2011, p. 360; Öberg 2011, p. 306.
109  Stucke 2011 pp. 287-288.
110  See Stucke 2011, pp. 287-288.
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3  The Moral Content of  
 Hard-core Cartels
3.1  THE REASONING BEHIND THE EMPLOYMENT 
OF CRIMINAL PENALTIES – RETRIBUTION AND 
DETERRENCE
Retribution and deterrence are the long-established philosophies behind 
the employment of criminal punishment.1 
Under the retribution theory individuals are seen as morally responsible 
for their own acts. The individuals are not a mere means towards an end, 
but an end in themselves, which may contribute to favorable views of the 
theory and is in accordance with the Kantian approach.2 The deterrence 
theory on the other hand may be credited with the preciseness of the level 
that the effective sanction is expressed.3 
Both approaches however have been criticized: the retribution theory 
may not always be able to show why certain unwanted conduct should attract 
criminal penalties. In consequence it has been put forward that besides the 
retribution theory also the forward-looking approach (deterrence) has its 
part to play.4 The deterrence theory on the other hand does not seem be 
able to tell when a punishment is not justified and further does not appear 
to be in accordance with the principle of responsibility and autonomy, and it 
may not seem to limit the punishment merely to those who are responsible in 
moral terms, especially when this undermines the maximization of utility.5
Therefore Whelan has advocated an approach that takes into account 
both the retribution and deterrence theories:6 A criminalization of cartels 
should thus observe the principle of efficiency emanating from the economic 
argument seeking to promote the maximization of welfare. The principle 
of responsibility on the other hand would ensure that an individual gets 
punished only where he is at fault, whereas the principle of proportionality 
1  Whelan 2007, p. 8.
2  See Kant 1996, p. 177.
3  Whelan 2007, p. 14.
4  Whelan 2007, pp. 14-15.
5  Whelan 2007, p. 15, 18.
6  Whelan 2007, p. 18.
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would require proportionate penalties. Further the principle of autonomy 
would treat individuals as moral agents and finally the imposition of the 
penalty should be fair and just.7
Arguably the dependence on the deterrence theory could produce a 
cartel offence that is ‘morally-neutral’, which may be problematic, inter alia 
because of a possible undermining effect on the legitimacy of criminal law, 
thus allowing the argument to surface that criminal sanctions should target 
only conduct clearly condemned by the society. 8
Criminal sanctions against cartel conduct are favoured out of reasons 
related to deterrence and the moral wrongfulness, and are the reasoning 
that proponents of a criminalized anti-cartel regime cite. Beaton-Wells and 
Parker have said that while there is not evidence to support the assumptions 
of deterrence, there is even less evidence to back the idea that cartels are 
intrinsically morally wrongful. They however acknowledged the theoretical 
backing for the moral wrongfulness that has been pursued.9 
As Whelan says for the retribution theory to be an argument in the 
cartel criminalization discussion the morally wrongful nature of cartels is 
important.10 
Also in order to justify a criminal measure under the ultima ratio 
principle it is of foremost importance to demonstrate from a moral 
perspective the seriousness of the violation. In the most reprehensible 
cases only criminal law as the ultimate measure could provide sufficient 
condemnation, both from a normative and the actual damage perspective.11 
Therefore an analysis of the moral wrongfulness and harmfulness of cartels 
will be undertaken below.
3.2  MORAL WRONGFULNESS OF THE CONDUCT 
SUBJECT TO CRIMINAL PROHIBITION
Besides the retributive and deterrent aims, a criminalization could be 
scrutinized from the perspective of wrongfulness and harmfulness of the 
given conduct.12 
While morality is important in terms of retribution, which is one 
notable aim of criminal penalties,  on the other hand it could be argued 
that mere harms would warrant criminal sanctions even when the conduct 
7  Whelan 2007, pp. 19-20.
8  Whelan 2013, p. 7.
9  Beaton-Wells and Parker 2012, p. 2-3.
10  Whelan 2013a, p. 9.
11  Harding 2012, p. 142.
12  Whelan 2007, p. 20.
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could not be characterised as morally wrong. 13 It may be argued however 
that observing the morality involved could be important to elicit support 
for criminal penalties, and if the corporate people internalize the pertinent 
moral standards the deterrence of the criminal penalties may be reinforced.14
One may note that on the one hand the economic viewpoints of the 
Chicago school seem to have had such an impact that morality is not an 
important consideration in the antitrust analysis.15 
On the other hand Sayre wrote in 1933 an article that still holds sway 
among the criminal law scholars who do not see that white-collar conduct 
should attract criminal penalties and16 as Green explains such views stem 
from the perception that a criminal label is attached to a behaviour that 
is morally neutral, making the criminal penalty unfair, thus diluting the 
meaning of the sanctions. On this view only the traditional offences merit 
criminal sanctions.17 
While the community does not favour a given criminalization, the 
prohibitions in question may be referred to as ‘sticky norms,’ – it connotes the 
idea that when the public’s view on moral wrongfulness diverges from what 
the laws dictate the legitimacy of the criminal law may be undermined.18 
As Beaton-Wells has pointed out such perceptions of overcriminalization 
seem to ignore however the educative function of criminal law that moulds 
the attitudes of the public.19 Stucke too who has pointed out that the 
overcriminalization critique overlooks the educative role of criminal law, 
society may come to condemn conduct that was once considered morally 
neutral, such as the environmental offences.20 
It may be argued that the public becomes aware of the reprehensibility 
of a given conduct through the application of a punishment.21
Wils has pointed out in relation to the criminalization of cartels that 
the criminal punishment is important with regard to the moral incentives 
that people get. A criminal punishment attaches a stigmatizing label on 
the perpetrators and the message sent spreads across the society, to the law-
abiding citizens as well, subsequently promoting the sense of justice.22 The 
corporate sanctions that currently are the mode of sanctions at the EU level 
fail to send such a strong message that individual criminal sanctions would 
13  Beaton-Wells 2007, p. 679 footnote 31.
14  Beaton-Wells 2007, p. 680.
15  Stucke 2006, p. 445.
16  Sayre 1933, p. 79.
17  Green 1997, p. 1536.
18  Beaton-Wells and Parker 2012, p. 14; See Kahan 2000. 
19  Beaton-Wells 2007 p. 677; Beaton-Wells and Parker 2012, p. 14 see footnote 57; See 
Robinson 2009.
20  Stucke 2006, p. 537; Whelan 2013, p. 8.
21  Coffee 1991, p. 200.
22  Wils 2002 p. 216.
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send.  Further, punishing the company instead of the culpable executive 
undermines the signal regarding the seriousness of the violation.23
‘Crimes have traditionally been said to be mala in se if they invovlve 
conduct that is wrongful regardless of whether the conduct has been 
made illegal.’24 Originally the mala in se (evil in itself ) category of crimes 
got their wrongfulness by a reference to God. As opposed to that mala 
prohibita crimes received their wrongfulness simply from the disobedience 
to law.25 These days the characterization as a mala prohibita offence gives 
the impression that some behavior derives its wrongfulness solely from 
it being prohibited by law.26 For example, under Husak’s minimalist 
approach, decreasing the amount of the so called mala prohibita offences 
is seen as desirable as arguably the mala prohibita offences do not meet 
the wrongfulness criterion.27 Green too points out that as a starting point 
criminal law should be reserved for conduct that is clearly blameworthy - it 
is the normal approach taken to possible criminalizations.28
The moral disapproval regarding cartels may be derived from the 
welfare losses that cartels bring about, the defiance of policy and collusion.29 
Stephan has argued that the criminalization of cartels could have its sole basis 
in the prevention of the harm, and that the moral aspects should be ignored, 
as in his view the moral quality of a given conduct is not important as follows 
from the evolution of the criminal law.30 Stephan recognizes however that 
the argument by Wardhaugh is persuasive: Wardhaugh argues that cartels 
undermine the institution in the society on which the individuals draw on 
to assure their own welfare and that the justification of a criminalization of 
cartels could be derived from that.31
In a similar vein Whelan has argued that while cartels have been viewed 
devoid of moral content, and therefore malum prohibitum, as opposed to 
mala in se, the foundation of the Western democracy being the free market 
economy, cartels could be seen problematic from a moral point of view as 
they weaken the market economy.32 The public opinion on cartels may 
not seem indignant however, and Whelan has consequently proposed that 
the public should be educated regarding the harmful effects of cartels.33 
23  ibid. p. 217.
24  Green 2012, in chapter 2, under the heading ’Theft in Unjust Societes’, at para 4.
25  Green 2006 p. 118.
26  Green 2006 p. 118.
27  Husak 2008. p. 119.
28  Green 2006 p. 1.
29  Harding 2012, pp. 148-150; Wagner-Von Papp, 2011, p. 179; Connor, Foer and 
Udwin 2010, pp. 210-211; See also Whelan 2007, p. 28.
30  Stephan 2012, pp. 137-138; Cf. Macculloch 2012 (pre-print version), p. 15.
31  Wardhaugh 2012b, p.1; See also Harding and Joshua, 2010 pp. 274-275.
32  Whelan 2007 p. 29.
33  Whelan 2007, p. 30.
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Harding has argued for example that a criminalization of cartels would 
require an authentic feeling of delinquency to be successful.34 He points out 
that it seems that the movement to criminalize cartels is more of a product 
of aspirations of the regulators than that of public perceptions of cartels as 
so reprehensible that they merit criminal sanctions. As Harding points out 
however, it is far from unheard of that the public opinion is influenced by 
the legal opinion and ‘especially in relatively technical areas of conduct, and 
to this extent public opinion may need to be formed by expert opinion.’35 
In the cartel context this may be all the more so since the UK survey showed 
that education of the respondents did not correlate with severe attitudes 
towards cartels. This could mean that people who follow the news and are 
well informed still lack the knowledge of the sinister nature that cartels have 
and do not receive sufficient information from the media that they follow.36 
While exploring the case to criminalize cartels Harding points to the 
notion of crime that ‘is about conduct as much as harm’. Considering this 
it is interesting to note that the US approach is to target conspiracy and 
the attitudes of the cartelists rather than the economic effects of cartels and 
that the US model provides ‘the convincing justification for using criminal 
law’.37
The moral reprehensibility of cartels is arguably on par with tax fraud, 
insider trading and intellectual property offences. Such conduct is mostly 
criminally prohibited in the Western countries. Thus one may point to the 
principle that like cases should be treated alike and unlike cases differently.38 
In this respect it seems relevant that the EU Commission has recently made 
a proposal to introduce minimum criminal law rules for market abuses.39
The principle of fair labeling should inform the legislature of how to 
grade various wrongdoings based on how they are commonly perceived. 
The sanction should reflect the graveness of the violation, meaning that 
sanctions should be proportionate. The law’s educative function is furthered 
by the proportionate sanctions that the principle of fair labeling supports.40 
As Stuart Green points out, the principle of fair labeling should be taken 
34  Harding 2006, p. 181.
35  Harding 2006 p. 200.
36  Stephan 2008a, p. 144.
37  Harding 2006, p. 200.
38  Matikkala 2009, p. 278; See also Whelan 2007, p. 28.
39  COM (2011) 654 final; The market abuse Regulation No 596/2014 and the 
Directive 2014/57EU regarding the criminalization of market abuse appeared 
in the EU Official Journal and the regulation will enter into force in July 2016, 
the directive has a 2-year implementation phase. To this effect see Daily News of 
2014-06-12, European Commission – 12/06/2014; Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on insider dealing and market manipulation 
(market abuse), Brussels, 20.10.2011. COM(2011) 651 final.
40  Ashworth 2009, p. 78. 
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into account also when considering of criminalizing a given conduct.41 As 
Stuart Green puts it ‘when legal rules fail to square with people’s common 
understanding of what is wrong, the result is unfair labeling.’42
Whelan acknowledges that if there is a large gap between the views of 
the public and what criminal law condemns it could bring about a ‘problem 
of resistance’. If however there is public support for criminal sanctions 
adopting them could save resources as a result of ‘an internalization of the 
moral norm’.43 It follows that the envisaged cartel offence should not be 
devoid of moral content, even if the main rationale behind criminalizing 
cartel conduct would boil down to the deterrence theory.44
The 2006 committee noted that from a perspective of fairness and 
proportionality criminal sanctions against cartels are called for since 
comparable offences such as tax fraud attract criminal sanctions. Moreover 
the 2006 committee acknowledged the criminal label is the strongest 
message that the state can send regarding the conduct that is not tolerated. 
Such argumentation is drawn from a call for a coherent proportionate and 
fair criminal justice system that takes note of the penal value of the offence 
and treats comparable offences alike. 45 The 2006 committee however took 
the position that the gravity of the offence was not sufficient to require the 
introduction of criminal law regime.46 
More recently the Danish 2012 committee pointed out that the cartel 
offence falls within the category of white-collar offences. Other white-
collar offences, the committee noted include inter alia insider trading, 
tax fraud, the copyright infringements that attract prison sentences. The 
prison sentences have also been enforced in practice, while the maximum 
prison terms may be up to 8 years. Yet the harm caused by cartels is at least 
equivalent to the harm derived from the aforementioned offences, while the 
sanctions that the cartelists are subject to are much more lenient.47 Nine 
committee members argued that the coherence of sanctions in the area of 
serious white-collar crimes calls for custodial sanctions.48
In a similar fashion in Norway in the course of the revision leading to 
the introduction of the Competition Act of 2004, the Ministry had argued 
in favor of retaining criminal enforcement in parallel with the administrative 
one, due to grave character of competition law infringements or else the 
41  Green 2006, p. 42.
42  Green 2006, p. 42.
43  Whelan 2013a, p. 8.
44  Whelan 2013a, pp. 8-9.
45  SOU 2006:99 p. 561.
46  SOU 2006:99 p. 563.
47  ’Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 35.
48  ’Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 39.
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penal value of competition law infringements could be perceived to be of a 
more lenient sort than other serious white-collar offences. 49 
Indeed the Australian Cartel Project findings indicated that those who 
thought that cartel conduct should attract criminal sanctions mostly saw the 
conduct on par in terms of seriousness with many other offences, including 
insider trading, tax evasion, theft and fraud. In contrast offences concerning 
an injury or a threat to physical health were perceived to be more severe.50
Matikkala has pointed out in the Finnish context that the legal values 
that merit protection are the market force and healthy competition and that 
the overall impression is that the criminal law protects several other interests 
that are comparable in nature. After all antitrust practices harm both directly 
and indirectly individuals and fellow competitors outside the cartel. Also 
the core structure of our society, namely the market economy is eroded he 
said.51 Pöyhönen has argued that an implied right of workable markets 
that strives for the collective good exists. Arguably the ever-increasing role 
of the market economy underscores this right. The market participants by 
entering the markets assume the obligation to act in the interests of the 
workable markets. 52 Indeed cartels challenge the prevailing economic mode 
and have therefore been dubbed as “cancers on the open market economy” 
by Mario Monti.53
While Connor et al. point out that criminal cartel prosecutions have a 
long history explaining that criminalizing cartels is not a new phenomenon 
as prohibitions of anticompetitive practices have been around since the 
ancient times,54 it may also be pointed out that when the trade was not 
liberalized to the extent that it is today, the prevention of cartels might not 
have seemed as important as today when the benefits that the free trade 
brings are destroyed by cartels.  The defiance of this whole system, according 
to Harding and Joshua, seems to be the most delinquent part of cartels, 
rather than the harm that the consumers incur, thus making the analogy 
between environmental offences better than between the traditional property 
offences. The cartelists collude to evade the legal prohibition, and especially 
the collusion shows the disagreeable sense of their conduct.55 Thus Harding 
and Joshua argue that the Sherman Act, which targets cartel conduct as 
49  Prop. 75 L (2012-2013) Proposisjon til Sortinget (forslag til lovvedtak) Endringer 
i konkurranseloven, see Chapter 4, at para. 4.1.2.; Regarding the more recent 
Norwegian revision of competition laws, see the Amendment to the Competition Act 
that was adopted by the Norwegian Parliament on 28th of May, 2013.
50  Beaton-Wells and Parker 2012, p. 18.
51  Matikkala 2009a p. 276.
52  Pöyhönen 2003, pp. 82-83.
53  Monti 2000.
54  Connor, Foer and Udwin 2010, p. 205; Also Stucke has pointed out that attaining 
material gain unfairly at the expense of others has been censored for long, Stucke 
2006, p. 498.
55  Harding and Joshua 2010, pp. 274-275.
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conspiracy rather than something similar to theft is a better definition for 
the offence to capture the delinquency of cartels.56 
Further cartel behaviour may also be seen as delinquent, because a 
possible significant economic power of a company is used to exercise the 
private power over other private and public interests.57 As Amaton Guiliano 
has eloquently put it, in a democracy, power should be based on law, and 
the owners of a firm only should enjoy certain privileges that however do 
not extend the power over other people unless consent has been obtained 
from the people concerned. Competition law then seeks to address this issue, 
on the one hand so that private power, which is not legitimated through 
the democratic process, would not form a threat to other essential freedom 
rights of a democracy and on the other hand in a way that the public power 
does not become too far-reaching.58 
Harding and Joshua argue however that for the purposes of a criminal 
offence, something more practical may be needed: coercion for example 
manifests in a more concrete way the abusive nature of the private power. 
The other way that large firms may abuse their power is the deceptive tactics 
that they use to conceal the cartel.59
The Moral Content of Breaking the Law
Most crimes may be classified either as mala in se or mala prohibitum 
depending on the perceptions of the society.60 The immorality of a behavior 
characterized as mala prohibitum can be found in the fact that the actor 
defies the letter of law by not following it.61
It has been thought that people do not commit the mala prohibita 
crimes only due to the possibility of sanctions whereas what restrains people 
from engaging in criminal activities concerning the mala in se crimes is the 
internally entertained morality.62 More recently studies suggest somewhat 
divergent views from the foregoing, emphasizing things such as personal 
morality as the key determinants in how to disincentivize criminal conduct 
– this then would not respect the presumed dividing lines between the mala 
in se and mala prohibita crimes. 63 
Green indicates that also with respect to the mala prohibita crimes 
that actually breaking law itself carries important moral weight and moral 
wrongfulness and thus rejecting the proposition that the element of 
56  Harding and Joshua 2010, pp. 276-277.
57  Harding and Joshua 2010, p. 275.
58  Amato 1997, pp. 3-4.
59  Harding and Joshua 2010 p. 276.
60  Green 2006, p. 120 footnote 33.
61  Green 2006, p. 120.
62  Ibid. p. 121 footnote 36.
63  Green 2006. pp. 121-122 footnote 36; See Tyler 1990, p. 68.
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immorality is missing.64 This may be worth noting while taking stock of 
the arguments against a possible cartel criminalization project.
3.2.1 The Length of the Prison Sentence: A Comparative   
 Outlook
Under the Canadian anti-cartel enforcement regime the range of penalties 
include a maximum sentence of 14 years’ incarceration, while prior to 
the amendment the maximum sentence was a 5-year term.  This is one of 
the toughest sanctions available across jurisdictions. Until the Canadian 
amendment the US maximum prison sentence of 10 years had been the 
harshest. As has been noted this may in part enhance the ability of the 
prosecutors to induce guilty pleas. Also the individual fines became more 
substantial, with a maximum of 25 million Canadian dollars per count.65 
What may be said is that while an assault attracts a maximum sentence of 
5 years in prison, an assault using a weapon a maximum 10-year term and 
torture a maximum of 14 years in prison, thus making it obvious that the 
cartel offence is treated as a very serious offence.66 Low QC and Halladay 
point out therefore that the treatment of conspiracy is far removed from so 
called the ‘regulatory offences’ – yet previously the cartel offence also could 
have been classified as a regulatory offence in Canada.67
In the UK the Hammond and Penrose report had recommended a 
maximum 5-year term in prison, since a lesser sentence would not display 
the seriousness of the offence, and in order to be an arrestable offence, a 
maximum sentence of 5 years had to be available.68 
9 Danish committee members took the position regarding the length 
of the prison sentence, especially due to the harm caused, that the prison 
term should be up to 1,5 years prescribed in the Competition Act. When 
‘particularly aggravating circumstances’ prevail individuals could be jailed 
up to 6 years.69 During the parliament hearing, it was put forward by 
the Minister that if an individual committed several infringements the 
maximum prison sentence could be 9 years.70 
64  Green 2006 pp. 121-122.
65  Low QC and Halladay 2011, under the heading ’C. New Penalties and the Law of 
Unintended Consequences’ at para 1.
66  Low QC and Halladay 2011, under the heading ’C. New Penalties and the Law of 
Unintended Consequences’ at para 2.
67  Low QC and Halladay 2011, under the heading ’C. New Penalties and the Law of 
Unintended Consequences’ at para 2.
68  Hammond and Penrose Report 2001 at para 1.22
69  Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 47; See also 
Dittmer and Meyer 2013, p. 1.
70  Folketingstidende B, Betænkning, over Forslag til lov om ændring af 
konkurrenceloven og straffeloven, Betænkning afgivet af Erhvervs-, Vækst- og 
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The Danish white-collar prosecutor, Hans Jakob Folker, who will take 
on the criminal cartel cases in Denmark commended the new legislation as 
more fitting and presumed that the dividing line between custodial sanctions 
and fines, and the harsher (up to 6 years) and more lenient custodial sanction 
(1 year and 6 months), would be set up once a handful of cases have reached 
the courts. 71
In Sweden the 2004 committee pointed out that the property crimes 
in Sweden attract for trifling offences fines or a term of 6 months in prison, 
in case of an offence of normal degree the maximum prison term may be 2 
years, and for grave offences the prison term may vary between 6 months and 
6 years. As the committee pointed out the whole idea about criminalizing 
cartel conduct is that administrative sanctions are not adequate. The 
committee was instructed to concentrate on the most serious infringements 
and therefore violations whose penal value attracts fines should be excluded 
from the scope of the criminal offence. The criminal prohibition should be 
designed in a way according to the Swedish 2004 committee that it only 
attracts prison sentences. A cartel offence of normal gravity should attract 
a maximum prison term of 2 years while a grave offence could attract a 
minimum prison term of 6 months and a maximum prison term of 6 years 
the committee envisaged.72
The Swedish 2006 committee however argued that the envisaged 
custodial sanction, which would usually not exceed two years, would mean 
in the Swedish context that sentences would not necessarily be unsuspended 
prison sentences. Therefore the committee postulated that in order for the 
custodial sanction to emerge as the customary penalty to be prompted by 
the cartel offence, the scale of penalties should be increased to an extent 
that would not be consistent with other comparable offences.73
Notably in Ireland the maximum prison sentence has been recently 
increased up to 10 years. Whelan points out that the increase in the length 
of the prison sentence may send a message to the trial judges that cartels 
should attract prison sentences.74 As Whelan says it is noteworthy that only 
hard-core cartels give rise to prison sentences in Ireland.75
Eksportudvalget den 6. december 2012, Til lovforslag nr. L 41. p. 2; Dittmer and 
Meyer 2013 p. 1.
71 Gitte Holtsø’s Interview with the Public Prosecutor for Serious White-Collar Crime, 
Hans Jacob Folker 2012; See also Dittmer Martin André and Meyer Michael, ‘Material 
amendments to the Danish Competition Act passed by the Danish Parliament’ Newsletter 
– EU & Competition, February 2013. At Slide 2.
72  SOU 2004:131 pp. 194-195.
73  SOU 2006:99 p. 566.
74  The increased sanctions followed an IMF bailout package that required reinforced 
competition law enforcement, see Whelan 2012d. p. 175.
75  See Whelan 2012d, p. 177.
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The amended Irish Competition Act had the objective of especially 
countering white-collar crime and reinforcing the fight against hard-core 
cartels, and the Minister particularly said that the cartel members would 
thereby receive a message regarding the severe nature of the violation.76 
It may be noted that previously the level of fines may seem meager in 
Ireland in light of the EU practice since Furse reported a fine in the order 
of €80.000 (in the Duffy case) being the maximum fine that had been 
imposed in Ireland.77
One point of interest is that the Competition Amendment Act 2012 
sets out in section 2(h) that a convicted person who is guilty of the offence, 
may be ordered by the court to fully compensate the competition Authority 
the costs that the investigations, detection and prosecution gave rise to, it 
is in the discretion of the court to omit to do so if ‘there are special and 
substantial reasons’.78 
Massey has been critical of the increase of the maximum prison terms in 
Ireland, pointing towards the argument that relatively short prison sentences 
create a sufficient deterrent effect, since we are dealing with white-collar 
offenders. The Irish problem in his view boils down to a lack of adequate 
enforcement, and not penalties biting enough. ‘Lengthy sentences obviously 
involve greatly increased costs to the State (of incarcerating such individuals 
for lengthy periods) with little extra benefit.’79 As Whelan notes since the 
introduction of prison sentences for competition law offences in 1996, 
there remains to be a case where one individual actually is incarcerated. 
One individual has been incarcerated however in response to his omission 
to pay the competition law fines he was subject to. Therefore in terms of 
deterrence actually imposing unsuspended prison sentences seems vital in 
the Irish context. Whether it pays off to increase the level of maximum 
prison terms in Ireland thus heavily relates to its actual impact on the 
enforcement rate – it is possible as Whelan points out that the increase in 
the length of the prison sentences may send a message to the trial judges 
76  ’Maximum prison sentence for competition offences doubled to ten years – Minister 
Bruton’, Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, on the 3rd of July, 2012; 
See also Whelan 2012d. 
77  Furse 2012 p. 176-178; See also Galbreath 2010, p. 4; Furthermore with respect 
to Ireland, the Competition Amendment Act 2012 brought about changes in terms 
of the severity of sanctions. As per Section 2(b)(i)both the corporate fines and 
individual fines prompted by hard-core cartels now have an increased maximum: 
upon conviction of an indictable offence the fine may be up to €5,000,000 instead 
of the previous €4,000,000, and individuals may face a prison sentence up to 10 
years as per section 2(b)(ii). What is more, as Whelan noted that while prior to 
the Amendment the DDOs could only be imposed against persons convicted on 
indictment, now the DDOs may be prompted upon summary convictions as well. 
The change is brought about by the Section 9 of the 2012 Act, amending the section 
160 of the Companies Act 1990. See Whelan 2012d, pp. 177-178.
78  See Whelan 2012d, p. 178.
79  Massey 2012, p. 170.
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that cartels should attract unsuspended prison sentences and regarding the 
availability of DDOs in case of summary convictions.80
Whelan argued in favour of the maximum 10-year sentence that was 
adopted in Ireland, and said that naturally such sentences would target only 
the most egregious violations, where the cartelists may have resorted to 
brutal measures.81 Whelan predicted that if adequate resources are available 
in Ireland enforcement may be improved and referred also to the ‘25% 
increase in the staff numbers of the Competition Authority’. 82 
Finally, it seems that there is some merit to the argument that the 
availability of lengthier custodial sanctions may be useful in prodding judges 
into awarding unsuspended prison sentences.83 
3.3  PRICE-FIXING AND THE EVERYDAY MORAL 
STANDARDS
Stuart Green has suggested that the white-collar crimes could in general be 
examined from the perspective of everyday moral norms. Price-fixing can 
be determined under his approach to be equivalent to a violation of the 
prevailing moral norms against cheating,84 deceiving and stealing. Stealing 
may be perceived to be a mala in se violation, something that would be 
perceived wrong even in the absence of a statutory prohibition.85 Instead 
of concentrating on rights-based approach (when someone’s interests are 
80  Whelan 2012d, p. 178.
81  Whelan 2012d, p. 180.
82  ’Maximum prison sentence for competition offences doubled to ten years – Minister 
Bruton’, Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, on the 3rd of July, 2012; 
Whelan 2012d, p. 6.
83  In terms of tax fraud offences, mostly suspended prison sentences have been awarded 
in Finland, see Oikarinen 2012, p. 761.
84  Green 2006, p. 60.
85  See Green 2006. pp. 55-56 and p. 88ff. ; Beaton-Wells Caron 2007, p. 698; 
Deception could be deemed to be particularly conspicuous in bid-rigging cartels: 
the tenderers intend to convey the misleading message that the tenders where made 
independently which is a false message See Beaton-Wells 2007 p. 700; Macculloch 
2012 (pre-print version), p. 12; Perhaps tellingly bid-rigging is in Germany and 
Austria the only antitrust infringement to attract criminal law penalties, see Dawes 
and Lynskey 2008, p. 153; Harding 2010, p. 48; See the Irish Case D.P.P. V Duffy 
& Anor, [2009] IEHC 208, where the judge says of cartels inter alia that ’They are 
offensive and abhorrent, not simply because they are malum prohibitum, but also 
because they are malum in se.’ At para. 22.; According to Stuart Green viewing 
stealing merely as law-breaking would not sufficiently account for what is wrong 
about it. It would reduce it to the malum prohibitum category. Green 2006, p. 89.
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violated) Green elaborates on wrongfulness from the perspective of everyday 
norms.86 
One point of consideration is how the definition of the cartel offence 
could be devised in order to catch the level of blameworthiness that is usual 
for criminally prohibited conduct87 and as Beaton-Wells notes that under 
Green’s approach price-fixing may be perceived to be ‘implicitly wrongful’, 
thus no further support for its wrongfulness is needed. 88 Arguably this 
could have the effect that there would no longer be a need to include a 
mental element to the cartel offence, such as dishonesty.89 Beaton-Wells 
has pointed out that, cartels usually are the result of dishonesty, and the 
cartel members intend to achieve an advantage at a cost to the customers 
and rivals. Therefore incorporating dishonesty in the design of the offence 
might not help in the pursuit of separating conduct that should attract an 
administrative sanction from conduct that should be subject to a criminal 
penalty. It seems the moral reprehensibility of cartels should be signalled, 
but this should take place outside the definition of the cartel offence.90 
To warrant a criminalization, at least moral wrongfulness, culpability 
and harmfulness should all be present under Green’s approach. Harmfulness 
as the sole underpinning of a criminalization in Green’s view is not sufficient, 
the conduct in question should also be morally wrongful.91 One may 
differentiate between culpability and wrongfulness in that if the offender 
may resort to the insanity excuse for example, the act may be wrongful, 
while the issue of culpability does not arise.92 The moral wrongfulness and 
harmfulness do not have to coincide either, lying, for example, while on 
the face of it is wrongful may not cause necessarily harm.93  
Green’s approach is non-consequentialist, whereby the results of an 
act are not central, but the infringement of a moral norm is.94 Moral 
wrongfulness, Green describes, is the infringement of a moral norm via a 
criminal act.95 It is precisely the infringement of the ‘free-standing moral 
rule’ wherefrom the wrongfulness may be derived, and not the results that 
the act causes.96
Under Green’s framework ‘culpability’ mirrors the blameworthiness of 
the conduct of the perpetrator. Instead of reflecting the results of the act 
86  Green 2006 p. 45.
87  Beaton-Wells 2007, p. 676
88  Beaton-Wells 2007, p. 698.
89  Beaton-Wells 2007 p. 698.
90  Beaton-Wells 2007 p. 703.
91  Green 2006 p. 44 and Beaton-Wells 2007 p. 678.
92  Green 1997 p. 1552.
93  Green 1997 p. 1552; See also Beaton-Wells 2007 p. 694.
94  Green 2006 p. 39.
95  Green 2006 p. 39.
96  Green 2006 p. 39; Beaton-Wells 2007 p. 694.
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or the act itself, culpability is centred on the actor.97  Green notes that with 
regard to regulatory offences, the removal or lowering of the mens rea has 
become ordinary, despite the fact that many see this as incongruent with 
the moral aspect that pertains to the criminal law.98 
Green refers to harmfulness under his framework as something that 
indicates the extent to which the criminal deed brings about harm.99 The 
harm is something that violates someone’s interests pronouncedly or on 
an enduring basis.100 Besides the harm to individuals, a ‘criminal harm’ 
may refer to the collective interests of the society, such as ‘fair and efficient 
markets’.101 While culpability is more pronouncedly related to the actor, 
harm on the other hand has a connection to the results of the act. As 
Green points out, an act may have harmful results, while the wrongfulness 
is absent.102 
With these basic premises in mind, the moral content of hard-core 
cartels is further explored below drawing on the everyday moral norms as 
explained by Green.
3.3.1 Hard-core Cartels as Stealing
Green says that ‘the norm against stealing does have an independent moral 
significance, which is neither wholly derivative of law nor wholly reducible 
to other moral norms.’103 According to Stuart Green viewing stealing merely 
as law breaking would not sufficiently account for what is wrong about it. 
It would reduce it to the malum prohibitum category.104 Beaton-Wells has 
pointed out that the concept of stealing under Green’s framework seems to 
be applicable to the cartel overcharge that is extracted from the customers as 
a result of the cartel. It is clear that the cartel members intentionally sought 
to take the money away from the customers, who have the legitimate interest 
in the money. 105 She points out that ‘what is stolen is the amount that is 
paid constituting the margin between the competitive price (that is, the price 
97  Green 1997. p. 1548; See also Beaton-Wells 2007 p. 683 ff.
98  Green 1997 p. 1548.
99  Green 2006 p. 34.
100  Green 2006 p. 34.
101  Green 1997 p. 1550; Beaton-Wells 2007 p. 689.
102  Green 1997 p. 1549.
103  Green 2006 p. 88.
104  Green 2006. p. 89.
105  Beaton-Wells 2007, pp. 700-701.
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that would have prevailed absent the cartel) and the cartel price.’106 Thus one 
could argue that the analogy between theft and a cartel appears accurate.
Harding has however pointed to the difference between theft and price-
fixing, noting that consumers do not feel the damage as directly as is the 
case with many other thefts.107 
Ultimately as Whelan argues, what may be crucial is whether the public 
considers the infringement inherently wrongful after it has been informed 
on the infringement’s nature.108 
Whelan points out that, ‘Green argues that the right of ownership does 
not necessarily owe its existence to the law; rather, it can have a non-legal 
character: stealing is “in some fundamental way pre-legal”. Consequently, one 
could argue that, irrespective of their legal rights, consumers are nonetheless 
entitled to a competitive price for the goods/serves on the market; that for, 
example, due to the endorsement of free market economics by European 
citizens, consumers have a right to a competitive market.’ However, it seems 
that this interpretation is open to challenge since it is difficult to say when 
exactly and in what way the consumers became entitled to the overcharge. 109 
Whelan makes the point that whether cartel conduct may be viewed 
as stealing depends also on whether the consumer welfare or total welfare 
standard is chosen. The total welfare standard regards wealth transfers from 
customers to the manufacturers as welfare-neutral. 110 Therefore, while the 
cartel overcharge may infringe the ownership rights of the consumer, this is 
not important from the perspective of the total welfare standards. Whelan 
notes that by adopting the consumer welfare standard the stealing argument 
regarding cartel conduct becomes more robust, since then the overprice 
most clearly belongs to the consumers.111 
106  Beaton-Wells 2007, p. 700.
107  Harding 2010, pp. 51-52.
108 As Whelan notes, the public may need education on the matter prior to the 
criminalization, see Whelan 2007, p.  20
109  Whelan however suggests that consumers’ right to ‘to a competitive market’ could 
possibly be derived under EU law from Article 101(3) TFEU, which exempts an 
agreement prohibited by art. 101(1) TFEU if the consumers get ‘a fair share of the 
resulting benefit’, Whelan 2013a, p. 10, see also footnote 68.
110  Whelan 2013a, p. 11.
111  Whelan 2013a, p. 12; Whelan referred to Majumdar who explains that the 
consumer welfare standard makes firms opt for the strategies that are most 
commercially viable but still do not injure consumers. As opposed to that the total 
welfare standard makes it possible for the firms to pursue an avenue which would 
appear to be the most lucrative from the firms’ perspective, but which would also 
seriously injure consumers, ‘…the very high profits just offset the loss to consumers’, 
while the ‘overall total welfare may hardly increase at all.’ Whelan 2013 p. 12; see 
also Majumdar 2008, p. 145; Whelan argues that in light of the foregoing the 
consumer welfare standard should be opted for, ‘even absent an express political 
judgement on the desirability of consumer-producer wealth tranfers.’ Simultaneously 
the view that cartel conduct equals stealing becomes more robust See Whelan 2013 
p. 13. 
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On another note, Whelan said that while the cartel member obtains the 
surcharge there is a violation of the consumer’s property rights, but crucially 
if the cartel agreement is never implemented there would be no ‘fundamental 
violation,’ since the customers’ ownership rights would not be infringed. 
There would only be an agreement regarding such an infringement. Thus 
in terms of the possible design of a cartel offence, the definitional elements 
designed to catch ‘stealing’ ought not to cover agreements that were never 
implemented. 112 
What is more, for cartel conduct to fall under the concept of ‘stealing’ 
the cartelist should have the intent to extract the surcharge.113 
Criminal law separates direct and indirect intentions. Whelan referring 
to Simester et al. explains how intention is widely seen in criminal law: direct 
intention refers to a perpetrator who either seeks to cause a given effect or 
thinks that a main objective may be reached only via causing the effect. 
Whelan further points out that it is recognized that while the perpetrator is 
pursuing a given objective by causing a certain effect the latter is considered 
‘an intentional act in its own right’. As opposed to that the indirect intention 
refers to a perpetrator who thinks the effect is the nearly unquestionable 
effect of his deed, while the effect may not have been the final goal and not 
a method of reaching the goal.114
Whelan notes that there is not a lot empirical evidence available 
regarding the intentions entertained by cartel members. In terms of the 
optimal deterrence theory cartelists are however expected to be rational 
profit-maximisers. But as he points out this supposition may be questioned. 
He referred for instance to Parker who has indicated that cartels are not 
exclusively motivated by greed and profit-maximisation, but also by ‘social 
and emotional (not just financial) rewards, and indirect (rather than direct) 
financial rewards, such as promotions and bonuses.’115 Yet as Whelan points 
out the empirical evidence may not categorically contradict the theory of 
cartelists being rational actors and does not have to undercut the suppositions 
made by the optimal deterrence theory. As he says while cartelists may 
even have well-meaning intentions such as avoiding redundancies, reaching 
the well-meaning objective requires the extraction of the overcharge – the 
objective, the cartelist believes, can be achieved only via cartel conduct.116 
Importantly Whelan notes that while the perpetrator may have numerous 
intentions in the pursuit of a specific goal, what matters is whether the 
actus reus was intended.117 
112  Whelan 2013a, p. 13.
113  Whelan 2013a, p. 13.
114  Whelan 2013a, p. 14; See Simester and Sullivan 2007, pp. 131-132.
115  Parker 2011, under the heading ’D. Attraction of Cartel Conduct is Not Always 
Pure Greed’ at para 1.
116  Whelan 2013a, p. 15.
117  Whelan 2013a, p. 14.
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In contrast regarding indirect intention which requires that the 
perpetrator regarded the effects of his actions as ‘virtually certain’, Whelan 
noted that while the agreement between the competitors is only entered, 
it is not ‘virtually certain’ that ultimately consumers will suffer, since the 
cartelist may be induced to deceive the cartel itself by cutting prices, as this 
way it may attract more customers. The result is that the cartel agreement did 
not reach the stage of implementation.118 On the other hand implemented 
cartel agreements in terms of intentions would fall under the concept of 
stealing due to the ‘virtually certain result.’119
3.3.2 Hard-core Cartels as Cheating 
Green defines cheating as follows: ‘…for us to say that X has cheated, X 
must (1) violate a fair and fairly enforced rule, (2) with the intent to obtain 
an advantage over a party with whom she is in a cooperative, rule-bound 
relationship.’120 The cheater gets to cheat and achieve an unfair advantage 
over others because the rule-abiding people perceive themselves to be morally 
tied to the mandatory rule.121 The moral standard against cheating would be 
violated, as Beaton-Wells argues, where companies fix prices, as in a market 
economy companies are expected to act separately from each other.122
Green has specified the character of the rule that is infringed under his 
approach: the rules should be inter alia general, as opposed to a situation 
where they apply only to a particular case, the rule ought to be prescriptive 
rather than descriptive, mandatory instead of optional and fair.123 As Beaton-
Wells argues the rule that companies act independently is a rule that would 
fall under Green’s aforementioned characterization of the rule.124 Whelan 
too has pointed out in his analysis of ‘cheating’ in the cartel context, that 
cartel conduct may be conceptualized as cheating. The cartel prohibition is 
prescriptive, since it dictates the conduct of the market participants instead 
of characterizing how market participants behave. The rule is mandatory 
in that it prohibits cartel conduct instead of giving recommendations.125 
Since inter alia cartels cause considerable harm and the chances that 
efficiencies would be found are very remote, it can be said that it does not 
118  Whelan 2013a,  2013 pp. 15-16.
119  Whelan 2013a, p. 16.
120  Green 2006 p. 57.
121  Green 2006 p. 60.
122  See Green 2006 pp. 58- 63; Beaton-Wells 2007 p. 699.
123  See Green 2006 pp. 58- 63; Beaton-Wells 2007 p. 699.
124  Beaton-Wells 2007 p. 699.
125  Whelan 2013a, pp. 21-22.
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appear to pose problems to say that the cartel prohibition falls within the 
tenet that the rule be fair.126 
Participating in the markets is beneficial for both the consumers and 
the companies. It could be argued that the parties have consented to refrain 
from certain acts and to be bound by certain rules in order to make the joint 
enterprise worthwhile. The interests of the parties may be diverging, as long 
as there is a potential benefit for both.127 Thus an obligation to follow the 
rules is created and so is the legitimate expectation that also others follow the 
rules.128 While becoming market participants there is the implied acceptance 
of being bound by the cartel prohibition. 129  
It is not necessary that the cheater is aware of the identity of her victim, 
but130 the violation of the rule should have taken place intentionally, in 
the pursuit of an advantage over others with whom the perpetrator is in 
a cooperative relationship governed by rules – the people obey the rules, 
thereby restricting their own freedom and in exchange expect benefits to 
accrue.131 
The victims of cheating in light of the foregoing are then most 
conspicuously the competitors of the perpetrator, but they could also be 
customers and suppliers as Beaton-Wells points out.132 
Whelan however singled out also final consumers, besides competitors 
and customers as the injured parties.133 Singling-out the advantage over the 
final consumer is hard, since cheating occurs under Green’s framework when 
the cartelist thinks that the consumer is obeying the cartel prohibition, while 
she herself seeks an advantage by ignoring the cartel prohibition, as Whelan 
notes however the final consumer intrinsically is not able to participate in 
cartel conduct. Whelan however takes the view that this may be a too strict 
interpretation. Under a broader interpretation arguably various market rules 
exist and the consumer may suppose that the seller has not engaged in cartel 
conduct and in return observes herself another rule, which Whelan points 
out could be refraining from lodging a complaint with the officials. In order 
to further illustrate his argument Whelan envisaged an exam situation where 
cheating could be said to be unfair not only with respect to others taking 
the same exam, but since other stakeholders with an interest are tricked too: 
for instance the examiner who on her part observes fairness rules. Thus one 
126  Whelan 2013a, p. 23.
127  Green 2006, p. 65.
128  Green 2006, p. 64.
129  Whelan 2013a, pp. 23-24.
130  Green 2006, p. 65.
131  Green 2006, pp. 65-66; Beaton-Wells 2007 p. 699.
132  Beaton-Wells 2007, p. 699.
133  Whelan 2013a, p. 23.
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could by analogy argue that the cartelist has also an unfair advantage over 
the final consumer.134
Cheating requires the intent to obtain the advantage over somebody. 
Whelan indicated that such advantages could be the cartel overcharge and 
perhaps more interestingly the freedom to engage in cartel conduct.135  The 
final goal of the cartel conduct may lie elsewhere (such as getting bonuses) 
but it could not be reached if there was not the intention to exercise ‘one’s 
freedom to engage in that cartel activity,’ thereby infringing the prohibition 
against cartel conduct. Whelan points out that the direct intention in 
relation to the goal reached via cartel conduct suggests that the cartelist 
had the direct intention to enter cartel conduct.  Subsequently the direct 
intentionality would not concern only cartel agreements that have been 
implemented, but extends to the instances where only a cartel agreement 
has been concluded, since this is required for any implementation to take 
place and thus the method to approach the final goal that may be the cartel 
profits. Thus, the definition of the cartel offence could be linked to cheating 
and would cover also the mere entering into a cartel agreement.136
Whelan notes that if rationality in the sense assumed by the optimal 
deterrence theory was proved, this would theoretically support a case to 
argue that the persons engaging in cartel activity intentionally infringe the 
moral norms discussed above and subsequently support the idea that from 
the perspective of retribution criminal sanctions are called for. However if 
cartelists were not rational the arguments based on deterrence and retribution 
would be undermined and showing the intentions for the purposes of the 
moral norms would become problematic. In order to surpass such a potential 
obstacle, Whelan said that it is possible to incorporate the fitting intentions 
into the offence in order to catch the morally unfair conduct, but this does 
not appear to be a desirable solution since the deterrent impact of the offence 
could suffer as a result of the increasing evidential burden.137
3.3.3 Hard-core Cartels as Deception
Besides cheating, price-fixing may under Green’s framework be conceived 
as deception as well: The price-fixers send the false message that they 
set the prices separately from each other, when the opposite is the case. 
This would give the wrong impression to the potential purchasers and 
competitors regarding the prices. In case of a bid-rigging cartel, the intended 
134  Whelan 2013a, p. 24.
135  Whelan 2013a, p. 25.
136  Whelan 2013a, p. 25.
137  Whelan 2013a, pp. 26-27.
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false message is that offers were made independently which means that the 
concept of deception appears to apply particularly well to bid rigging.138
Typically, the cartelist does not make the explicit statement that she 
has not entered a cartel. Despite the lack of such a statement Whelan said 
that there would be on part of the consumers an untrue belief due to the 
presumption that competition between rival market players prevails: since 
the cartelist puts her goods on the market this suggests that there is no cartel 
at work. Whelan however points out that a lack of empirical evidence exists 
regarding such an assumption made by the consumers. Whelan argued 
however that it could be inferred that consumers do indeed make such a 
presumption – the UK survey of people’s views on cartels indicated that 
that most people regarded cartels as ‘dishonest’ which in turn could mean 
that such views are prompted by the expectation that rival firms engage in 
competition. Furthermore, consumers may simply expect that the vendors 
are law-abiding, which however depends on the people’s knowledge of the 
illegality of cartels.139
The cartelist should act intentionally, something that the secrecy of the 
cartel may indicate although there is a lack of empirical evidence regarding 
the relevant intentions. However, in the absence of such evidence, one can 
draw on theoretical arguments when determining the intentions of the 
cartelist. The cartelist may engage in deception as a method of achieving the 
final goal of cartel profits. When the consumers are deceived into believing 
that there is no cartel, the cartelists seek inter alia to escape fines.140  
The argument of comparing cartels to deception is undermined by 
the requirement that the cartel agreement has to be implemented, since 
the untrue message involves a price with a mark-up. The customers should 
incorrectly assume that the price has been determined by competition, an 
assumption derived from the fact the goods are on the market. Thus the 
customers’ assumption can be incorrect only if the price has been subject 
to a mark-up. Subsequently Whelan points out that if the cartel offence 
is going to be connected to deception, from its ambit should be excluded 
agreements that never were implemented.141
3.3.4 Conclusion 
Cartels challenge the whole market based economy and the concept of 
cheating embodies the worry that cartel conduct ‘is wrong in that the act 
of making or implementing a cartel arrangement denies the marketplace 
138  Beaton-Wells 2007 pp. 699-700; Green 2006 p. 76.
139  Whelan 2013a, pp. 19-20; Stephan 2008a, p. 123. 
140  Whelan 2013a, p. 20.
141  Whelan 2013a, p. 21.
 43
of the legitimate expectation of a competitive process.’ Yet, as Macculloch 
has pointed out in terms of ‘traditional cartels’ the concept of cheating is 
problematic: ‘[i]t begs the questions of who is being cheated and where 
“the rules” are set out. A case can be made that markets are expected to be 
competitive in nature and therefore any attempt to avoid competition is 
cheating on that norm. However, if one needs to stretch the meaning of 
“cheating” that far, I can see no reason why it would not be better to clearly 
set out the limitation in a more natural use of words’.142
It seems that the concepts of deceiving and stealing would not cover 
cartel agreements that have not been implemented. Furthermore, Harding 
noted that ‘[i]t is the combination of conscious defiance and collusive action 
(or, put another way, heretic belief and trickery, in the sense of pretending 
to be good competitors but actually duping the system) which lies at the 
heart of cartel delinquency. In those terms Sherman Act definition of the 
offence, invoking the vocabulary of conspiracy, would seem to be closer to 
the mark than any attempt to draw upon the analogies of theft, fraud or 
dishonesty.’143 
All in all, it appears that the viability of the concepts of cheating, 
deceiving and stealing in the context of cartel activity is not beyond criticism. 
3.4 THE HARMFULNESS OF THE CONDUCT 
SUBJECT TO A CRIMINAL PROHIBITION
The general view is that criminalizations that seek to protect a person 
from harming himself should not be enacted.144  One may ask for example 
whether prostitution should be criminalized as it does not contain direct 
harm to other people and could be characterized as a victimless behavior, 
but could still be claimed to be immoral.145 
Moral wrongfulness and harmfulness do not always coincide: For 
example natural disasters may cause immense harm, but moral wrongfulness 
is absent. Distinguishing between the harm that is the result of a lawful 
conduct from what is unlawful is not necessarily easy: as Green has pointed 
out intense lawful competition may have the same consequences as unlawful 
142  Macculloch 2012, pp. 87-88; Stucke argued that [o]ften the antitrust crimes’ 
defilement originates from within, namely borne out of the executives’ hearts to 
deceive, steal, and cheat’, see Stucke 2006, p. 494; Connor et al. maintained that 
‘[t]he criminalization of cartel behavior has a long history that reflects the universal 
moral reprobation of secret conspiracy, theft, deception, extortion and fraud’, 
Connor, Foer and Udwin 2010, p. 217.
143  Harding 2010, p. 58.
144  See Huomo-Kettunen 2011, p. 38.
145  Green 2006, p. 43.
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price-fixing in the sense that jobs or market shares are lost.146 Assuming that 
the competition has not been restrained by unlawful means, such harms are 
not considered morally wrongful though.147 Kahan has said that ‘economic 
competition may impoverish a merchant every bit as much as theft. The 
reason that theft but not competition is viewed as wrongful, on this account, 
is that against the background of social norms theft expresses disrespect for 
the injured party’s moral worth whereas competition (at least ordinarily) 
does not.’148 Indeed one way of looking at wrongfulness is whether the 
victim’s value is somehow undermined, or whether his rights are violated.149 
A criminalization should not be based on the moral perceptions that 
inevitably are subjective. There are for example those who would readily 
criminalize adultery, but arguably this is not what a liberal society should 
do.150 Criminalizing adultery is in a stark contrast with more liberal views 
and the position of John Stuart Mill, who famously argued the following: 
‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. 
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better 
for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions 
of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.’151 In sum, it may be argued 
that the requirement of both wrongfulness and harmfulness ensures that 
private matters are not criminalized.152
Whelan points out that the criminal law should especially prohibit 
conduct that is very harmful. Therefore if something is to be criminalized, 
one should first show that the conduct is harmful. On the other hand the 
perceived wrongfulness of a certain conduct increases the support for a 
criminalization, and therefore where certain conduct is not regarded as 
wrongful, but is criminalized nonetheless, the public perception of the 
criminal law could suffer. The moral wrongfulness of a conduct however 
is not the necessary condition of a criminal prohibition and as previously 
mentioned what is important is how the public views the conduct once it 
has been informed of its nature.153 And when the immorality is manifest, 
also the politicians may be more inclined to act on the matter and introduce 
a criminal prohibition.154
146  Green 2006, p. 40.
147  A Marxist might disagree, as indicated by Green, see Green 2006, p. 40.
148  Kahan 1999, p. 420. 
149  Green 2006 p. 41
150  See Frände 2005, p. 24.
151  Mill 1859, ch 1, para. 9.
152  Green 2006 pp. 44-45
153  Whelan 2007 p. 20
154  Whelan 2007 p. 21
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While cartels are widely prohibited, the question remains according 
to Harding and Joshua whether the cartels merit criminal sanctions or are 
they perhaps just something that the regulators desire. The harm that results 
from cartels economically is clear: consumer products that are subject to 
price-fixing are subject to at least a 10 % markup. According to the OECD, 
under a conservative estimate, the harm stemming from cartels is more than 
billions of dollars per annum.155 Beaton-Wells notes however the difficulty of 
measuring the harm caused by cartels and singling out the injured parties is 
not easy.156 This is a common feature of the so-called white-collar conduct.157 
One argument which could be made that while cartel are harmful they are 
doomed to collapse anyway and subsequently ‘over-enforcement should be 
avoided as being inefficient,’ has been rejected for instance by Furse. He 
notes that ‘real world’ experience indicates otherwise.158
Furthermore the cartel harm may feel remote, because it is spread out 
between the consumers – this way the analogy with traditional property 
offences such as theft may not be the most accurate one. Harding and Joshua 
argue that the reprehensibility of cartels arguably exists rather at the macro-
level than at the micro-level.159
The London Economics had produced an analysis for the Danish 2012 
committee regarding the relative harmfulness of cartels when compared 
with other white-collar crimes. Both the direct harm to the victim and the 
indirect harm to the whole financial system were assessed. It was inter alia 
noted that the direct harm brought about by tax evasion (characteristically 
that not all income is reported) is of a smaller scale than that caused by 
cartels. The direct harm associated with insider trading is the smallest due 
to the substantial amount of possible investors that might be influenced.160
While the indirect harm is more difficult to estimate due to the large 
amount of people affected who due to the dispersed nature of the harm 
may experience it as quite small, the London Economics estimated that 
tax evasion has the gravest indirect implications for the financial system. 
The indirect implications of cartels were estimated however relatively 
speaking significant and are for instance greater than those of a copyright 
infringement.161 
In sum, the cartel harm is real and considerable, and clearly can be 
said to satisfy the criterion of harmfulness that may be required to warrant 
a criminalization.
155  OECD DAFFE/COMP(2002)7 9 of April 2002, p. 2, 5.
156  Beaton-Wells 2007 p. 689
157  Green 2006 pp. 35-36
158  Furse 2012 p. 21
159  Harding and Joshua 2010, pp. 272-274.
160  ’Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012. p. 196.
161  ibid. p. 197
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3.5 HARD-CORE CARTELS AND THE AMBIGUITY 
OF THE MORAL CONTENT: THE PERCEPTIONS 
OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC 
More than in other areas, in the field of white-collar crime there seems to 
be ambiguity with regard to the moral blameworthiness of the criminalized 
conduct.162 
When the law criminally prohibits what the society regards as morally 
wrongful, the perception of the moral wrongfulness is further reinforced. 
This is referred to as the educative function of the law. This way a message 
is sent to the society that some behavior merits strong disapproval. Where 
such consensus between the criminal law and public opinion is absent 
ambiguity follows.163
Your average Joe could for example reason cartels in the following way: 
As the maximum financial profit is the goal of any business the situation 
where the consumers end up paying higher prices due to cartels could 
be viewed from the business point of view as a risk that is part of any 
trade whereby two parties make the exchange of goods and money and by 
consenting to this the paying party takes the inherent business risk and thus 
there would be a legitimate cause for the injury.164
Furthermore, the increase in prices may appear nominal to the average 
Joe. Therefore the average Joe might ask how strongly should the cartelists 
be reprimanded after all? Arguably the most opprobrious parts of cartels 
that deserve the legal condemnation exist at the macro level – so how could 
the average Joe then associate them with something criminal?165 
For the lay people understanding the environment where white-collar 
offences take place is difficult. What may be even more challenging for the 
uninformed observer, is grasping what is criminal about white-collar crime 
as the white-collar crimes do not cause the visible result of bodily injury 
or someone being killed as a result of a physical assault or homicide.  The 
identification of harm is not as easy.166 
Further the moral evaluation of White-Collar crimes is that they often 
take place in an environment that is actually producing something good – 
just think of companies employing a lot of people, and creating value where 
it previously was absent. This may affect our judgment of the harmfulness 
of their conduct such as price-fixing.167 
162  Green 2006 p. 1
163  Green 2006 pp. 46-47.
164  Harding 2010 p. 52.
165  Harding, 2010 p. 52.
166  Green 2006 p. 35.
167  Green 2006 p. 39, see also Parker 2011, p. 252; See also Terry calvani, cartel 
penalties in ireland, p. 281.
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What may add to the ambiguous nature of white-collar crimes is that 
the same behavior may be subject to either criminal law or administrative 
(civil) law treatment. 168
Further, not making a distinction between the conduct and result causes 
a ‘blurring effect.’169 White-collar crimes may combine both incomplete and 
complete behavior into one offense only.170 
At the sentencing stage the political biases and class-consciousness of 
the judges may affect the severity of sentences imposed. As Stuart Green 
describes the conservative judge may be harsher in their thought on how 
street crime should be treated than what their liberal colleagues are, whereas 
the liberal colleagues would treat the white-collars more severely.  The moral 
ambiguity of white-collar crime may affect the stance taken by the legislature 
and the prosecutors as well. In the US context this is exemplified in the 
lysine cartel case where the appeal court raised the prison sentences from 
two to three years, which was the maximum sentence under the law.171 In 
relation to the mentioned cartel Stuart Green cites Kurt Eichenwald, the 
author of the blockbuster book, ‘the Informant’172, who has ridiculed the 
sentences in general for being too lenient by saying that: ‘Again, executives 
who effectively cheated every grocery store in the country received shorter 
sentences than if they robbed just one.’173
Despite the apparent ambivalent feelings in relation to white-collar 
conduct, for example Green has argued that white-collar activities often 
are so harmful that they merit criminal sanctions.174 This is the view that 
this author takes with regard to hard-core cartels. 
3.5.1 The Public Perception of the Cartel Offence in the UK  
 and Australia
While studying the moral content of cartels, it is helpful to survey the public 
opinion and this is what has been done in the UK and Australia. 
It may be argued that it is important to know how the public perceives 
cartels and that this should be part of the enforcement discussion.175 This is 
relevant especially if the discussion does not only touch upon the economic 
harm that cartels bring about, but also the moral sphere.176 Getting support 
168  Green 2006, p. 24.
169  Green, 2006, p. 37.
170  Green 2006, p. 37.
171  Green 2006. pp. 27-28.
172  The book gives an account of the infamous Lysine cartel, See Eichenwald 2012. 
173  Eichenwald 2002. 
174  Green 2004, p. 519.
175  Beaton-Wells 2012. p. 267.
176  Beaton-Wells 2012 p. 289.
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from the public to treat a given conduct as criminal may be viewed important 
from the perspective of criminal law.177 In Australia178 and in the UK179 
the public opinion regarding cartels has been surveyed and the studies 
are unique in the sense that they are the only ones of their kind touching 
upon this matter.180 Both studies took place online, the Australian sample 
consisting of 1334 respondents from Australia181 and the British sample of 
1219 people residing in the UK.182 It seems the study results are in general 
in agreement with each other.183 Both studies used factual settings to portray 
cartel behavior to get answers from the respondents.184 
The UK survey showed inter alia that only 11 % saw that the cartelists 
should be imprisoned.185
7% saw price-fixing as something similar to theft and 8% compared 
it to fraud –– only two in every four deemed price-fixing to be dishonest. 
This is problematic, because if cartel activities are not seen as something 
equivalent to criminal activities the criminal law based dishonesty 
requirement (which the Government removed) in the UK could indeed 
render the cartel offence ineffective. It seems that under such circumstances 
getting cartelists sentenced to prison will be challenging.186
In Australia two-thirds of the surveyed were of the opinion that cartels 
should be illegal. Yet most of the public does not see that cartels merit 
criminal treatment, 44% supported criminal prohibition against price-
fixing, the support for imprisonment in case of price-fixing was below 20 
%.187 Despite this both in the UK and Australia the public is of the view 
that firms and individuals should still be subject to penalties.188 In Australia 
there was not a significant support for the leniency policies, even if the cartel 
would remain undetected absent the leniency program.189 
Beaton-Wells and Parker pointed out that in order for the introduction 
of criminal sanctions against cartelists to be successful people engaged in 
commercial activity would have to recognize that cartel behavior is subject 
to criminal penalties that may attract custodial sanctions. In this regard 
177  ibid. p. 276.
178  See Beaton-Wells Caron, Haines Fiona, Parker Christine and Platania-Phung 
Chris, ’Report on a Survey of the Australian Public regarding Anti-Cartel Law and 
Enforcement’ 2010. 
179  See Stephan 2008a. 
180  Beaton-Wells 2012, p. 268.
181  Beaton-Wells 2012, p. 268 see footnote 12.
182  Stephan 2008, p. 125.
183  Beaton-Wells 2012 p. 268
184  Beaton-Wells 2012 pp. 269-270
185  Stephan 2008a, p. 144.
186  Stephan 2008a, p. 144.
187  Beaton-Wells 2012 . pp. 270-271
188  ibid. p. 272; Stephan 2008 pp. 132-133.
189  Beaton-Wells 2012 p. 274.
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the Australian Cartel Project showed that 45 per cent of the surveyed were 
aware of the competition law fines and whereas 23 per cent were informed 
of the possibility of custodial sanctions in case of cartel conduct.190  The 
surveyed for the most part perceived a higher probability of detection and 
enforcement when there was a shift from civil to criminal sanctions. 191 
Regarding the level of awareness of the sanctions and how the probability 
of detection and action was viewed, the Australian Cartel Project results 
showed that ‘the strongest predictor of knowledge and perceived likelihood 
of detection and enforcement was agreement with criminalization.’ The 
people who thought that price-fixing should not be subject to any action or 
criminal sanctions were 7 times more likely to suppose that cartel conduct 
did not contravene any laws.192 For the cartel criminalization context 
Beaton-Wells and Parker note that importantly deterrence depends on the 
person’s ‘normative appraisal of the law and its enforcement’ and therefore 
the deterrence theory with its rational profit-maximizing individuals is 
weakened.193 
15 per cent of the surveyed said that when civil sanctions were employed 
they themselves would probably infringe the laws, whereas the figure was 
9 per cent when criminal sanctions were available. As Beaton-Wells and 
Parker point out this means that 1 in 10 would consider entering cartel 
activity while being aware of exposing themselves to custodial sanctions.194
In Beaton-Wells’ view what is similar between the Australian and British 
studies is that the public tends to see cartel behavior as something more 
related to the moral sphere and to the ‘inherent nature of the conduct’ rather 
than the economic consequences that it produces.195 She lists the following 
points that support this view: 
-When the cartel conduct was characterized as dishonest rather than 
drawing on its economic results, treating it as a criminal offence got the 
most support from the respondents. 
-The public naming of the guilty was heavily supported in both 
countries, and as Beaton-Wells points out, this indicates that public sees 
that the conduct merits censure from the whole community. 
-That the public views the matter through moral lenses may be reflected 
also in the meager support for leniency, namely letting the whistle-blower 
go free.
190  Beaton-Wells and Parker 2012, p. 8.
191  Beaton-Wells and Parker 2012, p. 11.
192  Beaton-Wells and Parker 2012, pp. 12-13.
193  Beaton-Wells and Parker 2012, p. 13.
194  Beaton-Wells and Parker 2012, p. 14.
195  Beaton-Wells 2012, p. 275
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-Both surveys measured robust support for the view that cartels are 
equally serious irrespective of results, for example in the absence of a markup 
in prices.
-that cartel behavior should be treated more severely, when a ringleader 
has forced other cartel members, found significant support amongst the 
Australian respondents.196
Even if the cartel was entered in a bid to avoid redundancies or 
was formed by smaller companies or directed the cartel gains at making 
‘environmentally friendly’ products generally was not seen as a mitigating 
factor.197
Beaton-Wells however said that the study results imply that the project 
to criminalize cartels is more the concern of the authorities who wish to 
employ more robust tools than a movement amongst the general public. 
198 Green and Kugler argued that the moral acceptability of criminal law 
amongst the general public has a direct bearing on the stigmatizing and 
compliance cultivating traits of the criminal law.199 In order to develop 
compliance it is seen that a legal policy should be such that the law is in 
harmony with the moral perceptions of the public. This is so with or without 
the employment of criminal law measures. Where there is a gap between the 
law and the public perception, arguably problems could ensue, such as the 
incapability of the law to shape the conduct.200 Parker has asserted that if 
deterrence claims are supported by morally imbued claims that lack public 
support, the dedication to compliance of the firms could be impaired.201 
As Beaton-Wells points out it is not easy to bring into agreement the 
values of a firm and the law as was reflected in the promotion of a corporate 
executive while a criminal cartel charge against him was pending.202 Further, 
it has been argued that compliance could suffer when crisis cartels are formed 
out of altruistic motives, such as the motivation to avoid redundancies.203 
The aforementioned could be taken to mean that more emphasis should 
be put on the perceptions of the people working within firms so as to 
influence their views regarding commendable behavior and conversely 
wrongful behavior.204
It may be noted that the study of Green and Kugler ‘found that lay 
persons, in general are comfortable making fairly fine-grained distinctions 
196  ibid. pp. 275-276
197  Beaton-Wells and Parker 2012, pp. 17-18.
198  Beaton-Wells 2012, pp. 277-278.
199  Green and Kugler 2012, p. 33; Stucke 2006, p. 536.
200  Beaton-Wells 2012, pp. 278-279.
201  See also Parker 2006, p. 4.
202  Peel 2008; Beaton-Wells 2012 p. 279.
203  Beaton-Wells 2012 p. 280.
204  Beaton-Wells 2012 p. 280.
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regarding the law of white collar crime.’205 That people are capable of such 
an assessment arguably was overlooked in the design of the UK cartel offence 
that incorporated the dishonesty test.206 
Beaton-Wells and Parker noted that besides stigmatizing cartel 
conduct in an attempt to create deterrence the individuals normative 
judgments should be brought closer to what the law states in order to 
boost compliance.207 It would also be good for the authorities to establish 
a connection with the business community and seek to comprehend the 
businesses’ points of views, since the emergence of normative engagement 
depends on the subjective views of people deeming that they have been 
heard. 208 While the authorities should be willing to consider the views of 
the business community and communicate with it, the authorities do not 
have to embrace such views. 209 Nielsen and Parker had also acknowledged 
in their study that the regulator also needs a stick, since in the absence of 
one, the regulator’s attempts to shape conduct is futile, but still the regulator, 
in order to create a credible possibility of enforcement, should wield its 
power fairly.210 
3.6. CONCLUSION
From the perspective of ultima ratio, a central criminal law principle, the 
moral content of a given conduct, liable to become subject to criminal 
penalties, should be evident and such that a criminalization is justified, so 
as to reserve criminal law only to the most egregious cases. 
The legitimacy of the criminal law may depend on the public perceptions 
of the criminalized conduct. The overcriminalization critique draws inter alia 
on this gap that exists between the written law and the public perceptions, 
which arguably dilutes the criminal justice system. 
This author welcomes the discussion regarding the morality concerning 
cartel conduct and sees it as a vital part of any cartel criminalization project. 
Where there is ambiguity in the minds of the public regarding the moral 
wrongfulness of cartels, competition law advocacy is called for. On the other 
hand the educative function of the criminal law may alter such views held 
by the public. In terms of judicial attitudes prejudiced against unsuspended 
custodial sanctions, lengthier prison sentences may help.
205  Green and Kugler 2012. p. 34.
206  Beaton-Wells 2012. p. 281.
207  Beaton-Wells and Parker 2012, p. 21.
208  Beaton-Wells and Parker 2012, p. 21.
209  Beaton-Wells and Parker 2012, p. 21.
210  Parker and Nielsen 2011, p. 116.
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In the context of a cartel criminalization project it may be noted that 
while traditionally cartels have been viewed as mala prohibita crimes, the 
argument has been made above that they are not morally neutral – it appears 
that the delinquency of cartels is connected with the perception that they 
defy the whole market economy. 
The influential theory on white-collar conduct by Green indicates that 
cartels might violate everyday moral norms against cheating, deceiving 
and stealing, this argument concerning the viability of the aforementioned 
everyday moral standards is however not beyond criticism.  On the other 
hand there exists robust economic evidence on the harmfulness of cartels. 
Thus it seems that from a moral perspective there are grounds to criminalize 
cartels.
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4 Should the EU or     
 alternatively Individual   
  Member States take on the   
 Cartel Criminalization   
 Project?
4.1 INTRODUCTION
When a criminalization of cartels is contemplated in the European context 
one should naturally take heed of the developments in terms of the EU – 
if the EU chooses to take measures in this area EU member states would 
become under an obligation to implement the relevant EU rules. Therefore 
exploring the possible legal basis in the TFEU to criminalize cartels is 
important. This task will be undertaken below. One point of debate has 
been whether harmonized rules at the Member State level are sufficient or 
should cartels also be criminalized at the level of the EU Institutions. This 
is a relevant question and will be touched upon. Finally, a discussion is 
conducted concerning the sorts of costs that might be incurred in case of an 
EU-wide criminal anti-cartel regime and whether individual accountability 
could take the form of a Director Disqualification Order (DDO).
4.2 THE EVOLUTION OF THE EU CRIMINAL LAW 
COMPETENCE
As a starting point it may be asked whether criminal law is something 
exceptional in the EU law context? On the one hand, it may be pointed 
out that the EU law overrides national criminal law, thus not putting this 
area of law on a pedestal in relation to other areas of law. As opposed to 
that due to the severe interference that criminal law brings about and the 
cultural traits that it carries, it may be regarded as something special, far 
removed from other areas of law.1 The notion of the elevated status of 
1  Asp 2013 p. 74
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criminal law, according to Asp, owes inter alia to the rigorous criminal law 
safeguards, the condemnation that it carries. Moreover, ethics, tradition 
and sovereignty concerns of nation states highlight such understanding of 
criminal law, and the national constitutional provisions that grant such a 
position to criminal law. 2 With a view to the latter interpretation of the 
status of criminal law, one may examine the implications of the expanding 
criminal law powers of the EU. 
Originally the European community was a project to promote peace, 
but over time the competences covered for instance organized crime. The 
Maastricht Treaty further extended the criminal law powers, by introducing 
the third pillar, under which the unanimous Council could adopt criminal 
law measures. The Treaty of Amsterdam further reinforced this line of 
development.3 
Before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force the pillar structure of the 
Union gave the impression that criminal law measures could be properly 
adopted within the confines of the area of Police and Judicial Cooperation 
in Criminal Matters.4 The Commission contested in 2003 the Council 
framework decision regarding the criminal law rules on the protection of 
the environment, based on art. 29 and 31(e) in the EU Treaty, instead in 
the Commission’s view criminal measures should have been adopted on 
the basis of Article 175(1) in the former EC Treaty. The ECJ adopted the 
view in the Environmental crime case that based on art. 175 EC, now 
art. 192 TFEU, criminal measures could have been introduced ‘when the 
application of effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by 
the competent national authorities is an essential measure for combating 
serious environmental offences’ and the Union legislator may take criminal 
law measures that are necessary in its view, thus including the community 
pillar as well.5 Consequently based on ex art. 175 EC a directive was 
adopted.6 Further in the Ship-Source Pollution case the ECJ took the 
position that ‘ the determination of the type and level of the criminal 
penalties to be applied does not fall within the Community’s sphere of 
competence.’7 
By analogy such criminal powers could apply in other areas of 
community pillar than environmental matters, and indeed a directive 
introducing criminal penalties against employers of unlawfully staying 
third-country nationals had its basis in the former art. 63(3)(b) EC, now 
2  Asp 2013 pp. 76-78
3  Turner 2012, pp. 5-6.
4  Khan 2012 p. 83.
5  C-176/03 para 48.; Simonsson 2011, p. 206.
6  Directive 2008/99/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 
November 2008 on the protection of the environment through criminal law. OJ L 
328 2008. P.28 ff.
7  C-440/05 para. 70
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art. 79 TFEU. The explicit wording of the aforementioned article was silent 
on the criminal law powers, but this did not prevent the introduction of 
the directive.8 
In the field of intellectual property law the Commission sought to 
tackle counterfeit products via criminal law already back in 2003.9 This 
was not however accepted by the European Parliament. In the Parliament’s 
view administrative sanctions are sufficient.10 This was followed by a new 
proposal by the Commission.11 As a response to the Environmental crime 
case the Commission later amended the proposal.12
The Criminal law competences under art. 83(2) TFEU may be regarded 
as a systematization of the notable ECJ decisions, namely the Environmental 
and Ship-source pollution cases.13
Arguably Article 83 TFEU presented an explicit dilution of the 
sovereignty of the EU Member States in criminal matters.14
The democratic deficit at the EU level however gives support for 
the contention that the decision-making on criminal law should more 
appropriately take place at the national level to maintain legitimate criminal 
law. The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality that are enshrined in 
the Treaties give support for this as well.15
8  Khan 2012 p. 83; Directive 2009/52/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 18 Jun. 2009 providing for minimum standards on sanctions and 
measures against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals. OJ L 168, 
2009. p. 24.
9  See Simonsson 2011, p. 206; See Commission proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on measures and procedures to ensure the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights COM(2003) 46 final. Art. 20; See also  
Mylly 2012.
10  Bulletin EU 3-2004, Internal Market (23/28)), point 1.3.53.
11  Commission proposal for European parliament and council directive on criminal 
measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights; Proposal 
for a Council Framework Decision to strenghten the criminal law framework to 
combat intellectual property offences’ COM(2005) 276 final.
12  Commission, amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, COM(2006) 168 final.
13  Asp 2013 p. 127
14  See article 83(2) of the TFEU establishing a broad competence for the EU to 
legislate criminal law: “If the approximation of criminal law and regulations of the 
Member States proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union 
policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation measures, directives may 
establish minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal offences and 
sanctions in the area concerned.”
15  Turner 2012, p. 4.
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4.3 ARTICLE 83(2) TFEU – THE REQUIREMENT OF A 
PRIOR HARMONIZATION
Under the Lisbon Treaty the former pillar structure was abolished and Article 
83(2) TFEU was introduced, giving the Union explicit criminal law powers: 
‘if the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States 
proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in 
an area which has been subject to harmonization measures, directives may 
establish minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal offences 
and sanctions in the area concerned. Such directives shall be adopted by 
the same ordinary or special legislative procedure as was followed for the 
adoption of the harmonization measure in question, without prejudice to 
Article 76.’ 
It has been postulated that art. 83(2) TFEU is the very likely basis if 
an EU-wide criminal ban on cartels took place.16 In addition harmonized 
penalties for competition law infringements could  possibly be adopted 
on the basis of art 114 TFEU.  Article 114 TFEU provides that measures 
may be adopted ‘for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their 
object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.’17 Other 
possible legal bases are Article 103 TFEU and Article 352 TFEU.18
Art. 83(2) TFEU may be viewed as the main legal basis for criminal 
measures under the Lisbon Treaty.19 Opinions have been voiced, doubting 
whether the criteria introduced by Article 83(2) TFEU are fulfilled in the 
case of a criminalization of the competition law enforcement. Would it 
be regarded as ‘essential’ and has the required degree of harmonization 
occurred already? 20 
Dougan has argued that Article 83(2) TFEU seems to require that 
previous harmonization should have taken place via legislative instruments. 
Art. 101 and 102 TFEU, the primary rules on competition law, are instead 
Treaty provisions. As noted by Dougan, the drafters of the Treaty may not 
have been aware of this result. Dougan has advanced the argument that as 
art. 83(2) TFEU as a result of the wording seemingly would not allow the 
introduction criminal penalties against competition infringements, it is 
possible that the derived powers acknowledged in the Environmental Crime 
16  See Furse 2012, p. 222; The Constitutional Treaty which was rejected included 
a wording very similar to art. 83(2) TFEU in article III-271(2) and Wouter Wils 
argued that it ’…could undoubtedly be used to criminalize the enforcement of EU 
antitrust law in all the EU Member States…’. See Wils 2005a,  p. 159.
17  See Frese 2012, p. 113.
18  Khan 2012, pp. 84-85.
19  Öberg 2011, p. 315-316.
20  See for example Khan 2012 p. 84; Öberg 2011 p. 313 and 316.
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case could be invoked.21 The powers under the Environmental Crime case 
do not require directives, as Article 83(2) TFEU does, and the directives 
may only provide for minimum rules and therefore one could say that 
there is more room for flexibility under the former approach.22 Moreover 
the national parliaments may more easily interfere based on subsidiarity 
claims under Article 83(2) TFEU and the UK, Ireland and Denmark may 
opt-out under it with ease. Each Member State has also the right to use the 
emergency brake under art. 83(2).23 Dougan however considers the powers 
under the Environmental Crimes case latent and acknowledges that using 
such powers for a harmonization may be problematic from the viewpoint 
of the principle of legality if harmonization is accomplished via  ‘non-
legislative competence’24 
Khan has argued that while harmonization thus far in the field of 
competition law concerns the substantive rules, it does not as clearly concern 
the sanctions imposed and thus Article 83(2) TFEU requirement of prior 
harmonization would not be fulfilled.25 
Öberg says that while regulation 1/2003 was adopted on the basis of the 
sector specific art. 103 TFEU and it could be argued that Regulation 1/2003 
is a prior harmonization measure, being the special legislative procedure 
required by Article 83(2) TFEU, he still believes this to be the wrong 
solution due to a lack of democratic legitimacy.26 Democratic legitimacy 
may be regarded as particularly important in the field of criminal law as 
criminal measures are especially intrusive.27 This way merely consulting the 
European Parliament, as Article 103 TFEU requires which is the special 
legislative procedure under art. 289(2) TFEU derogating from the ordinary 
legislative procedure to make EU decision-making easier, would not suffice 
to establish democratic legitimacy.28 In the ordinary legislative procedure 
the Council and the Parliament are both legislators, whereas the special 
legislative procedure makes the Council the only legislator.29 
There is a case to argue that since Regulation 1/2003 does not concern 
substantive competition law rules, but rather touches upon procedural 
21  Case C-176/03 Commission of the European Communities v Council of the 
European Union; Dougan Michael, ‘From the Velvet Glove to the Iron Fist: 
Criminal Sanctions for the Enforcement of Union Law, in (ed.) Cremona Marise, 
Compliance and the Enforcement of EU Law, OUP: UK., 2012 p. 111.
22  Dougan 2012 p. 110.
23  Dougan 2012 p. 110.
24  Dougan 2012 p. 111.
25  Khan 2012 p. 84; Öberg 2011 pp. 315-316.
26  Öberg 2011 p. 315.
27  ‘The Manifesto on European Criminal Policy’, 2011, p. 90.
28  Öberg 2011 pp. 315-316.
29  See the Official Website of the European Union, http://europa.eu/legislation_
summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_treaty/ai0016_en.htm. Last visited on 
the 11th of March 2013. 
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aspects, and thus does not introduce sanctions on individuals, there is not 
a sufficient degree of prior harmonization in existence. Öberg has suggested 
that first the individual sanctions should be harmonized across Member 
States, having a legal basis in art. 114 TFEU, as a more democratically 
legitimate option and then if need be, in a subsequent directive having a 
legal basis in art. 83(2) TFEU, criminal measures against cartels would be 
adopted. Article 114 TFEU stipulates that measures may be introduced 
‘for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States which have as their object the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market.’30 
He points out that this way art. 83(2) TFEU as the chief legal basis for 
criminalization under the Lisbon Treaty would still be observed. 31
Chalmers et al. point out that the degree of prior harmonization could 
be interpreted either narrowly or broadly. Under the former interpretation it 
would mean that prior legislation set by the EU should have been violated 
to justify the criminal measures whereas the latter interpretation would 
allow criminal measures where certain conduct has not yet been completely 
regulated by the EU, and no violation of the preceding EU law in the area 
is required.32 
Peers points out that one cannot claim that a Union policy requires to 
be effectively implemented unless there has already been harmonization in 
the field law in question previously, and also this requirement was presented 
in the Court’s case law prior to the Lisbon Treaty changes. Peers however 
makes the point that a ‘full harmonization’ in a particular area is not what is 
the prerequisite.33 Regarding the temporal criterion in Article 83(2) TFEU 
of a prior harmonization, the English version of the Treaty does not appear 
to allow a simultaneous harmonization and criminalization, but according 
to Peers this interpretation should be doubted. As Peers puts forward the 
‘effective implementation’ of a Union policy could be eroded if criminal 
law measures could be adopted only once harmonization has occurred. 
Furthermore, the time period between the harmonization measure and the 
criminal measure is not prescribed, thus giving rise to the possibility that a 
criminal measure is adopted immediately after the harmonization measure.34 
30  Frese has also argued that art. 114 TFEU provides a possible legal basis, See Frese 
2012, p. 113; It may be mentioned that Cseres said that ’[t]he most important legal 
obligations that stemmed from Regulation 1/2003 for all the Member States were 
laid down in Article 3, namely the obligation for national competition authorities 
and national courts to apply Articles 101 and 102 as well as the convergence rule 
for Article 101, and in Article 35 in conjunction with Article 5, the obligation to 
empower national competition authorities.’ Cseres KJ, 2010, p. 151.
31  Öberg 2011 pp. 315-316.
32  Chalmers, Davies & Monti 2010, p. 617.
33  Peers 2011, p. 775.
34  Peers 2011, p. 776.
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Peers does not reject criminalization of EU competition law enforcement 
under art. 83(2) TFEU.35
Asp argues that as art. 83(2) TFEU sets out that harmonization may 
occur in areas where previous harmonization has taken place, and refers to 
the Treaty articles, such as art. 101 TFEU as a basis for such action. He notes 
the calls by several authors that prior to a criminal law harmonization, by 
means of a directive some degree of harmonization should be in place. In 
Asp’s view Article 83(2)TFEU may suggest such an interpretation. Further 
the ultima ratio principle means that criminal should be the last resort and 
from that perspective requiring two separate directives could be sensible.36 
According to Asp it is close to irrelevant whether the harmonization measures 
are adopted simultaneously, without a period between, and that it may very 
well be the case that the legislator and ECJ accept the non-criminal and 
criminal harmonization through one measure only. Whether this is good 
criminal policy is another matter, as Asp indicates.37
The environmental crime and the Ship-source pollution cases and the 
implied competences therein are arguably codified in Article 83(2)TFEU. 
Whether the former competence exists today despite the new Treaty 
provision is a matter of debate. In Asp’s view the introduction of art. 83(2) 
TFEU removes the competences derived from the aforementioned case law, 
as accepting such powers would not be based on good sense.38
35  Peers points out that decision making under art. 83(1) TFEU is different from art. 
103 TFEU. Peers 2011. p. 777; It may be mentioned that art. 83(1) TFEU reads as 
follows: ’The European Parliament and the Council may, by means of directives adopted 
in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules concerning 
the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime 
with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or impact of such offences or from 
a special need to combat them on a commmon basis. 
 These areas of crime are the following: terrorism, trafficking in human beings and secual 
exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, 
money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and 
organised crime.
 On the basis of developments in crime, the Council may adopt a decision identifying other 
areas of crime that meet the criteria specified in this paragraph. It shall act unanimously 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.’
36  Asp 2013 pp. 132-134
37  Asp 2013 pp. 134-135
38  Asp 2013 p. 136
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4.4 THE ESSENTIALITY REQUIREMENT UNDER 
ART. 83(2) TFEU
The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (hereinafter TFEU) sets out in 
Article 83(2) the competence of the EU to employ criminal law measures if 
they are essential for the effective implementation of Union policies. Article 
83(2) TFEU limits the Union competences to enact criminal law measures 
to criminal sanctions that are essential for the effective implementation of 
Union policies to materialize – it may be argued that the Union competence 
is constrained by the ultima ratio principle.39
Prior to the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty Dawes and Lynskey 
argued that the Community legislature should establish in each case whether 
criminal penalties are essential for the attainment of policy objectives.40 
Inter alia the following grounds were given in the Commission proposal 
in 2007 regarding the introduction of environmental penalties: firstly the 
deterrent effect of harsher sanctions which would be followed by a lower 
number of offences and in general the need to introduce criminal penalties 
to implement Community’s environmental policy and the stronger criminal 
investigatory means that are lacking under an administrative regime. The 
Commission opined that only criminal penalties are adequately dissuasive.41 
It may be pointed out that with regard to competition law infringements 
Wils has argued that more robust investigatory tools that are available under 
a criminal regime could provide effectiveness.42 
Analysing the essentiality requirement is a part of a determination 
whether the criminalization of cartels should be undertaken. The word 
‘essential’  may raise considerable interest, for example one commentator, 
Jacob Öberg, has examined the different language versions of the TFEU to 
determine whether variations exist as to the translation of the word ‘essential’ 
between different language versions. The result was that some versions appear 
to require that the criminal measures are ‘absolutely necessary’ whereas for 
example the Finnish and Swedish versions require only that the criminal 
measures are ‘necessary.’ Essentiality would then mean in the context of 
the Treaty that without criminal measures the Union policy could not be 
effectively implemented.43 
39  Draft Council conclusions on model provisions, guiding the Council’s criminal law 
negotiations, JAI 868, DROIPEN 160, 16542/09, Brussels, 23 November 2009, pp. 
4-5
40  Dawes and Lynskey 2008,  p. 144.
41  See to this effect Commission Proposal on February 9th, 2007, COM(2007) 51 
final, 2007/0022 (COD) p. 2.
42  See Wils 2005a, pp. 142-145.
43  See Öberg 2011, p. 292.
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As art. 83(2) TFEU gives competence for the EU to legislate in criminal 
matters when this is essential to effectively implement Union policies, 
Herlin-Karnell thinks that one may too easily suppose that criminal law 
brings with it effectiveness and checking on effectiveness is difficult – where 
goes the line beyond which it should be allowed to make the effectiveness 
claim. She points out that ‘most criminal lawyers and criminologists’ do not 
always regard criminal law as the best social control tool.44 She argues that 
art. 83(2) TFEU is inexact in terms of the competence that the Union gets 
to legislate, and opines that the competence appears broad.45 
When considering a criminalization in light of the principle of 
effectiveness, one line of argument goes on saying that the credibility of 
the criminal law system suffers as a result of a stipulation that is not effective 
(paper tiger argument). Too strict criminal law provisions on the other hand 
do not produce the desired effects as they loose the respect of the people. 46 
Herlin-Karnell characterizes art. 83 TFEU as lex specialis authorizing 
the EU to legislate. From a constitutional perspective she thinks it’s 
problematic. She is of the opinion that if art. 83(2) TFEU could undermine 
the idea of using criminal law as the last resort if used as a ‘carte blance’. 
Further it would make attribution of powers futile.47 She points out that 
overcriminalization goes against what is effective and calls for the observance 
of the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity in the field of criminal 
law.48 Art. 69 TFEU expects the national parliaments to safeguard these 
principles when the Union legislates.49 
According to Herlin-Karnell, the common perception is that those 
who seek to resort to a criminalization also need to prove that it would be 
effective, such burden according to her should not lie on those who do not 
propose the criminalization trajectory (this is the objective of the ultima 
ratio principle). 50 
It has been pointed out that its possible that administrative sanctions 
could in many instances be more effective than criminal law penalties. 
According to this reasoning administrative penalties would be more effective 
due to the lack of subjective fault requirement. She however points out that 
sanctions should not be disguised as administrative ones, if in reality they 
are criminal, at least under the autonomous interpretation of the European 
44  Herlin-Karnell 2012b p. 339; See  Opinion of Advocate General Mazak, Case 
C-440/05 para. 115
45  ibid. p. 339
46  Herlin-Karnell Ester 2012a, p. 59.
47  Herlin-Karnell Ester 2012b, p. 339.
48  Herlin-Karnell 2012b . pp. 344-345.
49  Herlin-Karnell 2012b p. 344.
50  See Herlin-Karnell 2012a, pp. 57-58; Öberg 2012, p. 12.
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Court of Human Rights.51 She underlines that it is problematic that the EU 
seems to use administrative penalties to in effect operate in the criminal law 
field. Importantly the crucial principle of nulla poena sine culpa enshrined 
in art. 6 ECHR is more limited under an administrative regime than under 
the criminal regime.52
Herlin-Karnell argues that symbolism, which is connected to 
effectiveness, raises questions if one sees European criminal law as a symbol. 
According to Herlin-Karnell, it is problematic if a criminalization is adopted 
on grounds of symbolism. She asks whether criminal law as a symbol 
guarantees effective protection or whether the goal is to attach a symbolic 
label on the offender. In her view the stigmatic label, that the criminal law 
brings with it is automatic and therefore, should not determine what gets 
criminalized as the result would lead to overcriminalization. 53 
If the objective is to influence morals, one could argue that such effects 
should be examined for a more extensive period of time to see how the 
morals of the society are affected. In Herlin-Karnell’s opinion the EU is 
not at the stage yet where it could employ the criminal law symbolism to 
affect the public’s views on what is morally acceptable and what is not. 54
Öberg has opined that the Union should proceed with criminalizing 
cartels only once less restrictive measures such as director disqualification 
orders in combination with personal fines have been tested and proven 
ineffective. He points out that the Union is not experienced in using 
individual sanctions and that the deterrent effect of criminal penalties 
remains to be proven and thus criminal sanctions should not be adopted 
at this point. He thinks that the Union legislator would not necessarily be 
able to show that criminal sanctions would prove essential for the effective 
implementation of Union policies.55
As pointed out by Peers assessing whether the criterion of essentiality 
under art. 83(2) TFEU is fulfilled does not happen without difficulty. 
During the pre-Lisbon Treaty era this already applied to the criminal law 
competence of the Community, as per the case law.56 The ECJ specifically 
referred to the essentiality requirement also in the Environmental Crime 
Case.57
51  See Herlin-Karnell 2012a, p. 58; See chapter ‘Punitive Administrative Sanctions in 
Finland: Neither Fish nor Fowl’
52  Herlin-Karnell 2012a, p. 59.
53  See Herlin-Karnell 2012a, p. 58; See in this work the discussion in chapter ‘Punitive 
Administrative Sanctions in Finland: Neither Fish nor Fowl’.
54  Herlin-Karnell 2012a, p. 59.
55  Öberg 2011, p. 313.
56  Peers 2012, p. 775.
57  See the ‘Environmental Crime Case’  Case C-176/03 para. 48.
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Asp points out that the EU legislator is the one who should make the 
decision whether the criteria of essentiality are met, thus the criteria curbing 
the legislative competence of the legislator. The decision by the legislator is 
further possibly subject to the review by the ECJ. 58
The Court has stated that the Union legislator should have a broad 
freedom to decide on matters that concern ‘political, economic and social 
choices on its part,’ and that only manifest inappropriateness can render 
the measure invalid.59
The Environmental case’s analysis did not assess the possibility of 
introducing alternative sanctions and arguably the evaluation regarding the 
fulfillment of the necessity requirement could have been more thorough.60 
Indeed critical views of the Environmental case have emerged relating to the 
principle of subsidiarity and attribution of powers as the Court only seemed 
to emphasize effective enforcement. Dougan argues that the court simply 
appeared to endorse the view that criminal sanctions are most effective.61 
Dougan acknowledges that the decision on the criminal law measures is 
appropriately made by political institutions.62 
Asp argues that ‘it is probably not realistic to require hard empirical 
data supporting the assertion that criminal law measures are essential – such 
data will seldom be available.’63 As opposed to that it could be expected 
that an effort is made by citing the available evidence and from a practical 
point of view advancing arguments of sound judgment.64
58  Asp 2013 pp. 130-132
59  See Case C-210/03, Swedish Match AB and Swedish Match UK Ltd v Secretary of 
State for Health. Para. 48 
60  Dougan 2012 p. 101
61  Dougan 2012 p.  101
62  ‘Such basic political choices about the appropriate role and scope of the criminal 
justice system are not (and should not) be open to second-guessing by the courts. 
The judicial function is better discharged by a careful scrutiny of whether the 
legislature’s more detailed choices about offences and sanctions, as well as their actual 
application and enforcement within the Member States, complies with the principles 
of proportionality and other fundamental rights guarantees.’ Dougan 2012 p. 102
63  Asp 2013 pp. 130-132
64  Asp 2013 p. 131
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4.5  THE PROPOSAL REGARDING MARKET ABUSE
65
Recently the Commission has proposed a Directive that addresses the market 
abuse problems, namely insider trading and market manipulation, by the 
introduction of criminal sanctions. The legal basis is in article 83(2) TFEU. 
Discussion has emerged whether this is the sufficient legal basis.66 A further 
Regulation is proposed by the Commission which would fight market abuse 
via administrative sanctions. The Regulation has a basis in article 114 TFEU. 
A number of questions arise due to these proposals: is the criminal law the 
correct tool to resort to in the first place, does sound legal basis exist and 
how are the fundamental rights protected.67
This proposed Directive concerning market abuse is interesting in the 
sense that it is the first case to show the boundaries of article 83(2) TFEU.68 
As art. 83(2) TFEU requires prior harmonization, also that requirement 
will be tested. It should be noted that not much areas of law remain where 
no harmonization has occurred.69
Enacting laws in this field of law might not necessarily be surprising, as 
historically speaking financial crimes have presented a considerable threat to 
the creation of the internal market. The Lisbon Treaty gives the EU expressly 
a competence to legislate in the field of criminal matters, but even prior to 
that there were views held that the as the EU was an economic union, there 
were grounds to take measures to prevent financial criminality.70
When considering the legal basis in art. 83(2) TFEU for the introduction 
of the market abuse directive, one may note that there is not a general 
competence for the EU to legislate with regard to market abuse. The EU 
has a shared competence with the Member States as set out by article 4(j) 
TFEU.71 
65  It should be noted that the market abuse Regulation No 596/2014 and the Directive 
2014/57EU regarding the criminalization of market abuse went on to appear in the 
EU Official Journal – the regulation will enter into force in July 2016, whereas the 
directive has a 2-year implementation phase. To this effect see Daily News of 2014-
06-12, European Commission – 12/06/2014; See also the Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal sanctions for insider dealing 
and market manipulation Brussels, 20.10.2011 COM (2011) 654 final; Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on insider dealing and 
market manipulation (market abuse), Brussels, 20.10.2011. COM(2011) 651 final.
66  See Herlin-Karnell Ester 2012c.
67  Herlin-Karnell 2012c, p. 481.
68  Herlin-Karnell 2012c, p. 485.
69  Herlin-Karnell 2012c, p. 485.
70  Herlin-Karnell 2012c, p. 482.
71  Herlin-Karnell 2012c, p. 483.
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In the impact assessment that supplements the market abuse proposals 
the Commission is of the view that a lack of coordination among the 
Member States would mean that problems persist. The divergence in terms 
of sanctions among the Member States is seen as a problem, as a given 
market abuse could be subject to sanctions in some Member States while not 
in others or be so to varying degrees, which as a result could undermine the 
deterrence as the offenders opt for the jurisdiction that has the most lenient 
penalties. In the Commission’s view the effectiveness of enforcement would 
be improved with the introduction of minimum rules for conduct that is 
criminal.72 Arguably to an extent similar reasoning could apply to a possible 
introduction on criminal measures concerning hard-core competition law 
infringements.
Further, the Directive inter alia provides the national authorities with 
strong investigative powers.73
Interestingly the Ship-Source Pollution case meant that Member States 
could themselves decide on the degree of criminal law sanctions whereas 
now the Commission in its proposal sought to introduce penalties that deter, 
which could be taken to mean that the minimum level for the sanctions 
is high.74 
In Herlin-Karnell’s view one could possibly find a better legal basis 
for the proposal in art. 114 TFEU, which although residual concerns the 
internal market. Another possibility would be art. 325 TFEU which sets out 
that measures countering fraud should be taken when the financial interests 
of the Union are affected.  It could be however that art. 325 TFEU alone 
would not suffice, but also the support of Article 83(2) TFEU would be 
needed. As Herlin-Karnell points out neither the emergency brake nor the 
opt-outs for the UK and Ireland would be available under art. 114 TFEU 
or art. 325 TFEU. 75 
With that in mind a few alternative bases for a possible criminalization 
of cartels will be examined below. 
4.6 ARTICLE 352 TFEU
It may be pondered whether art. 352 TFEU would provide the Union with 
criminal law powers. It reads as follows: ‘If action by the Union should 
prove necessary, within the framework of policies defined in the Treaties, 
72  Commission Staff Working Paper, ‘Impact assessment accompanying the proposals 
for a Regulation and a Directive on market abuse’ SEC(2011) 121 final. pp. 31-33; 
See also Herlin-Karnell 2012c, p. 485.
73  ibid p. 11
74  Herlin-Karnell 2012c pp. 489-490.
75  Herlin-Karnell 2012c pp. 485-486.
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to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have 
not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the 
European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures.’76 Where art. 
83(2) TFEU incorporates the essentiality requirement, art. 352 TFEU allows 
the adoption of measures on the condition of necessity. Based on such 
a resemblance, Asp has argued that it barely seems likely that situations 
would occur where Article 83(2)TFEU would not provide the competence 
to legislate, as the requirement of essentiality would not be met, but such 
measures would still be necessary in the sense of art. 352 TFEU.77
Article 83(2) TFEU allows the introduction of directives regarding 
definitions of offences and sanctions, but further-reaching measures are 
excluded, for example measures touching upon the general part of criminal 
law. It is there that art. 352 TFEU could become useful, but Asp argues that 
art. 352 TFEU cannot be used when Article 83(2)TFEU requirement of 
a prior harmonization is not fulfilled.78 In his view however it is possible 
that Article 352 TFEU could be resorted in the area of criminal law, but 
such possibility is undermined by the fact that the Council has to act 
unanimously, thus requiring the consent of the UK, Ireland and Denmark, 
that may use the opt-out arrangements under art. 83(2) TFEU.79
4.7 ARTICLE 325 TFEU
Art. 325 TFEU provides the EU with the power to ‘counter fraud and 
any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the Union.’ 
While the ex. art. 280, the predecessor of art. 325 TFEU explicitly excluded 
criminal law from its scope, such exclusion is not available now.80 Asp has 
suggested that Article 325 TFEU may be interpreted in a way that provides 
the EU with further-reaching criminal law powers than what are available 
under art. 83(2)TFEU. The other possible interpretation would be that 
art. 325 TFEU could only be used in conjunction with art. 83(2) TFEU. 
76  Emphasis added by the author. 
77  Asp 2013 p. 137
78  Asp 2013 p. 137-138
79  Asp 2013 pp. 138-139.
80  Asp 2013 pp. 142-143; Connor noted that ’[f ]raudulent representation is 
particularly evident in one popular form of cartel activity: bid-rigging. The very idea 
of a buyer inviting competitive bids through a formal process is meaningless if the 
bidders are not competing with one another. Thus, if the bidders subvert this process 
by pre-arranging the outcome, they have engaged in a fraudulent strategy. This 
reasoning may support the criminalization of bid rigging in countries like Germany 
where other forms of price fixing are civil administrative violations, and may explain 
why U.S. federal sentencing guidelines treat bid rigging more severely than other 
types of price fixing.’ Connor, Foer and Udwin 2010, p. 211.
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81 Due to the inclination of the Court to especially consider the efficiency 
perspective, Asp projects that former possibility is more likely.82 
As Asp points out, opinions have been voiced in support of a view that 
a number of provisions in the TFEU may be given the interpretation that 
they provide the Union with criminal law powers, such as art. 103 TFEU 
regarding competition law.  In his view such interpretation is not logically 
viable, as why would a number of criteria have to be fulfilled before resort 
may be had to Article 83 TFEU, and still find substantial criminal law 
powers beyond Chapter 4 of Title V. Asp argues that only art. 325 TFEU 
could be considered as a relevant candidate for such powers.83 This author 
tends to find such an interpretation convincing.
4.8 OTHER LIMITS TO EU CRIMINAL LAW 
COMPETENCE
One should also consider other possible limits to the EU’s competence to 
legislate criminal law, whether explicit or non-explicit. 
Criminal law may be seen to belong to the sovereign area of the Member 
States. The democratic deficit at the EU level arguably supports the idea 
that the decision-making on criminal law should more appropriately take 
place at the national level to maintain legitimate criminal law.84 Article 
83(3) TFEU itself provides that if ‘fundamental aspects’ of a Member State’s 
criminal justice system could be affected the Member State may ask that 
the measure be suspended. This is the so called ‘emergency brake’ available 
under art. 82(3) and art. 83(3) TFEU which may alleviate the Member 
State concerns about the creeping EU criminal law powers.85 
Adopting criminal law measures against cartels specifically under art. 
83(2) TFEU therefore appears to be supported inter alia by the availability 
of the ‘emergency brake’ procedure which may enhance the democratic 
legitimacy of the planned legislation.86
The principle of ultima ratio, meaning that the criminal law should be 
used only as a last resort is recognized by the Commission Communication 
‘Towards an EU Criminal Policy’.87 Further, the Treaty on the European 
Union incorporates in article 5(4) the principle of proportionality, which 
81  Asp 2013 p. 153.
82  Asp 2013 p. 154.
83  Asp 2013 pp. 162-163.
84  Turner 2012, p. 4.
85  See Herlin-Karnell 2010, pp. 1117-1118.
86  See Kaiafa-Gbandi 2011, p. 25.
87  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
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may also be of relevance.88 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights calls for 
proportionality in the prescription of criminal penalties.89 
The relevance of the principle of ultima ratio may however be questioned 
in the following context: if criminal penalties are introduced in an area where 
violations already attract administrative sanctions, it could be argued that 
the criminal penalties are adopted due to the experience that administrative 
penalties do not suffice. This way criminal law is not an alternative (which is 
the focus of the ultima ratio principle) but an additional measure.90 This is 
relevant in the EU setting, where competition law infringements are already 
subject to administrative penalties. 
Böse has touched upon the principle of protecting the legal interest and 
also the ultima ratio principle, which are the sub principles of the principle 
of proportionality. The Manifesto on European Criminal Policy sought to 
make the European Legislator more attentive to these principles.91 Böse is 
sceptical about heavily emphasizing these principles.92 He points out that the 
principles of proportionality, ultima ratio and the principle of protecting the 
legal interest do not limit in absolute terms criminal law, but are something 
to be discussed while preparing a legislative proposal.93
The Limiting Principles
Kumm has pointed out that the legislator must opt for the measure that 
is the least disruptive one and is necessary for the legitimate objective that 
addresses a common problem and sees proportionality as a limitation. 
He concludes that the Member States’ freedom to regulate should not 
be circumscribed any more than what is necessary.94 In Davies’ view also 
proportionality is a good tool to limit the EU’s competence to legislate.95
The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are relevant when 
considering the proper limits of the EU to legislate criminal law. In terms 
of the areas where Member States share competence with the EU, under 
the principle of subsidiarity, the EU may take action in situations where 
Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU 
policies through criminal law, Brussels, 20.9.2011 COM(2011) 573 final, p. 7
88  art. 5(4) TEU: ’…the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is 
necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.’
89  See art. 49(3) Charter of Fundamental Rights.
90  Böse 2011, p. 39.
91  See European Criminal Policy Initiative, ’A Manifesto on European Criminal 
Policy’, Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatic, 12/2009. 
92  Böse 2011, p. 35, 43.
93  Böse 2011, p. 42; See in the same volume the discussion on these principles by 
Petter Asp, who emphasizes the last-resort character of the criminal law in achiving 
the objectives set out by the Treaties, Asp 2011, p. 44.
94  Kumm 2006, p. 521.
95  Davies 2006, p. 66.
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the Member State actions have not been sufficient and the EU could act 
more effectively. The principle of subsidiarity is enshrined in the Treaty 
on European Union in art. 5(3).96 It should be born in mind however 
that as per art. 3 TFEU the competition law rules fall within the exclusive 
competence of the EU.
The principle of conferral shows the limits of the Union competences, 
meaning that the boundaries of the competences are set out in the Treaties. 
The principles of proportionality and subsidiarity are heavily linked, as was 
well expressed by Asp: ‘when it comes to proportionality the measure should 
be necessary to achieve the aim pursued; when it comes to subsidiarity it 
should be necessary to act on EU level’.97
With regard to the principle of subsidiarity one should carefully observe 
the nulla poena sine lege parlamentaria principle in the context of criminal 
law which touches upon matters of sovereignty: The society is best created 
at the regional level, not at the supranational one is the main premise of the 
subsidiarity principle, this way the citizens get the best opportunities to have 
an impact on the decisions influencing them.  Understandably one could 
argue that decisions with regard to criminal law are most appropriately taken 
at the national level within the EU, due to reasons relating to the election 
of the representatives and also the availability and standards attached to 
debates at the Member State level.98 Since criminal law is connected to the 
deep underlying values of the societies, the art 4(2) TEU requirement of 
respect for national identities should be observed.99
The Treaty on the European Union sets out in article 5(4) the following: 
“Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union 
action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaties.” The EU legislators should according to the principle show that 
actual contribution is achieved through the measures and that it does not 
reach any further than what is necessary and that the state or individual 
whose interests are involved, do not see an excessive effect on their interests 
– in other words no more force should be used than is necessary to achieve 
the desired result. 100 The court of justice of the EU has also extensively 
tackled the principle of proportionality, and based on the Fedesa case101  it 
has been argued that the principle forms a test divided into three parts” 
1. Is the measure suitable to achieve a legitimate aim? “ 2 Is the measure 
necessary to achieve that aim? 3 Does the measure have an excessive effect 
96  Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union - Article 5 ,  Official Journal 
115 , 09/05/2008 P. 0018 – 0018; See Turner 2012, p. 8.
97  Asp 2013 p. 183
98  Asp 2013 pp. 184-185
99  Asp 2013 p. 186
100  Turner 2012, pp. 8-9.
101  C-331/88 R v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Fedesa [1990 ] 
ECR I-4023.
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on the applicant’s interests?” .102 Chalmers, Davies and Monti argue that 
there is a test of necessity and suitability where the suitability refers to ‘the 
relationship between the means and the end’ and necessity to ‘weighing 
competing interests’. This way the Court may review the appropriateness of 
possible criminal law measures. Arguably the proportionality test is much 
more leniently applied to the EU institutions by the Court than to Member 
State measures. 103 Davies had argued that the national autonomy should 
be protected from the community’s measures less worth while by giving 
full effect to the proportionality principle in the court’s judicial review, 
assessing whether the EU measure truly is so important that it warrants the 
Member State’s interests being affected.104 As pointed out by Jenia Turner 
respecting the principle of proportionality means simultaneously that due 
respect is given to Article 4(2) TEU which requires the respect for national 
identities.105 The union legislators are however adamant that criminal 
measures are necessary to combat cross-border crimes.106
In addition to the foregoing, the principle of proportionality may 
be understood as referring to the proportionate relationship between the 
severity of the penalty and the gravity of the offence which is determined 
by the harm and culpability, thus calling for just deserts.107 This may be 
witnessed in Regulation 1/2003 art. 20, whereby it is stipulated that the 
calculation of fines is to have regard to the severity of the violation.108 
In terms of retrospective proportionality one may separate the ordinal 
proportionality which sets out the requirement that individuals convicted 
of similar offences should be subject to penalties of equal harshness, whereas 
cardinal proportionality refers to question whether the perpetrator deserves 
to be punished in the absolute sense.109 The retrospective proportionality 
is spelled out in Article 49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Asp 
is doubtful of the limiting ability at the EU level.110 As opposed to that 
he believes that the prospective proportionality principle could be more 
important if duly observed, especially the criterion of necessity, which has 
arguably been ignored in the area of criminal law harmonization, despite the 
primary importance of the proportionality principle among other EU law 
principles. The ultima ratio principle has a connection to the prospective 
102  Chalmers, Davies & Monti 2010, p. 367.
103  Chalmers, Davies & Monti 2010, p. 368.
104  Davies 2006. p. 83.
105  Turner 2012, p. 9.
106  Turner 2012, p. 9.
107  Asp 2013 pp. 189-190
108  Asp 2013 p. 191
109  Asp 2013 pp. 199-200
110  Asp 2013  p. 203
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proportionality principle, thus especially highlighting the importance of it 
from the perspective of criminal policy.111
The Principle of Legality
The principle of legality may be regarded among the most important 
criminal law principles and therefore must be examined briefly even when 
discussing a possible criminalization of cartels. It may be found in art. 7 
of the ECHR. It may be divided into four sub-divisions, which have been 
confirmed by the ECtHR112: 
1.  The criminal conduct must be prescribed by the written law, 
also referred to as nulla poena sine lege scripta
2.  The ban on retroactive criminal law, the Latin equivalent being 
nulla poena sine lege praevia
3.  The ban on application by analogy, also called nulla poena sine 
lege stricta
4.  Finally the principle of certainty, the requirement precisely 
defined law, also known as nulla poena sine lege certa.
If the EU adopted criminal law regulations the principle of legality 
would apply to such measures at the EU level.113 
The expression nulla poena sine lege parlamentaria, means in the 
context of EU criminal law that from a democratic perspective criminal laws 
should be adopted by the representatives of the people in the parliaments 
due to the lengths that criminal law can go in interfering with the lives of 
the people. This could be regarded as a part of the principle of legality. It 
further corroborates the subsidiarity principle.114
Besides the principle of legality, the principle of culpability is important 
in the area of criminal law, and is incorporated in art. 6 of the ECHR. It 
means that criminal liability cannot be invoked in the absence of mens 
rea. It is principally the legislator who should make laws that adhere to 
this principle115  – thus by not enacting laws that establish liability in the 
absence of culpability. Strict liability follows from omitting the tenets of 
the culpability principle. 116
111  Asp 2013 pp. 204-205
112  See Asp 2013 pp. 168-169; See also the discussion in section 6.2. in this work.
113  Asp 2013, p. 177.
114  Asp 2013, pp. 177-178.
115  Asp 2013, pp. 178-179.
116  Asp 2013, p. 182.
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The Principle of Coherence
Besides the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, the principle 
of coherence is important with regard to the emerging EU criminal law. 
While the principle of coherence does not get as explicit recognition in 
the Treaties as the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity do, the 
Manifesto on European Criminal Policy urges the European legislator to 
see to the coherence of the criminal justice systems of the Member States by 
not introducing measures that would require maximum penalties that would 
not be in harmony with the national system. Further, the Manifesto stated 
that ‘the European legislator must pay regard to the framework provided 
for in different EU-instruments’ and referred to Article 11(3) TEU which 
calls for coherent Union actions in the horizontal sense.117 The foregoing 
is interesting with regard to competition law sanctions, which arguable are 
of a similar penal value as insider trading – the Commission has proposed 
a minimum level regarding sanctions on market abuse. Duly observing 
coherence is important, as Asp points out criminal law is not just a tool for 
attaining specified aims, but also a way of sending a moral message. When 
the latter function is undermined by a lack of coherence then also the former 
ability of criminal law will suffer. Thus EU actions might have a considerable 
impact on national systems and thus restraint may be in place in the absence 
of good grounds to act.118 With regard to the horizontal coherence, lest the 
EU measures be inconsistent, the ordinal proportionality should be observed 
in relation to the introduction of minimum sanctions. Arguably it would be 
beneficial if EU criminal policy negotiations observed the aforementioned 
principles in order to produce coherent legislation.119 It appears that this 
principle has an important bearing on a possible criminalization of cartels 
that remain outside the reach of criminal law at the EU level, especially now 
that the Commission has proposed criminal rules against market abuse.
EU Cartel Sanctions and a ‘consistent and coherent’ EU Criminal 
Policy 
The Commission came out with a communication with regard to the EU 
criminal policy in the fall of 2011, which refers to a Eurobarometer survey 
that showed that the EU citizens were eager to see the EU put high priority 
on fighting crime.120 Bearing this in mind the Commission Communication 
117  See European Criminal Policy Initiative, ’A Manifesto on European Criminal 
Policy’, Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik, 2009. p. 709; Asp 2013, pp. 
206-207.
118  Asp 2013 p. 207; See also on fair labeling Ashworth Andrew, 2009. p. 78
119  Asp 2013 p. 212
120  See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of 
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‘Towards an EU Criminal Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation 
of EU policies through criminal law,’ underlines that as acknowledged by 
the Lisbon Treaty diversity exists among the different societies that have 
their own ‘basic values, customs and choices’ that the criminal law reflects. 
Understandably this then means that EU criminal law needs to be consistent 
and coherent to render added value.121 Such consistency requires due respect 
of the principles of proportionality and the ultima ratio principle, also 
acknowledged by the Commission’s Communication ‘Towards an EU 
Criminal Policy’.122 The Commission states that there should exist a shared 
understanding of the guiding principles in the field of EU criminal law. 123
In principle this approach by the Commission is commendable, but as 
pointed out by Herlin-Karnell such a cautious approach by the Commission 
might be undermined by the fact that ‘consistent and coherent’ criminal 
law could be understood to require increasingly more EU criminal law, 
which would conflict with the idea of giving space for the different values 
of the multiple societies within the EU. For instance the recent Directive 
on market abuse does not convince everyone that this objective is being 
duly observed by the Commission.124 
How should the hard-core cartels be seen in this context considering 
that they severely impede the functioning of the free market system and 
cause economic damage? The legal interest that is protected is the free market 
economy, which is arguably of same caliber than several other legal interests 
that are protected by the criminal law.125 
Furthermore as at the EU level the cartel control is administrative in 
name at least and as the EU may take over serious cartel cases from national 
authorities a question arises in cases where the national regime is based on 
criminal law: can it be considered to be ‘a coherent and consistent criminal 
policy’, as Harding asks, that an international cartel may be subject to a 
corporate fine, whereas individuals at the local level may be jailed?126 This 
EU policies through criminal law, Brussels, 20.9.2011 COM(2011) 573 final, p. 2; 
Eurobarometer 75 (Spring 2011). Available online at http://ec.europa.eu/public_
opinion/archives/eb/eb75/eb75_publ_en.pdf. Last visited on the 20th of December 
2012. P. 13
121  COM(2011) 573 final, p. 3; See also Herlin-Karnell Ester 2012c, p. 493.
122  See Manifesto on the EU Criminal Policy in 2009. Available online at http://www.
zis-online.com/dat/artikel/2009_12_383.pdf. Last accessed on the 20th of December 
2012. under the heading ’2. The ultima ratio principle’;  Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards an EU Criminal 
Policy: Ensuring the effective implementation of EU policies through criminal law, 
Brussels, 20.9.2011 COM(2011) 573 final p. 7
123  COM(2011) 573 final, p 12; Herlin-Karnell Ester 2012c, p. 493.
124  COM (2011) 654 final; Herlin-Karnell Ester 2012c, p. 493.
125  See Matikkala 2009, p. 276.
126  Harding 2012, p. 146.
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calls for a more nuanced approach by the EU with regard to the dividing 
line between administrative and criminal sanctions, especially now that the 
Lisbon Treaty has explicitly broadened the EU criminal law powers.
It seems relevant that the EU Commission has made a proposal to 
introduce minimum criminal law rules for market abuses at the EU level.127 
It may be asked whether it can be justified that individual cartelists go 
unpunished under the EU anti-cartel enforcement regime? 128
It is important to juxtapose hard-core cartels with other white-collar 
offences of arguably similar penal value, such as insider trading. This should 
be part of a ‘consistent and coherent’ EU criminal policy. The quest for a 
‘consistent and coherent’ EU criminal policy should include an extensive 
overall evaluation of the control policy, where both the criminal penalties 
and administrative sanctions are compared.129 
4.9 SHOULD CARTELS BE CRIMINALIZED AT THE 
LEVEL OF THE EU INSTITUTIONS, THROUGH 
HARMONIZED RULES AT THE MEMBER STATE 
LEVEL OR SHOULD IT BE UP TO INDIVIDUAL 
MEMBER STATES TO DO AS THEY PLEASE?
It may be useful to mention that one contested point is whether cartels 
should be criminalized at the Member State level or at the level of EU 
institutions or alternatively the criminalization project could be left to 
willing individual Member States. Harmonizing criminal law rules under 
art. 83(2) TFEU means that such criminal prohibition would remain absent 
at the level of the EU institutions. Wils has argued that the criminalization of 
cartels only at the Member State level would not be supportive of the leading 
role of the European Commission in the cartel enforcement if cartels were 
more effectively uncovered at the national level. In addition, the information 
exchange between the European Competition Authorities would suffer.130 
Furthermore, Wils has proposed that instead of a community prison, the 
127  See the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation Brussels, 20.10.2011 
COM (2011) 654 final. 
128  See Matikkala 2009, p. 278; See also Whelan 2007, p. 28.
129  See Lahti 2011, p. 46.
130   Wils, Wouter. ‘Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?’ Paper 
presented  in Amsterdam on 17-18 February 2005. pp. 46-52; The Swedish 
Government deliberations on a possible criminalization of cartels in Sweden 
concluded in a similar fashion as Wils did that the information exchange between 
MS competition authorities could suffer as a result of a criminalization and inter 
alia for this reason ended up rejecting such a project. See to this effect (in Swedish): 
Regeringens proposition 2007/08:135, pp. 152-153
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Member States could execute the prison sentences that at the EU level are 
imposed by the General Court of the EU (former Court of First Instance).131
Wils however acknowledged that the rejected Constitutional Treaty’s 
provision which closely resembled art. 83(2) TFEU, as the legitimate legal 
basis, would seem to block the possibility of criminalizing cartels at the 
level of the EU institutions due to the possibility of using only directives 
and not regulations.132
Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003 seeks to ensure information exchange 
between Member States that employ criminal enforcement with Member 
States that do not. Consequently Wils argues that the investigations would 
be supported by an EU-wide criminalization of cartels.133 This would also 
be beneficial in terms of extradition, and director disqualification orders 
that could take effect across Europe.134 As Wils points out when no leniency 
applicants have come forward, the investigations in Member States where 
criminal enforcement is absent, could suffer due to the possibility of 
prison sentences in other Member States and also due to the exchange of 
information between the competition authorities. Leniency as a detection 
tool could be impaired if the firms concluded that no detections occur 
unless there are leniency applicants. There is also the possibility that Member 
States lacking the criminal penalties could piggyback on the efforts of the 
Members States that employ such penalties.135
The leniency applications are an important detection tool of the 
Competition Authorities. Frese has advanced the argument that due to 
the functioning of Leniency the cartel criminalization should take place at 
the EU level as in the opposite case, where cartels were criminalized at the 
Member State level, the Leniency programs could be undermined due to 
a lack of transparency.136 
In Simonsson’s view art. 103 TFEU seems most viable as a legal basis 
for an EU-wide criminalization of the cartel conduct, but adds that this is 
dependent on the competences of the Union to do so under the Treaties.137 
However a possible alternative way forward is that cartels could be 
first criminalized by individual Member States. This is something that 
131  Wils 2002 ch 8, point 8.7.4.6.
132  Wils 2005a p. 159.
133  Wils 2005a, p. 154.
134  Wils 2005a, p. 154.
135  Wils 2005a, p. 155, also footnote 182.
136  Frese 2006, p. 208; Whelan acknowledged that ‘[i]rrespective of any future 
institutional development, reasons can nonetheless be advanced as to why criminal 
sanctions should in practice be provided for and/or imposed at EC level. But any 
effort at EC criminalization would involve significant legal and political challenges, 
and perhaps popular censure. It is principally for this pragmatic reason that 
criminalisation is best suited to national level, at least for the foreseeable future.’ See 
Whelan 2008, pp. 375-376 and Whelan 2007.
137  Simonsson 2011, p. 207.
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Simonson has envisaged. In her view the problems concerning inter alia a 
possible harmonization of cartel investigation and detection at the EU level 
favour a Member State led cartel criminalization project.138 Further, Reindl 
has argued that a situation where Member States criminalize cartels before 
the EU would be supported by the more thorough experience that the 
Member States have in prosecuting white-collars.139 Indeed the Competition 
Commissioner, Almunia, has rejected the criminalization of cartels at the EU 
level due to ‘the current legislative framework (e.g., there are no EU criminal 
courts).’140 Furse has recently pointed out however that the UK’s failure in 
its criminal prosecutions is likely to dissuade other Member States from 
taking the criminalization path and that ‘it is the very lack of harmonization 
and control at the EU centre that is responsible, significantly, for difficulties 
and limitations encountered in the operation of national criminal laws, at 
least in the UK, and Ireland.’141 
It should be noted, that the final call will obviously be made by the 
Member States and the European Commission, if they should one day 
desire the criminalization of cartels at the level of the institutions and 
through harmonized rules at the Member State level, as Wils notes, the 
Treaty provisions may be amended to the liking of the Member States and 
the Commission.142
4.9.1 The Consistent Application of Law 
One possible problem is related to the consistent application of law under 
an EU-wide criminal cartel regime. The task of seeing to the consistent 
application of law is assigned to the European Commission in art. 105 
TFEU. Currently the cooperation between the competition authorities 
is addressed by Regulation 1/2003, but the situation could be different 
under a criminal regime, if the criminal prohibition of cartels would be 
enforced in the Member State courts due to possible practical reasons, thus 
circumscribing the ability of the Commission to check on the consistent 
application of law.143 The Commission does not have a standing in national 
courts, and the Commission is not empowered to interfere in the case 
handled by the national court. Under the current regime the Member States 
have to provide the Commission with information regarding a given case 
138  Simonsson 2011, p. 216; Also Reindl opines that Cartels should be criminalized at 
the MS level, see Reindl 2006 p. 127.
139  Reindl 2006, p. 126.
140  Rivas 2011, p. 2.
141  Furse 2012, p. 223.
142  Wils 2005a p. 159.
143  Simonsson 2011, p. 213.
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and the Commission is entitled to give amicus curiae advice as per regulation 
1/2003 art. 15(2) and art. 15(3).144
Checking on consistency would be difficult inter alia due to variations in 
the national laws, for example regarding procedural questions. As Simonson 
indicates the ECJ might at the end of the day give a ruling on consistency.145
Another possibility, put forward by Wils, would be to have resort 
to art. 86 TFEU which says the following: ‘In order to combat crimes 
affecting the financial interests of the Union, the Council, by means of 
regulations adopted in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may 
establish a European Public Prosecutor’s Office from Eurojust.’ The public 
prosecutor could then be entrusted with the investigation and prosecution 
of the relevant cases in the competent Member State courts. As Wils points 
out, this would mean that the European Commission could no longer be 
the prosecutor and the EU Courts could not adjudicate the cases.146
Simonsson has suggested that the most viable option would be to let 
the most resourceful Member States to start criminalizing cartels while the 
remaining Member States could still assist in the investigation as per article 
22 of Regulation 1/2003 or provide evidence as set out in article 12(3).147 
In Simonsson’s opinion a harmonization of cartel criminalization 
would further fragment the EU Competition law control as a result of 
the numerous regulators and countless courts dealing with it. Eventhough 
leaving the criminalization to only the few resource-rich Member States 
would let the remaining free-riding Member States not introducing a 
criminalization enjoy the benefits, the harmonized criminalization is not 
either likely to produce an evenly shared workload between the Member 
States as the resources vary depending on the Member State.148 
4.9.2 Art. 6 ECHR and the Division of Functions
In the context of a possible criminal antitrust enforcement regime issues 
relating to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
144  Simonsson 2011, p. 214.
145  Simonsson 2011, P. 214.
146  Wils 2005a p. 159; See also Simonsson 2011, p. 214.
147  It may be useful to mention that art. 12(3) provides that the evidence acquired 
can be used against natural persons only if the sending authority has sanctions of 
a similar kind with regard to the violations of TFEU articles 101 or 102. If this 
requirement is not met the evidence can still be used against a natural person if the 
gathering of the evidence has been conducted so that the rights of defense have been 
respected to the same degree as the law stands in the Member State of the receiving 
authority. See EU 1/2003 Regulation 2003; Also Whelan envisaged that if the 
European jurisdictions with criminalized regimes prove victorious, other jurisdictions 
may alter their viewpoints. See Whelan 2012a p. 2.
148  Simonsson 2011, pp. 215-216.
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are liable to rise. Antitrust enforcement occurs in Europe both at the EU 
level and at the national level. Irrespective of the level where antitrust 
enforcement takes place Article 6 ECHR must be observed. The same 
appears to be true regardless of the mode of enforcement, be it administrative 
or criminal or whether the accused is a corporation or a natural person. 
However when criminal enforcement takes place or custodial sanctions 
are imposed the protection is more extensive. Already the criminal charges 
may cause considerable harm to the defendant despite an acquittal later.149
Article 6 ECHR provides the right to a fair trial. Art. 6 ECHR provides 
that in the determination of any criminal charge, everyone is entitled to a 
fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law.150 The presumption of innocence until 
proved guilty according to law is incorporated in the second paragraph.151 
Finally certain minimum rights are spelled out under the third paragraph. 
These rights include the right to be informed promptly, in a language, 
which the accused understands in detail and of the nature and cause of the 
accusations made. Further adequate time and facilities must be available 
for the preparation of defence. The right to legal assistance, the right to 
examine witnesses and the free assistance of an interpreter if needed is set 
out in the provision.152
The word ‘criminal’ has an independent meaning under the European 
Human Rights law. Its interpretation has been liberal. Due to the liberal 
interpretation of the word ‘criminal’ it has previously been subject to debate 
whether Article 6 ECHR is also applicable to the administrative antitrust 
procedure initiated by the Member States or the EU. At any rate introducing 
the criminalization would subsequently require the observance of article 6 
ECHR in antitrust proceedings. Moreover the domestic criminal law may 
still provide safeguards that are not equivalent to the ones under article 6 
ECHR and which are applied under administrative proceedings of criminal 
law nature. 153
Under an administrative regime it is possible that the investigative and 
prosecuting authority also exercises the adjudicative function. Thus the 
same body will collect the evidence and employ it against the defendant, 
either a natural person or an undertaking and finally will decide whether 
an infringement has taken place. The same body would also decide which 
sanction to impose. Afterwards a court may merely review the lawfulness of 
the decision. Most EU member states operate in the aforementioned fashion 
149  Whelan, 2011 pp. 217-218
150  ECHR article 6(1).
151  ECHR article 6(2).
152  ECHR article 6(3).
153  Whelan, 2011 p. 220.
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as does the European Commission.154 However in Finland for instance 
these functions are divided between the Competition authority and the 
Market Court.
The European Court of Human Rights in its case law has ruled that 
administrative proceedings may also invoke article 6 ECHR. It does not 
matter whether the offence is under domestic law either disciplinary or 
criminal if it provides for deprivation of liberty Article 6 ECHR applies. 
When assessing the applicability of article 6 ECRH the domestic classification 
of the the act, the nature of the offence, the severity of the punishment 
are something that the Court will assess when making a decision on the 
applicability of article 6 ECHR.155 
Article 6 ECHR entitles anyone who is criminally charged to have his 
case tried ‘by an independent and impartial tribunal.’ For example prima 
facie the European Commission which investigates the case, prosecutes and 
adjudicates does not fulfill the criteria of an ‘independent and impartial 
tribunal.’ Thus the European Commission cannot be deemed to be an 
independent tribunal in the sense of article 6 ECHR.156 Both the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights and the General Court of the EU 
consider this dilemma solved as the decision by the European Commission is 
always subject to the review by the General Court which is an ‘independent 
and impartial tribunal.’157 For example Wils has argued that the requirements 
of article 6 ECHR are met as a result of the General Court’s review.158 
However this view is not commonly accepted.159 
Concerning custodial sanctions the above reasoning is not sufficient: 
Article 6 ECHR requires that already the first instance to tackle the matter 
satisfies the condition of an independent and impartial tribunal – this 
interpretation was confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights in 
the case De Cubber v. Belgium, where it was not sufficient that only the 
appeal level satisfies the criteria of an ‘independent and impartial tribunal’ 
as the matter was not classified by the domestic law as administrative or 
disciplinary.160 Obviously it follows that if cartels were criminalized at the 
EU level the European Commission could no longer retain its adjudicatory 
function if it still remained the investigative and prosecutorial authority – 
154  Whelan, 2011 p. 226.
155  Case of Engel and others v. the Netherlands Judgment Strasbourg 8 June 1976 paras 
81, 82, 83; Whelan, 2011 p. 226
156  Roth 2006, p. 5.
157  See Case of Bryan v. the United Kingdom  Judgment Strasbourg 22 November 1995 
at para 40.; Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium Judgment Strasbourg 10 February 
1983 para 29. ; Case T-348/94 Enso Española v. Commission of the European 
Communities  (1998), paragraph 62.; Whelan 2011 p. 227.
158  Wils 2003a, p. 10.; Whelan, 2011 p. 227.
159  Whelan, 2011 p. 227.
160  De Cubber v. Belgium Judgment Strasbourg 26 October 1984 at para 32. ; Whelan, 
2011 p. 228.
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this division of functions however would not have to impair the possibilities 
to secure convictions.161
It can be claimed that the division of functions requires more resources 
as two separate bodies would need to acquire information that may be 
identical and thus less convictions would be secured with a specific amount 
of resources which would also undermine deterrence. However this line of 
reasoning can be weakened if one considers a system where the investigative, 
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions are under one authority but in 
addition a review by a tribunal is often made use of – thus there is already 
inherently another unit that does the investigation, which renders duplicate 
costs inevitable.162 
The division of functions could also greatly improve the procedure by 
cutting its length and ease the access to documents.163 The division would 
also prevent a ‘prosecutorial bias’ from taking place. Wils has identified three 
different kinds of prosecutorial biases related to the human psychology. 
By Confirmation bias Wils refers to the inclination of people to try to 
support rather than to call into question something that one has believed 
to be true. Also the European Commission could be influenced by such 
a bias: under articles 101 and 102 TFEU the investigations are launched 
only after the officials believe that the antitrust rules have been infringed, 
which definitely creates a fertile ground for such a bias.164
The hindsight bias refers to a situation where one thinks that after 
certain outcomes have taken place that they could have been predicted 
while underestimating the possibility that an alternative sequence of events 
could have taken place. Thus in the European Commission or in the DG 
Competition where the resources for enforcement are not abundant and 
the resources should be wisely allocated the people involved in enforcement 
are motivated to justify their decisions. However obviously miscalculations 
happen and at the stage of the second phase investigation or upon sending 
the statement of objections it could appear that no antitrust infringement 
had actually taken place or only a minor one. This could lead to the 
hindsight bias where the officials would view the initial choice to launch 
the second phase investigation as erroneous.  The Commission officials may 
then experience the so called cognitive dissonance if the initial choice was 
erroneous as it would not be in accordance with their trust in themselves. 
As an experience the cognitive dissonance is not comfortable and therefore 
people generally seek to circumvent knowledge that could induce such a 
mental state. It follows that the Commission officials who initially decided 
to launch the second phase investigation may be unmotivated to divert the 
161  Whelan, 2011 p. 228.
162  Wils 2003a, p. 23; Whelan, 2011 p. 228; See however Reindl 2006, p. 122.
163  Whelan, 2011 p. 228.
164  Wils 2003a, p. 16.
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course of action and decide that no prohibition decision should be made 
after all. Besides the internal motivation to refrain from such a decision it 
could also be attributed to a desire to show for instance someone higher in 
rank who may be influenced by the hindsight bias that the initial decision 
was not erroneous.165
The third prosecutorial bias is what could be called the desire to keep 
up appearances. In other words the officials working at the European 
Commission naturally wish show the world that they are up to their task 
by having for example a certain number of cartels detected and fines being 
imposed. These numbers are made public in the form of statistics. However 
the outside observers cannot easily conclude whether the infringements were 
justly punished, they can most likely only admire or criticize the number of 
decisions. This could incentivize abuse on part of the Commission officials 
in order to keep up appearances.166
To sum it up, it can thus be argued that it would be actually 
commendable that a division of functions would take place at the EU level. 
This would improve the chances of errorless adjudication by the European 
Commission. The argument to oppose a criminalization at the European 
level could be the added costs that a required division of functions would 
cause. However the above reasoning goes to show that also notable benefits 
could ensue which might outweigh the counterarguments.
4.9.3 The ’Effect on Member State Trade’ Requirement
According to Simonsson one of the problems regarding an EU-wide cartel 
criminalization would be that Article 101 TFEU which prohibits cartels at 
the EU level, is not applicable to cartels where the ‘effect on trade’ between 
member states is absent. Cartels that do not have an “effect on trade” could 
thus not induce criminal liability at the EU level.167 The Commission has 
stated that ‘agreements that are local in nature are in themselves not capable 
of appreciably affecting trade between Member States.’ The trade between 
Member States could be affected however if a sufficiently large share of the 
market is foreclosed.168
Consequently if a criminal enforcement regime in connection to art. 
101 TFEU was introduced there are likely to occur criminal trials contesting 
the “effect on trade” criterion. In the absence of an “effect on trade” the 
165  Wils 2003a, pp. 17-18.
166  Wils 2003a, pp. 18-19.
167  Simonsson 2011, p. 207.
168  Commission Notice, Guidelines on the effect on trade concept contained in Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty, para 91; The ECJ has a ruling on the ’effect on trade’ 
criterion in the Hugin case, see C-22/78 Hugin v Commission of the European 
Communities, 31st May 1979. Para. 17.
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criminal case against natural persons would collapse. Under the current 
administrative enforcement system against infringing firms that is present 
at the EU level and on which most EU Member State regimes are modeled 
this problem does not occur since the unlawful agreements are liable to be 
caught by the national provisions if they escaped the supranational ones.169 
Thus arguably the criminal regime would be feasible only if domestic anti-
cartel criminal rules would complement a criminal prohibition at the EU 
level. Otherwise the legitimacy of the EU criminal Antitrust Enforcement 
regime could suffer. However as Simonsson points out the EU competition 
policy targets actions that have an effect on Member State trade, while 
actions of lesser impact are subject to Member State Laws.  If an EU-wide 
cartel criminalization sought to catch also cartels that do not have an effect 
on Member State trade, art. 103 TFEU as a legal basis appears problematic: 
Simosson notes that ‘[i]t would seem difficult to base harmonized cartel 
criminalisation on TFEU article 103 if participation in all cartels, large or 
small, should be included.’170
4.9.4 Costs of a Criminal Cartel Enforcement Regime
A Gradual Process
A ‘consistent and coherent’ EU criminal policy should also be informed 
of the costs of a possible criminal anti-cartel regime. What may be noted 
about criminal penalties is that arguably before the benefits of criminal 
cartel enforcement are likely to occur, the costs of such a system may take 
place.171 The lack of criminal prosecutions in the UK may be regarded as 
indicative of this.172 At an early stage of criminal enforcement there could 
be less convicting judgements which may raise questions as to the effective 
use of resources and therefore an advance awareness of this would do good 
both among the public and policy makers.173  The US experience shows 
that the step-by-step development of criminal cartel enforcement by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) began in the late 1950’s and has been gradually 
improved with the help of the Congress, it was only after 1974 that a more 
severe treatment of the cartel infringements took place.174 One may note 
that despite a span of more than a century of the Sherman act and the 
169  Simonsson 2011, p. 208.
170  Simonsson 2011, p. 208; Art. 103 TFEU reads ’1. The appropriate regulations or 
directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 101 and 102 shall be laid 
down by the Council, on proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament…’
171  Reindl 2006, p. 126.
172  Regarding the lack of criminal prosecutions in the UK see, Joshua 2011 p.155.
173  Reindl 2006, p. 126.
174  Kovacic 2011, p. 68.
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initial criminal prohibition of cartels, it was only during the past 20 years 
that criminal enforcement has really been stepped up in the US, regularly 
sending executives to prison.175
Besides the material costs derived from the criminal investigation, 
there is the risk that notwithstanding a criminal prohibition the cartel 
conduct would not appear to be affected or that criminal rules would not 
be applied. The outcome could be that the legitimacy of criminal sanctions 
suffers.176 This possibility could materialize for instance if the prosecution is 
not continually funded and supported to a sufficient degree subsequently 
resulting in the absence of prosecutions.177 
While contemplating the different options for cartel control, the costs 
of administrative and criminal regimes respectively may be compared.178 
In this regard it may be noted that in Sweden where the cartel control is 
of an administrative mode, the introduction of a criminal cartel offence 
was considered, but rejected. The Swedish discussion document estimated 
that an added 4,5 million euros would be needed annually if the criminal 
cartel offence was to be introduced.179 Thus one could investigate whether 
a better outcome would be attained by allocating such funds to the already 
existing administrative regime rather than investing in the introduction of a 
criminal cartel offence.180 In New Zealand a ministerial discussion document 
concluded that ‘there is a prima facie case for criminalization.’ It noted that 
assessing the costs of criminal enforcement is not easy and that the precise 
amount of resources required turns on the ‘nature of the criminal regime.’ It 
cited inter alia the criminal investigations, evidence rules and criminal trials 
as sources of costs that could make criminal enforcement more expensive 
than civil enforcement. 181 In contrast a proponent of individual criminal 
penalties, Wils has argued that due to the more robust investigative powers 
175  Massey 2012, p. 166.
176  Harding 2012, p. 142, 153.
177  Harding 2012, p. 147 .
178  As Harding notes the elaboration on the costs could further take note of the 
possibility of ‘over-enforcement’ if one cartel is prosecuted in several jurisdictions or 
if in parallel both individuals and the company face liability for one infringement. 
Harding also mentions that the cost calculations could include a comparison between 
private and public enforcement modes, Harding 2012, pp. 146-147.
179  See the Swedish Deliberation (in Swedish), SOU 2004:131 Konkurrensbrott - En 
lagstiftningsmodell p. 260; One reason why Finland and Sweden both rejected 
the criminalization of cartels is that the idea of inroducing a possiblity for plea 
barganing/leniency under the criminal justice system was foreign, the traditional 
Nordic approach is to give more value to the reprehensibilty of the crime rather than 
the perpetrator’s confession, see (in Swedish) Regeringens proposition 2007/08:135. p. 
151 and  (in Finnish) Kuoppamäki 2006, p. 66; on the Related German discussion 
see Wagner-Von Papp, 2011, p. 176 and Vollmer 2006, p. 259.
180  Simonsson 2011, p. 213.
181  Ministry of Economic Development, Cartel Criminalisation: Discussion Document, 
January 2010 p. 32
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available under a criminal regime, it might actually require less resources 
than an administrative mode of control.182 In any case assessing the costs of 
enforcement is a vital part of a thorough policy consideration.
Costs related to Personnel at the Member State Authorities
Cartel cases may often take several years, exceeding 10 years if appealed. 
This time-consuming nature of the proceedings is present both when the 
mode of control is either administrative or criminal.  In this respect the 
competition authorities and courts should have the sufficient resources to 
tackle the cases, as the coherent application of the law is of essence for the 
authorities themselves.183
It should be ensured that the competition authorities and courts have 
adequate resources to tackle antitrust matters in relation to the personnel 
working at the authority and the procedures.184 Simonsson argued that 
essentially this is a matter of attracting competent people, by for instance 
providing lucrative pay schemes. The private top notch advocates litigating 
the cases need to be matched by professional expertise at the competition 
authority. Further, the efforts of the competition authorities across Europe 
should be coordinated in order to create an effective EU-wide criminal ban 
on cartels. The success of a cartel criminalization would arguably directly 
depend upon the resources available to its enforcement.185 
Simonsson has pointed out that as the Union law does not determine 
the required resources for example in relation to the amount of needed 
personnel, the Member States themselves may evaluate the needed number 
of staff members. Thus in terms of the lengthy proceedings, in the context of 
an EU-wide cartel prohibition, the Commission might not be able to ensure 
that the relevant Member States authorities are provided with sufficient 
resources.186 
However as Simonsson acknowledges one could argue that the 
decentralization of anti-cartel enforcement has brought about a situation 
where the Member States are already sufficiently competent to introduce 
a criminal anti-cartel regime, which would not be especially resource-
intensive. For instance the prosecution of natural persons and firms could 
draw on the same pool of evidence and might even be tried under the same 
proceedings.187
182  For Wils’ comment, see Ehlermann and Atanasiu 2007, p. 244.
183  Simonsson 2011, p. 208.
184  Simonsson 2011, p. 208, 210.
185  Simonsson 2011, p. 209.
186  Simonsson 2011, pp. 209-210.
187  Simonsson 2011, p. 210.
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Costs Related to Language Translation and Extradition 
Due to the multitude of languages present in the various EU Member 
States, Simonsson also points out that as Article 6(3) ECHR guarantees 
that ‘everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum 
rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands 
and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.’ Also 
legal assistance free of charge should be provided, including an interpreter. 
As a result of the nature of cartels as an offence not observing the borders 
of the Member States, criminally prosecuted natural persons might often 
find themselves in a Member State whose language they do not speak. 
Subsequently resources would be required to meet this challenge. Currently 
under the regime against companies this is not as central, as it may be 
sought to bring charges against the business residing in the Member State 
that pursues the case and not another unit of the business group existing 
outside the Member State.188 
Simonsson noted also the costs related to extradition that emanate from 
the cooperation between the countries. Extradition arguably is an integral 
part of an effective criminal enforcement system.189
To sum it up, it appears necessary to acknowledge the costs that would 
accompany the introduction of an EU-wide criminal ban against cartels, 
but in light of the foregoing, the costs would not present one with sufficient 
grounds to reject a cartel criminalization project. 
4.10 DIRECTOR DISQUALIFICATION ORDERS 
– A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE TO CRIMINAL 
PENALTIES?
The OECD has recommended that its member states should consider the 
option of introducing custodial sanctions for hard-core cartels due to the 
insolvency cap with regard to optimal corporate fines and as anecdotal 
evidence speaks in favour of incarceration.190 Yet the European Competition 
Commissioner has rejected the introduction of criminal penalties at the EU 
level.191 In light of the foregoing and in an attempt to duly observe the ultima 
ratio principle it could be asked whether there are any viable alternatives 
188  Simonsson 2011, p. 212.
189  Simonsson 2011, p. 213.
190  OECD, Hard Core Cartels, Recent progress and challenges ahead, 2003. p. 
28; OECD, Hard Core Cartels: Third Report on the Implementation of the 
1998 Recommendation. 15.12.2005.  p. 27 and pp. 39-40; OECD, Council 
Recommendation Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, 1998.
191  Rivas 2011, p. 2.
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to the criminal penalties in order to bring about individual accountability 
into an antitrust regime that relies exclusively on corporate fines. Could 
the Director Disqualification Orders (hereinafter DDOs) present a feasible 
alternative? It seems at least that this is what Sweden concluded when it 
introduced the DDOs, but no criminal liability.192 
As DDOs represent a method of introducing individual accountability, 
they share some features with custodial sanctions and individual fines. 
DDOs introduce a certain period of time during which the offender may 
not be concerned in the management of a company. DDOs may not only 
be considered as an alternative to prison sentences, but the DDOs could 
also complement the prison sentences and fines in the array of sanctions 
available.193  A DDO carries with it an opportunity cost as the offender will 
have to step down as a manager which may affect the offender’s salary and 
future ability to find employment. DDOs may also affect the reputation of 
the offender, and could prevent recidivism.194 Furthermore, Ginsburg and 
Wright suggest that the DDOs may be useful against directors who out of 
negligence fail to implement compliance and are thus indirectly responsible 
for cartel activities.195 
In Finland however the Committee that produced a memorandum 
regarding the new Competition Act, did not propose the introduction 
of the DDOs due to the challenges involved in the surveillance and the 
identification of the responsible individuals.196 The problems of monitoring 
were also noted by the Swedish 2006 committee.197 The evidence from the 
UK is not encouraging: the imposition of a DDO under the Enterprise 
Act has yet to materialise. However, in the Marine Hoses case DDOs were 
imposed under Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.198 As far as 
the author knows no competition law DDOs have been imposed in Sweden 
either. Actually it has been reported that it seems that the perpetrators 
may circumvent the DDOs without much effort and that it apprears the 
compliance with the DDOs is not monitored to a sufficient degree.199 
Bernitz has pointed out that if the Swedish solution to adopt the DDOs 
192  See (in Swedish) Regeringens proposition 2007/08:135 p. 156.
193  Ginsburg and Wright 2010, p. 19. Also Stephan argues in favour of a ‘mixed’ 
approach, see Stephan 2011a, p. 8.
194  Ginsburg and Wright 2010, p. 19; see also OECD, Roundtable on promoting 
Compliance with Competition Law, DAF/COMP(2011)4, 07-Oct-2011. p. 17.
195  Ginsburg and Wright 2010, p. 19.
196  See The Ministry of Employment and the Economy , Kilpailulaki 2010 
(Competitiveness 4/2009) p. 53, 
197  SOU 2006:99 p. 574
198  Under this Act DDOs may be used in case of criminal offences. See Stephan 2011a, 
p. 4.; See also the discussion under section 8.3.5 in this work.
199  Sveriges television ’Brottslingarna kan enkelt kringgå näringsförbuden’, 26/10 2011.
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seems unsatisfactory, the issue of criminalizing cartels may well arise again 
in Sweden.200
In the UK context Stephan has pointed to the difficulty of monitoring 
the DDOs: a study regarding DDOs in cases of insolvency in 1997 indicated 
that DDOs did not present a significant obstacle for individuals seeking 
employment and that the perceived chance of getting caught running a firm 
once the DDOs had been imposed was not high. Stephan mentions also 
other studies, which indicate that the deterrent effect of the DDOs is not 
great,201 a US study from the 1970s suggests that the antitrust offenders’ 
value in the job markets is maintained even after a prison sentence.202 
Furthermore, in the EU context it is problematic that the EU law 
does not recognize DDOs and in the absence of DDOs in the legislation 
of some member states, the fact that a DDO is imposed in one member 
state does not inevitably translate into a situation where the disqualified 
director could not assume a senior position in another member state with 
no equivalent sanctions.203 
The DDOs may disproportionately apply to small businesses than 
larger ones, since it may be less plausible for a small company director to 
argue that he was not aware of the infringement.204 On a slightly different 
note, the Swedish Government Bill predicted that the DDO may target 
disproportionately smaller firms since in cartel conduct, the various 
individuals in the respective businesses may have comparatively speaking 
very different positions: for instance the individual engaged in cartel conduct 
from a smaller firm may be its owner or managing director whereas a lower-
ranking individual, who does not occupy any managerial positions may be 
the human link between the bigger company and the cartel. The Government 
Bill suggested that while the blameworthiness of the individuals may be on 
an equal level, this runs the risk that only the individuals employed by the 
smaller companies would be subject to DDOs.205
It may be noted also that many of the problems associated with criminal 
sanctions may be present with regard to DDOs and personal fines, as 
individuals may have recourse to the full array of legal protections in a 
similar fashion as under a criminal regime.206 The Swedish Government 
acknowledged that cases concerning corporate fines could become more 
cumbersome if the Competition Authority pursued a DDO due to reasons 
related to the collection of evidence: an individual who could be the possible 
200  Bernitz 2011. p. 213.
201  Stephan 2011a, p. 6.
202  Stephan 2008b, p. 30.
203  OFT, The impact of competition interventions on compliance and deterrence (OFT 
1391 December 2011) p. 36.
204  Stephan 2011a, p. 5.
205  Prop. 2007/08:135 p. 158
206  See Furse 2012, pp. 53-54
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target of a DDO could not be heard under similar conditions as previously.207 
The Swedish Government Bill noted the DDOs may be viewed as a criminal 
sanction under the European Convention of Human Rights and therefore 
the Competition Authority in the course of investigations should observe 
the defendant’s right against self-incrimination. What is more, Regulation 
1/2003 sets out in art. 12 a restriction on the information exchange between 
MS authorities when the evidence could be used in the pursuit of individual 
sanctions and therefore the Competition Authority must be careful not to 
use such information in a way that violates the rules of Regulation 1/2003 
lest the future cooperation be undermined.208 
Regarding the individual fines as a tool against cartels the 2006 
committee argued that the company might compensate the individual 
engaged in the cartel conduct something that would be difficult to prevent.209 
The DDOs on the other hand would be probably perceived by the target 
group as a stringent penalty, and would not be easily reimbursed by the 
firm. 210 The 2006 committee rejected the idea of introducing individual 
fines since it argued that the sanction system could become overburdened.211 
According to Wils the stigmatic effect and moral message of the DDOs 
could be stronger than that of the fines. Wils considers DDOs to be a 
viable complement to imprisonment and ‘a defensible second-best,’ but 
not a true alternative. In his view imprisonment appears to carry a stronger 
deterrent effect than the DDOs. In the absence of other individual penalties, 
it is possible that for the offender the DDO may represent just a route 
to retirement: the company could still compensate for the loss of salary 
etc.212  Whelan noted that one disadvantage is that DDOs may target only 
directors, whereas individuals engaged in prohibited conduct, but who are 
not directors escape DDOs – custodial sanctios do not suffer from a similar 
drawback.213 This deficiency prompted the 2006 committee to recognize that 
as a cartel fighting measure the individual fines could be imposed against a 
larger number of individuals. 214
The 2006 committee envisaged that the DDO as a measure would be 
primarily concerned with increasing the general preventive effect.215  The 
DDOs would put directors in a position where it is against their interests 
to suspect or to be aware of violations within the firm and turn a blind 
207  Prop. 2007/08:135 p. 159
208  Prop. 2007/08:135 p. 168
209  SOU 2006:99 p. 573
210  SOU 2006:99 p. 574
211  SOU 2006:99 pp. 575-576
212  Wils 2008a, p. 188; SOU 2006:99 p. 574
213  Whelan took the position that DDOs should be used only to accompany criminal 
penalties. See Whelan 2012d, p. 6.
214  SOU 2006:99 p. 574
215  SOU 2006:99 p. 584
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eye. The DDOs target the individuals who have the greatest sway over the 
employees and may seek to instill compliance within the company – the 
committee presumed that this may significantly increase compliance. 216 
The 2006 committee argued that the individual who could become 
subject to a DDO would have more to lose than a business, and therefore it 
would create additional instability from the perspective of a company that 
entered cartel conduct. Thus the whistle-blower may not only be another 
cartel member, but also an individual.217
For the DDO to be imposed it does not matter in what capacity 
the person in question exercised the managerial powers, as long as he had 
such powers.218 Regarding the question how to identify the responsible 
individuals for the purposes of imposing DDOs, the 2006 committee said 
that reference should be made to the criminal law principles regarding 
corporate responsibility:  in many larger firms tasks need to be delegated 
to lower-ranking individuals since the management cannot control every 
part. With the delegation of tasks the criminal responsibility shifts to the 
lower-ranking individuals. Even then however the company management 
however must ensure sufficient monitoring – if the management becomes 
aware of an infringement that was carried out by lower-ranking individuals 
who had taken on the delegated tasks, and if the management ignored the 
state of affairs, it may be held responsible the Swedish 2006 committee 
envisaged.219 
On a final note, a study commissioned in 2007 by the Office of Fair 
Trading showed that the surveyed companies regarded criminal penalties 
as the most important sanction followed by the director disqualification 
order.220 In Stephan’s view this could indicate that companies view fines ‘as 
a cost rather than as a penalty.’221 
To sum it up, it seems that as a stand-alone sanction for individual 
antitrust offenders the DDOs are not sufficient. On the other hand, using 
it as a complement to criminal penalties may be favoured. 
216  SOU 2006:99 pp. 575-576
217  SOU 2006:99 pp. 599-600
218  ibid. p. 590
219  SOU 2006:99 p. 594
220  The study surveyed 202 UK companies, see OFT, The Deterrent Effect of Competition 
Enforcement by the OFT, A Report Prepared for the OFT by Deloitte (OFT 962, 
November 2007). p.5 and pp. 70- 72. Another study commissioned by the OFT and 
undertaken by London Economics in 2011 attempted to assess the deterrent effect 
of competition intervention, thus sharing objectives with the earlier Deloitte 2007 
survey. The businesses surveyed amounted to 809. The results were mostly in line 
with those of the Deloitte study. However whereas the Deloitte study underlined the 
importance of individual sanctions, the newer findings suggested that reputational 
damage and fines are more important in the eyes of the businesses. See to this effect: 
OFT, The impact of competition interventions on compliance and deterrence (OFT 1391 
December 2011) p. 75
221  Stephan 2011a, p. 4.
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4.10.1 A Combination of Measures as the Ultimate Solution
Hazel Genn has indicated that ‘[c]companies which do not have a natural 
interest in safety require considerable advice, encouragement and coercion.’222 
Referring to Genn’s paper Beaton-Wells and Parker pointed out that business 
executives start weighing the costs and benefits of compliance only once 
the costs of not complying are publicized which in consequence raises their 
awareness to the perils of not obeying the rules.223
Various commentators have postulated tentatively that a mixture of 
measures may be beneficial in achieving deterrence, instilling a culture 
attentive to the antitrust rules.224 The variety of sanctions, including criminal 
penalties, fines, private damage actions and disqualification orders may 
possibly influence the management of a company to take the steps to change 
the corporate culture.225
As pointed out by Öberg this conforms to the idea of the tit-for-tat 
strategy as advocated by Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite. Essentially it means 
that an array of punishments and persuasion are available.226 Ayres and 
Braithwaite argue that as the toughness of the penalties increases so does the 
level of compliance that the agency is able to achieve and that simultaneously 
the need to employ tough measures decreases: ‘Regulatory agencies will be 
able to speak more softly when they are perceived as carrying big sticks.’227 
In their view this approach embraces both the rational choice doctrine and 
sociological studies in combination, forming the basis of the tit-for-tat 
strategy.228 Therefore at the EU level according to this approach penalties 
of varying severity should be available to the Commission, suggesting that 
individual penalties besides the criminal ones, could include inter alia 
director disqualification orders and personal fines, but as complements, 
not as stand-alone sanctions. 
4.11 CONCLUSION
In art. 83(2) TFEU there is an explicit legal basis to harmonize criminal rules 
within the EU Member States, subject to the fulfillment of certain criteria. 
222  Genn 1993. p. 219; Beaton-Wells and Parker 2012, p. 6, see footnote 33.
223  Beaton-Wells and Parker 2012, p. 6, see footnote 33.
224  See Stucke 2011, p. 288; Harding favours director disqualification orders over 
prison sentences, see Harding 2011, p.  375; Stephan 2011a, p. 8; Wils 2005a, pp. 
145, 147; See also Fingleton et al., 2007. p. 9ff.
225  See Harding 2011 p. 375
226  Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 5; Öberg has recently used the tit-for-tat argument 
in the context of antitrust violations, see Öberg 2011, p. 316.
227  Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 6.
228  Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, p. 19.
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Views have been voiced that a criminal prohibition of cartels should have 
its basis in art. 83(2) TFEU. On the other hand with regard to the possible 
cartel criminalization project it has been proposed that the sufficient prior 
harmonization in the competition law area would not be in place for the 
Union to proceed to criminalize cartels based on art. 83(2) TFEU. This 
author agrees with those who argue that it seems that the non-criminal 
and criminal measure could be adopted almost simultaneously. Regarding 
the essentiality requirement, it must be concluded, that empirical evidence 
is extremely hard to acquire and therefore it is unrealistic to expect such 
evidence.  It could be argued that already the existing anti-cartel regime has 
proved that more robust measures, including the criminal ones, are needed. 
The Commission has recently made a proposal regarding harmonized 
criminal rules on market abuse – this initiative will be the first one to show 
the boundaries of art. 83(2) TFEU and may be of relevance with a view to 
a possible future harmonization in the area of competition law.
Another question is whether cartels should be criminalized at the level 
of the EU institutions or at the level of the Member States or both. In terms 
of the arguments presented above, such as the exchange of information 
between Member States and leniency, it seems that having harmonized 
criminal rules would be desirable. However there are practical problems 
concerning a criminalization at the level of the EU institutions, further the 
introduction of art. 83(2) TFEU may rule out such an option. Therefore it 
may be argued that it might be feasible that individual resourceful Member 
States would proceed with the cartel criminalization project. However, as 
Furse has pointed out, the collapse of the UK criminal cartel regime seems 
to prove that an EU-led project could be more viable. For the time being it 
seems that the EU is reluctant to proceed in this area, and therefore it appears 
that at least in the near future, it falls on the Member States themselves to 
adopt criminal rules, if such a level of condemnation is seen as appropriate. 
As was pointed out, the resources required to properly enforce a possible 
criminal prohibition of cartels would be considerable and should definitely 
be a part of the consideration of such a project both at the EU level and at 
the level of the Member States. Based on the above this author tends to think 
that criminal anti-cartel enforcement is needed both at the EU level and 
at the Member State level, and if the former requires Treaty amendments, 
this may not be excluded as a possibility in the future. For now, it seems 
however, that the intricacies of possible criminal cartel enforcement are to 
be solved at the Member State level.
A ‘consistent and coherent’ EU criminal policy with regard to cartels, an 
egregious antitrust violation, should take into account a number of factors. 
The policy should provide consistency by criminally prohibiting conduct 
of similar penal value to support the credibility of the criminal justice 
system. It may be argued that the relative penal value of cartels warrants a 
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criminal prohibition. While the EU exercises its criminal law competence, 
due respect should be given to the principle of ultima ratio, using criminal 
law only as the last resort thus keeping in check the broad EU criminal 
law powers. The EU criminal policy should have a clear approach as to the 
distinction between administrative and criminal sanctions in order to ensure 
that the appropriate message is conveyed to the public: when the ultimate 
condemnation of criminal law is needed the director disqualification order 
does not provide the proper signal as it lacks the stigmatizing label that 
criminal penalties carry. Arguably director disqualification orders are not 
sufficiently deterrent, but are still a good complement to criminal sanctions 
- no conclusive evidence as to the deterrent effect of criminal penalties exists, 
but anecdotal evidence, various attempts at measuring deterrence and the 
possible educative function indicate that adding criminal penalties to an 
anti-cartel enforcement regime could create deterrence. It is argued that the 
European Commission ultimately needs a mixture of measures, including 
a big stick, to adequately address the cartel problem in Europe.
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5  Punitive Administrative   
 Sanctions in Finland and   
  Sweden: Neither Fish nor   
 Fowl
This chapter discusses the systems of sanctions in Finland and Sweden and 
the criticism of the aforementioned systems that has been prompted by 
their arguable incoherence. Outside the US cartel regulation ‘has been of a 
predominantly administrative character...’.1 However the matter has been 
recently a hotbed for debate, and as Whelan has pointed out the debate has 
extended beyond the academic realms since some European countries have 
moved to criminalize cartels and even more countries have considered the 
possibility of doing so.2 
There is a range of various penalties employed against antitrust 
infringements within the EU member states, for instance Sweden, 
Luxembourgh and Holland do not employ criminal sanctions, whereas 
the UK, Germany and Estonia do.3 Whelan predicted that due to reasons 
related to efficiency it is not probable that the administrative sanctions 
against competition law infringements would be dropped in favor of criminal 
sanctions, rather they are going to exist in parallel. Further the challenges 
involved in a criminalization project may be daunting to some member 
states.4 Some member states with less mature competition law regimes 
might understandably choose to wait until their competition law cultures 
are more developed.5 Against such a backdrop administrative sanctions 
particularly in Finland will be explored, first on a more general level.
In Finland administrative sanctions have been employed for a long 
time. They have been applied in parallel with criminal sanctions and 
control policy discussions have tackled the possible measures extensively.6 
1  Harding 2006, p. 181.
2  Whelan 2013b, p. 144; See for instance the discussion in Beaton-Wells and Ezrachi 
2011. 
3  See Whelan 2013b,  p. 147; For a brief statement of the criminal sanctions across 
EU member states see, O’Kane 2009, pp. 325-327.
4  Whelan 2013b,  p. 147; See also OFT, An Assessment of Discretionary Penalties 
Regimes, OFT 1132, 2009 at para. 1.4.
5  Whelan 2013b, p. 148; See also Fingleton et al. 2007, Under the heading 
’Conclusion’. 
6  Kiiski 2011 p. 4.
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During the 1970s the criminal policy objectives were remolded and the 
most important goal of the criminal sanction was considered to be the 
condemnation that it carries. This then showed the citizens what conduct 
negatively affects the society.7 One of the aims was the curbing of the ever-
increasing employment of criminal law.8 Further, one goal was that the 
culpability should be proportionately reflected in the sanction. Criminal 
enforcement brings costs, and the awareness of this increased during the 
1970s and thus the criminal policy was to take this into account as well.9 
What has been the outcome policy wise in the recent decades shall be the 
focus of this chapter. The suggested changes will be taken into account and 
the relevance of the EU in this regulation environment.
Several commentators have indicated that there seems to be an increasing 
need to develop a consistent approach as to the entire control policy, not 
just the criminal penalties, but also the sanctions that are administrative, 
but of a penal nature.10 The Nordic and Finnish approach has been to 
consider administrative sanctions as something complementary to the 
criminal sanction system, but not an alternative. Their development has 
not drawn on the general criminal law doctrine. 11 The lack of a systematic 
approach as to the administrative sanctions may be explained in the Nordic 
context by the absence of a German like ‘Ordnungswidrigkeit’ – system 
which is a coherent system of administrative sanctions.12 Warnling-Nerep 
argues that the lack of a systematic approach is problematic. She highlights 
the legal uncertainty that the lack of a systematic approach with regard to 
the administrative sanctions brings about.13 Both administrative sanctions 
and criminal sanctions may aim to create deterrence.14 Thus if statutory 
rules were introduced regarding administrative sanctions, determining the 
boundaries of such rules might not be easy.15
The criminal law committee that handed over its deliberation on 
the Finnish criminal policy decades ago is still today influential.16 The 
criminal law committee envisaged already in the 1970s a system where 
minor violations would be addressed by a system of administrative sanctions 
– this proposal never materialized however.17 As opposed to this proposal 
7  Kiiski 2011 p. 4.
8  Kiiski 2011 p. 5.
9  Kiiski 2011 p. 5.
10  Lahti 2012, p. 9; See Warnling-Nerep 2010; Kiiski 2011. 
11  Kiiski 2011, p. 6.
12  Lahti 2012, p. 9.
13  Warnling-Nerep 2011, p. 121.
14  Kiiski 2011 p. 9.
15  See Warnling-Nerep 2011 p. 122.
16  See Rikosoikeuskomitean mietintö 1976:72; Kiiski 2011 p. 6.
17  See (The Committee deliberation on Criminal Law) Rikosoikeuskomitean mietintö 
1976:72 pp. 86-90.
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it was early on decided that no administrative sanction system would be 
created as an alternative to criminal justice system and an evaluation of the 
advantages and disadvantages regarding the proposed criminal prohibitions 
was scarcely made. Thus for instance introduction of the antitrust fines for 
antitrust law violations and the fines for the market abuse violations did 
not occur after a thorough consideration regarding the advantages and 
disadvantages of the criminal law and administrative sanctions. Arguably 
this may be regarded as a conspicuous flaw in the law drafting stage.18 
Indeed administrative sanctions have been adopted in various areas 
without a clear coordination.  For example the on-the-spot-fine system in 
Finland (6/2983) that was amended in 2010 (754/2010) remained under 
the criminal law system despite views that since such minor violations are 
committed in great quantities, the general preventive effect would probably 
not be created to any large extent and that the ever increasing use of criminal 
law undermines the moral educative function of criminal law.19 On the 
other hand the white collars are ever more sophisticated in their operations 
and the offences extend to various spheres of life. Obviously this poses a 
challenge and requires that criminal law needs to be amended more often 
to get to grips with the evolving behavior.20 
To sum it up a more consistent control policy is called for to produce 
a system where the relative penal value is reflected in the robustness of the 
legal guarantees and the severity of the condemnation. Still effectiveness 
considerations should not be overlooked as will be demonstrated below. 
5.1 RETHINKING THE APPROACH AS TO THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS
Partially the EU is to be blamed for the confusion regarding the Finnish 
control policy: Prior to the Lisbon Treaty the EU lacked general criminal 
law competence which arguably brought about the expansion of the 
administrative law sanctions. The requirement of effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive sanctions in the implementation of EU law measures at 
the national level may have had an effect.21 Subsequently it can be argued 
that the system could have been more consistently developed if criminal 
law competences had been earlier available.22 As Warling-Nerep notes it 
18  Lahti 2006, pp. 54-55.
19  Lahti 2012, p. 11.
20  Lahti 2006, pp. 59-60.
21  Lahti 2012, pp. 9-10; Warnling-Nerep 2011 p. 119.
22  Matikkala 2009 p. 288.
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seems that the legislator, while enthusiastic about effectiveness, overlooks 
the requirement of proportionality.23 
In Warnling-Nerep’s view the aim towards effectiveness has completely 
overridden the legal certainty aspects.24 The administrative sanctions have 
been adopted out of a desire to prevent the inflation of criminal law, and to 
address the effectiveness concerns, that relate to the criminal law principles.25 
The administrative sanction has a deterrent and retributive aim, and has 
replaced criminal sanctions in Sweden.26 Further for instance Warnling-
Nerep says she agrees that the incapability of the criminal environmental 
law to prevent violations, also referred to as the paper tiger, may threaten 
the very legitimacy of criminal law.27 On the other hand it is acknowledged 
in Sweden too that the moral message sent by the administrative sanctions 
is weaker than what the criminal law sanctions convey.28 
While the effectiveness perspective may support administrative 
sanctions, the tenets of legal certainty can provide arguments for certain 
conduct to be covered by a criminal prohibition. Under a criminal regime 
the right to a fair trial guaranteed under the art 6 ECHR and safeguards 
emanating from the principle of legality, art. 7 ECHR, get better protection.29
Melander has pointed out that the ECHR requirement set out in 
art. 6, may have a bearing on the principle of ultima ratio: ‘the European 
procedural safeguards may still convert the solution adopted to be considered 
“criminal” – in the sense of the criminal charge mentioned in Article 6.’ This 
may frustrate possible national efforts to resort to non-criminal measures 
as per the ultima ratio principle.30 
Arguably if an administrative EU measure falls under the scope of 
Article 6 of the ECHR, due to the autonomous interpretation of the word 
‘criminal’, one could perceive the measure to be actually European criminal 
law.31 At the EU level EU competition law could be regarded under the 
doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) 
as criminal law, despite the wording set forth in Regulation 1/2003 article 
23 that ‘[d]ecisions taken pursuant to paragraph 1 and 2 shall not be of a 
23  Warnling-Nerep 2011 p. 119 .
24  In one respect at least however the situation is better at the national level in Finland 
and Sweden than at the EU level: at the EU level the Commission acts as the police, 
prosecutor and judge, while in Sweden and Finland the competition authority makes 
a case and subsequently a relevant court of law on the initiative of the competition 
authority proceeds to decide the case. See Warnling-Nerep 2010 p. 79.
25  Warnling-Nerep 2010 p. 17.
26  Warnling-Nerep 2010 p. 17.
27  Warnling-Nerep 2010 p. 19
28  Warnling-Nerep 2010 p. 19
29  Lahti 2012, p. 13; See also Häyrynen 2006 p. 424-425.
30  Melander 2013, p. 58.
31  Lahti 2012, p. 10.
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criminal nature.’32  This view is confirmed by the fact that the European 
Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ) takes into account the principles set out by 
the ECtHR regarding criminal proceedings while dealing with competition 
law.33 
Besides the development at the EU level, the Finnish control policy 
has been affected by an aim towards effectiveness – thus the administrative 
sanctions have been adopted in Finland out of a desire to complement the 
criminal penalties. Their design has not drawn on any given model, such 
as the criminalization principles. Administrative sanctions have not been 
opted for only when the criminal justice system is regarded as too harsh in 
relation to the violation.  Subsequently there appears to prevail a lack of a 
coherent approach.34 Yet more traditionally administrative sanctions have 
been prompted by the widespread nature of the violations and the relatively 
low level of reprehensibility which validates less-resource intensive measures 
than criminal law tools – these include for instance parking tickets.35 
Compellingly Kiiski has asked whether the criminal sanctions have been 
disguised as administrative sanctions or whether the EU model is just being 
used to justify the adoption of less resource-intensive measures that weaken 
the legal guarantees that otherwise would be available. 36
In light of the foregoing the Commission proposal on a directive and 
regulation regarding market abuse is interesting.37 The proposals were 
touched upon by the Finnish Committee of Legal Affairs.38 It has stated 
32  See André Klip’s book on European Criminal Law, where EU competition law is 
treated as criminal law. Klip 2012,  p. 2.
33  Klip 2012, p. 3; Advocate General Sharpston has stated the following:’…, I have 
little difficulty in concluding that the procedure whereby a fine is imposed for breach 
of the prohibition on price-fixing and market-sharing agreements in article 81(1) EC 
falls under the “criminal head” of Article 6 ECHR… the intention is explicitly to 
punish and deter…´, see  C-272/09, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston of 10 
February 2012, point 64  and Klip referring specifically to these points made by the 
Advocate General, see Klip 2012, p. 212. 
34  Kiiski 2011 p. 37.
35  Kiiski 2011 p. 37.
36  Kiiski has pointed out however that while the ECtHR distinguishes between 
administrative and criminal penalties, it uses as the decisive criterion the impact of 
the penalty on the individual autonomy.  Further the competition law fines do not 
interfere with such individual autonomy and are proportionate to the firm’s turnover. 
See Kiiski 2011 p. 38
37  The market abuse Regulation No 596/2014 and the Directive 2014/57EU 
regarding the criminalization of market abuse went on to appear in the EU Official 
Journal – the regulation will enter into force in July 2016, whereas the directive 
has a 2-year implementation phase. To this effect see Daily News of 2014-06-12, 
European Commission – 12/06/2014; See also the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on criminal sanctions for insider dealing 
and market manipulation Brussels, 20.10.2011 COM (2011) 654 final; Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on insider dealing and 
market manipulation (market abuse), Brussels, 20.10.2011. COM(2011) 651 final.
38 Legal Affairs Committee 1/2012 vp – U 58/2011 vp, U 49/2011 vp.
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that the proposal limiting corporate fines to 10% of the preceding’s years 
annual turnover and personal fines of max. 5 million euros are high and in 
the Finnish regulation environment foreign, and pointed out the relevance 
of the double jeopardy principle (ne bis in idem) and the principle of 
proportionality in this context. The committee further underlined that the 
administrative fines are very high and possibly harsher than the criminal 
law penalties.39 In this regard it may be noted that as the criminal law 
measures should be of last resort, the administrative sanctions should not 
subsequently be tougher, as this would defeat the last resort purpose of the 
criminal sanctions that should be the ultimate means.40
In a similar vein the EU competition law fines on which the Finnish 
competition law sanctions have been modeled contradict earlier Finnish 
criminal policy principles in that the EU sanctions discard culpability 
questions, responsibility is objectively defined under the competition law 
rules.41 Thus the law drafting has not emphasized the determination of 
subjective culpability, but instead the damage caused by the violation has 
risen to the forefront.42 
5.2 THE EFFECTIVENESS CONSIDERATIONS 
The assumption in Finland seems to have been that administrative sanctions 
are more effective than the criminal sanctions whose imposition may lag, and 
the higher standards of proof may even impede a conviction altogether. Thus 
a shift towards administrative sanctions could indicate that an increased 
control of a given conduct is pursued – this would owe to the perceived 
rigidness and ineffectiveness of the criminal justice system.43 
For example in terms of enforcement against market abuse violations 
Häyrynen has postulated that administrative enforcement is less cumbersome, 
since the determination of responsibility requires less robust determination 
39  Further the Council of State has paid attention to the proposed more robust 
investigatory tools, including home search and access to telephone traffic data, that 
the national supervising authority ought to have according to the market abuse 
proposal. According to the Coercive Measures Act (pakkokeinolaki) 1987/450 and 
the new Coercive Measures Act (806/2011) which is going to enter into force in 
2014, the competence to do such far-reaching searches belongs to the authority 
conducting the preliminary investigation. The Council of State had made reference 
to the fundamental rights and their observance in this context and underlined that 
the Finnish practice requires a prior decision of the court to allow access to telephone 
traffic data, even when the investigation is done by the authority conducting the 
preliminary investigation. Legal Affairs Committee 1/2012 vp – U 58/2011 vp, U 
59/2011 vp.
40  Kurenmaa 2003, p. 350.
41  Kiiski 2011, p. 37.
42  Kiiski 2011, p. 37.
43  Melander 2008, p. 424.
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of subjective culpability.44 Another drawback of a criminal regime may be 
the possibility that people through the media deem it ineffective due to the 
time-consuming proceedings. An administrative regime on the other hand 
is arguably less resource intensive, allowing more resources to be allocated 
to the enforcement of the most egregious violations.45 
Similarly if higher standards were required under criminal anti-cartel 
enforcement, the deterrent effect of the criminal sanctions in the area of 
competition law could suffer.46 The problem of presumably low detection 
rates could possibly be addressed by introducing tougher sanctions, which 
may however contradict the principle of proportionality.47 Whelan has 
proposed with regard to cartels that the leniency program, and other more 
robust criminal law investigatory tools might operate more effectively under 
a criminal anti-cartel regime thus neutralizing the possible counterproductive 
effects of more cumbersome criminal proceedings.48 
The now outdated49 Government Bill in 2002 on Financial Supervisory 
Authority in Finland left it to the authority to determine in each individual 
case whether the general and special preventive effect gets better observed 
via the criminal law route.50 According to Häyrynen one of the problems 
regarding criminal enforcement of the market abuse violation could be 
that the authority might be unwilling to bring cases if the likelihood of 
conviction is not significant due to the large number of decisions by the 
prosecutor not to raise charges.51 Such fears may not be without grounds as 
for instance in the UK it is the prosecutors who may have been deterred from 
bringing criminal charges in cartel cases due to the ‘dishonesty’ requirement, 
which arguably significantly undermines the chances of a conviction.52 
44  Häyrynen 2006, pp. 348-349.
45  Häyrynen 2006, pp. 350-351.
46  Whelan 2011, p. 229.
47  The rate of detection in the area of competition law has been estimated to be 
between 10-20%, see Connor, Foer and Udwin 2010, p. 203; Bryant and Eckhard 
1911, p. 535; Wils 2005b, p. 28.
 ;Whelan 2011, p. 230; See also Lahti 2011, p. 45.
48  Whelan 2011, p. 233, 234; Baker 2001, p. 693.
49  A new authority supervises this area now, see the Act on the Financial Supervisory 
Authority No. 878, Adopted in Helsinki on 19 December 2008. 
50  HE 175/2002 p. 63; Häyrinen 2006 p. 364.
51  This in turn could induce the potential perpetrators to increase their activities 
in the grey area. In terms of the preventive effect, it is regrettable, if the market 
participants get the picture that perpetrators get of scott-free. It may be assumed 
that the detection rate of insider trading is low. The detection rate and the level of 
punishments should be sufficient to maintain the credibility of a criminal justice 
system in the prosecution of market abuse violations. Häyrynen 2006 p. 342-343; 
Oker-Blom has argued in 2003 that in the context of market abuses adding harsher 
punishments has not led to decrease of suspected insider trading cases by the 
Authority. See Oker-Blom 2003, p. 249.
52  Joshua 2011.pp. 154-155.
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Häyrynen has pointed out that the investigations of suspected market 
abuse violations have rarely led to criminal convictions. This could indicate 
that the criminal regime is ineffective. As Häyrynen notes, this is not peculiar 
to Finland, criminal enforcement in this area apparently has not produced 
the desired effect elsewhere either.53  He has cited inter alia the following 
reasons relevant in this regard54: 
•  The criminal law requires that the principle of legality is observed 
which complicates matters when the suspected market abuse violations 
could be out of the definition of the offence or in the grey area. 
•  Further, as in the field of competition law, the criminal prosecution of 
market abuse cases seems to be plagued by the evidentiary questions, 
both in Finland and elsewhere.
•  Arguably due to a lack of resources and expertise within the police, 
getting sufficient evidence may be delayed as the investigation lags. 
•  While investigating cases relating to market abuse, telephone tapping 
for example could have been useful in getting sufficient evidence. 
•  Moreover the witnesses in court almost never include the victims, 
which at least does not contribute to the investigation of the case. The 
possible criminal prosecution of a cartel offence may suffer from this 
as well.  
•  In Finland whether investors get the position of a plaintiff in a market 
abuse case, has been rejected by the Finnish Supreme Court in one 
particular case, where it said that the victims in a market abuse case 
typically are an unidentified group of people, and the definition of the 
offence does not require that someone would have personally suffered 
damage.55 As Häyrynen points out the offence protects not only the 
public interest, but also the right of a private party. Ultimately the 
individual legal interest that is being protected in the case of market 
abuses is related to the right to property derived from the fundamental 
rights.56 Such a reasoning seems to cast a shadow on the decision of 
the Supreme Court.
The administrative sanctions however lack the moral educative function 
of criminal law.57 These considerations were taken into account for instance 
in the Government Bill on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. Due to 
the blameworthiness of such violations however, the criminal prohibition 
53  See Häyrynen 2006.  p. 335ff.
54  Häyrynen 2006, pp. 336-338.
55  KKO 2000:82.
56  Häyrynen 2006, pp. 339-340.
57  It is also noteworthy that when the detection rate is low, from the perspective of 
general prevention the impact of a prison sentence arguably is significant, Lahti 
2012, pp. 14-15.
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was retained.58  Similarly in Häyrynen’s view despite the doubts regarding 
criminal enforcement in the area of market abuses, using criminal law is 
essential, as only it can convey the proper message, the reprehensibility of 
the conduct – the illicit profit gained may only be addressed by the criminal 
law tools.59  By analogy arguably similar assertion applies to competition 
law violations, namely hard-core cartels.
5.2.1 A Balancing Act between diverging Objectives
The Swedish proposal regarding the criminal rules on insider trading rejected 
the adoption of administrative sanctions and the decriminalization of insider 
trading. The proposal argued that the society’s attitudes in relation to the 
blameworthiness of the conduct should be influenced through the criminal 
law rules by for example requiring a lesser degree of negligence in the 
definition of the offence. This is preferable to the lowering of standards of 
proof (under an administrative regime), since it is more transparent, but still 
improves the likelihood of a conviction. The swiftness of the administrative 
proceedings was not seen as a sufficient reason to shift from the criminal 
regime to an administrative one in terms of natural persons.60  
Further the proposal cited the statistics regarding the low level of 
convictions on market abuse under the criminal regime, which according 
to critics indicates the ineffectiveness of the criminal regime. The proposal 
however noted that without a thorough analysis of the subject matter, no 
conclusions on the effectiveness of the criminal regime could be drawn. The 
proposal pointed out that from the perspective of rule of law the argument 
supporting a lower standard of proof in order to obtain more convictions 
is problematic. 61
Kiiski indicated that the legal drafting of administrative sanctions in 
Finland has observed principles similar to the criminal regime. At the same 
time the administrative principles have been excluded from the assessment 
in the legal drafting phase, which may highlight the ambivalent nature of 
the punitive administrative sanctions. It may be asked whether the legislator 
resorts to the administrative sanctions in order to bring about a situation 
where legal guarantees do not have to be granted as robust protection as 
under a criminal regime.62 
58  Lahti 2012, p. 15; see also the Government Bill 77/2005 for an Act amending the 
Act on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships.
59  Häyrynen 2006, pp. 345-346.
60  Prop. 2004/05:142 pp. 46-47; Warnling-Nerep 2010 pp. 28-29.
61  Prop. 2004/05:142 pp. 46-47.
62  Kiiski 2011, p. 39.
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In Warnling-Nerep’s view however administrative sanctions should not 
be afforded the same stringent procedural treatment as criminal offences – if 
same requirements concerned the former, the legislator would not be as eager 
to adopt the administrative sanctions. Moreover the deterrent effect becomes 
more credible, Warnling-Nerep argues, when hefty fines are imposed 
on firms, instead of meager personal fines. The effectiveness perspective 
supports sanctions that may be speedily imposed by an administrative 
authority without culpability considerations while the sanctions still bite. 
If administrative sanctions got the same treatment as criminal sanctions, they 
would lose their purpose Warnling-Nerep argued. In her view the possibility 
of an administrative authority to impose hefty fines against companies 
is something that the effectiveness perspective seems to require. What is 
important in her opinion is the predictability of the Act, which emanates 
from the principle of legality and the ECHR requirement, just as under 
the criminal law regime.63 
Warnling-Nerep stressed that it should be acknowledged that if the 
administrative sanctions are to serve a purpose the legal guarantees have 
to be undermined to a certain extent, but that the restrictions on legal 
certainty should be allowed only to the extent that they are absolutely 
necessary. She assumed that the ECHR legal guarantees apply to the current 
administrative fines. When the aim to punish however is not compelling 
and the amount of the fine low, an exception to this presumption should 
be granted in her view.64 Yet even if the legislator fails to enact laws in 
accordance with the ECHR, the application of the laws should still observe 
the ECHR requirements. Above all it seems that a consistent approach as 
to the administrative sanctions is needed.65
Both Finland and Sweden have adopted criminal prohibitions against 
insider dealing. Simultaneously such a severe ban has been absent in terms 
of hard-core cartels. This arguable incongruence may have been brought 
about by the effectiveness considerations accounted for above. In the current 
Author’s opinion the Swedish reasoning that led to the retention of the 
criminal prohibition against market abuse violations is convincing and by 
analogy is relevant to the development of competition law enforcement 
at the national in Finland and Sweden. In order to further reinforce such 
63  Warnling-Nerep 2010, p. 281.
64  Warnling-Nerep 2010, pp. 281-282.
65  Warnling-Nerep points out the need for new guidelines or legislation regarding the 
administrative sanctions. According to her another possibility is to provide by way 
of doctrine the legislators and the instances applying the law with a list of items as 
a reminder of what to consider when tackling administrative fines.The precise term 
Warnling-Nerep uses is system thinking as to the administrative sanctions: ‘…men det 
är nu definitivt dags att tillföra ett systemtänkande’ Warnling-Nerep 2010 pp. 282-
283.
 103
reasoning the rationales behind the recent Competition Acts in Finland 
will be briefly touched upon.  
5.2.2 The Finnish Evolution of the Competition Law Sanctions
In 1992 Finland adopted the prohibition principle in the anti-cartel 
context as the new Competition Act was introduced. Cartels were however 
decriminalized. 66 Wils has actually argued that based on the past it could 
be said that countries which did not employ the prohibition principle have 
proceeded with the decriminalization of cartels. However as a second step 
Wils envisaged that once again the evolution would lead towards individual 
custodial sanctions when it comes to hard-core cartels.67 Indeed Kovacic has 
pointed out that in the US the developments towards the current state of 
affairs in antirust enforcement has been a long process and has depended 
on investments spanning several decades.68
According to article 12 of the Finnish Competition Act (948/2011) a 
fine shall be imposed on a company that infringes articles 5 or 7 of the Act 
or articles 101 or 102 TFEU. The fining of the infringing companies was 
introduced in the 1992 Competition Act.  The previous criminal provisions 
and the scale of penalties was lenient and was regarded as ineffective. The 
individuals had been subject to fines or a prison sentence of a maximum 
one-year term. Only few cases that had reached the court led to meager 
fines. They appeared to lack the general preventive effect to a large extent.69 
Further, the Bill underlined the need for expertise due to the special 
economic nature of competition cases that required deeper insights. The 
aim was also to shift the focus from the individual blameworthiness of 
competition infringements to the detrimental effects on the businesses.70 
Melander has argued that such an aim towards effectiveness reflected in the 
Competition Act was foreign to criminal law ideologically.71 
The Competition Act was amended in 2004. The Government Bill 
on the amendment stressed the low level of fines in Finland in comparison 
to other OECD states. An overhaul of the fining system took place and 
aligned it with that of the EU, whereby a statutory maximum for the fine 
was determined. The amendment also introduced the leniency program in 
Finland. Granting leniency to the cooperating company was regarded as 
an effective way of cracking cartels. In addition the European network of 
66  HE 162/1991 vp.
67  Wils 2005b, pp. 23-24.
68  Kovacic 2011, p. 71.
69  HE 162/1991 vp. p. 5 section 2.1.2.
70  HE 162/1991 vp p. 6 section 2.1.3. 
71  Melander 2008 pp. 421
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Competition Authorities (ECN) was a further reason for the adoption of 
the leniency program.72  Thus arguably the effectiveness perspective was 
important in this later amendment as well, for instance under a criminal 
regime a leniency program could be regarded as a moral compromise.73
The committee that prepared the most recent Finnish Competition Act 
noted that the more rigorous criminal law proceedings could undermine 
the effectiveness of the administrative proceedings. However the committee 
acknowledged that the presumption of innocence and the privilege against 
self-incrimination, both manifestly criminal law principles, were applicable 
in the administrative competition law proceedings.74 Thus the gap between 
administrative and criminal proceedings might not be as wide as what one 
might expect.75 
Melander argued that the grounds cited had not met the requirements 
of an alternative measure introduced instead of criminal sanctions as per the 
ultima ratio principle. Melander however acknowledged that the ultima ratio 
principle does not necessarily lend itself to the evaluation of the competition 
law sanctions: For instance the current penalties, monetary fines, do not 
interfere with an individual’s autonomy, private property is beyond reach 
as the current sanctions target the undertaking’s annual turnover (The 
Competition Act, article 12, 948/2011).76 
Still the antitrust fines may be exorbitant.77  The Finnish case law has 
not regarded the antitrust fines as penal – the fines have been viewed to be 
of a confiscatory nature. A monetary sanction of confiscatory nature only 
seeks to eliminate the gain that has been achieved through the violation. 78 
The Finnish Constitutional Committee on the other hand has regarded them 
as penal.79  Melander argued that due to their penal character effectiveness 
72  Government Bill HE 11/2004 vp p. 24; Melander 2008 p. 422.
73  Government Bill HE 44/2002 vp p. 194; Melander 2008 p. 422.
74  Kilpailulaki 2010, Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriön julkaisuja 2009. p. 44, 51.
75  See also Matikkala 2007, p. 266; With the regard to the current administrative 
control of the EU Whelan has however argued that Article 6 ECHR requires a more 
rigorous treatment than what is afforded under EU competition law enforcement. 
See Whelan 2011, p. 221.
76  Melander 2008 p. 422.
77  See the proposal of the Finnish Competition Authority to the Market Court 
regarding the level of fines in the asphalt cartel case on the 31st of March, 2004, 
Diary no 1198/61/01   p. 105.
78  To this effect see ruling by the Supreme Administrative Court KHO 2000:45 and 
the ruling by the Administrative Court of Helsinki HAO on the 18th of February, 
2005 05/0151/3; Melander 2008 p. 423 footnote 154.
79  See the opinion of the Constitutional Comittee 7/2004 vp,  The committee 
evaluated the search warrant set out in the Competition Act and which was 
relevant to the right to respect for private and family life, but did not reject it as 
inappropriate.; see also Kiiski 2011 p. 26.
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considerations are not sufficient. A more thorough assessment of the 
sanction is needed.80 
Melander noted that very high administrative fines that are not formally 
of penal nature, but in reality are, do not contribute to the lowering of the 
general level of sanctions. He argued that the employment of administrative 
fines should not extend beyond cases of minor importance.81 If certain 
conduct is not merely of minor reprehensibility the exclusion of criminal 
law safeguards is dubious. The same applies to a case where significant fines 
may be imposed.82 Melander further said that especially the fines that may 
be imposed regarding infringements related to the businesses should be 
separated from the fines that result from minor violations. The disparity 
between the two is underlined by the vastly different levels of fines that may 
be imposed for the violations respectively, yet both may be referred to as 
administrative sanctions.83
In the anti-cartel context, in light of Governmental and parliamentary 
documents changes may  appear in the Finnish antitrust landscape: The recent 
publication by the Prime Minister’s Office, produced by a workgroup, urged 
that increasingly biting competition law sanctions should be adopted, and 
that introducing individual criminal sanctions in case of bidding-cartels 
should be a matter for investigation.84 Further the Commerce Committee 
of the Finnish Parliament opined while elaborating on the proposal for a 
new Competition Act that if it is noted that the administrative sanctions 
do not suffice, one must make them more effective and when the legal 
principles allow, the possibility to introduce criminal sanctions in the area 
must be investigated. This message was repeated in the Government Program 
of Jyrki Katainen.85 
5.3 CONCLUSION
The Finnish and Swedish scholarly discussion has pointed out that to some 
extent the EU may be blamed for the absence of a coherent system of 
sanctions – a matter, which was arguably brought about by the absence 
of an explicit criminal law competence prior to the Lisbon Treaty, giving 
rise to the introduction of administrative sanctions that possibly were 
regarded as effective, thus seemingly observing the requirement of effective, 
80  Melander 2008 p. 423.
81  Melander 2008 p. 424.
82  Melander 2008 p. 425.
83  Melander 2008 p. 425.
84  Prime Minister’s Office Publications, Finland 2020 – From thought to action, Final 
report by the Growth Initiative working group, 13/2010, p. 24.
85  See (talousvaliokunta) Commerce Committee 50/2010; The Government Program 
of Jyrki Katainen 22.6.2011, pp. 39-40.
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proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in the implementation of EU law 
at the national level. While effectiveness considerations may have been 
embraced by the Finnish and Swedish legislators, one could contend that 
at the national level precisely the demands of proportionality and coherence 
have not been observed in the determination of the system of sanctions as is 
indicated by the aforementioned inconsistency of sanctions. Subsequently 
it is interesting that as was noted in the preceding chapter concerning the 
stance of the EU,86 there are reasons that speak in favor of an EU criminal 
harmonization measure against hard-core cartels, and in this regard Furse 
specifically argued that the lack of an EU harmonization in the area of 
competition law may explain to some extent the problems that the UK 
has faced in terms of its criminalized anti-cartel regime. 87 Thus it appears 
that the Finnish and Swedish discussion regarding the incoherent system 
of sanctions further reinforces the point that Furse was making.
It seems that consensus obtains as to the need to develop a consistent 
approach in relation to the administrative sanctions at the national level, 
both in Finland and Sweden, which is arguably clearly displayed by the 
total absence of individual accountability in terms of hard-core cartels in 
Finland. Yet the antitrust fines targeting firms appear to be of a penal nature. 
The Swedish legal drafting on the market abuse violations may by way of 
analogy provide a good starting point for rethinking the administrative 
sanctions in the fight against cartels and whether individual criminal liability 
should be available. It dismissed the idea of decriminalizing insider trading 
and reasoned that the swifter nature of administrative sanctions does not 
give grounds to do so. Instead criminal law could shape the attitudes of 
the society regarding the prohibited conduct. All in all, it seems that the 
rationale behind an exlusively administrative enforcement regime against 
hard-core cartels is weak. Specifically, one could argue that administrative 
sanctions against individuals should cover only minor offences, which 
should not include hard-core cartels.
86  See to this effect the discussion under the section ‘Should the EU or alternatively 
Individual Member States take on the Cartel Criminalization Project?’ in this work.
87  Furse 2012, p. 223.
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6  An Elaboration on    
 Criminalized Cartel Conduct  
 Especially in Light of the   
 Swedish Contemplation
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In the early 2000s a Swedish Committee  (hereinafter the 2001 committee) 
assessed competition law enforcement and as a part of that the question of 
criminalizing cartels. This did not lead into a legislative draft regarding a 
criminal prohibition.1 
Cartels, namely those concerning gross prices and bid-rigging had 
been criminally prohibited in Sweden already in the 1953 legislation. The 
same prohibition was applicable under the 1982 Competition Act. The 
Competition Act that was passed in 1993 adopted the administrative mode 
of control and dropped the criminal prohibition. 
In 2001 the position regarding the criminal sanctions was reconsidered 
and it was concluded that competition law violations should not be subject 
to criminal penalties. It may be mentioned that while the discussion below 
has as a starting point the Swedish contemplation, it will also draw on the 
international legal literature and the experiences of other jurisdictions, such 
as the UK, in a bid to illuminate the subject-matter.
The Swedish committee argued that designing the cartel offence would 
be made difficult by questions related to legal certainty and due process – 
these are matters that will be touched upon below, especially in relation to 
the desirable scope of a possible criminal cartel offence. Indeed as Whelan 
has pointed out that the criminal anti-cartel regime should observe the 
‘mandatory legalities’ – which refer to the observance of the due process 
requirements flowing from the ECHR and are important from a legitimacy 
point of view. However the due process requirements may be seen to impair 
the deterrence and retribution objectives, which have a bearing on the 
decision whether to introduce a criminal prohibition against cartels in the 
first place.2
1  See Simonsson 2011, Under the heading ’IV The Costs and Complexities…’ at para. 2.
2  Overlooking the due process requirements is not problematic only from a legal 
perspective, but may waste resources and harm the reputation of the anti-cartel 
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Further the mental and physical elements of the envisaged offence will 
be discussed in light of the Swedish contemplation.3  
Another point of consideration in this chapter is the role of the 
Competition Authority under a criminalized anti-cartel regime, something 
which is related to the existence of parallel criminal and administrative 
regimes, the information exchange as prescribed in Regulation 1/2003 and 
the operation of the principle of ne bis in idem. 
It may be noted that the Swedish 2001 committee argued that the 
criminalization should meet the following criteria:
1.  The conduct subject to criminal penalties is liable to cause serious 
harm.
2.  There are no alternative sanctions available, it would not be 
sensible to adopt the alternative sanctions or they would cause 
significant costs.
3.  The reprehensibility of the violation calls for criminal punishment.
4.  A criminal punishment would effectively tackle the undesirable 
conduct.
5.  The judicial system is able to undertake from a resource point of 
view the criminalization project and the additional strain that it 
brings about.4
The committee took the position that the first criterion was fulfilled, 
since the cartels could harm the consumers, other firms and the economy 
as a whole. Regarding the second criterion, the committee viewed the 
administrative sanctions as an alternative, despite the absence of the individual 
accountability. The committee further argued that the effectiveness of the 
criminal sanctions cannot be verified.5 As to the reprehensibility mentioned 
in the third criterion the 2001 committee stated that the legislature was 
of the view that criminal punishment was not required. 6 The Committee 
noted that the North American perception is that criminal punishment is 
an effective tool in the fight against cartels and that the Swedish legislator 
regime. Further as Whelan says the cartel criminalization project needs to be justified 
from a principled perspective – in the pursuit of a justification the advocates of a 
criminal prohibition usually draw on the deterrence and retribution theories, which 
Whelan identifies as the main antitrust enforcement goals in Europe see Whelan 
2013b, p. 144; SOU 2004:131 p. 167; SOU 2001:74 pp. 130-143.
3  SOU 2004:131 p. 167; SOU 2001:74 pp. 130-143.
4  The liberal translation by the Author, SOU 2001:74 p. 132.
5  Regarding this argument the same discussion has been ongoing regarding the 
possible introduction of criminal sanctions at the EU level, and it has been noted 
that proving empirically the effectiveness is close to impossible, see the discussion in 
this work in the Chapter, ’Essentiality Requirement under art. 83(2)TFEU.’
6  SOU 2001:74 p. 132; The reprehensiblity of cartels is however arguably on par 
with theft, see to this effect the discussion in this work under the title, ’The Moral 
Content of Hard-Core Cartels’.
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explicitly chose criminal measures over civil ones to address insider trading 
– this was done in an attempt to signal the seriousness of the violation – 
thus the reasoning diverged from the one concerning competition law.7 
SOU 2004:131 – The Swedish Green Paper on Criminalizing 
Cartel Conduct
While the 2001 committee did not produce draft legislation, another 
committee (hereinafter the 2004 committee) produced a green paper 
regarding the criminalization of cartels.8 The 2004 committee was instructed 
to concentrate on the most serious competition law infringements, the ones 
that carry a conspiratorial character, benefit the cartel members and greatly 
impair competition.9 The proposal was however never adopted. The Current 
civil prohibition against cartels in the Swedish Competition Act sets out in 
Chapter 2, article 1 that: 
‘Agreements between undertakings shall be prohibited if they have as their 
object or effect, the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the 
market to an appreciable extent, if not otherwise regulated in this act. 
This shall apply, in particular, to agreements which: 
1.  directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other 
trading conditions; 
2.  limit or control production, markets, technical development, or 
investment;
3.  share markets or sources of supply;
4.  apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; or 
5.  make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations, which by their nature or 
7  For arguments why such an incoherent approach as to treatment of offences of 
similar penal value is not desirable, see the discussion in this work in the Chapter, 
’The Moral Content of Hard-Core Cartels’; As to the fourth criterion, the 2001 
Committee went on to say that criminal punishment is effective against cartels only 
when it is applied - the potential cartelists must run the risk of being prosecuted 
in order to tap on the educative function of criminal law and to create the 
preventive effect. This means that the authorities must have the necessary resources 
to investigate and prosecute cartels and to prioritize them. Therefore the 2001 
committee took the position that the fifth criterion is not met: the judicial system 
does not probably have the required resources, see SOU 2001: 74 p. 133; Another 
Swedish committee took subsequently essentially the same position, see SOU 
2006:99 pp. 571-572.
8  Simonsson 2011 p. 211; SOU 2004: 131.
9  SOU 2004:131 p. 169.
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according to commercial usage have no connection with the subject 
of such contracts.’
6.2  THE CRIMINAL CARTEL OFFENCE AND THE  
PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY
The 2001 Committee argued that even when only the serious infringements 
are targeted, it is difficult to design the offence in a way that excludes benign 
agreements. One option would be to center the design of the offence around 
the harm brought about – such an offence however could be difficult to apply 
and investigate and therefore the committee did not favor it. On the other 
hand providing legal exceptions could make the system complicated and a 
system of exemptions regarding certain agreements could require resources 
and is therefore not a good option according to the 2001 committee.10 
The committee concluded that due to the difficulties related to the design 
of the offence in a way that observes the requirements of legal certainty, a 
criminalization is scarcely a practicable tool to fight cartels. However it was 
admitted that this does not constitute a complete impediment. 11 
Despite its aforementioned position the 2001 committee had discussed 
the following draft provision of a criminal offence: 
He who contributes to the violation of Article 6 of the Competition Act by an 
undertaking via entering an agreement that includes the fixing of prices, or 
that production or markets are allocated and through which competition is in 
a significant part of the market seriously prevented, restricted or distorted, will 
be sentenced to prison.12
Whelan has pointed out that since there is a tendency towards the 
criminalization of cartels, and since arguments in favor of such a project are 
theoretically strong, it is also good to note that art. 7 ECHR, regarding legal 
certainty does not have to place impediments in the way of criminalizing 
cartels.13
Whelan has discussed art. 7 ECHR in the context of criminalized 
cartel conduct. Article 7 ECHR provides that a person can only be subject 
to a criminal penalty if it has been previously prescribed in law (nullem 
crimen, nulla poena sine lege).14 One should be able to establish in advance 
10  SOU 2001:74 p. 138.
11  See SOU 2001:74 p. 139.
12  A liberal translation by the author, see SOU 2001:74 p. 139.
13  Whelan 2012c, p. 702.
14  Whelan 2012c, p. 680; See art. 7 ECHR: ’1. No one shall be held guilty of any 
criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal 
offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall 
a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal 
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what conduct falls within the scope of the criminal prohibition by merely 
checking the law.15 Therefore a person should be able to clearly know that 
cartel conduct is subject to a criminal punishment.16 
As a demerit of a criminalization of cartel conduct, it has been put 
forward that due to the harshness of incarceration and since the competition 
laws may be vague to some extent due to their basis in the economics, 
criminal penalties against individuals should not be adopted and that 
criminal cartel offence might fall foul of the legal certainty principle. This has 
been claimed especially when criminal sanctions are something new in the 
antitrust context. 17 While this argument might be true in terms of Article 
102 TFEU violations, Whelan points out that Article 102 TFEU prohibition 
should be juxtaposed with Article 101 TFEU prohibition concerning cartel 
activity – there is not much lack of consensus regarding the anticompetitive 
character of such conduct, especially among the Competition Authorities 
across the globe.18 
As Whelan points out the arrangements to conceal cartels indicate a 
level of awareness among the cartelists regarding the unlawfulness of their 
conduct. For instance in the Gas Insulated Switchgear case the Commission 
said that ‘[a]t both the worldwide level and the European level, the 
participants took elaborate precautions in order to disguise or conceal their 
contacts and meetings.’19 As Whelan notes under the previous notification 
system as per Regulation 17/62 cartels were infrequently notified and the 
appeals contested the amount of the fines or evidential questions.20 The 
arguments related to the principle of legal certainty have nearly always 
touched upon the amount of the fines, rather than the inherent infringement 
itself. Moreover Article 101(3) TFEU exemptions are highly improbable. 21 
Consequently Whelan underlined that while little doubt remains as 
to the illegality of hard-core cartels, claiming vagueness is more compelling 
when it comes to art. 102 TFEU infringements and the periphery of 
anticompetitive conduct.22 The notion of price-fixing is understandable, 
making clear that competitors should refrain from discussing prices, drawing 
on an economic insight that is not challenged and is quite uncomplicated. 
offence was committed. 2. This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any 
person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal 
according to the general principles of law recognized by civilised nations.’
15  Whelan 2012c, p. 681.
16  Whelan 2012c, p. 682.
17  Whelan 2012c, p. 682.
18  Whelan 2012c, pp. 682-683; Whish and Bailey 2012 p. 513ff.
19  Whelan 2012c, p. 683; Case COMP/F/38.899, Gas Insulated Switchgear, 
Commission Decision 24 of January 2007, at para 6.5.4.
20  Whelan 2012c, p. 683.
21  Whelan 2012c, p. 684.
22  Whelan 2012c, p. 684.
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Thus the economic analysis should neither pose difficulties for the offenders 
nor for the courts to perceive the illegality of the conduct. 23 For instance in 
the US the proof that the defendants had entered a conspiracy to fix-prices 
suffices, whereas the impact on prices or output is irrelevant. As Posner says 
‘(i)n short, the law punished the attempt to fix prices; the completed act- 
an actual restriction of output- was incidental’.24  Subsequently arguments 
saying that Article 101 TFEU is not clear enough for the purposes of the 
legal certainty principle are not convincing. In order to avoid a design of 
the cartel offence that must resort to prosecutorial discretion in the rare 
cases where doubt remains regarding unlawfulness, Whelan argues that the 
definition of the offence should be under-inclusive.25
6.2.1 The Invocation of a pre-existing Criminal Offence against  
 Cartel Offences
Whelan has examined the application of the legal certainty principle as 
set out in art. 7 ECHR in a context where a pre-existing broad criminal 
prohibition, which does not specifically concern cartels (‘sleeping giant’), 
is invoked as a response to a cartel, as happened in the Norris case. If 
the authorities wish to invoke such a provision in the cartel context, an 
advance notice should be given by the authorities, which however may 
not make it more reasonable to apply the ‘sleeping giant’ to cartel activity, 
thus colliding with the principle of legal certainty. Moreover there must be 
an adequate nexus between the ‘sleepig giant’ and the cartel conduct. The 
‘sleeping giants’ might be awoken for instance by the US authorities who 
fiercely pursue the extradition of foreign individuals responsible for cartel 
activities.26  Whelan points out that the foregoing may be of a particular 
relevance in the Swedish or Dutch context where the legislators have rejected 
the criminalization of cartels.27 
It must be noted however that the ‘sleeping giant’ would do nothing 
to alleviate the problems associated with the impaired functioning of the 
administrative leniency program if immunity is not available against criminal 
prosecution, a compelling point cited in the Swedish context – the ultimate 
23  Whelan 2012c, p. 685; Frese has pointed out that: ’The possible complications 
stemming from the fact that courts are not adequately equipped to make these 
analyses and from the possibility that criminal law principles will be breached, will 
not materialize in these ”by their object-cases”. Since most hard-core cartels can be 
qualified as such, introducing custodial sanctions for this type of infringement could 
be reconciled with the economic nature of the assessment under Article 81(3) EC.’ 
See Frese 2006, p. 205.
24  Posner 2001. p. 53; Whelan 2012c, p. 685.
25  Whelan 2012c, p. 686.
26  Whelan 2012c, p. 701.
27  Whelan 2012c p. 702.
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result might be that less cartels are detected, given the importance of the 
leniency program as a cartel busting tool.28 
The ‘sleeping giant’ argument has however been raised even in the 
Finnish discussion, albeit in relation to the bid-rigging cartels only.29 
Similarly in Germany a pre-existing fraud provision was enforced against 
bid-rigging in the 1990s,30 which was followed by the introduction of a cartel 
offence targeting bid-rigging cartels. While even director disqualification 
orders could be imposed for such conduct under s 70, StGB, the courts do 
not seem to be inclined to resort to them. If the imprisonment exceeds 90 
days in Germany, an entry in to the criminal record will be made, something 
that the employers may become aware of upon inquiry.31 
6.3 THE SCOPE OF THE OFFENCE
The Swedish 2004 committee said that the contemplated criminal 
prohibition should cover only the most serious cases – it would draw on a 
comparison with egregious property offences and the penal value of such 
offences that often attract prisons sentences ranging from six months up to 
six years.32 For instance the Commission guidelines on setting fines have 
singled-out price-fixing, market-sharing and output restrictions as the most 
egregious competition law violations and as subject to substantial fines.33 
The reach of criminal law could for instance be designed in a way that the 
penal value of a normal offence attracts a prison sentence.34  By way of an 
introduction below various European cartel prohibitions will be reproduced.
Similarly to the stance of the Swedish committee, 12 Danish committee 
members that represented the majority view took the position that custodial 
28  See SOU 2004:131 p. 246-48.
29  Kilpailulaki 2010, Työ- ja elinkeinominsiteriön julkaisuja 2009. p. 47.
30  Wagner-Von Papp, 2011, under the heading’A. The Application of the General 
Criminal Offence of Fraud’.
31  Wagner-Von Papp, 2011, under the heading ’B. Introducing the Bid Rigging 
Offence in1997(StGB section 298) at paras 1,2,4,5.
32  SOU 2004:131 p. 171.
33  Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of 
Regulation No 1/2003, OJ C 210, 1.9.2006. at para. 23.
34  SOU 2004:131 p. 172; the 2001 committee noted that the Swedish civil 
prohibition against anticompetitive agreements required that the object or effect 
of the agreement was to prevent, restrict or distort competition to an appreciable 
extent. No intention to curb competition on the part of the undertakings was 
required, it was sufficient that the agreement has such an effect, or has the potential 
effect of doing so. The agreement may be prohibited even when no competition 
exists between the parties when the agreement is entered– if competition could 
possibly occur, but it is curbed by the agreement. Since the prohibition catches 
only agreements that have an appreciable effect small companies are exempted. 
Due to the foregoing the 2001 committee argued that the outcome of a case can 
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sentences should be introduced with regard to cartel conduct. The design of 
the cartel offence would be set out in the Competition Act, and the cartel 
agreement would concern prices, profits and the like regarding the sale and 
resale of goods and services, output restrictions regarding production or 
sales, market or customer allocation and big-rigging. 35  
The Danish committee pointed out that the criminal prohibition 
against cartels envisaged would encompass only horizontal agreements, 
thus excluding the vertical agreements from the scope of the criminal cartel 
offence.36 The committee assessed various ways of designing the cartel 
offence, drawing on criminal prohibitions in relation to other white-collar 
offences that attract custodial sanctions. The core principle regarding the 
white-collar offences is that they should attract custodial sanctions when 
infringements have been undertaken intentionally. Imposing fines, in 
contrast, may be prompted by a gross negligence as the mental element.37 
The revised Danish Competition Act sets out the following in the 
provision 23 subparagraph 3: ‘the punishment for anyone who acts in breach 
of Section 6(1) of this Act or Article 101(1) TFEU…by entering into a cartel 
agreement…may increase to imprisonment for up to one year and six months 
if the breach is intentional and of a grave nature, especially due to the extent 
of the infringement or its potentially damaging effects. In this Act, a cartel 
agreement under first sentence shall mean an agreement, concerted practice or 
decision between undertakings, operating at the same level of trade, on i) prices, 
profits, etc. for the sale or resale of goods or services, ii) restrictions on production 
or sales, iii) sharing of markets or customers, or ix) coordination of bids....’.38 
Section 30 of the Norwegian Competition Act says that ‘[f ]ines or 
imprisonment of up to three years may be imposed on anyone who intentionally 
be hard to predict and the investigations are complicated – therefore there should 
be no criminal prohibition introduced that would cover all the aspects of the civil 
prohibition. See SOU 2001:74 pp. 135-136.
35  ’Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 46.
36  ’Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 204.
37  ibid. p. 205.
38  The Danish ban on cartels and some other agreements reads as follows in the section 
6 of the revised Competition Act: ‘It shall be prohibited for undertakings etc. to enter 
into agreements that have restriction of competition as their direct or indirect object or 
effect. (2) Agreements covered by subsection (1) may, in particular be agreements made to 
i) fix purchase or selling prices or other trading conditions; ii) limit or control production, 
sales technical development or investments; iii) share markets or sources of supply iv) 
apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with trading partners, thereby 
placing them at a competitive disadvantage; v) make the conclusion of contracts subject 
to acceptance by the other contracting party of supplementary obligations which, by their 
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts; vi) coordinate the competitive practices of two or more undertakings through 
the establishment of a joint venture; or vii) determine binding resale prices or in other 
ways seek to induce one or more trading partners not to deviate from recommended resale 
prices.’ See to this effect the Danish Competition Act, Consolidation Act No. 23 of 
17 January 2013.
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or through gross negligence’ violates the section 10 prohibition. ‘If an infringement 
of Section 10 is made under severely aggravating circumstances, imprisonment 
of up to six years may be imposed. When deciding whether severely aggravating 
circumstances exist, factors such as whether there was an attempt to conceal 
the infringement, whether significant monetary damage occurred, whether 
considerable financial advantages were obtained, and the severity of the 
infringement in general, must be considered.’39 
The starting point for a criminalization of competition law violations, 
according to the Swedish 2004 committee is that the violations should 
be capable of causing serious damage – this implies that the competitive 
process is undermined, thus making the society and the consumers bear 
the costs – this reflects the outcome oriented approach. On the other hand 
the blameworthiness of the conduct may require criminal sanctions, for 
instance due to the conspiratorial elements employed by the companies – 
this reflects the conduct oriented approach – as the committee 2004 points 
out the blameworthiness of a given conduct may depend on its quality of 
bringing about damages.40 Harding has pointed out the difference between 
a conduct-oriented and an outcome-oriented cartel control – under the 
former approach the cartel is seen as a conspiracy, and under the latter ‘as 
an instrument of damage.’41 The European outcome-oriented approach 
arguably tends to target the effects that the cartels have rather than the 
conduct of the company.42 
However criminalizing all-inclusively conduct that is liable to cause 
even serious damage is difficult. A criminalization should also fulfill the 
39  The Norwegian Competition Act sets out the ban on cartels in section 10: ‘The 
following shall be prohibited: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which have as their object or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, and in particular those which: 
a. directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any trading conditions; b. limit 
or control production, markets, technical development, or investment, c. share markets 
or sources of supply; d. apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with 
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; e. make 
the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection 
with the subject of such contracts.’ See the Competition Act of 5 March 2004 No. 12 
on competition between undertakings and control of concentrations. 
40  The committee 2004 recognized that cartels cause great losses to the society. Certain 
prevailing features of cartels are also acknowledged, such as the intent to refrain from 
competition. According to the committee the cartel members make significant cartel 
profits, and are very well aware that the competition law rules are being infringed – 
the cartel meetings are disguised as something else and any evidence is cleared away 
consciously. While the cartel operations take place secretly an outward appearance of 
competition is portrayed. The 2004 committee pointed out that the most enduring 
and serious cartels have been well organized and the company directors have either 
participated in it or at least been aware of the existence of the cartel. SOU 2004:131 
pp. 172-173; Harding 2002, pp. 410-411.
41  Harding 2002, pp. 410-411.
42  Harding 2002, p. 411.
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criteria of foreseeability and legal certainty from the perspective of the 
individual the Swedish 2004 committee noted.43
The 2004 committee noted that bid-rigging cartels have been previously 
subject to a criminal prohibition in Sweden, as is the case currently in 
Germany.44 The committee argued that the most narrow thinkable criminal 
prohibition would merely cover the bid-rigging cartels. The committee 
however opined that in light of the nature of the other types of cartels this 
would be a very conservative approach – a criminal prohibition should cover 
price-fixing, market allocation and quota and production cartels as well the 
committee argued. The committee pointed out that such an approach would 
correspond to the UK rules, and for the most part also the Norwegian, Irish 
and US rules against cartels.45
In contrast to the foregoing due to constitutional reasons the abuse 
of a dominant position attracts criminal penalties in Ireland.46 The Irish 
Competition Act 2002 sets out in sections 6 and 7(which notably concerns 
the abuse of a dominant position) the criminal offences: Section 6(1) states 
that ‘[a]n undertaking – which (a) enters into, or implements, an agreement, 
or (b) makes or implements a decision, or (c) engages in a concerted practice 
that is prohibited by section 4(1) or by Article 81(1 of the Treaty shall be guilty 
of an offence.’ 
As Whelan says section 6(2) separates the hard-core cartels from other 
less severe infringements,47 section 6(2) prescribes that ‘…it shall be presumed 
that an agreement between competing undertakings, a decision made by an 
association of competing undertakings or a concerted practice engaged in by 
competing undertakings the purpose of which is to – (a) directly or indirectly fix 
prices with respect to the provision of goods or services to persons not party to the 
agreement, decision or concerted practice, (b) limit output or sales, or (c) share 
markets or customers, has as its object the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition in trade in any goods or services in the State or in any part of the 
State or within the common market, as the case may be, unless the defendant 
proves otherwise.’ Further, the section 6(3) states that when proceedings 
are pursued under section 6(1), ‘it shall be a good defence to prove that the 
agreement, decision or concerted practice in question did not contravene that 
prohibition by virtue of section 4(2).’ 
43  Moreover the criminal regulation should be an effective tool to fight violations, also 
in terms of prosecutions – these imply that the risk of detection and prosecution 
should be substantial to create an incentive not to engage in cartel activity. When 
the aforementioned criteria are not fulfilled, the legal system should according to the 
2004 committee rely on corporate fines. SOU 2004:131 p. 173.
44  SOU 2004:131 p. 174; See the discussion in Wagner-Von Papp, 2011.  
45  SOU 2004:131 p. 175.
46  See Whelan 2012d, p. 176.
47  See Whelan 2012d, p. 176.
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Section 4(2) says that ‘[a]n agreement, decision or concerted practice 
shall not be prohibited under subsection (1) if it complies with the conditions 
referred to in subsection (5) or falls within a category of agreements, decisions, or 
concerted practices…’.  As Whelan points out section 4(5) draws on Article 
103 TFEU, and sets out that the agreement not caught by the section 4(1) 
‘contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or provision of 
services or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers 
a fair share of the resulting benefit and does not – (a) impose on the undertakings 
concerned terms which are not indispensable to the attainment of those objectives, 
(b) afford undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of 
a substantial part of the products or services in question.’ 48
On the other hand a bid-rigging cartel is not subject to custodial 
sanctions in Ireland save for the possibility that it is seen as a type of 
price-fixing.49 
While various European criminal bans were reproduced above by way of 
an introduction, the next chapters will seek to determine what type of anti-
competitive conduct should preferably be covered by a criminal prohibition.
6.3.1 Which horizontal agreements should not be caught by the  
 prohibition?
Via the cartel conspiracy the cooperating companies assume the power 
that previously was wielded by the consumers or the suppliers who lack 
alternative ways of selling their products.50 As the 2004 committee states 
cartels are distinct from other competition law violations in a sense that 
their damaging effects can be assumed without a closer inquiry.51 It is no 
wonder then that horizontal agreements between competitors are subject 
to particularly severe treatment, even prison sentences.52
As opposed to cartels, as pointed out by the Commission in the 
Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, horizontal 
agreements can also produce economic benefits: ‘[h]orizontal co-operation 
agreements can lead to substantial economic benefits, in particular if 
they combine complementary activities, skills or assets. Horizontal co-
operation can be a means to share risk, save costs, increase investments, 
pool know-how, enhance product quality and variety, and launch innovation 
48  See Whelan 2012d p. 176.
49  See Whelan 2012d p.  181.
50  SOU 2004:131 p. 173.
51  SOU 2004:131 pp. 173-174.
52  Whish and Bailey, 2012 p. 3.
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faster.’ 53 The mentioned Guidelines seek to assess the most typical co-
operation agreements, including research and development agreements, 
and standardization agreements, which are less likely to fix prices.54 Certain 
horizontal agreements are not caught at all by Article 101 TFEU and others 
are covered by block exemptions.55 
As the 2004 committee points out, the aforementioned horizontal co-
operations are distinct from cartels, since they do not seek to remove the 
competitive process. While such co-operation may have damaging effects, 
typically they do not seriously prevent, restrict or distort competition. The 
analysis of such co-operation agreements should take place on a case by 
case basis, and they should not be caught by a criminal prohibition.56 
Whish and Bailey also point out that importantly cooperation agreements 
between competitors may be economically beneficial from the consumer 
perspective, as recognized by the Commission in the aforementioned 
Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements. There should be no 
categorical prohibition against horizontal agreements as the cooperation 
may produce efficiency gains that weigh heavier than the accompanying 
constraints on competition.57 
Regarding purchasing agreements the 2004 committee says that their 
effects can be positive often when small buyers’ bargaining position is 
improved viz a viz a powerful supplier.58 As the Commission Guidelines 
state, as a general rule the joint purchasing agreements are not liable to 
hamper competition when the parties lack market power.59 Joint purchasing 
agreements should also be excluded from the scope of the criminal 
prohibition, as they do not prioritize the removal of the competitive 
process the 2004 committee said. It may be noted that while the criminal 
prohibition does not catch horizontal agreements apart from cartels, the 
civil regime may do so.60 To sum it up, the cartel offence should target only 
the so-called hard-core cartels. 
53  Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, 2011/C 11/01. at para 2
54  Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, 2011/C 11/01. at para 5; SOU 
2004:131 p. 176
55  SOU 2004:131 p. 177.
56  SOU 2004:131 p. 177.
57  Whish and Bailey 2012 p. 585.
58  SOU 2004:131 p. 178.
59  Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, 2011/C 11/01 para 204.
60  SOU 2004:131 p. 178.
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6.3.2 The Abuse of a Dominant Position
As opposed to the abuse of a dominant position, cartels distinctly conspire 
against the interest of other market participants, whereas the abuse of a 
dominant position is a unilateral act that lacks the conspiratorial character 
– therefore arguably cartels may more appropriately be subject to criminal 
measures.61
It may be noted that regarding the abuse of a dominant position, which 
Ireland has criminalized, it has been proposed by Massey and Cooke that 
this approach may not be feasible due to the high standards of proof. The 
EU application of art. 102 TFEU has shown that it may always be the 
argument of the defence that there was a legitimate reason for the conduct 
– ‘[t]here is frequently a very fine dividing line between abusive behavior 
and legitimate aggressive competition.’ Therefore the prosecutors may not 
be inclined to seek a conviction of abuse of dominance, requiring proof of 
mens rea, unless the case involves a monopolist engaging in recidivism.62 
Wagner-Papp on the other hand has pointed out that by criminalizing the 
abuse of dominant position, vertical agreements, concerted practices besides 
the horizontal agreements, Ireland may deter legitimate business practices or 
bring about lackluster enforcement efforts due to a criminal prohibition that 
applies both to hard-core infringements and insignificant infringements.63
The 2004 committee noted that where a company with a position 
approaching a monopoly seeks to prevent the setting up of new companies 
the conduct may be on par with horizontal agreements in terms of penal 
value. However there is a fine line between harmful conduct and conduct 
that has pro-competitive effects, for instance a given conduct may be allowed 
for a company that does occupy a dominant position whereas a dominant 
company would not be allowed the same conduct , or depending on the 
market conditions a given conduct by a dominant company may or may 
not fall under the prohibition against the abuse of a dominant position. On 
the other hand establishing the dominant position of a company requires 
carrying out a complicated economic assessment. Moreover the existence 
of a dominant position alone is not caught by the prohibition. Due to the 
maze of regulation and complex economic affairs, it may be difficult for a 
company to predict whether a given conduct is caught by the prohibition. 
In this regard the committee pointed out that the design of criminal law 
regulation should be such that companies have a real opportunity to 
determine themselves whether a given conduct falls within the scope of 
61  SOU 2001:74 p. 138.
62  Massey and Cooke 2011, under the heading ’Conclusion’ at para 4.
63  Wagner-Von Papp 2011, at para 1, footnote 3.; See the Irish Competition Act 2002, 
section 7.
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the prohibition. In a criminal law context such a lack of foreseeability would 
not meet the criteria of legal certainty.64 
Wils has argued that effective deterrence would require that corporate 
fines are accompanied by prison sanctions in case of a price cartel. He says 
that also other art. 101 and art. 102 violations that are on par with price 
cartels in terms of financial rewards and which can be hidden with little 
effort may arguably be subject to imprisonment. On the other hand, when 
concealment is not effortless and profits are meager, corporate fines possibly 
in conjunction with director disqualification orders would be adequate to 
create a plausible deterrence in Wils’ view. 65
Wils points out that any errors in imposing prison sanctions costs more 
than the mistaken imposition of corporate fines – besides the distress on 
natural persons, the inaccurate employment of incarceration is also a cost 
to those having to tolerate the risk of facing an unwarranted punishment. 
Additionally it may have a chilling effect on lawful conduct and the 
normative compliance with law in general may suffer. Due to this line of 
argumentation Wils argues that imprisonment should be employed only in 
unambiguous cases. Wils proposes that incarceration should apply only in 
cases where, the law is willfully breached, and the evidence of a conscious 
and manifest disregard for the law is available – a presumption of willfulness 
would be made in unambiguous cases.66 In light of the foregoing Wils 
would restrict the criminal prohibition to the so-called hard-core violations, 
namely price-fixing, bid-rigging and market allocation cases. From the ambit 
of a criminal prohibition Wils would exclude other horizontal cooperation 
agreements, vertical restraints and the abuse of a dominant position as per 
art. 102 TFEU – due to easier detection, the victims’ usual perception of 
the violation and the greater likelihood of depressing lawful behavior and 
the thin line between pro-competitive and harmful effects corporate fines 
in combination with director disqualification orders could be enough in 
his view.67 
All in all it appears clear that an abuse of a dominant position should 
not be covered by a criminal prohibition.
6.3.3 Vertical Restraints
As Whish and Bailey note the application of the prohibition in Article 101 
TFEU to vertical agreements has been contested on a long-lasting basis. 
While it appears clear that there should be a ban against hard-core violations, 
64  SOU2004:131 pp. 179-180.
65  Wils 2005a, p. 145.
66  Wils 2005a, p. 145.
67  Wils 2005a, p. 146.
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since they involve a combination of the market power of the companies 
that puts the companies into a more favorable position, vertical agreements 
do no such thing. Vertical agreements tend to come under closer scrutiny 
only when either at the supply or buyer level market power is wielded. This 
may bring about a situation where the competition with other companies is 
restricted (inter-brand competition). Where the inter-brand competition is 
not significant it may also be useful to see to the preservation of the intra-
brand competition between distributors.68 
While concerns regarding the vertical agreements have been expressed, 
at the other end of the spectrum are scholars who shun all intervention by the 
authorities. The Guidelines on Vertical Restraints explicitly acknowledge the 
positive effects brought about by the vertical agreements, by enhancing non-
price competition and improving the quality of service – while a company 
lacks market power, profits may be increased by streamlining distribution. 
In such a context the vertical agreements may facilitate business relations 
between the supplier and buyer that are not usually intimate.69 
In a similar fashion Beaton-Wells and Fisse say that vertical agreements 
should explicitly be outside the scope of the per se cartel prohibition.70 
Massey has explained that since Ireland follows the European Union in that 
competition law violations outside the hard-core area, namely the vertical 
agreements and the abuse of a dominant position, are subject to fines it 
is imperative that they are criminally prohibited. He points out that it is 
controversial whether such conduct should be subject to fines at all in terms 
of economics. 71 Further, the Irish competition authority does not often 
resort to civil remedies against violations outside the hard-core area – as 
Massey says ‘[i]ts approach, in some instances to vertical restraints comes 
close to a per se legal standards.’72 
In the UK the Hammond and Penrose report noted that competition 
law experts do not favor a criminal prohibition of the vertical agreements due 
to potential pro-competitive effects.73 Such agreements may make worries 
mount especially if resale prices are maintained the report observed. Further, 
vertical agreements may benefit from art. 101(3) TFEU exemptions and 
therefore keeping them outside the scope of a criminal prohibition prevents 
68  For a more detailed treatment, see Whish and Bailey 2012 p. 624ff. 
69  European Commission, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2010/ 130/01. At para 
106; Whish and Bailey 2012 p. 626; See also Commissoin Regulation (EU) No 
330/2010 of 20 April 2010, on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted 
practices.; Kuoppamäki 2012, p. 127ff.
70  Beaton-Wells and Fisse 2012 p. 54, footnote 117.
71  Massey 2012, p. 155, 164.
72  Massey 2012, pp. 171-172.
73  The Hammond and Penrose report 2001 p. 4
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situations where a given vertical agreement is exempted at the EU level, but 
falls foul of national criminal prohibition.74
Finally the Swedish 2004 committee pointed out with regard to vertical 
agreements that assessing should take place both from the economic and 
legal perspective. It should be assessed how the competitive process appears 
in the absence of such an agreement in a specific case, especially with 
regard to intra-brand and inter-brand competition, while the latter is of 
a more compelling interest. The effects should be evaluated from a long-
term and a short-term perspective.75 The 2004 committee also pointed out 
that normally vertical agreements are less damaging than the horizontal 
agreements, and may bring about positive effects, such as improved quality 
or increased access. However while assessing vertical agreements attention 
is paid to the influence of the company on the markets and several other 
factors. It may be seen that it is difficult to single-out the vertical agreements 
that should fall under the criminal prohibition. The criminalization of 
the vertical agreements would be difficult to design in a way that would 
appropriately target the agreements and the general criminal prohibition of 
vertical agreements was out of the question the 2004 committee said.76 The 
2004 committee however acknowledged the possibility of criminalizing very 
serious vertical agreements that could concern resale price maintenance and 
territorial protection. Whether such arrangements bring about excluding 
effects requires economic analysis and therefore a criminal prohibition 
seems however not well suited and the civil regime may be left to catch 
the violations.77
6.3.4 Should the Possible National Criminal Cartel Offence  
 cover Art. 101 TFEU violations? 
The UK approach is to not to regard the cartel offence as national competition 
law for the purposes of Regulation 1/2003 due to reasons related to the 
jurisdiction of the UK criminal Courts and the ability to prosecute cases 
when the EU proceedings are assumed in parallel.78 Also the 2004 committee 
considered whether the criminal offence should be tied to the competition 
74  The Hammond and Penrose report 2001 p. 11.
75  SOU 2004:131 p. 180.
76  SOU 2004:131 p. 181.
77  SOU 2004:131 p. 182.
78  See the discussion in this work under in the Chapter ’The Relationship between the 
EU and the National Competition Law – Is the Cartel Offence ’national competition 
law’ for the purposes of Regulation 1/2003?’; Regulation 1/2003 says in art. 11(6) 
that ‘[t]he initiation by the commission of proceedings for the adoption of a decision 
under Chapter III shall relieve the competition authorities of the Member States of 
their competence to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty’, see Whelan 2012b p. 
599.
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law rules and subsequently argued that the criminal punishment should be 
directly linked to the competition law prohibition. 79 The 2004 committee 
noted that the prohibition in art. 101 TFEU and the one in the Swedish 
Competition Act overlap as a general rule and it may be asked whether 
Article 101 TFEU should be incorporated in the offence .The committee 
envisaged that the cartel offence could incorporate the violation of Article 
101 TFEU as an alternative requirement in the offence.80 
The Committee also pointed out that Sweden must employ the same 
sanctions to enforce the EU competition law and the national competition 
law, which would indicate that the cartel offence should cover also Article 
101 TFEU violations. Therefore it would according to the committee not 
be sensible to narrow the scope of the cartel offence to the violations of the 
national prohibition.81
Further, the criminal prohibition should not extend to conduct which 
is allowed under the competition law rules. The Swedish contemplation 
noted the scope of the offence should clearly be delineated in a way that the 
offence is committed only when the prohibition against cartels is violated.82 
The current Author tends to favour the UK approach for reasons, which 
will be further touched upon in the Chapter concerning the UK design of 
the Cartel offence.
6.3.5 What should qualify for an agreement for the purposes of  
 the Cartel Offence?
As Whish has pointed out the scope of art. 101 TFEU is not restricted 
to contracts, which would facilitate avoiding the dicates of the provision. 
Instead the term ‘agreement’ is broadly interpreted and the application of 
art. 101 TFEU covers also informal arrangements, concerted practices and 
decisions of trade associations, as does for instance the UK Competition 
Act of 1998 in Chapter I. As Whish notes it is difficult to say with regard 
79  The 2004 Committee noted that Regulation 1/2003  in art. 3. requires that Member 
State Competition Authorities and Courts while applying national competition 
law to agreements that may concern also Article 101 TFEU, since trade between 
Member States is affected, to apply art. 101 TFEU to the arrangements. There are 
heavy grounds in the committee’s view to argue however that Regulation 1/2003 
does not apply when natural persons are subject to criminal penalties, in particular 
since corporate fines are imposed on the company. Therefore, it was argued that 
Regulation 1/2003 does not hamper a criminalization project. SOU 2004:131 p. 
184-185.
80  SOU 2004:131 p. 185.
81  The envisaged criminal prohibition would be have been violated also by an 
agreement concluded outside Sweden, if it had effects in Sweden, see SOU 2004:131 
p. 186.
82  SOU 2004:131 p. 184.
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to an oligopolistic market whether the parallel behavior is prompted by an 
agreement between the firms which in turn is caught by Article 101 TFEU. 
If not, the appropriate response concerns the market structure.83
While there is no question that a legal agreement is caught by art. 
101 TFEU, also legally non-binding agreements, such as the gentleman’s 
agreement and simple understandings have been considered agreements for 
the purposes of Article 101 TFEU. It may be mentioned that the agreement 
does not need to be enforced, may be oral, can be the constitution of a trade 
association, guidelines produced by one person, correspondence and even 
intentions expressed only by one at a meeting may amount to an agreement 
or to a concerted practice.84
The Swedish 2004 committee gave a similar account regarding the 
Swedish cartel prohibition and the notion of the term ‘agreement’. The 
committee said that without concluding an agreement in the normal sense 
firms may act on a mutual understanding amounting to concerted practices 
– for this to take place, at least indirect contact between the firms must have 
occurred. The 2004 committee also made the point that it may be difficult 
to distinguish between natural parallel behavior and concerted practices, and 
the distinction between an agreement and concerted practices is blurred, 
since an agreement may be entered tacitly – the legal implications of an 
agreement and concerted practices however often remain the same.85
83  Whish and Bailey 2012 p. 99; Article 101  TFEU reads as follows: ’1. The following 
shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all agreements between 
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which 
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in 
particular those which: (a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;  
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage; e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the 
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or accordging to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 2. Any 
agreeements or decision prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically 
void. 3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in 
the case of: - any agreement or caterogry of agreements between undertakings,
 -any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, - any 
concerted practice or category of concerted practices, which contricbutes to 
improving the production or distribtuion of goods or to promoting technical or 
economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, 
and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concrned restriction which are 
not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings 
the possiblity of eliminating compeittion in respect of a subtantial part of the 
products in question.’
84  Whish and Bailey 2012 pp. 100-101; Regarding Finland see Kuoppamäki 2012 p. 
105ff.
85  SOU 2004:131 p. 187.
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Understandably it may be asked whether the criminal prohibition 
should cover concerted practices, and the committee noted that only 
agreements fall within the scope of the UK cartel offence due to problems 
related to legal certainty if concerted practices were subject to criminal 
penalties.86 In contrast the Swedish 2004 committee took the position 
that making a distinction between an agreement and concerted practices is 
difficult and that also concerted practices should be criminally prohibited, 
as in the absence of a criminal prohibition the preventive effect could be 
impaired.87 
The current author argues that due to reasons related to legal certainty 
concerted practices should be outside the scope of the criminal cartel offence.
6.3.6 Inchoate Liability?
It may be noted that in Australia the cartel prohibitions are accompanied by 
inchoate liability for attempt.88  In Ireland too the Section 11 of the 2002 
Act provides that ‘A person indicted (whether as principal or an accessory) 
for an offence under section 6 or 7 or the offence of attempting to commit 
such an offence or the offence of conspiracy to commit such an offence…’.89 
Rather convincingly however the Swedish 2004 committee noted 
that as the cartel offence involves the entering into an agreement or its 
implementation, the point of completion of the offence lies early. The 
committee suggested that the criminalization of completed offences should 
suffice. The forms of inchoate liability are not either of sufficient penal value 
to attract the intervention of criminal law in case of competition law, the 
committee argued. Further, such forms of liability could be problematic 
from the perspective of investigation.90 
86  The recent UK government document said that there should be a meeting of minds 
‘that goes further than a mere concerted practice,’ to establish the violation of the 
offence. BIS, Growth, Competition and The Competition Regime: Government Response 
to Consultation, March 2012 at para 7.32
87  SOU 2004:131 p. 187.
88  Beaton-Wells and Fisse 2012 p. 184ff.
89  Emphasis added by the Author, see also Massey and Cooke 2011, under the heading 
’B. Penalties’ at para 3.
90  SOU 2004:131 p. 195.
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6.4  THE DESIGN OF THE MENTAL AND PHYSICAL 
ELEMENTS OF THE CARTEL OFFENCE
6.4.1 Mens Rea – the ‘Guilty Mind’
As Williams has pointed out the mens rea threshold of an offence may 
be purposefully set at a low level to instill carefulness.91 The mens rea 
requirement may be used to indicate the culpability involved. As Williams 
notes the Irish criminal offence does not seem to incorporate a description 
of a mens rea requirement at all. On the other hand in the US the Supreme 
Court has stated92 that the defendant’s intent must be established in antitrust 
cases – it may however be noted that a mens rea requirement is absent in 
§ 1 of the Sherman Act.93 The recent amendment in the UK dropped the 
mental element of dishonesty, but retained the requirement of ‘intention’ to 
enter the cartel agreement.94 The Australian cartel offence under the Trade 
Practices Act s 44ZZRF(2) and 44ZZRG(2) requires as a fault element 
knowledge or belief of a cartel provision in the contract, arrangement 
or understanding. Additionally the s 44ZZRG requires that there is an 
intention to give effect to the stipulation.95 
Williams has pointed out that if cartel agreements are not viewed as 
reprehensible the stigmatizing effect, associated with a criminalization, does 
not materialize.96 She says that even if the actus reus employs the concept of 
price-fixing instead of concepts such as cheating (that perhaps may arguably 
better reflect intrinsic criminality), ‘there is a case for requiring a mens rea 
of ulterior intent to produce the underlying delinquency which justifies the 
use of the criminal law. Thus, for example, while “price fixing” may not yet 
carry the necessary moral stigma, an offence of (intentional) price fixing 
with intent to cheat or exploit might come to do so more rapidly than an 
91  Williams 2011, under the heading ’B. Defining the Mens Rea’ at para 1.
92  United States v. United States Gypsum Co. – 438 U.S. 422 (1978) at para 30. 
93  Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C.  § 1 reads: ‘Every contract, combination in the form 
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any 
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall 
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not 
exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by 
imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the 
court.’
94  BIS, Growth, Competition and The Competition Regime: Government Response to 
Consultation, March 2012 at paras. 7.9-7.10.
95  Beaton-Wells and Fisse 2011 pp. 141-142; Williams 2011, under the heading ’B. 
Defining the Mens Rea’ at paras 2-3.
96  Williams 2011, under the heading ’B. Defining the Mens Rea’ at paras 2-3.
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offence of (intentional) price fixing per se might do.’ 97  She envisaged the 
possibility of designing the mental element of the cartel offence so that it 
seeks to prohibit exploitation, accompanied by a requirement of an intent 
as an alternative to the troubled dishonesty requirement.98 
The Swedish 2004 committee noted that as a general rule it may be 
presumed that one who enters a cartel is aware of the effects of the conduct. 
The case law regarding antitrust practices is such that it is not necessary 
to prove that a company consciously infringed the competition laws to 
establish that the offence was intentionally committed. As opposed to that 
it is sufficient to show that the company could not have been unaware that 
the conduct in question restricted competition. Individual criminal liability 
however, the committee argued, should only cover intentional offences while 
the penal value of negligent conduct does not warrant criminal punishment 
and should be excluded from the scope of the offence.99 
Under the Swedish 2004 committee proposal, as an element of intent 
it is required that the offender was aware of the conclusion of an agreement 
that is prohibited at the national and EU level and that the agreement 
involves companies at the same level of trade fixing prices, allocating markets 
or limiting output. Further the serious prevention restriction or distortion 
of competition must have taken place intentionally. On the other hand 
it is not required that the offender was aware that the agreement would 
legally be determined to seriously prevent, restrict or distort competition. 
However, the offender must have been aware of the factual circumstances 
that prompt this judgment.100
It may be noted that requiring the intent to enter the agreement in the 
definition of the offence contradicts the approach in the national and the 
EU prohibitions that are of civil nature – the criminal liability can only arise 
if the offender understood that the measure in question was an unlawful 
restriction of competition.101
Similarly in Denmark it was proposed that only individuals who have 
intentionally committed offences should be subject to custodial sanctions.102 
Harding and Joshua have said that the core reprehensiblity concerning 
hard-core cartel collusion lies in the fact that the parties to the cartel, who 
should compete, intentionally enter into an agreement known to be harmful 
and unlawful. Since hard-core cartels are prohibited,  the agreements are 
entered in secret and have a ’cover and contumacious character which may 
97  William 2011, under the heading ’B. Defining the Mens Rea’ at para 3,6.
98  William 2011, under the heading ’B. Defining the Mens Rea’ at para 6.
99  SOU 2004:131 pp. 189-190.
100  SOU 2004:131 p. 264.
101  SOU 2004:131 p. 264.
102  ’Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 46, 211.
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be seen as adding to the delinquent character of such conduct.’103 Harding 
and Joshua argued that the offence should be confined along the lines of 
intention, ’[a]n individual is guilty of an offence if he intentionally agrees with 
one or more other persons to make or implement, or to cause to be made or 
implemented, legally prohibited arrangements of the following kind’.104 Patel 
has criticized this approach by arguing that restricting the offence simply to 
the requirement of intention, could mean that defendants could be subject 
to prosecution after entering a prohibited agreement even if they lacked 
the guilty mind. Patel would favor the following design of the offence: ‘An 
individual is guilty of an offense if he agrees with one or more other persons 
to make or implement, or to cause to be made or implemented arrangements 
of the following kind relating to at least two undertakings (A and B), which 
he knows, suspects, or has reasonable grounds to suspect to be illegal.’105 
However as Harding and Joshua pointed out the most conspicuously 
delinquent part about cartels is the agreement that was concluded conscious 
of the legal prohibition. As they say the word ‘agreement’ could adequately 
speak for the attitude, but adding ‘intentionally’ and ‘legally prohibited’ 
would reflect the determination and awareness.106 Both the actus reus and 
mens rea  elements would be captured in the term ‘agreement’ thus giving 
rise to criminal liability.107 Harding and Joshua point out that defining the 
offence this way is the approach adopted in Canada and Australia.108 As 
per the Swedish Green paper and in line with the argumentation used by 
Harding and Joshua this author is of the view that the reasonable approach 
is to incorporate an element of intention in the offence, but not requiring 
additional mental elements.
6.4.2 Actus Reus – the harm brought about by the Offender
Criminal liability requires criminal intent and prior to the demonstration of 
intent, there must be a finding of actus reus, the objective element, namely a 
103  Harding and Joshua 2012, p. 2.
104  Harding and Joshua 2012, p. 4.
105  See Patel 2012, pp. 14-15.
106  Harding and Joshua 2012 p. 2, 4; See also New Zealand, see Ministry of Economic 
Development, Cartel Criminalisation: Discussion Document, January 2010. p. 48.
107  Harding and Joshua 2012 p. 4.
108  Harding and Joshua 2012 p. 4; Beaton-Wells 2009, pp. 5-6; Low QC and Halladay 
2011, under the heading ’ A. Overview of the New Cartel Offence’ at paras 2-4.
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violation of the national or EU prohibition against cartels – in such a context 
the anticompetitive objective of the agreement may come under scrutiny.109 
While mens rea refers to the ‘guilty mind’, actus reus (the physical 
element) refers to the harm brought about by the offender.  Civil prohibitions 
usually need only the actus reus part.110 
Should the Definition of the Offence draw on the Harmful Effects 
brought about or the ill-gotten Profits?
Whelan points out that ‘[s]ubject to the dictates of the de minimis doctrine, 
EU law does not require the proof of the actual negative effects of, say, a price-
fixing cartel on the relevant market in order for the European Commission 
to find an infringement of Article 101 TFEU and to impose a sanction 
for such an infringement. “Hard core” cartels are viewed as restriction of 
competition by object and therefore are not subject to an effects-based 
analysis’. Whelan further notes that this approach adheres to the US model 
and also the criminalization movement tends to observe these tenets.111 It 
may be mentioned however that the possibility of advancing economic 
evidence during court proceedings has not been rejected in Ireland, which 
marks a contrast between the British and Irish regimes.112
On a different note, the Danish Committee noted that while the 
proposed models are designed around the agreement between competitors 
on the same level of trade, the design of the offence could also be more 
confined, drawing on inter alia the cartel profits. Other property law offences 
in Denmark particularly draw on the profits, for instance embezzlement and 
fraud – in other words the offender should profit from the infringement. 
Following this model would require that the prosecutor show that the cartel 
agreement was entered in an attempt to profit. In contrast to other property 
offences the proposal does not set out that the cartel agreement brought 
about losses or a substantial risk of losses, which is something that inter 
alia the statutory definition regarding fraud calls for. 113 If however the 
cartel offence was designed in a similar fashion as the property offences, 
109  SOU 2004:131 p. 264.
110  New Zealand, see Ministry of Economic Development, Cartel Criminalisation: 
Discussion Document, January 2010. P. 48; Green 2004, p. 512.
111  Whelan 2012a p. 3; See Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance 
which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 81(2) of the Treaty 
establishing the Euroepan Community, Official Journal C 368, 22/12/2001 p. 0013-
0015.
112  For this reason and since the design of the offence makes it linked to the violation 
of art. 101 TFEU Furse points out that as a result Ireland has not the need to 
distinguish ‘between the EU law-based procedure and a separate national criminal 
law.’Furse 2012 p. 173; Regarding the employment of economic evidence at trial, see 
section 9 of the Irish Competition Act 2002.
113  ’Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 208.
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the prosecutor besides the profits may prove the harm brought about or 
a risk of a significant loss. Moreover the prosecution must prove that the 
elements of the statutory prohibition were all contravened purposefully.114 
Indeed the Danish White-Collar prosecutor highlighted that it does 
not have to prove the damages brought about in order to pursue custodial 
sanctions. The possibility of damages alone is adequate, in the fashion of 
other white-collar crimes.115 
The Swedish 2004 committee noted that hard-core cartels usually seek to 
secure profits that would be unavailable if unrestricted competition obtained 
– in that sense incorporating a requirement of profits in the cartel offence 
might be redundant. Moreover designing the possible profit requirement 
in a way that observes the demands of legal certainty while targeting the 
conduct that is intended to be covered by the criminal prohibition, is 
difficult according to the 2004 committee. Therefore the committee ruled 
out a design of the offence that draws on the cartel profits. 116 Also Whelan 
has underlined that showing individual profits is difficult.117 
Alternatively, designing the offence in a way that draws on the harmful 
effects brought about by the lack of competition, such as the deadweight 
loss is not desirable either, since in practice it could be difficult to link such 
damages to a lack of competition. Therefore there should be no requirement 
of damages to establish criminal liability – when it comes to cartels, the 
harmful effects may usually be presumed.118 Indeed the troubled dishonesty 
requirement in the UK had provided the defendants with a gateway to the 
introduction of economic evidence which was not considered desirable.119
In light of the above Swedish elaboration one may take note of the 
discussion inter alia by Williams regarding the question whether the 
offence should target the conduct or results. As she notes the English, Irish, 
Australian and US offences ban chiefly the conduct with no regard to the 
results, which may be referred to as the ‘per se illegality’.120 As an example 
of the conduct approach Williams cites the prohibition in the Enterprise 
Act, enshrined in s 188, which sets out that an agreement between persons 
regarding the implementation of a forbidden agreement gives rise to criminal 
liability, and similarly with a reference to art 101(1) TFEU the s 6 of the 
Competition Act forbids entering into an agreement, implementing it and 
114  ibid. p. 209.
115  Gitte Holtsø’s Interview with the Public Prosecutor for Serious White-Collar Crime, 
Hans Jacob Folker 2012.
116  SOU 2004:131 pp.188-189.
117  Whelan 2012b p. 597.
118  SOU 2004:131 pp. 188-189.
119  BIS, Growth, Competition and the Competition Regime, Government Response to 
Consultation, March 2012. at para. 7.5.
120  See also the discussion in New Zealand, see Ministry of Economic Development, 
Cartel Criminalisation: Discussion Document, January 2010. P. 43ff.
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concerted practices. The situation is not much different in Australia where 
the Trade Practices Act ss 44ZZRF makes it an offence for a corporation to 
enter a contract, arrangement or arrive at an understanding that includes a 
cartel provision. Thus also the Australian offence targets conduct. Williams 
acknowledges that this state of affairs may emanate from the difficulty of 
determining the effects of a cartel. 121  
For instance previously the Australian civil prohibition exempted 
exclusionary stipulations concerning contracts, arrangements and 
understandings in relation to a joint venture, if they ‘do not have the purpose 
or effect of substantially lessening competition.’ While the joint ventures in 
terms of production and provision of goods and services are exempted under 
the revised Australian civil and criminal regimes, the test for competitive 
effects is absent for the criminal offence apparently out of a desire to prevent 
the juries from doing the evaluation of the effects.122  As Williams points 
out, from the perspective of legal certainty this approach is desirable, but 
pays attention to the distinction between a criminal prohibition against 
conduct and a criminal prohibition against effects and notes that Harding 
has suggested that the US approach of criminalizing conduct naturally calls 
for criminal enforcement due to the moral assessment involved, whereas 
the analysis of the market effects needs economic analysis and is therefore 
more suitably dealt with under the administrative regime.123 
As Williams says the design of the actus reus may be viewed to mirror 
the justification for the criminal prohibition – while some may favor a stricter 
observance of the harm principle and thus an offence that criminalizes 
harmful results, legal moralists would satisfy with a criminal prohibition 
against the conduct. The middle way along the lines set out by Feinberg, 
121  Williams 2011, under heading ’i. Should Conduct or Results be Prohibited?’, at para 
1, see also footnote 104.
122  Beaton-Wells 2009, pp. 6-7; Williams 2011, under heading ’i. Should Conduct or 
Results be Prohibited?’, at para 1.
123  According to Williams the distinction between conduct and effects could reflect 
the decision ‘between the forward- and backward-looking approaches…’. The 
forward-looking approach would then be indicative of the desire of deterring a given 
conduct, irrespective of a lack of harm in a particular case, while harm could possibly 
be brought about in a future case. The backward-looking approach on the other 
hand requires both moral wrongfulness and harmful effects to warrant a criminal 
law intervention. In light of the foregoing Williams asks whether cartels would 
more appropriately fall under the concept of inchoate offences rather than conduct 
offences: no principal offence or effects are required, collusion itself suffices. It may 
be noted that while liberalism might not accept inchoate crimes, Feinberg however, 
as Williams notes does not limit punishing only to offences with effects, see Williams 
2011, under heading ’i. Should Conduct or Results be Prohibited?’, at paras 4-6; 
Feinberg 1995, p. 119; Harding 2006, p. 186.
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would demand the presupposition of harm, but would be content with a 
prohibition against the disobedience to the law.124 
All in all, as for instance the Swedish contemplation acknowledged the 
approach drawing on the effects of the conduct is problematic from the 
perspective of legal certainty and thus should be avoided.
The Criminality of Actus Reus
In the UK context Whelan has argued that the cartel offence was possibly 
plagued by a lack of legal certainty, since the dishonesty requirement was 
not matched by an actus reus that is linked to criminality – this followed in 
Whelan’s opinion from the absence of a link between the cartel offence and 
the EU prohibition. ‘With no actus reus which necessarily violates the EU 
prohibition on cartel activity, Section 188 EA expects a cartelist to decide 
whether her conduct is dishonest (and therefore criminal) without providing 
a clear pointer to criminality in the offence itself.’125As an alternative to 
binding the cartel offence to the EU prohibition to express the criminality, 
the cartel activity itself could be viewed inherently morally wrongful126 – to 
achieve this, Whelan points to the concepts of ‘cheating,’ ‘deception,’ and 
‘stealing’.127 As mentioned Williams too argued that the design of the offence 
could signal its justification by incorporating for instance concepts such as 
‘cheating’ or ‘exploitation’ into the offence. While offences usually, such as 
the criminalization of ‘theft’ do not refer to ‘the violation of property rights’ 
Williams argued that cartels are not morally as intuitive and therefore it 
would be desirable to point out in the offence the pertinent delinquency, in 
order for the necessary reprehensibility to emerge over time. Thus as time 
124  At the end of the day what counts according to Williams however is that the 
definition of the offence is designed in ways that signals the backward-looking 
approach to warrant a criminal measure, see Williams 2011, under heading ’i. 
Should Conduct or Results be Prohibited?’ at para. 7.
125  Further the EU prohibition differed from the UK cartel offence, since the de 
minimis requirement does not apply in relation to the cartel offence, the effect on 
trade between the EU member states is not required, Article 101(3) TFEU style 
exemptions are not available, and finally the dishonesty requirement distinguished 
the cartel offence. Whelan 2012c pp. 687-688; See Commission Notice on 
agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition 
under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ C 368, 
22.12.2001.
126  See the Irish Case D.P.P. V Duffy & Anor, [2009] IEHC 208, where the judge 
says of cartels inter alia that ’[t]hey are offensive and abhorrent, not simply because 
they are malum prohibitum, but also because they are malum in se.’ At para. 22.; 
According to Stuart Green viewing stealing merely as law-breaking would not 
sufficiently account for what is wrong about it. It would reduce it to the malum 
prohibitum category. Green 2006., p. 89.
127  Whelan 2012 p. 691.
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passes price-fixing could eventually as a term attract rebuke in the way that 
theft does.128 
Whelan says that the aforementioned concepts, ‘cheating, ‘deception’, 
and ‘stealing’ require that assumptions are made regarding the motivations 
of the cartelists, and considering what is known of such motivations129 – it 
cannot be easily claimed that cartelists have automatically the applicable 
intentions for the purposes of the mentioned concepts. To remedy this, the 
offence could require for instance that there was ‘an intention to obtain an 
advantage’ but the downside is that this would be one more hurdle for the 
prosecutors to overcome that could undermine the economic deterrence.130 
In order to avoid this ordeal Whelan argues that the cartel offence would be 
better off if it was tied to the civil prohibition to establish the criminality 
of the actus reus. 131
6.5  THE ROLE OF THE COMPETITION 
AUTHORITY 
While the Role of the Competition Authority is related to question how 
its role is determined under a criminalized anti-cartel regime, it also has 
a heavy link to the possibly precarious parallel existence of criminal and 
administrative regimes,132 which in turn may affect issues concerning 
128  cf. Whelan 2012 p. 692; Williams 2011 under the heading ’ii. Should the 
Definition Directly Refer to the Delinquency at Issue?’ at paras 1-2; See also Beaton-
Wells and Fisse who say that ’[f ]urther differentation should be achieved by means 
of distinctive labelling of the prohibitions, separate definition of their physical 
elements,…’ Beaton-Wells and Fisse 2011 p. 35
129  Whelan refers to Parker 2011 and Stucke 2011; see also the discussion in this work 
in the Chapter ’[t]he Moral Content of Hard-core Cartels’.
130  Thus translating into a situation where the same amount of resources allow 
prosecutors to secure less convictions, see Whelan 2012c p. 692.
131  Whelan 2012c p. 692.
132  In this regard see also the chapter ’Punitive Administrative Sanctions in Finland 
and Sweden: Neither Fish nor Fowl’ in this work, which looked in to the seemingly 
incoherent system of sanctions in Finland and Sweden, and the rationale behind 
administrative anti-cartel regimes in the aforementioned contexts.
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information exchange between the Commission and NCAs and the principle 
of ne bis in idem, all of which will be discussed below. 
6.5.1 The Division of tasks between the Competition Authority  
 and the Authority prosecuting the Criminal Cartel   
 Offence and questions related to parallel Enforcement
Criminalizing cartels has been described as a ‘formidable undertaking’ and 
it may ‘send ripples through each element of the legal process.’133 One 
question of importance is the role of the competition authority under a 
criminal anti-cartel regime, which will be discussed below. 
This is an important issue to raise in the discussion on criminalizing 
cartel conduct since the actual performance of the Authorities involved 
may be very important: Tom R. Tyler has suggested that whether people 
are motivated to observe the dictates of the legal authorities depends on 
‘social relationships and ethical judgments, and does not primarily flow 
from the desire to avoid punishment or gain rewards.’134 One possibility is 
that the criminal anti-cartel regime would become counterproductive, since 
businesses would try to circumvent the new rules – thus overall compliance 
would not be increased.135 Also individuals may just further strengthen their 
secretive tactics and collusion.136 
Importantly whether this will be the case depends arguably, as Beaton-
Wells explains, on the one hand on the performance of the ACCC (the 
Australian Competition Authority) in terms of the number of prosecutions 
and on the other hand on whether the business people view the ACCC 
as just, consistent, proportionate and transparent – the attitudes towards 
compliance will depend on such factors of procedural justice.137  As 
133  Kovacic 2011, under the heading ’Introduction’ at para 4.
134  Tyler 2006, p. 170ff.; Beaton-Wells has previously used this argument in the anti-
cartel enforcement context, see Beaton-Wells 2011, under the title ’G. Unseasureable 
and Possibly Counter-Productive Effects’ at para 3. 
135  Parker 2011, under the heading ’Conclusion’ at paras 2-3.
136  Harding has explained that ‘[d]eterrence would enter the picture only when official 
policy toward most forms of “private” cartel hardened during the 1970s and 1980s 
so that determined cartelists had to go underground and start behaving like offenders 
rather than subjects of consensual regulation. Thus began a vicious circle and upward 
spiral of enforcement: the more secretive and more evasive the cartels became, 
the greater the powers of investigation and enforcement required by regulators, 
provoking ever more subterfuge on the part of companies, which in turn required yet 
greater powers of investigation and sanctioning, so transforming companies and their 
employees into criminal-like actors.’ Harding 2011, p. 346.
137  Beaton-Wells 2011, under the heading ’G. Unmeasurable and Possibly Counter-
Productive Effects’ at para 3; Tyler 2006 p. 170ff.
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Beaton-Wells points out the agency’s reputation is at stake and mistakes 
will cost dearly.138 
Indeed the recent UK experience of the rather spectacular collapse 
of the British Airways case regarding fuel surcharges, whereby the OFT 
led criminal prosecution failed, prompted a debate regarding the reform 
of the design of the criminal anti-cartel regime. While leniency against 
criminal prosecution may be an important detection tool of the competition 
authority, it certainly does not appear to be the panacea for the vagaries 
associated with criminal anti-cartel enforcement and perhaps even less so are 
the more robust investigatory tools available under a criminal regime that 
have not been used to the extent that was originally predicted in the UK.139
The OFT had prepared the British Airways case for four years and the 
case collapsed prior to any witness hearings due to a failure to observe the 
standards of disclosure related to a criminal trial.140 Thus questions could be 
raised regarding the role of the Office of Fair Trading in criminal enforcement 
– it shares with the Serious Fraud Office the task of enforcing the cartel 
offence. 141 In relation to that it has been noted in the Australian context that 
the ACCC personnel is not well-versed in criminal law matters.142 Indeed 
as Calvani puts it ‘the skills of detectives and prosecutors with experience in 
embezzlement cases are likely to be more valuable than those with experience 
in abuse of dominance matters.’143 With such a warning in mind the Swedish 
Green paper proposal on the envisaged role of the Competition Authority 
under a criminal anti-cartel regime will be scrutinized below.
Under the Swedish 2004 Committee Proposal (the Green paper) the 
Competition Authority would retain the investigation obligations under 
the administrative regime, while the Economic Crime Authority would 
concentrate on investigating the cartel offences. 144  The prosecutor at 
the Economic Crime Authority would make the decision to launch the 
preliminary investigation of a suspected cartel offence.145
138  Beaton-Wells 2011, under the heading ’C. Enhanced Room for Investigatory Error’ 
at para 3.
139  See the Discussion in this work under the Chapter ’Detecting, Investigating and 
Prosecuting Cartels particularly in the UK’
140  Joshua 2011, p. 129; Furse 2012, p. 155.
141  Purnell et al. 2010, p. 315, 317; Hammond and Penrose Report 2001 p. 45
142  Beaton-Wells 2011, under the heading ’C. Enhanced Room for Investigatory Error’ 
at para 2.
143  Calvani and Calvani 2009, p. 139.
144  Such arrangements would not require legislative amendments according to the 
committee, see SOU 2004:131 pp. 205-206
145  SOU 2004:131 p. 206; The Swedish 2004 committee noted that it is especially 
important that during the preliminary investigation proceedings the principle of 
objectivity as set out in the chapter 23 section 4 of the Code of Judicial Procedure 
is observed, thus also paying attention to information that is favorable to the 
defendant. SOU 2004:131 p. 207-208; The Chapter 23, section 4 of the Swedish 
Code of Judicial Procedure sets out as follows: ‘At the preliminary investigation, not 
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The cartel offence investigations would according to the 2004 
committee be so sophisticated that the participation of the Prosecutor is 
needed from the very beginning. The Prosecutor could resort both to the 
resources for investigation available at the Economic Crimes Authority 
and ask the Competition Authority whether it could place resources for 
investigation at the disposal of the Prosecutor regarding a specific case dealt 
with at the Economic Crimes Authority.146 
In Germany worries have been expressed about the possibility that the 
efficient role of the Bundeskartellamt (the German Competition Authority) 
might suffer, if public prosecutors enforced the criminal cases – the public 
prosecutors may not emphasize the cartel cases, instead they may prioritize 
other types of crimes. Further public prosecutors may lack expertise in 
competition law matters. On the other hand in Wagner von-Papp’s view 
the handling of the bid-rigging offence has decently been taken care of by 
the public prosecutors.147 
The German concern may not be without merit: the cooperation 
between the competition authorities and the public prosecutors has not 
been smooth in Israel, Ireland or Norway, where the competition authorities 
have been compelled to persuade the public prosecutors to take on cases. 
The reluctance of the public prosecutors may also owe inter alia to the 
higher standards of proof.148 
A further concern raised by Wouter Wils is if the public prosecutors 
were not minded to be bound by the leniency decisions made by the 
Competition Authority that had conducted the investigation. Wils argued 
that the Competition Authority should engage the public prosecutors in 
the leniency negotiations and thereby make them binding upon the public 
prosecutors as well.149 Another thing that may make prosecutions outside 
only circumstances that are not in favour of the suspect but also circumstances in his 
favour shall be considered, and any evidence favourable to the suspect shall be preserved. 
The investigation should be conducted so that no person is unnecessarily exposed to 
suspicion, or put to unnecessary cost or inconvenience. 
 The preliminary investigation shall be conducted as expeditiously as possible. When there 
is no longer reason for pursuing the investigation, it shall be discontinued.’
146  SOU 2004:131 p. 207; In Denmark it was suggested that when a particular case 
may attract prison sentences the Competition Authority should not touch upon 
the case.  This course of action would be prompted from the moment on when the 
Prosecutor deems that there are grounds to prosecute. See ’Rapport fra udvalget om 
Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 47.
147  Wagner-Von Papp 2011, under the heading ’ii. The Division of Competences: 
Efficient Bundeskartellamt v Inefficient Prosecutors’ at paras 1-2.
148  OECD Hard Core Cartels. Third Report on the Implementation of the 1998 
Recommendation, 2005.  p. 28; Baker 2011, p. 29 footnote 51.
149  Wils 2007, p. 37.
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the US more precarious is the seeming unwillingness of judges to sentence 
defendants to prison.150
Wagner Von-Papp has also proposed in the German context that the 
Bundeskartellamt could take part in criminal enforcement, perhaps in a 
similar fashion as the tax authorities, which investigate the case, may pose 
questions and express views during the trial.151 On the other hand Wagner 
Von-Papp has also envisaged the possibility of introducing specialised public 
prosecutors.152 
The idea of specialized public prosecutors may to some extent 
correspond to the Swedish position of the 2004 committee: In Sweden the 
Swedish Economic Crime Authority (in Swedish ‘Ekobrottsmyndigheten’) 
was deemed by the 2004 committee the most appropriate authority to 
prosecute the criminal cartel offence. The 2004 committee pointed out that 
the choice must be made between various prosecuting authorities, namely 
the public prosecutors and the Swedish Economic Crime Authority. While 
the Economic Crime Authority has a focus on white-collar criminality 
also experts from other authorities, such as the tax administration are 
on secondment to the Economic Crime Authority. The 2004 committee 
excluded the possibility that any other body would be entrusted with the 
task of investigating the cartel offence due to its serious nature. Therefore 
the Economic Crime Authority should undertake both the investigation 
and prosecution of the criminal offence. The 2004 committee noted that 
this solution reflects to a certain extent the state of affairs in the UK where 
an authority with expertise instead of the public prosecutors undertakes the 
aforementioned task. Yet one should note that crucially the enforcement 
task in the UK is a shared endeavor between the OFT and the Serious 
Fraud Office. 153 
As a condition of cooperation between the Competition Authority and 
the Economic Crime Authority the Swedish 2006 committee argued that 
the cooperation should be formalized even to a greater extent than what the 
2004 committee had proposed in order to avoid confusion regarding the 
150 In Ireland the judges have given suspended prison sentences. Beaton-Wells argues 
that this may indicate that judges prefer suspended prison terms when the criminal 
regime is at a more immature stage, see Beaton-Wells 2011, under the heading ’E. 
Uncertain Outcomes’ at para  2; See also Calvani and Calvani, 2009. p. 137.
151  Wagner-Von Papp 2011, under the heading ’The Division of Competences: Efficient 
Bundeskartellamt v Inefficient Prosecutors?’ at para 5.
152  Wagner-Von Papp 2011, under the heading ’The Division of Competences: Efficient 
Bundeskartellamt v Inefficient Prosecutors?’ at para 4.
153  Like in other economic crimes the investigation of the cartel offence would concern 
economic matters. While the number of cases may be presumed small, each case will 
require significant resources for investigation. Therefore, according to the committee, 
the investigation of cartels should be in the hands of a few authorities with the 
expertise and which can recruit qualified executive officials.  See SOU 2004:131 pp. 
199-201; See the discussion in this work in the Chapter ’Detecting, Investigating 
and Prosecuting Cartels particularly in the UK’
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roles of the respective authorities. The 2006 committee specifically noted 
that in the introductory period of criminal enforcement such clarity of roles 
is important for investigation and enforcement. 154  
Beaton-Wells who has discussed the challenges that lie ahead of the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (the ACCC),155 
has singled-out as problematic the reduced independence of the ACCC 
under the criminal regime, as the ACCC prior to the criminal regime had 
an autonomous decision-making regarding competition law violations. 
As opposed to that now under the criminal regime the ACCC shares 
competences with the office of the Commonwealth Director of Public 
Prosecutions (hereinafter CDPP), an agency that is entrusted with the task 
of prosecuting federal offences. The benefit of this approach may be that 
the knowledge of the ACCC may be employed in the investigation while 
the prosecutorial decision-making will remain coherent and impartial due 
to a separate prosecution agency. The ACCC and CDPP have agreed to 
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that sets out the ‘bifurcated 
model’, stating that the ACCC will carry out investigations and once the 
ACCC has referred a case to the CDPP, it will make the decision whether 
to prosecute. As Beaton-Wells points out, as opposed to that the US DOJ 
in contrast employs an ‘integrated model’, whereby one agency undertakes 
both the investigation and the prosecution.156 
Cooke and Massey have noted that not allocating the investigative role 
to the police (Gardai), but instead to the Competition Authority could slow 
down the pace of prosecutions due to agency’s need for gaining experience. 
Since the introduction of the Competition Act 2002 the Competition 
Authority in Ireland has had two Gardai helping it to carry out criminal 
enquires.157 The Competition Authority had initially in the early 1990s 
not been assigned an investigative task.158 Also the Australian Competition 
Authority (ACCC) has enlisted people from the police force, the corporate 
agency ASIC and a Special Counsel who is a criminal law barrister.159  
154  SOU 2006:99 pp. 566-567
155  Beaton-Wells however said that ‘[n]othing in this chapter should be taken to mean 
that the author does not support criminalization as a policy in dealing with serious 
cartel conduct or has concluded that a criminal regime is doomed to failure in 
Australia.’ See Beaton-Wells 2011, Under the heading ’Introduction’ at para 7.
156  Beaton-Wells 2011, Under the heading ’A. Reduced Autonomy and Potential 
Intra-Agency Conflict’ at paras 1-2; The ACCC alone gets to decide which case is 
sufficiently serious to justify a criminal prosecution and therefore it may ultimately 
be asked why certain cases and individuals were given the criminal law treatment and 
others the civil law treatment. Beaton-Wells 2011. Under the heading ’D. Challenges 
in Case Selection’ at para 3.
157  Massey and Cooke 2011 under the title ’Conclusion’ at para 2, see also footnote 95.
158  Massey and Cooke 2011 under the title ’Conclusion’ at para 2.
159  Beaton-Wells 2011, under the heading ’C. Enhanced Room for Investigatory Error’ 
at para 2.
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By employing the ‘bifurcated model’, however the regime runs the risk 
of a conflict between the two agencies, which may damage the reputation 
of the whole regime if publicized. Beaton-Wells argued however that on 
the other hand remarkable benefits may materialize in the form of skilled 
prosecution of cartel cases and adding to the legal safeguards due to the 
independence of the prosecution agency.160 
The Swedish 2006 committee noted however that even if there were 
no conflicts between the Competition Authority and the Economic 
Crimes Authority and there would be synergies involved related to 
previous knowledge, the due process requirements could mean that the 
criminal investigation would have to be prioritized which could undermine 
administrative enforcement.161 A similar comment has been made in the 
UK context by Bloom who argued that the delay is still worthwhile due to 
the deterrence gain.162 
The Swedish 2004 committee pointed to the possibility that the 
administrative investigation might be delayed as the administrative inquiry 
could not be concluded prior to the preliminary investigation. In the 2004 
committee’s view such effects could probably not be counterbalanced by the 
benefits accruing from the cooperation between the Competition Authority 
and the Swedish Economic Crime Authority. Whether the preliminary 
investigation into the suspected crime is commenced thus must be decided 
at such an early stage, that since the Economic Crime Authority will conduct 
the main part of the investigation, it prevents the Competition Authority 
from investigating the case for instance via dawn raids.163
On a different note, in terms of parallel enforcement the 2004 
committee pointed out that while criminal cartel cases would be tried at 
the general courts, the Market Court deals with the cases against companies, 
thus running the risk of the emergence of contradicting case law. What is 
more, the committee predicted the parallel criminal and administrative 
proceedings could require substantial resources, since the same evidence 
would have to be presented at separate trials.164 
160  Beaton-Wells 2011, under the heading ’A. Reduced Autonomy and Potential Intra-
Agency Conflict’ at para 4.
161  SOU 2006:99 p. 567; 
162  Bloom 2002, p. 8; See also Furse 2012 p. 127; See also the discussion in this work in 
Chapter titled ’Investigating and Prosecuting Cartels’ under the section ’the Requisite 
level of Evidence in criminal cases’; It may be noted that in contrast in Australia the 
criminal prosecution rules out the civil proceedings. See Beaton-Wells 2011, under 
the heading ’B. Fewer Civil Settlements, Fewer Visible Results’ at paras 1-2, 4.
163  SOU 2004:131  p. 255.
164  SOU 2004:131 pp. 255-256.
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From a due process perspective Whelan has argued that criminal 
sanctions in a given jurisdiction do not prevent the parallel employment 
of administrative sanctions in relation to a cartel case.165 
While administrative investigation may be first launched, it is possible 
that in the course of the investigations the authority becomes aware of 
evidence that concerns an individual – subsequently this prompts a criminal 
investigation. If the administrative investigation did not observe the criminal 
law protections while gathering evidence, using the evidence in a criminal 
trial would risk infringing Article 6 ECHR, 166 since the rights of the 
defendants are not afforded the criminal law safeguards throughout the 
investigation and prosecution. 167 As Whelan points out in the UK the OFT 
first investigates while observing the criminal law protections if it is at first 
obscure whether the criminal or administrative proceedings should be opted 
for – the administrative standards should become operative only once it is 
certain the proceedings should be administrative ones. Thus Whelan suggests 
that it might be advisable ‘to avoid situations where evidence is initially 
collected using administrative powers but which then must be reacquired 
using criminal powers.’168
Under the Swedish 2004 committee proposal the Competition 
Authority in parallel with the Economic Crime Authority could conduct its 
proceedings against infringing firms. The staff of the Competition Authority 
could be present when the suspected perpetrators or witnesses are heard and 
assist the Economic Crime Authority – in this respect the committee referred 
to the practices between the Economic Crime Authority and the Swedish Tax 
Agency which organized joint meetings.169 Thus the committee suggested 
that cooperation should take place between the Competition Authority and 
the Economic Crime Authority and further that the classified information 
regarding the preliminary investigation held by the latter authority could 
contribute to the investigations of the Competition Authority, meaning 
that such transfer of information should be allowed.170 However even the 
Competition Authority must observe the confidential nature of the evidence 
165  Whelan 2013b p. 145.
166  Whelan 2013b p. 158.
167  Incidentally, as Whelan explains this does not prevent concurrent proceedings 
by one and the same authority, if sufficient measures are taken to observe the due 
process: it should be made sure that the administrative and criminal investigative 
teams are isolated from each other by virtue of the ‘Chinese walls’, if operating 
within the same authority. Whelan 2013b p. 159.
168  Whelan undelines the importance of having an experienced team making the 
decision whether to undertake either criminal or administrative proceedings. Whelan 
2013b p. 160.
169  SOU 2004:131 pp. 215-216.
170  SOU 2004:131 p. 217.
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and has limited possibilities to resort to it in a prosecution against a company 
before the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.171
The 2006 committee underlined the fact that the Swedish track record 
of parallel enforcement had been poor and an effort had been made to 
alleviate the problems associated with it.172 It may be noted that in the 
Slovenian anti-cartel enforcement context Jager has stated that ‘[b]y the 
unwritten law of practice the administrative procedure undertaken by the 
specialized state agency – the CPO – takes priority and only after that is 
potential criminal enforcement at best even considered.’173
Beaton-Wells has said in the Australian context that the fears of a lack 
of criminal prosecutions were confirmed regarding offences in the area of 
corporate law, which then prompted the introduction of civil sanctions.174
Furse had said that in the UK there may be a difficulty in opting for 
either a civil or criminal enforcement in a given case. The same case may 
invoke both the Competition Act 1998 and the Enterprise Act. As opposed 
to that in the US whether a civil or criminal prosecution is brought may be 
decided speedily and for instance if the decision is in favour of a criminal 
prosecution, both the individual and the company could be criminally 
prosecuted.175
Furse had noted that in the US the civil and criminal proceedings are 
never pursued in parallel with regard to one arrangement whereas in the 
UK the opposite may be the case.176
In this regard, it is interesting that Furse argues that the constitutional 
constraint in Ireland, which prevented the introduction of civil fines may 
have brought about a situation where the Irish anti-cartel regime compares 
well with the UK regime.177 
Beaton-Wells too has been critical of the UK regime where the case 
will be pursued under the civil regime when undertakings are concerned 
and respectively when individuals are the targets the criminal proceedings 
171  SOU 2004:131 p. 255
172  SOU 2006:99 pp. 566-567
173  Jager 2011, p. 295.
174  Beaton-Wells 2011, under the heading ’B. Fewer Civil Settlements, Fewer Visible 
Results’ at para 6.
175  Furse 2012, p. 8.
176  Furse 2012, pp. 76-77.
177  Furse 2012, p. 168; Criminalising the conduct of individuals in Ireland, does not 
according to Massey stem from the constitutional reasons, but from ‘a deliberate 
political decision that criminal penalties should apply to individual business 
executives...’.Massey 2012, p. 155.
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will be launched.178 It has been recognized for instance by the OFT that 
parallel criminal and civil enforcement is not an easy task. 179 
Beaton-Wells has acknowledged though that since the criminal 
prosecution rules out the civil proceedings in Australia, the Competition 
Authority may not be able to sustain its steady record of litigating and then 
settling a case. 180
As a response to similar concerns in Germany Wagner Von-Papp has 
pointed out that currently the Bundeskartellamt continues to be responsible 
for enforcement against firms even when public prosecutors have undertaken 
the case against individuals in bid-rigging cases. If a criminal regime against 
cartels was introduced, Wagner Von-Papps has argued in the German 
context on a more optimistic note that ‘the worst that could happen is that 
enforcement against individuals becomes slightly less efficient.’181 
In sum, while it seems that there is some merit to the claim that parallel 
enforcement against cartels may have some inherent weaknesses, on balance, 
it does not appear to carry the sort of weight that alone would warrant 
the abandonment of the idea of criminalizing cartels, which constitute an 
egregious violation of Competition Law. Furthermore, the Swedish idea of 
entrusting exlusively the Economic Crime Authority with the enforcement 
of the envisaged criminal cartel offence seems sensible when taking into 
consideration the failed criminal prosecution of the British Airways case in 
the UK.182
Criminalizing Cartel Conduct in Light of the Required Resources 
The 2004 committee highlighted the importance of detection and 
prosecution of the guilty individuals. Thus in order to achieve the intended 
178  Beaton-Wells does not favor the Irish regime either since only criminal proceedings 
are available irrespective of the anti-competitive conduct in question. Beaton-Wells 
2011, under the heading ’D. Challenges in Case Selection’ at para 2.
179  OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases, OFT’s detailed guidance 
on the principles and process, OFT1495, July 2013 - at para 1.3 and 1.4.; See also 
Crowther 2011; Furse 2012 pp. 120-121
180  Beaton-Wells 2011, under the heading ’B. Fewer Civil Settlements, Fewer Visible 
Results’ at paras 1-2, 4.
181  Wagner-Von Papp 2011, under the heading ’ii. The Division of Competences: 
Efficient Bundeskartellamt v Inefficient Prosecutors?’ at para 3.
182  For a UK-specific, but directly related issue, see the discussion under the section 
’The Institutional Structure’ in the Chapter titled ’Detecting, Investigating and 
Prosecuting Cartels particularly in the UK’ in this work.
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outcome the relevant authorities would have to be equipped with effective 
tools and adequate resources to detect cartels.183 
What is more, in the Irish context the Annual Report of the Competition 
Authority in 2000 revealed that the Authority could not launch investigations 
timeously as a result of inadequate resources.’184
It must be born in mind also that criminal proceedings are time-
consuming since the likely subjects of criminal prosecution, the corporate 
executives, are probably going to exhaust every possible resource to contest 
the prosecution against them. Beaton-Wells points to the UK and Ireland 
where the criminal proceedings have lasted for years – in Ireland, it is 
reported, three criminal cases have been successfully concluded, each 
lasting approximately 3 years.185 Also the 2004 noted that cartel cases had 
shown that significant resources would be needed, for instance due the 
aforementioned time-consuming nature of trials.186 
The Swedish elaboration envisaged that the Economic Crimes Authority 
would need more resources as it would be the designated prosecutor of 
cartel cases. 187  The 2004 committee pointed out that it is unavoidable 
the overlapping investigations of both the Competition Authority and the 
Economic Crimes Authority would take up resources. On the other hand the 
results of the criminal investigation may be employed by the Competition 
Authority in its administrative proceedings once the prosecution has been 
brought. The Competition Authority itself on the other hand would not 
need additional resources the committee predicted, but the criminal regime 
would not reduce the spendings of the Competition Authority. 188 The total 
costs of a criminal anti-cartel regime were estimated to be some 44 million 
Swedish Crowns per annum.189 
In Australia, as a result of the introduction of the criminal regime, 
resources previously utilized in other activities of the Competition Authority 
will now be redirected to criminal enforcement. This may be ill-adviced, 
since as Beaton-Wells pointed out it is possible that criminal enforcement 
will undermine therefore the execution of the remaining obligations of 
the Competition Authority.190  Similarly the 2006 committee argued that 
183  SOU 2004:131 p. 252.
184  Competition Authority, Annual Report 2000, p. 1; Massey however pointed out that 
in spite of the lacking resources a good result was reached in the Heating Oil case, see 
Massey and Cooke 2011, under the heading ’Conclusion’ at para 3.
185  Beaton-Wells 2011, under the heading ’F. Resource Diversion’ at para 1.
186  SOU 2004:131 p. 258.
187  SOU 2004:131 p. 258.
188  SOU 2004:131 p. 258; Simonsson too has argued that a criminal anti-cartel 
enforcement regime may involve the duplication of the required resources, see 
Simonsson 2011, p. 210.
189  SOU 2004:131 p. 21.
190  Beaton-Wells 2011. Under the heading ’F. Resource Diversion’ at para 2.
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allocating the Competition Authority’s resources to criminal enforcement 
would be counterproductive, since under such a regime the Competition 
Authority would still retain the responsibility of initial investigation. The 
committee said that besides the Competition Authority, also the police, 
the courts administration and the prosecutors would lack resources for the 
purposes of criminal anti-cartel enforcement and that assigning resources 
to criminal enforcement would be unwarranted since the same resources 
could be allocated to the existing administrative regime. 191 
Simonsson has however taken the position that despite the resources 
needed, ‘the argument has been made (and convincingly to my mind) that 
cartel criminalization against natural persons ought to be a worthwhile 
project.’192 
It is interesting that in contrast to the Swedish claims the Danish 
Government Bill estimated that the introduction of prison sentences 
would not put a heavy strain on the public purse: It was predicted that 
custodial sanctions would not be frequently employed and the more robust 
investigatory measures would streamline the investigations, thus possibly in 
conjunction with a greater probability of detection and heavier penalties, 
it was thought that the number of leniency applications would rise thus 
strengthening enforcement. Subsequently the Government Bill estimated 
the economic effects of the introduction of prison sentences and higher 
fines on the public purse to be very narrow.193 
The Author tends to subscribe to the view that despite the resources 
needed, the case has been made that the required resources should not be 
an overpowering argument against introducing criminal sanctions. 
6.5.2 Information Exchange between the Commission and the  
 NCAs 
Art. 12(3) of Regulation 1/2003 makes arrangements for the exchange of 
information between national competition authorities (NCAs) to enforce 
Article 101 TFEU.194 Whelan further notes that Regulation 1/2003 for 
instance acknowledges in recital 16 that very different sorts of sanctions are 
employed against natural persons across member states and the particular 
191  SOU 2006:99 p. 571-572.
192  Simonsson 2011, under the heading ’IV. The Costs and Complexities of Enforcing 
Criminal Cartel Laws’ at para 11.
193  See Forslag til Lov om ændring af konkurrenceloven og straffeloven, October 26th, 
2012  p. 11.
194  Whelan 2013b p. 146; Wils has also pointed out that by virtue of art. 5 of the 
Regulatition 1/2003 member states may resort to fines or ’any other penalty provided 
in their national law’, see Wils 2005a p. 129, 152,153.
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way of enforcing Article 101 TFEU is open for the member states to decide 
as per art. 5 of Regulation 1/2003.195
Regarding the information exchange between the national competition 
authorities and the Commission as set out in Regulation 1/2003, the Swedish 
2004 committee stated that the introduction of a criminal prohibition 
in Sweden could hamper the Swedish information exchange with the 
aforementioned institutions.196
The information exchange takes place in the framework provided by 
Regulation 1/2003, which sets out in the recital 15 that the Commission 
in conjunction with the Member State competition Authorities constitutes 
a network that applies the EU competition laws.197 While the main rule 
is that the information exchange is used to enforce the EU competition 
law rules, (articles 101 and 102 TFEU), the exchanged information may 
be used in the parallel application of national competition laws, provided 
that a result at variance is not reached.198 To avoid due process problems 
Regulation 1/2003 art. 12(3) sets out the following: ‘Information exchanged 
pursuant to paragraph 1 can only be used in evidence to impose sanctions on 
natural persons where:
-the law of the transmitting authority foresees sanctions of a similar kind 
in relation to an infringement of Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty or, in 
the absence thereof,
-the information has been collected in a way which respects the same 
level of protection of the rights of defence of natural persons as provided for 
under the national rules of the receiving authority. However in this case, the 
information exchanged cannot be used by the receiving authority to impose 
custodial sanctions.’
Thus Regulation 1/2003 explicitly takes note of the possibility that 
certain jurisdictions may have opted to criminalize cartel conduct. 199 Where 
only the ‘requesting state’ has a criminal antitrust regime, the evidence 
collected under the administrative regime by the ‘requested state’ may 
not be utilized as evidence, but as intelligence, bar the situations where 
the ‘requested state’ observed the protections of the receiving state when 
195  Whelan 2013b pp. 145-146.
196  SOU 2004:131 p. 228.
197  See articles 11 and 12 of Regulation 1/2003; See also the Commission Notice 
which provides that the NCAs and the Commission use the network as a forum for 
conversation regarding the application of the EU rules, see European Commission, 
Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, 
2004/C 101/03, Brussels, 24 April 2004. 
198  Regulation 1/2003 art. 12(2).
199  Whelan 2013b p. 150.
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collecting the evidence, yet even in these cases the receiving state could not 
resort to the transmitted evidence to pursue custodial sanctions.200
The 2006 committee argued that a possible Swedish decision to 
criminalize cartels could reflect a defensive attitude, which might not be 
wise. What is more, the results of a criminalization in terms of the ECN 
cooperation are unpredictable.201
Whelan has however rejected the argument that employing both 
administrative and criminal sanctions against cartel conduct would 
inevitably lead to divisions within the ECN by excluding the jurisdictions 
with custodial sanctions from the wider community. Whelan noted that 
while Regulation 1/2003 art. 12(3) bans the use of transmitted information 
as evidence, the information received may assist the cartel investigations, 
indeed the received information may be legally employed ‘to detect and to 
obtain proof of – rather than to use as evidence’ of cartel conduct.202 
Wils has recognized that the possibility that intelligence (which cannot 
be used as evidence) would be sent from jurisdictions with no criminal 
sanctions to jurisdictions that employ criminal sanctions could prompt 
efforts in the jurisdictions that have criminalized cartel conduct to gather 
the relevant evidence to send individuals to prison. This might make the 
individuals and companies more reluctant to cooperate unless if they are 
covered by the leniency programs. When it comes to leniency applicants 
this state of affairs is recognized, as Wils notes, by the Commission Notice 
on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities which protects 
the leniency applicants against the employment of exchanged intelligence 
by requiring that the ‘receiving authority’ promises not to employ the 
information to pursue sanctions against the ‘leniency applicant’ or natural 
persons or employees to which the leniency is extended by the sending 
authority.203 
200  Whelan 2013b p. 151; Whelan has noted that it is not clear why Regulation 1/2003 
rules out that the evidence transmitted from a jurisdiction with administrative 
sanctions could be used in a jurisdiction with criminal sanctions to pursue custodial 
sanctions, where Article 6 ECHR obligations have been observed in the gathering of 
the evidence. He further argues that in the event that Regulation 1/2003 is reformed 
the ‘(unnecessary) custodial rule should be abolished…’, since it undermines 
deterrence while from a legal perspective the rule is not warranted. See Whelan 
2013b pp. 152-153.
201  SOU 2006:99 p. 569.
202  For Wils’ similar argumentation, see Wils 2005a p. 153; Whelan 2013b, p. 153.
203  See Wils 2005a pp. 153-154; See Commission Notice on cooperation within the 
Network of Competition Authorities OJ C 101, 27.4.2004. Para 40 provides: ‘…
information voluntarily submitted by a leniency applicant will only be transmitted 
to another member of the network pursuant to Article 12 of the Council Regulation 
with the consent of the applicant’. Further, para 41 states that no permission for 
sending information is needed from the leniency applicant ‘where the receiving 
authority has provided a written commitment that neither the information 
transmitted to it nor any other information it may obtain following the date and 
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As the Swedish competition authority is bound by the Commission Notice 
on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, according to 
the 2004 committee, it seems to suggest the competition authority may not 
send information to an authority entrusted with criminal investigation.204 
In the UK the OFT has said that information from the ECN would 
not prompt criminal investigations as it would violate the ‘spirit’ of the 
Network Notice.205  It seems that this is the reasonable approach to protect 
the integrity of the leniency systems across Europe. At any rate, arguably 
the foregoing supports Frese’s point that an EU-wide approximation of the 
sanctions and coordination of the Leniency programs is called for.206 Furse 
has also postulated that not giving immunity against prosecution at the 
national level could violate the principle of sincere cooperation.207 
The possibility of the exchange of intelligence could in Wils’ view 
potentially still have an adverse effect on the inspections of the Commission 
or in case of the jurisdictions that lack criminal sanctions in a context 
where the individuals are not covered by the leniency programs and the 
acquired intelligence could be sent to states that have criminalized cartel 
conduct – in such cases ‘[i]ndividuals may for instance be less forthcoming 
in answering to on-the-spot questions during inspections, or companies may 
be more evasive in their answers to written requests for information’ when 
the investigation is carried out for example by the European Commission 
and it could potentially send information to the UK authorities.208 Indeed 
Wils has suggested that if cartel conduct was criminalized in all EU member 
states and also at the level of the EU institutions the cooperation between 
competition authorities would be reinforced.209
What is more, the 2004 committee noted that for the purposes of 
Regulation 1/2003 the Economic Crime Authority could possibly be viewed 
as the national competition authority, since under the committee’s proposal 
it would also apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU which would subsequently 
time of transmission as noted by the transmitting authority, will be used by it or 
by any other authority to which the information is subsequently transmitted to 
impose sanctions (a) on the leniency applicant; (b) any other legal or natural person 
covered by the favourable treatment offered by the transmitting authority as a result 
of the application made by the applicant under its leniency programme; (c) on any 
employee or former employee of any of the persons covered by (a) or (b).’
204  SOU 2004:131 pp. 229-230; See Commission Notice on cooperation within the 
Network of Competition Authorities OJ C 101, 27.4.2004.
205  Furse 2012 p. 129; Wils 2005a p. 153; See Commission Notice on cooperation within 
the Network of Competition Authorities OJ C 101, 27.4.2004.; OFT Applications for 
leniency and no-action in cartel cases, OFT’s detailed guidance on the principles and 
process, OFT1495, July 2013. para 8.11, footnote 102.
206  See Frese 2006, p. 208.
207  Furse 2012 p. 151.
208  Wils 2005a p. 155.
209  Wils 2005a p. 154.
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mean that it should take part in the cooperation prescribed in Regulation 
1/2003. However, in order to show that this might not necessarily be so, 
the 2004 committee pointed to the recital 8 of Regulation 1/2003 which 
states that ‘…this Regulation does not apply to national laws which impose 
criminal sanctions on natural persons except to the extent that such sanctions 
are the means whereby competition rules applying to undertakings are 
enforced.’ 210  Subsequently the committee argued that it could be deduced 
that when natural individuals are subject to criminal enforcement related 
to the infringements of Article 101 TFEU, Regulation 1/2003 would 
not be applicable especially if the firms are subject to corporate fines. 211 
The Swedish 2006 committee pointed out however that the European 
Commission took the position that under the Swedish 2004 committee 
proposal under which the Economic Crime Authority applies art. 101 
TFEU, the Economic Crime Authority would fall within the scope of 
Regulation 1/2003. Therefore, before the ECJ has given a ruling on the 
matter, the competence of the Economic Crime Authority would depend 
on the decision of the Commission to assume proceedings as per art. 11(6) 
in Regulation 1/2003, which means that the national competition authority 
no longer is tasked with enforcing the Union law.212
With a view to the above, it appears that national criminal anti-cartel 
enforcement could pose problems in the context of the ECN cooperation, 
although not necessarily insurmountable ones.
6.5.3 Questions related to the Principle of Ne Bis in Idem
The Swedish 2001 committee regarded the principle ne bis in idem, as an 
argument against criminalizing cartels in Sweden. Discussion points that 
have been raised especially in Finland and Sweden will be touched upon 
below.213 The ne bis in idem principle or the double jeopardy principle is 
an important criminal procedural law principle that prohibits trying or 
punishing twice for the same act.214 Thus pursuing a case if the final verdict 
has been given, be it a convicting or acquitting one, would infringe the ne 
210  SOU 2004:131 pp. 228-230; Wils holds an opinion at variance, see Wils 2005a p. 
133.
211  SOU 2004:131 pp. 228-230.
212  SOU 2006:99 pp. 568-569.
213  SOU 2001:74 p. 139.
214  SOU 2001:74 p. 21.
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bis in idem principle.215  The ne bis in idem principle is set out in Article 
4 of the no. 7 protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights.216 
In terms of EU antitrust enforcement, importantly the ECtHR has 
given a ruling, which appears to confirm that administrative antitrust 
proceedings fall within the scope of the art 6 ECHR due to the autonomous 
interpretation of the word ‘criminal’ by the ECtHR. 217 The Swedish Green 
paper on the criminalization of cartels had noted that the competition law 
fines may be regarded as a penal sanction under the European Convention 
of Human Rights and therefore Article 4 of the protocol no. 7 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights may be infringed if a firm is 
subject to competition law fines while the owner/director of the company 
is also subject to separate criminal penalties. The Green paper however 
also observed that in terms of the envisaged cartel offence such an incident 
is likely to arise rarely since the close relationship between the company 
subject to the competition law fines and the individual subject to a criminal 
punishment that may evoke the ne bis in idem rule under the European 
Convention of Human Rights would be exceptional.218 
215  Whelan 2013b, p. 154.
216  The Protocol no 7, art. 4 sets out that: ‘1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished 
again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence 
for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law 
and penal procedure of that State. 2. The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not 
prevent the reopening of the case in accordance with the law and penal procedure of the 
State concerned, if there is evidence of new or newly discovered facts, or if there has been 
a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings, which could affect the outcome of the 
case.’; For another discussion which will not be touched upon here and that relates to 
extradition in the context of the ne bis in idem principle, and ’means that a person 
cannot be extradited for an offence if they have already been convicted or acquitted 
of the same offence or an offence substantially relating to the same facts.’ See O’Kane 
2011b, under the heading ’II. Bars to Extradition’ at para. 2 and under the heading 
’C. Double Jeopardy’ at para 1ff.
217  Menarini Diagnostics SRL v Italy, complaint 43509/08, September 27, 2011.; 
See also Cadete 2012; Whelan 2013b, p. 154; The Finnish Supreme Court has 
stated that the tax surcharge falls within the meaning of the word ’criminal’ by the 
European Court of Human Rights, see KKO 2010:45 paras. 9-13; Helenius Dan 
2010, p. 769; The autonomous meaning ascribed to the word ’criminal’ by the 
ECtHR is not dependent on the national interpretations of the word ’criminal’, See 
Whelan 2011, p. 219.
218  SOU 2004:131 p. 254; It may be noted that Jager has discussed the ne bis in idem 
principle in the Slovenian anti-cartel context, where criminal actions may be brought 
not only against individuals, but also against companies in relation to hard-core 
cartel activity. If an act could prompt both civil and criminal proceedings in Slovenia 
the ne bis in idem rule dictates that only the criminal proceedings are initiated. 
For instance when a criminal case has been concluded, administrative proceedings 
may not be launched. However ‘[t]he latest Act Amending Administrative Offences 
Act (ZP-1G) softens this absolute prohibition in cases of criminal non-conviction 
and allows for a subsequent administrative procedure if the reasons for the decision 
reached in criminal procedure do not exclude it.’ See Jager 2011 pp. 293-294.
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Harding and Joshua have regarded the conduct of a company and a 
natural person something that may be separated and therefore punishing 
the individual and the company would not fall foul of the ne bis in idem 
principle. As they point out this is the prevailing approach. While the 
natural person may be considered responsible for planning the activity, 
the company commits the violation.219  In a similar fashion the 2001 
Committee pointed out that the competition law fine is imposed on a 
company whereas the criminal sanctions would target natural individuals. 
However a sole proprietorship that is run by one individual who is subject 
to a competition law fine would be the same individual that would face the 
criminal punishment.220 
While the double jeopardy principle set out in the protocol 7, art 4 of 
the ECHR concerns only punishments within one jurisdictions, art 50 of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights provides a more extensive protection, 
covering the whole of the EU.221 
The ne bis in idem principle could be infringed since due to a broad 
interpretation of the word ‘undertaking’ an individual may constitute an 
undertaking for the purposes of the EU law and since it appears that a 
natural person could be the addressee of fines, while simultaneously being 
subject to a criminal punishment. 222 
The Discussion concerning the Ne Bis In Idem Principle in the 
Nordic Context
The Swedish 2001 committee had discussed situations where a tax surcharge 
had been imposed as a result of a violation that had prompted criminal 
charges as well. The Swedish Supreme Court had previously ruled that the 
tax surcharge was not a criminal sanction under Swedish law and therefore 
a criminal charge for tax fraud regarding the same act could be brought 
even if a tax surcharge had already been imposed. 223  
219  Harding and Joshua 2010, p. 349.
220  SOU 2001:74 p. 140; A similar point has been made in New Zealand, see Ministry 
of Economic Development, Cartel Criminalisation: Discussion Document, January 
2010. P. 88; In Australia the degree of applicability of the common law double 
jeopardy principles to civil penalties is not yet resolved, see Beaton-Wells and Fisse 
2011a, p. 362.
221  See the Charter of Fundamental Rights, art. 50: ’Right not to be tried or punished 
twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence’
222  Whelan 2013b p. 156; Further, in the EU context, ‘[i]n accordance with consistent 
EU case law in the field of anti-competitive practices, the principle of ne bi in idem 
is subject to the threefold condition of identity of the facts, unity of the offender and 
unity of the legal interest protected’, see Frese 2012, p. 95.
223  The Court was of the opinion however that art 6 ECHR could be applicable to the 
tax surcharge imposed in Sweden, but this however did not mean that the imposition 
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The same matter regarding tax surcharges and tax fraud prosecutions in 
relation to one act have prompted in Finland a discussion regarding the ne 
bis in idem principle. This has led to a Government proposal, which seeks 
to amend the legislation concerning tax surcharges in a way that observes 
the obligations flowing from the ECHR and the ne bis in idem principle set 
out in that Convention.  Under the proposal the Finnish tax administration 
may make a tax assessment decision, but omit a decision regarding the 
tax surcharge until the next calendar year – if a criminal offence has been 
reported, the general rule will be that no tax surcharges may be imposed.224 
The Finnish Supreme Court has changed its position regarding the 
ne bis in idem principle in a case that concerned a business that had been 
subject to a tax surcharge and had been prosecuted for tax fraud in relation 
to the same act that had prompted the tax surcharge. 225 The Finnish Supreme 
Court had in its previous case law ruled that based on the ECtHR case law 
the prohibition against ne bis in idem applied only in relation to successive 
proceedings – thus if the decision regarding the tax surcharge was not final, 
criminal prosecution could be contemplated. This position had been rejected 
by the Finnish Constitutional Committee, saying that the ne bis in idem 
does not protect against merely successive proceedings, but also against 
parallel proceedings regarding the same matter – this was derived from the 
wording of art. 4 of the protocol no. 7 ECHR and the ECtHR judgments 
in Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia226 on 10.2.2009 and Tomasovic v. Croatia227 
18.10.2011.228 In the former case the European Court of Human Rights 
stated that ‘the approach which emphasizes the legal characterization of the 
two offences is too restrictive on the rights of the individual, for if the Court 
limits itself to finding that the person was prosecuted for the offences having 
a different legal classification it risks undermining the guarantee enshrined 
of the tax surcharge affected a successive criminal case – this was deduced from the 
fact that the European Convention of Human Rights referred to the internal law of 
its member states and the case law of the European Court of Human Rights did not 
support a view that would reject the aforementioned Swedish position. Further the 
Swedish Supreme Court had pointed out that the tax fraud offence required either 
intent or negligence whereas the imposition of the tax surcharge required neither. 
According to this line of argumentation the Swedish Supreme Court took the 
position that under the ECHR law the tax fraud prosecution could not be derived 
from the same violation as the imposition of the tax surcharge. See SOU 2001:74 pp. 
139-140; See NJA 2000 s 622.
224  See Finnish Government Proposal HE 191/2012
225  Regarding the former position see for instance the ruling in KKO 2010:45, see para. 
44; For a discussion as to the case law of the Finnish Supreme Court see Helenius 
and Hellsten 2013. 
226  European Court of Human Rights, Case of Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia 10 February 
2009. See paras. 81,82, 83, 84, 115
227  European Court of Human Rights, Case of Tomasović v Croatia  18 October 2011. 
Paras. 29-32
228  See PeVL 9/2012 vp and PeVL 17/2013
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in Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 rather than rendering it practical and effective 
as required by the Convention.[…] Accordingly, the Court takes the view 
that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 must be understood as prohibiting the 
prosecution or trial of a second “offence” in so far as it arises from identical 
facts or facts which are substantially the same.’229
Subsequently more recently the Finnish Supreme Court took the 
position based on the interpretations by the Constitutional Committee 
(regarding article 21 of the Constitution which concerns due process of 
law and article 4 of the no. 7 Protocol of the European Human Rights 
Convention, and the obligations flowing from Article 6 of the Constitution), 
that if a decision regarding the imposition or non-imposition of a tax 
surcharge has been made, a criminal prosecution regarding the matter that 
prompted the tax surcharge decision may not be launched. This applies to 
parallel proceedings as well.230 
In accordance with the foregoing, in the antitrust context, Whelan 
explains that the ne bis in idem principle becomes operative when there 
are parallel prosecutions, and the latter prosecution relates to an offence 
regarding which a final verdict has been given. Assessing whether the latter 
prosecution concerns the same offence may require an assessment of the facts, 
and the ne bis in idem principle becomes operative if the facts are identical or 
very similar.231 When the principle is operative the latter prosecution should 
be dropped, and if the administrative proceedings were first assumed, the 
criminal proceedings need to be discontinued – a factor that might affect the 
deterrent capabilities of criminal anti-cartel enforcement. In a case where the 
individual constitutes the undertaking he would subsequently face merely 
the administrative proceedings.232 
To sum it up, with regard to a possible criminalization of the cartel 
conduct, it seems important to observe that such a project would not 
seem to be problematic in relation to the ne bis in idem principle since 
conflicts would be rare and could be simply resolved by dropping the latter 
prosecution.
6.6 CONCLUSION
In Sweden concerns have been raised with regard to criminalized cartel 
conduct due to fears that the principle of legal certainty might be infringed 
229  European Court of Human Rights, Case of Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia 10 February 
2009. At paras. 81-82; See Also Helenius 2010, p. 776.
230  See the press release on 5th of July, 2013. ’Veropetossyytteen tutkintaan liittyvää 
tulkintalinjaa muutettiin’
231  Whelan 2013b p. 156
232  Whelan 2013b p. 158.
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– in order to avoid such problems the above elaboration has demonstrated 
that such worries may be superfluous. The cartel offence and more broadly 
criminal enforcement should exclude from their scope horizontal agreements 
that do not fall within the category of hard-core cartels, vertical agreements 
and art. 102 TFEU conduct that may produce pro-competitive effects and 
may be difficult for the courts to assess. Article 101 TFEU on the other 
hand is clear enough for the purposes of the principle of legal certainty: as 
per uncontested economic insight competitors should not discuss prices. 
The definition of the offence should include an element of intent, but 
arguably the word ‘agreement’ speaks sufficiently for the delinquent aspect, 
additional elements could present the prosecutors with further hurdles, that 
might impair the deterrent effect of the offence – importantly the Swedish 
contemplation did not suggest mental elements beyond the requirement of 
intentionality – further the idea that criminal liability would arise only if the 
harmful effects of the cartel were shown was rejected as such effects may be 
presumed and would be problematic from the perspective of legal certainty. 
As was noted above the determination of the role of the Competition 
Authority under a criminalized anti-cartel regime is important, since it 
is also related to the possibly shaky endeavour of parallel criminal and 
administrative enforcement regimes, an argument which alone does not 
seem to mandate a decision to reject the criminalization of hard-core cartels. 
It appears that the position of the Swedish contemplation to exclusively 
task the Economic Crime Authority with criminal anti-cartel enforcement 
is sensible in light of the unsuccessful UK experience. 
What is more, parallel enforcement may inherently bring about a 
duplication of the required resources – the current Author however tends 
to think that it should not represent an irrefutable argument against a 
criminalized cartel regime. 
Also Article 12(3) of Regulation 1/2003 has been portrayed as a 
counterargument in Sweden concerning the criminalization of cartels, since 
it could possibly undermine the exchange of information within the ECN. 
The problem essentially lies in the fact that the transmitted intelligence, 
which may not be used as evidence, could still prompt investigations in 
jurisdictions with criminalized anti-cartel regimes, thus possibly inducing 
less cooperation from individuals and firms not covered by the leniency 
programs. While the OFT has taken the position that such a course of 
action would violate the spirit of the Network Notice, the foregoing further 
reinforces the argument made in favour of an EU-led cartel criminalization 
project that would not only introduce coherence in terms of sanctions, but 
also with respect to leniency programs. While the ECN cooperation could be 
encumbered by the introduction of individual criminal liability, the current 
Author is inclined to think that the possible hurdles are not overwhelming.
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Moreover, the Swedish contemplation noted that problematically 
the Economic Crime Authority could be perceived to be the national 
competition authority for the purposes of Regulation 1/2003, since it 
would apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU – thus the competence of the 
aforementioned Authority would depend on the decision of the European 
Commission to start proceedings according to Art. 11(6) in Regulation 
1/2003. Uncertainty in this regard would prevail until a possible ECJ ruling 
on the matter is delivered.
Another problem that has been discussed in Sweden is whether the 
principle of ne bis in idem could constitute an argument against criminalizing 
cartel conduct: as the above discussion demonstrates conflicts would be 
rare and could be easily resolved by dropping the latter prosecution. It may 
be concluded that the legal certainty and due process arguments are not 
necessarily problematic in terms of a cartel criminalization project.  
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7  The UK Design of the    
 Criminal Cartel Offence
7.1 INTRODUCTION
In line with the comparative nature of this thesis the UK criminal Cartel 
Offence will be subject to scrutiny below. The exploration will focus on the 
UK experience predating the reform of the cartel offence and the discussion 
in the years leading up to it. It should be noted however that on the 25th of 
April 2013 the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act (hereinafter ERRA) 
received Royal Assent and the amended cartel offence entered into force 
on April 1st 2014.
The UK is a notable European jurisdiction to have criminalized cartels. 
With the intention of increasing deterrence of cartels the Enterprise Act 
was introduced in the UK, it received Royal Assent on 7th of November 
2002 and came into force on 20th of June 2003. This Act incorporated the 
criminal prohibition against cartel offences.1 The relevant cartel offence 
provisions run from section 188 to 202. Section 188 sets out the offence. 
Section 190 prescribes the penalties.2 Sections 191-202 concern the 
criminal investigations by the OFT, allowing robust measures to investigate. 
The critical sections 188 and 189 read as follows: 
‘188 Cartel Offence(1) An individual is guilty of an offence if he dishonestly agrees with one 
or more other persons to make or implement, or to cause to be made 
or implemented, arrangements of the following kind relating to at 
least two undertakings (A and B).(2) The arrangements must be ones which, if operating as the parties to 
the agreement intend, would- (a) directly or indirectly fix a price for the supply by A in the 
United Kingdom (otherwise than to B) of a product or service,(b) limit or prevent supply by A in the United Kingdom of a 
product or service, (c) limit or prevent production by A in the United Kingdom of a 
product, (d) divide between A and B the supply in the United Kingdom of a 
1  Furse 2012 p. 7, 107.
2  Furse 2012 p. 108.
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product or service to a customer or customers,(e) divide between A and B customers for the supply in the United 
Kingdom or a product or service, or (f) be bid-rigging arrangements.(3) Unless subsection (2)(d), (e) or (f ) applies, the arrangements must 
also be ones which, if operating as the parties to the agreement 
intend, would- (a) directly or indirectly fix a price for the supply by B in the United 
Kingdom (otherwise than to A)  a product or service, (b) limit or prevent supply by B in the United Kingdom of a 
product.(4) In subsection (2)(a) to (d) and (3), references to supply or production 
are to supply or production in the appropriate circumstances (for 
which see section 189).(5) “Bid-rigging arrangements” are arrangements under which, in 
response to a request for bids for the supply of a product or service 
in the United Kingdom, or for the production of a product in the 
United Kingdom- (a) A but not B may make a bid, or(b) A and B may each make a bid but, in one case or both, only a 
bid arrived at in accordance with the arrangements.(6) But arrangements are not bid-rigging arrangements if, under them, 
the person requesting bids would be informed of them at or before 
the time when a bid is made.(7) “Undertaking” has the same meaning as in Part 1 of the 1998 Act.’
‘Section 189 Cartel offence: supplementary(1) For section 188(2)(a), the appropriate circumstances are that A’s 
supply of the product or service would be at a level in the supply 
chain at which the product or service would at the same time be 
supplied by B in the United Kingdom.(2) For section 188(2)(b), the appropriate circumstances are that A’s 
supply of the product or service would be at a level in the supply 
chain- (a) at which the product or service would at the same time be 
supplied by B in the United Kingdom, or(b) at which supply by B in the United Kingdom of the product or 
service would be limited or prevented by the arrangements.(3) For section 188(2)©, the appropriate circumstances are that A’s 
production of the product would be at a level in the production 
chain-(a) at which the product would at the same time produced by B in 
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the United Kingdom, or(b) at which production by B in the United Kingdom of the 
product would be limited or prevented by the arrangements.  (4) For section 188(2)(d), the appropriate circumstances are that A’s 
supply of the product or service would be at the same level in the 
supply chain as B’s.(5) For section 188(3)(a), the appropriate circumstances are that B’s 
supply of the product or service would be at a level in the supply 
chain at which the product or service would be at a level in the 
supply chain at which the product or service would at the same time 
be supplied by A in the United Kingdom.(6) For section 188(3)(b), the appropriate circumstances are that B’s 
supply of the product or service would be at a level in the supply 
chain-(a) at which the product or service would at the same time be 
supplied by A in the United Kingdom, or(b) at which supply by A in the United Kingdom of the product or 
service would be limited or prevented by the arrangements.(7) For section 188(3)©, the appropriate circumstances are that B’s 
production of the product would be at a level in the production 
chain-(a) at which the product would at the same time be produced by A 
in the United Kingdom, or (b) at which production by A in the United Kingdom of the 
product would be limited or prevented by the arrangements.’
As Furse points out the above provisions may attract attention by their 
excessive concern with form and their exactness. The same degree of precision 
cannot be found in the relevant TFEU articles, the UK Competition Act 
1998 nor the Sherman Act.3 Basically the complex language means, Furse 
explains, that individuals may not dishonestly enter into arrangements with 
each other with the outcome or planned outcome of price-fixing, output 
restriction, market sharing or bid-rigging.4
7.2  THE HAMMOND AND PENROSE REPORT AND 
THE WHITE PAPER
The report prepared by Hammond and Penrose produced suggestions that 
were later observed in the drafting of the Enterprise Act of 2002, as did the 
3  Furse 2012 pp. 108-109
4  Furse 2012 p. 111
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White Paper.5 Furse notes that the White paper emphasized the clearness 
of the offence, so that firms and court may easily comprehend it. Further 
the White paper required that the cartel offence ‘be actively applied so that 
its deterrent effect is genuinely felt’.6
The aim was to design the offence so that only the so-called hard-
core cartels would be caught by it. This would remove the possibility to 
resort to the defence that the intention of the cartel members was actually 
pro-competitive.7 Apparently the UK preparation was influenced by the 
OECD recommendation given in 1998 saying that the member countries 
should make sure that their legislation especially tackles the hard-core cartels, 
and that sanctions should be effective and of sufficient level to deter both 
companies and individuals and that enforcement and the institutions should 
be equipped with sufficient powers to bust cartels – such as the power to 
acquire documents.8
The report by Penrose and Hammond noted in line with the foregoing 
that it is the opinion of the competition law experts that the criminal 
prohibition of cartels should only apply to horizontal cartels entered by 
individuals, operating at the same level of the supply-chain. The report 
recommended that the vertical agreements should be excluded from the 
scope of the offence as they may have pro-competitive effects.9
In a similar fashion the White Paper said the following:
‘7.19 The new criminal offence will cover hard-core cartels only – widely 
recognized as the most serious form of competition breach. The most common 
form of hard-core cartel involves illegal price-fixing – where a number of 
firms agree what price should be charged for a particular product. In most 
cases, this will be above what the competitive market price would be.
7.20 However, cartels can also involve conduct which achieves the same 
economic result by different means. This includes agreeing not to compete 
for each other’s customers – which leaves each firm free to set higher prices 
(market sharing). Or firms could agree to reduce levels of output – which also 
increases the price that they can charge.
7.21 In some cases, firms will agree to inflate the price charged in a tender-
5  See Office of Fair Trading, ’Proposed criminalisation of cartels in the UK’, a report 
prepared for the Office of Fair Trading by Sir Anthony Hammond KCB QC and Roy 
Penrose OBE QPM, OFT365, November 2001; Department of Trade and Industry, 
’A World Class Competition Regime’ Cm 5233, July 2001.; Furse 2012 p. 111
6  Department of Trade and Industry, ’A World Class Competition Regime’ Cm 5233, 
July 2001 at para 7.33.; Furse 2012 p. 112
7  Furse 2012 p. 112
8  OECD, ’Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action against Hard 
Core Cartels’ 25 March, 1998  C(98)35/FINAL .p. 3; Furse 2012 p. 112
9  Office of Fair Trading, ’Proposed criminalisation of cartels in the UK’, a report 
prepared for the Office of Fair Trading by Sir Anthony Hammond KCB QC and Roy 
Penrose OBE QPM, OFT365, November 2001 at para 1.12.
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bidding process and enter bids which ensure that one company in the cartel 
will win, but on better terms than would otherwise be the case (collusive 
tendering). The OFT believes that public sector contracts are particularly 
vulnerable to these practices. As such, they could hit taxpayers hard – because 
Local Authorities or Government departments have to pay more for public 
services.
7.22 In all these cases, the effect is the same – prices rise and consumers pay 
more than they should. The Government intends that the new criminal 
offence will cover each of these different types of cartel. Defining the offence in 
a way that distinguishes legitimate agreements from illegitimate ones is likely 
to be more difficult in some areas, in particular market sharing.
7.23 The Government is also considering whether the offence should only 
catch involvement in horizontal agreements between competitors or whether 
certain types of vertical agreement, especially those which are already outside 
the existing EC exemptions and involve abuse of market power, should also be 
caught.’10
7.3  THE TROUBLED ELEMENT OF DISHONESTY IN 
THE CARTEL OFFENCE
An element of the cartel offence is the dishonesty requirement according 
to which the perpetrator should have dishonestly entered the agreement. 
The dishonesty requirement has been the subject of heavy criticism.11 
Such an element was also rejected in Australia, which more recently 
criminalized cartels.12 In 2011 a consultation document, A Competition 
Regime for Growth: a consultation on options for reform,13 was produced by 
the Government, which suggested that the dishonesty requirement should 
be discarded.14
Joshua argued that those who promoted the inclusion of the dishonesty 
requirement, saw the virtue of it in the fact that, that the severe nature of 
the offence would be reflected, but the problem lies in the fact that among 
the public there is no consensus as to the blameworthiness of cartels and 
the defendants could thus make the argument in their defence that cartels 
are not reprehensible.15 The Norris Case touched upon price-fixing in light 
10  Department of Trade and Industry, ’A World Class Competition Regime’ Cm 5233, 
July 2001 p. 41
11  See the discussion in Stephan 2011b; Joshua 2011.
12  See the discussion in Beaton-Wells and Fisse 2011a, pp. 19 ff.
13  BIS A Competition Regime for Growth: a consultation on options for reform March 
2011 p. 61 (Hereinafter the Consultation Document).
14  See Whish and Bailey 2012 p. 434. 
15  Joshua 2010, p. 5.
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of common law conspiracy to defraud. It was concluded that price-fixing 
alone was not dishonest ‘without aggravating features’.16 This related to law 
prior to the entering into force of the cartel offence in 2003. As Whelan 
explains, while this is not directly related to the cartel offence, it could be 
asked that did price-fixing become dishonest just by the introduction of the 
cartel offence? 17 Also the consultation document pointed to the dishonesty 
requirement as a cause of the low frequency of prosecutions, as it may not 
be easy to prove the dishonest nature of the defendants’ conduct.18
 The aforementioned consultation document also paid attention to 
the survey by Stephan where it was noted that roughly 6 people in 10 
regarded price-fixing as dishonest, 2 people in 10 do not regard it as such. 
Subsequently drawing on this finding it was stated that there was not 
significant support for an offence incorporating the dishonesty requirement 
and that the juries do not easily convict when such a definitional element 
exists.19 
The OFT has supported the removal of the dishonesty requirement 
from the offence,20 arguing that dishonesty adds to unpredictability, 
especially since the juries are not dealing with a field of law familiar to 
them. The OFT’s investigations had shown that the defendants might claim 
that their conduct was not dishonest, since they were motivated by the 
avoidance of loss of jobs, the defendants themselves did not receive financial 
gains, the defendants participated in the conduct only due to it being part 
of their work, the cartel was entered as a way to tackle considerable buying 
power of the customers. Finally the defendants could say that they did not 
consider the conduct to be dishonest, despite the fact that they realized 
that it was wrong.21
The OFT pointed out that the uncertainty stemming from the concept 
of dishonesty works against the interests of both firms and employees 
who look for advice and the defendants. 22  Whelan argued that the cartel 
offence with the dishonesty element would not have met the foreseeability 
requirements set out in art. 7 ECHR, as dishonesty, the only measure of 
criminality, is ‘itself an inherently vague and uncertain concept,’ and as the 
16  Norris v Government of the United States of America and others 2008 UKHL 16 at 
para 62.
17  Whelan 2012b p. 593.
18  BIS A Competition Regime for Growth: a consultation on options for reform March 
2011 at para 6.6; See also Furse 2012 p. 115.
19  BIS A Competition Regime for Growth: a consultation on options for reform March 
2011 at para 6.14. ; See Stephan 2008a, p. 135; Furse 2012 p. 161.
20  OFT, A Competition Regime for Growth: A Consultation on Options for Reform. 
The OFT’s Response to the Government’s Consultation, OFT 1335, June 2011. At 
para 5.4.
21  ibid. at para 5.5.
22  ibid. at para 5.6.
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national or EU law may not inform on this particular point and getting 
legal advice may not be helpful either. 23
The OFT further argued that those who otherwise would be willing to 
concede that they took part in the cartel have a reason not to do so, as they 
could try to convince the jury that they were not dishonest in their conduct. 
This would then require more resources for the cartel investigation and 
prosecution.24 As Furse points out this was a bold statement, and showed 
that the OFT wanted to get rid of the dishonesty requirement as it made it 
harder to show that the cartel offence had been committed. Furse argued 
that ‘a robust response might be to suggest that the OFT, having been made 
to look ridiculous and not fit for purpose in light of the collapse of the BA 
case, was seeking simply to move the goalposts, rather than learning to play 
the game better’.25
The OFT also believed that the inclusion of dishonesty could decrease 
the attractiveness of the leniency program, as getting the immunity requires 
the applicant to concede that the cartel offence was committed, and the 
applicant might have less desire to do so when dishonesty is a part of the 
offence.26
The OFT argued that if the dishonesty requirement is dropped, the 
design of the offence could still be made such that agreements that are 
not caught by the civil regime do not fall under the cartel offence either. 
The dropping of the dishonesty requirement might make it more difficult 
prosecuting individuals who are the target of the administrative proceedings 
by the EU, the OFT acknowledged, unless the offence is amended in other 
ways as well. Further, while the dishonesty requirement was expected to 
relieve the juries from assessing the economic evidence, it seemed possible 
that the contrary was the case. In the OFT’s view the issue of economic 
effects should rather be tackled by the prosecutor while assessing the merits 
of the case, and by the sentencing court with a view to the severity of the 
violation.27
23  This stems from the fact that the Enterprise Act could have been infringed while 
the national or the EU competition law may exempt certain agreements, since 
the individual could be considered to have behaved dishonestly by a jury, thus 
committing the cartel offence, see Whelan 2012b, pp. 592-593.
24  OFT, A Competition Regime for Growth: A Consultation on Options for Reform. 
The OFT’s Response to the Government’s Consultation, OFT 1335, June 2011 at 
para 5.6.
25  Furse 2012 p. 120
26  OFT, A Competition Regime for Growth: A Consultation on Options for Reform. 
The OFT’s Response to the Government’s Consultation, OFT 1335, June 2011 at 
para. 5.7.
27  ibid. at para 5.8.
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7.3.1 The Ghosh test
The case R v Ghosh28 established in 1982 the test for dishonesty. The test 
is divided into two parts, which are the following: 
 1. ‘a jury must first of all decide whether according to the 
ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people what was 
done was dishonest. If it was not dishonest by those standards, 
that is the end of the matter and the prosecution fails.’
 2. ‘then the jury must consider whether the defendant himself 
must have realized that what he was doing was by those 
standards dishonest.’29
The consultation document listed the reasons why the dishonesty test 
was initially adopted. The reasons included the desire to make sure that 
from the ambit of the offence would be excluded agreements that are not 
caught by the civil regime and assuming that the dishonesty test would 
do just this.30 It was also thought that the dishonesty requirement would 
decrease the reliance on economic evidence.31  Further, it was argued, that 
the juries would be familiar with the dishonesty test, it would reflect the 
severity of the violation and the subsequent sanctions, thus creating the 
best possible deterrence.32 
The dishonesty requirement had barely been tackled in the cartel case 
law, but it arose in the British Airways case.33 The consultation document 
argued that the British Airways case implied that also economic evidence 
would be considered in relation to the dishonesty requirement, and that 
possibly the defendants could have advanced the argument that they believed 
that the arrangement was not harmful to the consumers and that therefore 
the defendants were not dishonest.34
28  2 All ER 689. [1982]
29  See also Furse 2012 p. 116; BIS A Competition Regime for Growth: a consultation on 
options for reform March 2011 at para 6.7. 
30  BIS A Competition Regime for Growth: a consultation on options for reform March 
2011 at para 6.8.
31  ibid. at para 6.9.
32  ibid. at para. 6.10.
33  The dishonesty requirement has been touched upon at least in the George case, 
where the Court said that ’at an earlier stage of the preparatory hearing the 
trial judge ruled that the test of dishonesty in section 188(1) is the two-tier test 
propounded in Ghosh,’ see R v George, Burns, Burnett and Crawley, [2010] EWCA 
Crim 1148 at para 6; See also Furse 2012 p. 116.
34  BIS A Competition Regime for Growth: a consultation on options for reform March 
2011 at para 6.13.
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While the dishonesty requirement has not received much support, 
Furse notes that maybe the difficulty of showing dishonesty as per the 
Ghosh criteria is what is needed, as the prosecutor seeks to send people to 
jail after all.35 
Crowther pointed out that the cases brought so far do not prove the 
ineffectiveness of the cartel offence as defined in the Enterprise Act of 2002 
and that it cannot be said conclusively from the evidence at hand whether 
the dishonesty requirement deserved to be discarded. In his view rather than 
paying so much attention to the particular issue of dishonesty, the spotlight 
should be on the possible problems related to parallel criminal and civil 
enforcement.36 Furse has made the same point arguing that there is a greater 
problem underlying the regime than the concept of dishonesty, namely the 
parallel criminal and civil enforcement of the offence. 37
7.4  THE FOUR OPTIONS IN THE CONSULTATION 
DOCUMENT AND THE REFORM OF THE 
CARTEL OFFENCE
The Consultation document presented four different options that could 
reform the UK cartel offence. They were as follows: 1. The removal of the 
dishonesty requirement and the introduction of prosecutorial guidance, 2. 
The removal of the dishonesty requirement and excluding certain white-
listed agreements 3. That ‘secrecy’ as an element should take the place of 
‘dishonesty’, 4. The removal of the dishonesty requirement and the exclusion 
of agreements made openly.38 
7.4.1 Option 1: The removal of the dishonesty requirement and  
 the introduction of prosecutorial guidance
The option 1 would make the UK offence resemble more the US one. The 
difference is however that in the US agreements without offsetting benefits 
are per se infringements, while the rule of reason influences the evaluation 
of agreements with offsetting benefits.39 Such a clear division is absent in 
35  Furse 2012 pp. 117-118
36  Crowther 2011.
37  Furse 2012 pp. 120-121
38  BIS A Competition Regime for Growth: a consultation on options for reform March 
2011 at para 6; Whelan 2012b, p. 589.
39  BIS A Competition Regime for Growth: a consultation on options for reform March 
2011 at para 6.25.
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the EU where even price-fixing agreements, though very rarely, may be 
exempted under art. 101(3) TFEU if there are adequate offsetting benefits. 
The consultation document sets out the following: ‘[r]emoving the 
dishonesty element would be combined with introducing clear guidance 
for prosecutors (to which prosecutors would have to have regard ) as to 
the types of agreements that are most likely to warrant investigation and 
prosecution.’40 
As the consultation document explains in the EU the agreements may 
be divided to those that have an anticompetitive object, and to those that 
have an anticompetitive effect, and the former may always be candidates for 
an exemption under art. 101(3) TFEU. 
As the dishonesty element was supposed to exclude agreements from 
the scope of the offence that could be exempted under the civil regime,41 
the concern was that with no further modifications to the offence, besides 
dropping the element of dishonesty, the possibility that the offence is 
considered national competition law for the purposes of Regulation 1/2003 
could be increased.42 Additionally the option 1 could also fall foul of art. 
7 ECHR it was feared, as instead of the statutory text, the prosecutorial 
guidelines would be used to limit the ambit of the offence.43
7.4.2 Option 2: The removal of the dishonesty requirement and  
 excluding certain white-listed agreements
The option 2 would have had the white-listed offences excluded from the 
scope of the offence. It was noted that in Australia joint venture agreements 
and resale price maintenance agreements are excluded from the scope of 
the offence, and Canada excludes ancillary agreements that are the part 
of a lawful one.44 Explicitly excluding certain agreements would be the 
40  ‘Option 1 removes the problems associated with the dishonesty element of the 
offence and it provides much greater clarity for business, by way of prosecutorial 
guidance. However it carries the risk of making the offence itself too broad.’, ibid. at 
paras 6.23, 6.24.
41  Furse 2012 p. 161; BIS A Competition Regime for Growth: a consultation on options 
for reform March 2011 at para 6.26 and para 6.27.
42  BIS A Competition Regime for Growth: a consultation on options for reform March 
2011 at para 6.31; Furse 2012 p. 162.
43  BIS A Competition Regime for Growth: a consultation on options for reform March 
2011 at para 6.31.
44  ibid. at para 6.34
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advantage of option 2 when compared to option 1, it was argued.45 Also 
the predictability for firms would be better.46
Further in order to escape the argument regarding economic effects, 
the white list would be designed in a way that would probably cover more 
agreements than would be the number of agreements that would be deemed 
to have countervailing effects as a result of an economic assessment.47 
The drawback of the option 2 would rely on how successful the design 
of the white list ultimately is, and as the consultation document admits, 
whatever preciseness is attempted in their design, there would always be 
room left for argument regarding their meaning.48 Once again the fear arose 
regarding the possibility that the offence, when designed as under option 
2, would not be compatible with the EU competition law, falling within 
the scope of Regulation 1/2003, thus halting national proceedings if EU 
investigations are commenced.49 
Harding and Joshua favored the Option 2, arguing that ‘it has the appeal 
of more accurately defining the objectionable cartel behavior in economic 
terms and avoiding difficult defence argument based on economic and 
market analysis. At the same time it bases criminal liability on the concept 
of an illegal agreement and brings the process of agreement to the forefront 
for this purpose.’ They underlined that the foremost delinquent part of 
cartel conduct ‘is an agreement to act in defined illegal anticompetitive 
ways, doing so determinedly with an awareness of the prohibited nature 
of the conduct. They further rejected option 4 on the basis that it would 
be impracticable, since if the agreements are made public civil sanctions 
could still ensue and thus the cartel profits would be lost.  Option 3 with 
the secrecy requirement in their opinion would be possibly difficult to prove 
and the prosecution would hinge on it. Option 1 on the other hand would 
in their view be problematic from the perspective of legal certainty.50
7.4.3 Option 3: That ‘secrecy’ as an element should take the  
 place of ‘dishonesty’
Option 3 would have the dishonesty requirement removed and let the 
element of secrecy take its place in the definition of the offence, which 
would be committed, ‘where an individual “secretly agrees”’.51 The following 
45  ibid. at para 6.35
46  ibid. at para 6.36
47  ibid at para. 6.37
48  ibid at para 6.38
49  ibid. at para 6.39
50  Harding and Joshua, 2012, pp. 3-4.
51  BIS A Competition Regime for Growth: a consultation on options for reform 
March 2011 at para 6.40
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statutory text was devised: ‘an agreement may be proved to have been made 
secretly where the persons who make the agreement take measures to prevent the 
agreement or the intended agreements becoming known to customers or public 
authorities.’52 The cartels are secretive in character and often a great effort 
to keep them out of the public eye is made, as the cartelists know that the 
cartel is subject to penalties and is immoral. Therefore the option 3, inserting 
the ‘secrecy’ element in the definition of the offence might be appealing. 
It would limit the scope of the offence, excluding certain agreements, and 
separate it from the civil regime.53 
As opposed to the moral assessment involved in the Ghosh test, 
establishing secrecy, would depend on evidence, and if the agreement 
was openly made, it would be outside the scope of the offence. 54 The 
consultation document identified possible problems in the event that 
prosecution had to show that measures were actively taken to uphold secrecy. 
Alternatively if proving passive secrecy is sufficient, it could be problematic 
from the perspective of clearness and possibly not harmful agreements might 
caught, such agreements that the firms deemed unnecessary to make public, 
while they did not purposefully hide them.55 Further, while the dishonesty 
element contained the assessment of objective and subjective element, the 
secrecy element does not, and the situation could possibly arise, albeit rarely, 
that an agreement that was not unlawful, but the defendant so believed, and 
would fall within the scope of the offence.56 Finally, it was argued that the 
secrecy element would effectively separate the offence from the civil regime, 
in the same manner that the dishonesty element did and the prosecution 
could escape the problems connected to the dishonesty element.57
7.4.4 Option 4: The removal of the dishonesty requirement and 
the exclusion of agreements made openly
In the Consultation document the Government said that it has a preference 
for the option 4.58 Under options 4, agreements that are entered into openly, 
are not captured by the offence.59 
The problems relating to the establishment of active secrecy and the 
difficulties associated with passive secrecy under option 3 would be escaped. 
52  ibid at para 6.41
53  ibid. at para 6.43
54  ibid. at paras 6.44-6.45
55  ibid. at para 6.46
56  ibid at para 6.47
57  ibid. at para 6.48
58  BIS A Competition Regime for Growth: a consultation on options for reform March 
2011 at para 6
59  ibid. at para 6.49
 167
The Government thought that the option 4 would diminish the possibility 
that the defendants resort to economic evidence, which is hard for the jury 
to comprehend. Further the kinds of agreements that would have offsetting 
benefits under the civil regime would not fall within the scope of the cartel 
offence, and finally it would make it less likely that the offence would be 
considered national competition law, which would mean that EU action 
in the matter would halt the national prosecution.60 In addition the offence 
could be modeled on s 188(6) of the Enterprise Act 2002, which carves out 
arrangements relating to bid-rigging in a situation where the one asking 
for bids is informed in advance or at the time of the bid of the agreement 
between the ones putting forwards the bids.61 The consumers made aware 
of the arrangements may subsequently make the decision to make purchases 
in other places.62
7.4.5 The OFT Response to the Government Consultation
The OFT had a preference for the option 4.63 It argued that option 4 
would be less challenging to design into law in uncomplicated language, 
and would not rely on provisions detached from the offence, as would be 
the case with the prosecutorial guidance. Further the option 4 means that 
simple factual questions are tackled, thus making it less difficult for the 
prosecutor to decide when to mount prosecution, subsequently diminishing 
unpredictability. There should be no room for competing firms to have 
between them secret arrangements with an aim to fix prices, therefore one 
can arguably see that by concentrating on secrecy the harmful conduct is 
identified. 
The design of the offence should however be possible in a way that 
legitimate confidential business interests do not need to be exposed. The 
OFT also pointed out that the civil regime could catch arrangements made 
openly, which do not fall within the scope of the cartel offence, as it would 
capture arrangements that would not be deemed hard core cartels. 64 
The OFT rejected option 1, inter alia because of the possibility, besides 
bringing about uncertainty, the defendants could challenge decisions to 
mount a prosecution thus impairing the swiftness of the proceedings.65 
Regarding option 2, the OFT argued for example that designing a white 
60  ibid. at para 6.; Furse 2012 pp. 160-161
61  Ibid at para. 6.53
62  ibid. at para. 6.52
63  OFT, A Competition Regime for Growth: A Consultation on Options for Reform. 
The OFT’s Response to the Government’s Consultation, OFT 1335, June 2011, at 
para 5.10.
64  ibid. at para. 5.10; Furse 2012 p. 163
65  ibid. at para 5.11.
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list is difficult, and might need amendments in the future, depending on 
the varying business operations and the defendants could on a regular basis 
challenge the categorization of agreements.66
The OFT liked better option 3, than 1 or 2, arguing that secrecy, a 
frequent element of cartels, also indicates that the cartelists were aware of the 
illegal nature of their conduct. The OFT argued however that proving active 
concealment might not be easy. ‘Concealment often consists of omissions, 
for example, failing to note meetings in diaries, or failing to claim for cartel 
related expenses. Also, requiring such proof creates a perverse incentive for 
cartel participants to minimize evidence, and destroy such evidence as it 
is created.’67 
7.4.6 The Government Response
The Government consultation document was followed by a Government 
response68 after 115 written responses had been obtained.69 The Government’s 
chosen option was the option 4 with a tweak: the dishonesty requirement 
would be dropped and the open agreements referred to in that particular 
option, that are excluded from the scope of the offence, refer to agreements 
that are published in a suitable format prior to their implementation, so 
that customers and others become aware of them.70 
The Government thought that dropping the dishonesty test will make 
the prosecution smoother and improves deterrence.71 The Government 
admitted the absence of live proof regarding problems associated with the 
dishonesty requirement, but went on to conclude that it is likely that it 
hampers prosecutions, and that it is especially tricky when the prosecution 
is pursuing white-collars.72 
The Government pointed out that while the dishonesty test is discarded, 
the prosecution would still need to establish the intention of entering the 
cartel agreement and putting it into effect (mental elements). While the 
Government acknowledged the need of an explicit mental element in 
conjunction with a physical element to justify imprisonment, it underlined 
the international recognition of the harms cartels cause, and believed that 
even without the dishonesty test the gravity of the offence is such that the 
66  ibid. at para 5.12.
67  ibid. at para 5.13; Furse 2012 p. 163.
68  BIS, Growth, Competition and The Competition Regime: Government Response to 
Consultation, March 2012 (hereinafter the Government Response).
69  45 of the responses concerned ‘A Stronger Antitrust Regime’, ibid. at paras 2.1, 2,3; 
See also Whelan 2012b, pp. 589-590.
70  ibid. at para 7; Whelan 2012b p. 590.
71  ibid. at para 7.7.
72  ibid. at para. 7.4.; Furse 2012 p. 164.
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imprisonment up to 5 years should be retained in the array of sanctions.73 
Furthermore, it was noted that other white-collar offences, such as insider 
trading, do not incorporate the dishonesty test either. For the prosecution 
to prove insider trading, it is sufficient, that it is shown that the defendant 
was aware that the information he had was inside information.74
The option 4 was not a favored one among the respondents of the 
Government consultation exercise. The few supporters of option 4 however 
saw that the openly made agreements would make the offence more 
consistent with civil prohibitions, and would help to distinguish the offence 
from art. 101 TFEU prohibition, thus enabling parallel EU and national 
proceedings.75 It may be mentioned that while the reform was supported by 
prosecutors, competition authorities abroad, the OFT, certain academics, 
and members of the bar, most of the firms, advocates specialized in criminal 
law, and competition law oriented law firms opposed the reform.76
While the firms may need to protect their confidential business interests 
that are part of the arrangements, the Government saw that such interests 
of confidentiality could not justify the protection of information related 
to hard-core cartels.77
Further the Government took the position that mid-level managers who 
act at the behest of their superiors should not escape criminal prosecution, 
when it is established that they have committed the cartel offence. As 
opposed to that, in a situation where a person lacking knowledge of the 
cartel agreement, puts it into practice, will not be prosecuted, as he or she 
is not a party to the cartel agreement.78 
Concerted practices would be excluded from the scope of the offence 
– there should be an agreement, a meeting of minds, ‘that goes further 
than a mere concerted practice,’ to establish the violation of the offence.79
As the Government pondered the question of how the parties to the 
agreement should publish the agreement to escape prosecution, it was 
suggested that for example London Gazette could be the proper medium 
for this purpose, to make known the relevant details. The government argued 
that therefore one could barely make the argument that it was not feasible 
73  ibid. at paras. 7.9-7.10; Harding and Joshua argued that the definition of the offence 
should be the following:’An individual is guilty of an offence if he intentionally agrees 
with one or more other persons to make or implement, or to cause to be made or 
implemented, legally prohibited arrangements of the following kind’ Harding and 
Joshua 2012, p. 4; Patel has been critical, see Patel 2012, pp. 14-15.
74  ibid. at para 7.11.
75  ibid. at para 7.22; See the discussion in section 7.4.5 in this work; Whelan favoured 
Option 4, see Whelan 2011b, p. 15.; See also Whelan 2012b, p. 590. 
76  ibid. at para 7.4.
77  ibid. at para 7.27.
78  ibid. at para. 7.31.
79  ibid. at para. 7.32.
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to publish the details and the possible problems relating to the identification 
of customers would not arise.80
In its response to the Consultation exercise the Government further 
noted that some respondents had paid attention to the fact that inter alia the 
Serious Fraud Office lacked experience in prosecuting criminal cartel cases. 
Some respondents also suggested that plea bargaining agreements should 
be employed and that a more extensive use of the director disqualification 
order would be desirable.81 
Regarding the Serious Fraud Office, the Government believed that it 
should retain its parallel jurisdiction with the Competition and Markets 
Authority (hereinafter CMA), an Authority that replaced the OFT, but 
pointed out that it follows from the need to ensure the uniform application 
of leniency that the CMA should mostly mount prosecution.82 
Regarding plea bargaining the Government Response acknowledged 
the defendants might be induced to plead guilty if plea bargaining was more 
substantially used, but stated it could have an adverse effect on the criminal 
justice system and would require a thorough contemplation.83 
Regarding the director disqualification order, the Government was 
of the view that it could not take the place of the cartel offence.84 The 
Government stated that that it ‘has no intention of abolishing the criminal 
cartel offence: doing so would be directly at odds with the Government’s 
aims under this part of its consultation.’85
7.4.7 The Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act of 2013
On the 25th of April, 2013 the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
received Royal Assent. The amended cartel offence entered into force on 
April 1st 2014.86 The amendment to the section 188 cartel offence of the 
Enterprise Act 2002 in Chapter 4 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
Act is noteworthy and is reproduced below: 
‘47 Cartel offence(1) Section 188 of the 2002 Act (cartel offence) is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (1), omit “dishonestly”.(3) Omit subsection (6).(4) After subsection (7) insert-
80  ibid. at para 7.35.
81  ibid. at paras 7.36, 7.37.
82  ibid. at para 7.39.
83  ibid. at para 7.40.
84  ibid. at para 7.41.
85  ibid. at para 7.44.
86  OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases. OFT’s detailed guidance on 
the principles and process, OFT1495, July 2013. p. 25 footnote 19. 
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“(8) This section is subject to section 188A”(5) After that section insert-
“188A    Circumstances in which cartel offence not committed(1) An individual does not commit an offence under section 188(1) 
if, under the arrangements-(a) in a case where the arrangements would (operating as the 
parties intend affect the supply in the United Kingdom of 
a product or service, customers would be given relevant 
information about the arrangements before they enter into 
agreements for the supply to them of the product or service 
so affected,(b) in the case of bid-rigging arrangements, the person 
requesting bids would be given relevant information about 
the at or before the time when a bid is made, or(c) in any case, relevant information about the arrangements 
would be published, before the arrangements are 
implemented, in the manner specified at the time of the 
making of the agreement in an order made by the Secretary 
of State.(2) In subsection (1), “relevant information” means-(a) the names of the undertakings to which the arrangements 
relate,(b) a description of the nature of the arrangements which is 
sufficient to show why they are or might be arrangements of 
the kind to which section 188(1) applies,(c) the products or services to which they relate, and (d) such other information as may be specified in an order 
made by the Secretary of State.(3) An individual does not commit an offence under section 
188(1) if the agreement is made in order to comply with a legal 
requirement.(4) In subsection (3), “legal requirement” has the same meaning as 
in paragraph 5 of Schedule 3 to the Competition Act 1998.(5) A power to make an order under this section-(a) is exercisable by statutory instrument,(b) may be exercised so as to make different provision for 
different cases or different purposes, and(c) includes power to make such incidental, supplementary, 
consequential, transitory, transitional or saving provision as 
the Secretary of State considers appropriate.(6) A statutory instrument containing an order under this section is 
subject to annulment      in pursuance of a resolution of either 
House of Parliament.”
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(7) After section 188A (as inserter by subsection (5) above) insert-
“188B Defences to commission of cartel offence(1) In a case where the arrangements would (operating as the parties 
intend) affect the supply in the United Kingdom of a product or 
service, it is a defence for an individual charged with an offence 
under section 188(1) to show that, at the time of the making of 
the agreement, he or she did not intend that the nature of the 
arrangements would be concealed from customers at all times 
before they enter into agreements for the supply to them of the 
product or service.(2) It is a defence for an individual charged with an offence under 
section 188(1) to show that, at the time of the making of the 
agreement, he or she did not intend that the nature of the 
arrangements would be concealed from the CMA.(3) It is a defence for an individual charged with an offence under 
section 188(1) to show that, before the making of the agreement, 
he or she took reasonable steps to ensure that the nature of the 
arrangements would be disclosed to professional legal advisers for 
the purposes of obtaining advice about them before their making 
or (as the case may be) their implementation.”’
In addition the Government introduced the Competition and Markets 
Authority (CMA)87, which meant that the responsibilities of both the OFT 
and the Competition Commission were transferred to the new Authority.88
7.5 AN ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS AND DEMERITS 
OF THE OPTION 4
Wardhaugh has launched criticism of the Government Consultation and 
the Response.89 While he welcomes the improvements to the UK anti-
cartel regime, he argues that the reform is characterized by a ‘piecemeal 
approach’.90 Rather than reforming with the whole in mind, the Government 
tinkers with few elements of the regime, overlooking the fact that all the 
elements of the regime are interrelated. At the end these reforms could tax 
87  This study focuses on the UK experience prior to the reform of the cartel offence 
and the institutional structure, which is reflected in the sense that references are 
made to the now defunct OFT rather than to the CMA.
88  See BIS, Growth, Competition and The Competition Regime: Government Response to 
Consultation, March 2012, at para 3.
89  Wardhaugh 2012a.
90  Wardhaugh 2012a, p. 573.
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the effectiveness of the regime in his view.91 Inter alia he points out that the 
design of the cartel offence has a bearing on the capabilities of the leniency 
functioning well, and says that this aspect was omitted in the Consultation 
document and the Response.92
In particular Wardhaugh is critical of the new design of the offence, 
arguing that dropping the dishonesty requirement would be followed by 
a lack of transparency.93 He underlines that the damaging effects of cartels 
occur irrespective the fact that the cartel agreement was made openly. As 
under the reformed cartel offence open agreements are exempted, Warghaugh 
argues that such conduct may even be fuelled.94 
Further, he is of the view that the new design of the offence that targets 
secretly made agreements brings about uncertainty, as does the reference to 
the exempted agreements of which ‘relevant information’ has been given 
to the customers. He predicts that future trials will focus on the details 
given to customers and whether it is adequate and that the prosecution 
will necessarily touch upon the topic in the event customers have been 
given some information. This is then arguably exacerbated by the indefinite 
term ‘relevant’. As he points out an alternative would have been to make 
the definition of the offence such that the prosecution would only need to 
show the existence of an agreement.95
91  ibid. p. 574.
92  ibid. pp. 579-580.
93  ibid. p. 580.
94  ibid. p. 582; Patel noted that ’given that cartels are regarded as the most serious 
and damaging forms of anticompetitive conduct, it is not clear why BIS has chosen 
not to punish those who in engage in this activity openly. The act of publishing 
does nothing, of itself, to justify or legitimize the existence of the cartel or make 
the offense somehow less pernicious.’ Patel went on to say that ’it is not clear why 
companies will have the incentive to publish the existence of the agreement given 
that it is not, strictly speaking, in its interests to do so (publication affords protection 
to the individual, not to the company, and there are downsides to such disclosure’, 
see Patel 2012, pp. 11-12; Harding and Joshua noted regarding option 4 that ’[t]
he concept of ”open” or announced agreements addresses the same element of 
covert behaviour, by inviting cartels participants to publicise their actions, in effect 
automatically casting undeclared hard core cartels as secret and therefore criminal in 
nature, if proven. But this incentive to declare acts of price fixing, or whatever, would 
seem doubtful in practice. In return for immunity against criminal prosecution, 
cartelists would be revealing their illegal arrangements, thus undermining their 
planned profitable enterprise and exposing themselves to non-criminal law sanctions’, 
See Harding and Joshua 2012, pp. 3-4; Furse observes Wardhaugh’s ’substantial 
contribution to the debate’, see Furse 2012 pp. 163-164.
95  Wardhaugh 2012a, p. 582; It may be mentioned that while Whelan supported 
carving out agreements that have been made public before implementation, he has 
been critical of the third defence that appeared in the ERRA (regarding the defences 
see the previous section in this Chapter): ‘this defence allows cartelists to escape a 
criminal conviction where they have contacted their lawyers and informed them of 
their future plans to cartelise. This is troubling. There is presumably no obligation 
to follow the lawyer’s advice and the lawyers would, it seems, be under no obligation 
to inform the CMA of their clients’ future plans: the activity in question does not fit 
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As the deterrent effect of a sanction turns on the severity of sanctions 
and detection rate, Wardhaugh, argues that the penalty level should have 
been addressed as well in the reform, especially considering the more severe 
penalties that have been introduced both in the US and Canada. Further, the 
Director Disqualification orders should have been subject to improvement 
in his opinion.96
The question of resources of the investigative authorities was admittedly 
barely addressed in the UK reform. As Wardhaugh says, this would seem 
to be an important issue after the collapse of the British Airways case. The 
Project Condor Board Review, a paper analyzing the collapse of the British 
Airways case,97 had specifically mentioned the more robust investigatory 
powers that the Serious Fraud Office has, ‘especially in relation to forensic 
analysis and recovery of electronic data,’ but that it lacked the OFT’s 
experience in competition law matters. The Condor report argued the OFT 
should improve its capabilities to pursue criminal cases. The Serious Fraud 
Office was overloaded with work, while the British Airways case had taken 
place.98 It is true that the consultation document and the Government 
response paid scant attention to the possible lack of experience and resources 
of the investigating and prosecuting authority, and this would seem to be 
an important point from the perspective of deterrence.99
Wardhaugh makes also an important point concerning the system 
of plea-bargaining and its introduction in the context of anti-cartel 
enforcement. He admits that a fully-fledged system of plea-bargaining in 
the US fashion may not be desirable, but that a more narrow use of it 
should be contemplated and that a persuasive argument advocating it could 
especially be made with regard to anti-cartel enforcement.100
On a different note Macculloch has pointed out that one of the 
difficulties related to the dropping of the dishonesty element is how to 
distinguish between those individuals that should not fall within the scope 
within the recognised exceptions to client confidentiality. In fact, lawyers will face 
professional discipline if they breach their clients’ confidence in this manner. The 
worry here is that cartelists will undermine the effectiveness of the criminal Cartel 
Offence by routinely seeking relevant ‘advice’ from their lawyers when they are 
considering entering into cartel arrangements with their competitors.’ According to 
Whelan: [t]he first two defenses are not really problematic. Like the “carve out” of 
agreements which are (in effect) publicised prior to their implementation, they can 
be rationalized as an attempt to link (criminalised) cartel activity to deception: an 
absence of an intention to conceal can be interpreted as an absence of an intention to 
mislead. Admittedly, their impact in practice may be negligible due to the potential 
difficulties in proving an absence of an intention to conceal.’ See Whelan 2013c.
96  Wardhaugh 2012a, p. 584.
97  OFT, ’Project Condor Board Review’, December 2010. 
98  Ibid. p. 11; Wardhaugh 2012a, p. 585.
99  Wardhaugh 2012a, p. 585.
100  ibid. p. 588; For a more detailed treatment regarding plea bargaining see Chapter 9 
in this work.
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of the cartel offence and those that should:  Such a situation could arise 
in a case where a manager at a retail store implements the regular pricing 
instructions as ordered by his superiors, without being aware of the fact 
that he is implementing the cartel agreement. In another scenario the 
individuals seeks to make sure that the cartel agreement is observed by the 
cartel members resorting to even threats. It seems sensible that only the 
latter should fall under the criminal prohibition. The retail manager could 
have argued that he was not acting dishonestly, thus the dishonesty element 
provides the dividing line between criminal and non-criminal conduct.101 
7.5.1 The Moral Censure and the Cartel Offence
Macculloch has argued that the definition of the cartel offence would be 
better off not incorporating harmfulness into the offence.  This would be 
so, as the prosecution would otherwise need to show the degree of harm 
to secure a conviction, thus making the trial phase more cumbersome with 
the introduction of complicated economic evidence.102 He further says that 
criminal penalties prohibiting cartels should not be warranted by citing 
exclusively the harmfulness perspective: ‘the nature of the harm caused 
by cartels is ill suited to a response through criminal law.’103 In relation to 
the UK reform of the cartel offence and the dropping of the dishonesty 
requirement, he asks whether the criminality of the conduct should be 
reflected to a greater extent than what the actus reus does, and if answered 
in the affirmative, how could this be achieved.104 
Whelan was among the supporters of the option 4. He says that the 
dishonesty was incorporated in the cartel offence for three reasons, namely to 
make sure it is in agreement with art 101(3) TFEU, to limit the offence, and 
to display the wrongful nature of the cartel conduct.105 According to him the 
dilemma is that, while criminal penalties are employed in order to engender 
less sympathetic views of cartels, the dishonesty element already required as 
a precondition that such views exist. As has been pointed out above, this is 
problematic when defences of questionable value are advanced.106 
Williams too has pointed out in the UK context that the UK cartel 
offence was intended to attract moral opprobrium through the element of 
dishonesty. The ‘forward-looking’ offence cannot be expected to signal a 
101  Macculloch 2012, pp. 83-84.
102  Macculloch 2012, p. 75.
103  ibid. p. 78
104  ibid. p. 82
105  Whelan 2012b p. 591; See also MacCulloch 2007, p. 356.
106  Whelan 2012b p. 592.
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‘backward-looking’ moral disapproval. 107 Williams further warns against 
the excessive use of criminal law as it may lose its stigmatizing effect. As the 
ability of the society to attach a label of blame on a behavior is not unlimited 
a careful consideration must be exercised prior to a criminalization in order 
not to to impair the effectiveness of criminal law. 108 Williams however goes 
on to argue that the delinquency or criminality of cartel activity can also be 
identified in its exploitative nature – also under English law other property 
and economic offences derive their delinquency from exploitation, which 
provides a link between cartels and other economic offences.109
Macculloch has said that no strong opinions have been voiced in favor 
of adopting the approach that cartels should be a strict liability offence, 
that is lacking the mental element, which in his opinion would not be 
guide enough to show the proper limits of the offence. He argues that 
from various propositions made in the literature regarding the design of 
the offence, ‘cheating’ and ‘subversion of competition’ would be the best 
options to replace the dishonesty requirement in an attempt to capture the 
criminality of the conduct, and warns against a design of the offence that 
would only attend to the prosecutorial concerns. He underlines that the 
general public must also understand the message conveyed. 110 Even if the 
prosecutors may then have more hurdles to overcome, he says that it ‘will 
increase the effectiveness of the offence, not simply through deterrence and 
punishment, but through people’s desire to comply with the law’.111
The reason he favors the concepts of ‘cheating’ or ‘subversion of 
competition’, he says, is because they reflect the idea that the wrongfulness 
of cartels is derived from the fact that the competitive process, which may 
be rightfully expected on the markets, is hampered, thereby violating the 
‘rules of the game’.112
Cheating, would arguably make the scope of the offence more limited, 
and it would most easily apply to a bid-rigging case. As the scope would be 
narrow, excluded would be cartel conduct that is not the most blatant.113 The 
concept of cheating would not as naturally apply to price-fixing, as it is not 
as easy to identify the victims of cheating, thus making it more difficult from 
the evidential point of view. However while there is the rightful expectation 
of the competitive process and thereby price-fixing could be conceived 
as a violation of this moral standard, Macculloch reasons that such an 
interpretation of the term cheating is still a stretch, and a more spontaneous 
107  Williams 2011, pp. 297-298.
108  Williams 2011, pp. 297-298.
109  Williams 2011, p. 301.
110  Macculloch 2012, p. 87, 84.
111  ibid. p. 85.
112  ibid. p. 87.
113  ibid. p. 87-88.
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approach might be adopting the concept of ‘subversion of the competitive 
process, ’ which would cover also price-fixing and other hard-core cartels. 114
Macculloch notes that the UK cartel offence has another mental 
element that of intention in subsections 2 and 3. While he indicates that 
in foreign jurisdictions, physical elements of the offence are given more 
weight than the mental element, he argues in favor of having an explicit 
mental element in the UK cartel offence to fight the appearance of a 
regulatory crime, a technical violation rather than an authentic crime. His 
suggestion is to bring the element of intention to subsection 1 in relation 
to the concept of subversion of the competitive process that according to 
his suggestion is also inserted. This would exclude from the scope of the 
offence the likes of the ‘retail manager’ who just implements the pricing 
instructions of his superiors. In relation to proving intention Macculloch 
argues that experience from other countries shows, that courts deduce intent 
from cartel behavior.115
Regarding option 4 Macculloch points out that while agreements 
that would most likely not merit criminal prosecution, are excluded, no 
instruction is given as to the reprehensibility of agreements. He is of the 
view that it seems that the offence should be more narrowly defined than 
under the option 4 – the option 4 fails to pinpoint specifically the conduct 
that merits the condemnation of criminal law. As a result, he argues, the 
limitation of the offence would depend on prosecutorial judgment.116 
Option 3, that would replace dishonesty with the element of secrecy, finds 
favor with Macculloch in the sense that it clearly indicates which conduct 
should be subject to criminal sanctions. The problem is however in his view 
that secrecy in itself would not be the proper indicator as to the criminality 
of a given conduct: ‘secrecy results from the cartelists’ awareness that they 
are committing a wrong; it is not the wrong itself. To effectively limit the 
cartel offence it would be preferable to identify the wrong itself, rather than 
writing into the offence a proxy such as secrecy.’117
Macculloch recognizes that his formulation of the offence, based on the 
intent to subvert the competitive process could invite the comment that, 
not only individuals but also corporations should be subject to criminal 
penalties. He however rejects this approach in the UK context. In his view 
ascribing intent to a firm is not easy, the retributive value in comparison with 
the administrative control is doubtful, and the deterrent effect would barely 
be improved. In contrast, as Macculloch refers to Leslie’s article118, according 
114  ibid. p. 88; See the discussion in this work in the section ’Price-fixing and the 
Everyday Moral Standards’.
115  ibid. p. 90
116  ibid. p. 85
117  ibid. p. 86
118  Leslie 2008, p. 1621.
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to which the interests of the employee and the employer should not be 
aligned in order to further destabilize cartels –it is desirable to maintain 
distinct sanctions for the firms and the individuals. At the end of the day 
cartel conduct is entered by individuals, who implement the agreements, 
which merits retribution while the corporation remains accountable under 
the administrative law. 
Macculloch acknowledged that once the cartel conduct is detected 
by the authorities, the responsible individuals may have already left the 
firm and in terms of liability would not be subject to penalties under an 
administrative regime, but if criminal penalties are available could still be 
held accountable. Criminal penalties could also be needed against the rogue 
managers, who against the internal company instructions engage in cartel 
conduct.119
Whelan on the other hand has argued in favor of the option 4. He 
recognized that dropping the dishonesty element invites the criticisms that 
the offence covers conduct that is from a moral perspective such that it 
should not attract criminal penalties – and he too noted that this may lead 
to the dilution of the criminal law as a result of unfair labeling.120 To evade 
such overcriminalization critique, Whelan argues that the cartel conduct 
should be associated with some immoral conduct and he proposes that 
the concept of deception should undertake this task. At the risk of being 
redundant the reader is reminded that as a cartel member falsely sends the 
message to customers that no cartel is in operation, he effectively deceives. 
Whelan points out that no express message to this end is needed, as the 
cartel member may know that customers may act on the assumption that 
the cartel member lawfully competes with other market participants, as he is 
selling goods on the market. By not making public the cartel agreement, the 
assumption may be made that prices are formed as a result of unrestrained 
competition.121 
Arguably the nature of cartels, as something hidden, worsens the false 
supposition that the customers hold that competition is unrestrained and 
assists the association of cartels with deception.122 This approach means 
that cartel agreements which are made openly, should not be covered by 
the cartel offence – obviously it seems difficult to argue that the cartel 
deceives customers, if the customers had been informed of it prior to its 
implementation. 123
119  Macculloch 2012, pp. 90-91.
120  Whelan 2012b p. 594.
121  Whelan 2012b p. 595; See also the discussion in this work under the Chaper ’Hard-
core Cartels as Deception’. 
122  Whelan 2012b p. 596.
123  Whelan 2012b p. 597.
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Whelan points out that one advantage of employing the moral norm 
against deception is that, as opposed to the moral norm against cheating, 
which requires that the cartel member acquires an ‘unfair advantage’, it must 
not be shown that the individual entering the cartel got personal benefits. 
This is desirable since individual gains are difficult to show. Further, the 
option 4, would not require the assessment of the economic effects to 
establish that the cartel offence has been committed. As opposed to that 
when the dishonesty requirement was a part of the statutory definition, 
the defence could advance the argument that the defendant thought that 
the agreement would be exempted under art. 101(3) TFEU, thus possibly 
affecting the jury’s assessment of dishonesty.124 
In line with the Govenrment’s arguments Whelan favors option 4, 
instead of option 3, which would have the dishonesty element replaced by 
the secrecy element, as the option 3 would require that it was shown that 
the agreement was secret, the option 4 would relieve the UK prosecution 
from such a burden, and not requiring the determination of the content 
of the word ‘secrecy’.125
From the point of view of Article 101(3) TFEU, Whelan says, the option 
4 may be favorably viewed. If one seeks to benefit from the exemptions 
under art. 101(3) TFEU and to avoid criminal penalties, one just has to 
make the agreement public prior to implementation. Whelan acknowledges 
that it could be argued that cartelists could circumvent criminal penalties 
by always publishing the agreements. Yet in his view it seems unlikely that 
this would take place, as it may be assumed that the cartelists want to reap 
the rewards of a cartel, which means that the cartel should be kept secret. 
However, if the cartelist seeks to circumvent criminal penalties by making 
the agreement public, the cartel could then be detected and prosecuted 
as a civil offence under the UK Competition Act or Article 101 TFEU.126
Further the option 4, Whelan says, would be helpful, as the likelihood 
of jury nullification is smaller as the jury does not have to consider the 
moral aspects, and the Norris case would not have a direct impact on the 
assessment.127
124  Whelan 2012b p. 597.
125  Whelan 2012b p. 598.
126  Whelan 2012b p. 598.
127  Whelan 2012b p. 597.
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7.5.2 The Relationship between the EU and the National   
 Competition Law – Is the UK Cartel Offence ‘national  
 competition law’ for the purposes of Regulation 1/2003?
Whelan argues that option 4 should be preferred as it is less likely under 
that option that the cartel offence would fall within the scope of Regulation 
1/2003.128 Regulation 1/2003 would govern the enforcement of the cartel 
offence if it were regarded as national competition law for the purposes of 
the mentioned regulation. According to Whelan such a result would have 
two important implications, firstly it would affect the jurisdiction of the 
UK Criminal Courts, and secondly it could affect the ability to prosecute 
the cases in the UK, if EU proceedings are taking place simultaneously.129 
The latter flows from the fact that Regulation 1/2003 says in art. 11(6) 
that ‘The initiation by the commission of proceedings for the adoption of 
a decision under Chapter III shall relieve the competition authorities of 
the Member States of their competence to apply Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty. ‘130
Further the recital 8 of Regulation 1/2003 says that when national 
laws are applied to agreements that fall within the scope of 101 TFEU, the 
national competition laws may not prohibit such agreements if the Union 
law does not prohibit them. Crucially however with regard to the cartel 
offence Regulation 1/2003 provides in the last sentence of the recital 8 the 
following: ‘Furthermore, this Regulation does not apply to national laws 
which impose criminal sanctions on natural persons except to the extent 
that such sanctions are the means whereby competition rules applying to 
undertakings are enforced.’ 
Furse argues that one cannot be indifferent to the possibility that the 
cartel offence would be considered national competition law for the purposes 
of Regulation 1/2003, but sees that the independent existence of the offence 
would support the interpretation that the cartel offence is not national 
competition law for the purposes of the regulation. He however admits 
that Wils makes a good case to argue the opposite. 131
As Wils points out art. 3(3) of Regulation 1/2003 says that it does not 
‘preclude the application of provisions of national law that predominantly 
pursue an objective different from that pursued by Articles 81 and 82 of 
the Treaty.’ The aforementioned recital 8 Regulation 1/2003 then is in Wils’ 
view just to detail art. 3 of Regulation 1/2003, and his interpretation is that 
128  Council Regulation EC No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation 
of the Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.
129  Whelan 2012b p. 599.
130  Whelan 2012b p. 599.
131  Furse 2012 p. 121
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art. 3(1) and (2) would be applicable to all national laws (despite a possible 
criminal offence against natural persons) that do not have for the most part 
a different objective than Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 132 Wils argues that 
one can scarcely see the possibility that the UK cartel offence would have a 
predominantly different objective from the one that is incorporated in art. 
101 TFEU. He points out that the UK cartel offence was introduced to 
improve the deterrent effect as the fines against the companies were not seen 
as sufficient, and that cartel offence is ‘a means whereby competition rule 
applying to undertakings are enforced.’133 Furse notes inter alia that given 
that the s 188 (1) of the Enterprise act itself refers to ‘undertakings’ and 
that the White paper134 referred to cartels, it may be asked that if the cartel 
offence was not to prevent cartels and agreements between undertakings 
then what is its aim?135
In the case IB v The Queen136 the defendants advanced the argument 
that Regulation 1/2003 has the effect that the UK Crown Court cannot 
preside cartel cases where there is an effect on the member state trade as 
then only the Competition authority would be the properly designated 
authority under art. 35 of Regulation 1/2003 to impose fines.137 The 
Court did not accept this argument – as Whelan explains the Court ‘held 
that the Cartel offence is outside of the scope of Regulation 1/2003 as it 
is not a “national competition law” within the meaning of that piece of 
EU legislation: the Cartel offence does not involve a decision whether a 
given agreement is valid or rendered invalid for infringement of Article 
101 TFEU.’138 Further, the court said that even if it was mistaken in this 
interpretation, Regulation 1/2003 does not make the national competition 
authority the only possible instance to punish offences, which would be 
considered national competition law.139
Whelan says that the option 4 by linking deception to cartel activity, 
aims at retribution instead of deterrence. It could be said that ‘one is in 
fact punishing “deception,” as opposed to the mere conclusion of a price-
fixing agreement’. This would mean that while the (administrative Union) 
competition law aims to punish without regard to immorality, the option 
4, on the other hand punishes when the moral norm against deception has 
132  Note that art. 81 and 82 have been renumbered since the introduction of the Lisbon 
Treaty and are now art. 101 and 102 TFEU respectively, Wils 2005a. p. 133.
133  Wils 2005a p. 133; See also Department of Trade and Industry,  A World Class 
Competition Regime July 2001. In particular at para 7.2. 
134  A World Class Competition Regime July 2001, in particular at para 7.22.
135  Furse 2012 p. 125.
136  IB v The Queen 2009 EWCA Crim 2575; Whelan 2012b, p. 599.
137  IB v The Queen 2009 EWCA Crim 2575 at para 2. 
138  Whelan 2012b, p. 599 footnote 52; see IB v The Queen 2009 EWCA Crim 2575 at 
para 34.
139  ibid. at para. 38.
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been infringed. This is relevant since Regulation 1/2003 in its recital 9 says, 
that the regulation does not apply when the objective is not the protection 
of competition on the market. Subsequently, the option 4 incorporating an 
aim of retribution could be said to have a different objective. Yet, as Whelan 
points out, the ECJ might one day give a ruling on this particular point, 
which would settle this unresolved question.140
The Government argued that the cartel offence would be separate from 
the EU competition law regime under the option 4 and would not be more 
susceptible to fall within the scope of Regulation 1/2003. This would follow 
from the secrecy aspect, which is not an integral part of Article 101 TFEU.141 
7.6 CONCLUSION
The UK Enterprise Act that was passed into law in 2002 has recently been 
reformed inter alia by removing the troubled element of dishonesty from 
the cartel offence. 
The Hammond and Penrose report and the White Paper preceded 
the enactment of the Enterprise Act of 2002. The OECD had previously 
suggested that individual liability in the context of cartel conduct should 
be available.  The UK Cartel offence would then target the hard-core cartel 
conduct and exclude the so called vertical agreements. Among the aims of 
the Enterprise Act was a clear statutory prohibition intelligible to businesses 
and a deterrent effect as a result of application of the law in question. It is 
questionable whether either of these aims was attained. 
In 2011 a consultation document, A Competition Regime for Growth: a 
consultation on options for reform suggested that the dishonesty requirement 
should be dropped. It inter alia referred to a survey whose results indicated 
that there was not a substantial support among the general public for the view 
that cartel conduct was dishonest. The OFT referring to its own experience 
argued that the dishonesty requirement could induce unmeritorious defences 
and should be dropped from the cartel offence. The dishonesty requirement 
had arguably made it more likely that the jury would have to evaluate 
complex economic evidence. Ironically initially the dishonesty test was 
adopted to escape the problems associated with the economic evidence, 
and to distinguish the civil regime from the criminal one.
It is notable that the dishonesty element was dropped albeit it was 
barely touched upon the in cartel case law.
140  Whelan Peter, ’Improving Criminal Cartel Enforcement in the UK: the Case for the 
Adoption of BIS’s ”Option 4”’ European Competition Journal December, 2012 p. 600
141  BIS, Growth, Competition and The Competition Regime: Government Response to 
Consultation, March 2012 at para 7.30
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The Consultation document suggested four different options to reform 
the UK cartel offence:1. The removal of the dishonesty requirement and the 
introduction of prosecutorial guidance, 2. The removal of the dishonesty 
requirement and excluding certain white-listed agreements 3. That ‘secrecy’ 
as an element should take the place of ‘dishonesty’, 4. The removal of the 
dishonesty requirement and the exclusion of agreements made openly. 
The Government chose the option 4, which would inter alia diminish 
the likelihood of defences relating to complex economic evidence. The 
option 4 found also favor with the OFT and a few other respondents. The 
OFT pointed out that the civil regime would still catch the openly made 
agreements that would be outside the scope of the cartel offence.
One problem identified with option 1 was that it would not sufficiently 
clearly distinguish the cartel offence from the civil prohibition. As to option 
2, concerns were expressed that devising the white-listed offences could 
be exceedingly difficult, and the interpretation of the list may always be 
challenged. Regarding option 3, it was argued that proving active secrecy 
could be difficult. 
The Government argued that dropping dishonesty would streamline 
prosecution and add to deterrence. While the Government acknowledged 
the importance of the mental element in the cartel offence it underlined the 
harm that cartels cause, and argued that even in the absence of the dishonesty 
test the gravity of the offence warrants imprisonment up to 5 years. 
The reform has received criticism inter alia due to its ‘piecemeal 
approach’: arguably other parts, besides the definitional elements of the 
cartel offence would have deserved attention, for instance the introduction 
of a system of plea bargaining. This particular argument regarding plea 
bargaining is one that the author of this dissertation finds persuasive – 
relying exclusively on the information received from the leniency applicant is 
risky. Having the runner-up to leniency enter a guilty plea could streamline 
the prosecution. 
Further while seeking to improve anti-cartel enforcement, it would 
seem that the criticism is warranted regarding the absence of analysis as to 
the resources available to the OFT (now the CMA), especially with a view 
to the argumentation in this direction in the Condor report that analyzed 
the collapse of the Airlines case.
One of the problems regarding the dishonesty requirement seemed 
to be that it presupposed that the public perception of cartels is negative. 
However making the cartel offence a strict liability offence has not received 
much support. The reformed cartel offence retains the mental element of 
intention. This author is not keen to add further mental elements to the 
offence - the physical element is already in itself implicitly immoral.142 
Further exempting openly made agreements may bring about uncertainty, 
142  See Beaton-Wells 2007 p. 698.
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for instance the defendants may claim that ‘relevant’ information had been 
given to customers. Due to the inherent vagueness of the term ‘relevant’, 
one may expect that this point will be litigated. As one commentator has 
noted, the prosecution already bears the burden of proving the existence 
of the cartel agreement.
While the ECJ has the final say regarding the relation between the 
UK cartel offence and the EU law, it seems sensible that an effort is made 
to keep the two separate, and it appears that the option 4 supports such an 
interpretation. Having said that it must be acknowledged that exempting 
openly made agreements is problematic, not just for the potential damaging 
effects, but in particular by bringing unnecessary hurdles in the way of the 
prosecution.
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8 Detecting, Investigating   
 and Prosecuting Cartels   
 Particularly from the UK   
 Perspective
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This Chapter provides an overview of the particulars related to the detection, 
investigation and prosecution of cartels in the United Kingdom. The primary 
purpose is to draw on the UK experience in this respect and to produce 
recommendations as to a possible Finnish or Swedish criminal anti-cartel 
regime – inevitably this implies the sort of treatment of the topic that 
involves necessarily a fairly detailed account of the UK regime before any 
conclusions can be drawn.
Detecting cartels appears to be indebted to leniency programs. The 
notorious collapse of the airlines case,1 involving the British Airways 
and the Virgin Atlantic (hereinafter the airlines case)2, has prompted 
commentators to explore the extent of the disclosure obligations of the 
now replaced Office of Fair Trading (hereinafter OFT) and the relevance of 
a prosecutor well-versed in criminal law. These questions will be explored 
below. 
8.2 THE UK LENIENCY PROGRAMME AND 
BOUNTIES
8.2.1 Introduction
The American regulators started to employ the criminal powers to their full 
potential in the 1990’s. The Lysine cartel3 was cracked with the extensive 
investigations rights: a video recording from the cartelists’ meeting was 
obtained. The Department of Justice introduced its stick and carrot approach 
1  See R v George 2010 EWCA Crim 1148.
2  It has also been referred to as the British Airways case.
3  Regarding the Lysine cartel, See Eichenwald 2012. 
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to break the code of silence. These two together, the robust investigatory 
powers and leniency, draw on the natural instability of cartels. The apparent 
success of the US showed the way for other jurisdictions around the world 
that wished to improve their cartel cracking abilities,4 the UK among those 
jurisdictions. It has been proposed that the arguable success of the American 
leniency policy hinges on three different elements: firstly, a truly tempting 
offer made by the DOJ, secondly, the policy taps into the instability of cartels 
and also produces the suspicion among the cartel members and thirdly, the 
leniency scheme becomes even more powerful as only the first informant 
is extensively rewarded.5
As Harding and Joshua explain, the character of cartels is more of 
a truce than a real alliance: there is the possibility that a member of the 
cartel is tempted to cheat as they are still independent rivals. The members 
constantly estimate what are their advantages and disadvantages to retain 
the cartel membership. A cartel involves cooperation and the contingency 
of a betrayal and this has led to the application of the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
to cartels.  The firms are incentivized by the cartel profits to collude, but 
once the cartel operates individual cartel members may cheat by lowering 
prices due to another incentive which then results in competition when 
other cartel members lower prices as well. Therefore sustaining the cartel 
can be immensely difficult. 6
Many conspicuous and successful cartels have demonstrated how the 
maintenance of the cartel has required constant policing and care to keep the 
working order despite the lucrative cartel profits for its members. Successful 
cartels such as the Zinc Producers’ Group where the cartel bit by bit fell 
apart,7 the PVC Cartel where it was suggested that cheating took place,8 and 
the Pre-Insulated Pipes Cartel where monitoring took place to guarantee 
compliance among the cartel members indicate the inherent instability of 
a cartel.9 The carrot and stick strategy may exploit such a culture of distrust 
between the cartel members to crack the secretiveness of cartels.10 Each 
cartel member is then subject to the application of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
wondering whether other members of cartel will confess and get the full 
benefits of leniency. There are two essential requirements for the efficient 
4  Harding and Joshua 2010 pp. 228-229.
5  Harding and Joshua 2010, p. 235.
6  ibid. pp. 229-230
7  See the OJ, L 220, 17.8.1984, p. 42
8  See Commission Decision of 21 December 1988 relating to a proceeding pursuant 
ot Article 85 of the EEC Treaty (IV/31.865, PVC) (89/190/EEC) OJ L 74, 
17.3.1989 p. 5
9  See Commission Decision of 21 October 1998 relating to a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the EC Treaty (Case No IV/35.691/E-4: Pre-Insulated Piper Cartel) 
(1999/60/EC) OJ L 24, 30.1.1999 p. 29.
10  Harding and Joshua 2010, p. 231.
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application of the Prisoner’s Dilemma: firstly, the threat of detection must 
be real and secondly the following sanctions must be harsh enough.11 The 
knowledge of the full immunity to only the first applicant may affect the 
perceived likelihood of detection.12
Furthermore while leniency makes a secret cartel unstable if the cartel 
members believe that they could be detected in the absence of the leniency 
as well – it makes the cartel members to race to the authority, thus decreasing 
the amount of resources the authority needs for investigation. It also provides 
a variety of information as a result. Therefore leniency is perceived as the 
one of the best ways to detect cartels.13
8.2.2 The Policy Rationale behind Leniency
One reason why Finland and Sweden both gave the red light to the 
criminalization of cartels is that the idea of inroducing a possiblity for 
plea barganing/leniency under the criminal justice system was foreign, the 
traditional Nordic approach is to give more value to the reprehensibilty of 
the crime rather than the perpetrator’s confession. Therefore delving into the 
UK leniency program that grants immunity against criminal prosecution to 
individuals is of relevance in a comparatively oriented study.14 
In the German discussion it has been pointed out that granting 
immunity infringes the principle of mandatory prosecution.15 Removing 
the prosecutorial discretion seeks to eliminate possible arbitrary elements 
from enforcement.16 One argument in favor of a criminal anti-cartel regime 
is actually that it enchances the leniency program by giving incentives to 
inviduals to come forward, whereas in the absence of individual accountability 
the indivuals may not wish to turn in the firm that employs them or ’recall 
awkward facts about meetings and understandings’. On the other hand the 
risk of a prison sentence upends the situation, inducing speedy actions on 
part of the individuals who seek to provide strong evidence to the authorities 
in order to obtain immunity. Thus the leniency mechanism exploits the 
colliding interests of the firm and the individuals. Arguably this outcome 
may alleaviate the increased evidentiary problems associated with a criminal 
anti-cartel regime.17
11  Harding and Joshua 2010, p. 232; 
12  Harding and Joshua 2010, p. 232
13  Whelan 2011, p. 231.
14  See (in Swedish) Regeringens proposition 2007/08:135. p. 151 and (in Finnish) 
Kuoppamäki 2006, p. 66; See also the discussion in chapter 9 in this work.
15  Vollmer 2006, p. 259.
16  Wagner-Von Papp 2011, p. 175.
17  Whelan 2011, p. 233.
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The OFT by awarding immunity to individuals against criminal 
prosecution and leniency against civil proceedings to companies is in an 
exceptional position in the UK to have such powers.18 
The OFT states in its Guidance regarding its leniency policy that 
both individuals and firms are granted immunity in the framework of the 
UK leniency program, when they reveal the existence of a cartel and fully 
cooperate. In the OFT’s view the pardon is justified by the interests of 
the economy. The penalties may be reduced as a result of leniency and 
individuals may escape prosecution and the imposition of the Director 
Disqualification order.19 
Harding and Joshua argue that the adoption of leniency to break the 
silence among the cartel members indicates a move towards criminal law 
regulation. This follows from the fact that the genesis of leniency resides 
in criminal justice. Leniency however requires a trade-off of retributive 
values in favor of more utilitarian objectives. In order to avoid a complete 
abandonment of retributive values, the exclusion of the ringleader from the 
benefits of the leniency program reflects still retributive justice. In Europe 
there seems to be however a narrow definition of the ringleader or bully, 
which in turn indicates a very pragmatic approach.20
The underlying policy idea is that it is more important from the 
perspective of customers and consumers that cartels are detected than 
punishing the cooperating responsible individuals or firms, who have 
informed the Authority of the existence of the cartel.21 Through leniency 
cartels are detected and become subject to legal prosecution with the help of 
the evidence acquired from the leniency applicants.22 Furse argues that this 
reflects a competition policy, which places a higher emphasis on efficiency 
than moral questions involved. He further points out that leniency could 
be supported with the view that by confessing the cartelist may put his 
past faults behind and make amends.23  Confessing one’s sins and then the 
subsequent absolution is a part of many major religions, from Christianity 
to Buddism. In case of a confessing cartel member it is important that the 
confession is recorded and responsibility assumed, just as a sinner would. 
This way the cartel members also retain evidence of the cartel rather than 
18  Special arrangements concern Scotland, see Furse 2012 p. 146; Lawrence et al. 
2008, p. 18.
19  OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases. OFT’s detailed guidance 
on the principles and process. A consultation on OFT guidance. OFT803con, October 
2011, at para 2.2.
20  Harding and Joshua 2010, pp. 249-252.
21  OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases. OFT’s detailed guidance 
on the principles and process. A consultation on OFT guidance. OFT803con, October 
2011, at para 2.3
22  ibid. at para 2.4.
23  Furse 2012 pp. 146-47.
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destroy it, in order to secure the best position for a leniency application. 
The emotional side of all this is that the cartel member first breaks the law 
by entering the cartel and subsequently betrays its fellow cartel members 
by applying for leniency. Harding and Joshua argue that this still does not 
leave too deep emotional wounds as it is ‘strictly business.’24
The OFT seeks to persuade both firms and individuals that have engaged 
in cartel activities to report their conduct and to cooperate. The OFT takes 
the view that firstly providing leniency promotes the detection of cartels that 
is difficult, secondly cartels are terminated as that is the condition to qualify 
for leniency, thirdly by further increasing the likelihood of the imposition 
of penalties leniency brings about deterrence and finally facilitates private 
damage actions. As a result, the OFT argues, greater compliance is achieved, 
prices will be lower etc.25
8.2.3 The Conditions for Leniency
The OFT has recently updated its Guidance relating to the leniency 
applications and immunity.26 As Furse notes the British Airways case may 
have partly prompted the OFT to revise the guidance regarding immunity 
against prosecution. The OFT consultation took place in 201127 and the 
Guidance followed in July 2013.28 Regarding the ‘relevant information’ 
that the leniency applicants should furnish the Guidance specifically 
states that evidence of the existence of the cartel and on the other hand 
‘”exculpatory” material’ must be provided.29 Thus anything, but legally 
privileged information is included.30
The leniency applicant must meet certain criteria to qualify for 
immunity against criminal prosecution or corporate fines. The individuals 
24  Harding and Joshua 2010 pp. 252-255.
25  OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases, OFT’s detailed guidance on 
the principles and process, OFT1495, July 2013, under title ’Foreword’, p. 6.
26  OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases, OFT’s detailed guidance on 
the principles and process, OFT1495, July 2013
27  See OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases. OFT’s detailed 
guidance on the principles and process. A consultation on OFT guidance. OFT803con, 
October 2011
28  See OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases, OFT’s detailed 
guidance on the principles and process, OFT1495, July 2013; Furse 2012 p. 146
29  Further clues as to additional information that the OFT might want to go after 
must be also produced. OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases, 
OFT’s detailed guidance on the principles and process, OFT1495, July 2013at para. 
5.15; Furse 2012 p. 150
30  The information that the OFT might want includes anything that could be of 
relevance for the investigation. OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel 
cases, OFT’s detailed guidance on the principles and process, OFT1495, July 2013 at 
para. 5.14 and 5.12
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‘must admit participation in the cartel offence under section 188 of the 
EA02.’ They ‘must provide the OFT with all the non-legally privileged 
information.’ Further, ‘The applicant must maintain continuous and 
complete cooperation throughout the investigation and until the conclusion 
of any action (including criminal proceedings and defending civil or criminal 
appeals) by the OFT arising as a result of the investigation.’ Regarding 
the time after the leniency application has been submitted, ‘the applicant 
must refrain from further participation in the cartel activity from the time 
of informing of the OFT of the cartel activity (except as may be directed 
by the OFT).  Finally, ‘the applicant must not have taken steps to coerce 
another undertaking to take part in the cartel activity.’31
An individual no-action letter may be cancelled.32 Immunity could be 
cancelled where the applicant has not cooperated fully, or has acted in bad 
faith. In such cases the OFT can only use the information obtained against 
the unsuccessful leniency applicant (an individual) or third parties if ‘he/
she knowingly or recklessly provided information that is false or misleading 
in a material particular.’33
To qualify for criminal or civil leniency the applicant does not have 
to waive legal professional privilege regarding the relevant information.34 
As Purnell et al. point out the chief obligation of a trial judge is to make 
sure that the trial is fair, which may require the disclosure of privileged 
information and therefore the leniency applicant is under a pressure to 
accede to such demands as cooperation on part of the leniency applicant is 
the condition for leniency. This then may make it less appealing to apply 
31  ibid. at para. 2.7; With regard to leniency the Enterprise Act provides the following 
in s 190(4): 
 ‘Where, for the purpose of the investigation or prosecution of offences under section 188, 
the OFT gives a person written notice under this subsection, no proceedings for an offence 
under section 188 that falls within a description specified in the notice may be brought 
against that person in England and Wales or Northern Ireland except in circumstances 
specified in the notice.’ 
32  ibid at para 5.30.
33  ibid at para 7.20 and para 7.24; See Furse 2012 p. 147.
34  The OFT says however that is does not exclude the possibility that it would ask 
whether legal professional privilege would be waived by the leniency applicant with 
regard to certain information. If the leniency applicant declines no unfavorable 
results will follow and in the opposite case where the applicant permits the waiver 
he will not in return receive more favorable treatment in any respect than would 
have otherwise been the case. When the applicant claims legal professional privilege 
over certain information, and if the OFT is doubtful, it may routinely require 
that an independent counsel may review the information who will then form an 
independent opinion as to the question whether the given information is covered by 
the legal professional privilege. OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel 
cases, OFT’s detailed guidance on the principles and process, OFT1495, July 2013 at 
paras 3.15 (also footnote 30), 3.16; Furse 2012 p. 150.
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for leniency than what perhaps was the case before the launching of the 
criminal cartel offence.35 
The OFT has stated that leniency applications from undertakings are 
much more frequent than from individuals.36 When type A immunity is 
granted, the firm will not face corporate fines under the Competition Act of 
1998, and ‘blanket immunity’ protects all, directors and employees, whether 
present-day or previous, from criminal prosecution. Further the directors 
gain immunity against the director disqualification order. 37
Baker has pointed out that when individuals are subject to prison 
sentences, an attractive leniency program tends to induce the individuals 
to come forward. He further argues that this is an advantage that the DOJ 
enjoys, but the European Commission does not. 38 Harding and Joshua point 
out that there appears to be the notion of individuals and corporations being 
distinct actors, which would mean that responsibility should be allocated 
accordingly. Arguably both the corporation and the individuals need to be 
subject to legal control. 39
When the individuals run the risk of being incarcerated the interests 
of the employer and employees diverge and create the ‘dog eat dog’ 
environment.40 Type A immunity will be granted to an individual applying 
for it, but neither the firm employing the individual nor his fellow-workers 
are covered.41 
The individual applying for immunity will be interviewed by the 
OFT. The information disclosed by the individual in the interview will 
not be utilized against them in following criminal proceedings, apart from 
cases where the individual has acted in bad faith or the no-action letter is 
cancelled.42
35  Purnell et al. 2010, p. 322.
36  OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases, OFT’s detailed guidance on 
the principles and process, OFT1495, July 2013 at para. 2.8.
37  Type A immunity is granted to the first leniency applicant with respect to the 
uncovered cartel when in the absence of the application the OFT would not have 
had enough information to prove the existence of the cartel, and had not launched 
investigation regarding the cartel. OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in 
cartel cases, OFT’s detailed guidance on the principles and process, OFT1495, July 2013 
at paras. 2.9, 2.10.
38  Baker 2001, pp. 709-710.
39  Harding and Joshua 2010, pp. 258- 260.
40  See Baker 2001 p. 709.
41  Type A immunity, once the OFT has launched investigations, is not obtainable.  The 
same is true if the OFT has already previously gotten an application for leniency 
or has the adequate information to prove the existence of the cartel, see OFT, 
Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases, OFT’s detailed guidance on the 
principles and process, OFT1495, July 2013 at paras 2.12, 2.14; Regarding Prisoner’s 
Dilemma see Kuoppamäki 2006, p. 66.
42  OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases, OFT’s detailed guidance 
on the principles and process, OFT1495, July 2013 at para 5.30; It may be noted that 
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As Furse points out prior to the whistle-blowing, it is probable that 
the firm applying for leniency has launched an inner enquiry, assisted often 
by legal advisors, into the matter, which may involve the persuasion of the 
individuals to assist – during the initial steps of an inner enquiry all the 
relevant particulars may not be revealed, especially if the applicant must 
acknowledge dishonesty. Yet the criminal prosecution crucially relies on 
the information produced and after the Airlines (British Airways) case it 
appears that in the context of parallel civil and criminal enforcement, which 
involves the handling of both no-action letters on behalf of individuals and 
corporate leniency applications these matters are of increasing curiosity. 43 
With a view to the foregoing, it has been proposed that early on 
the OFT should itself interview the whistle-blowers, but this has been 
questioned since the OFT might not have the necessary experience and 
resources to undertake such a task.44
The OFT may launch investigations either through the civil or criminal 
route or both, and this does not depend on who made the application, the 
firm or the individual. The OFT’s Guidance acknowledges that the parallel 
civil and criminal regimes ‘mean that this is a complex topic,’ 45 a matter 
that will be discussed more thoroughly below in the context of the collapse 
of the airlines case. 
Incidentally, parallel civil and criminal anti-cartel enforcement has been 
heavily criticized in the Slovenian context – Jager has argued in favor of a 
wholesale decriminalization due to the problems involved. The problems 
relate to a lack of coordination between the criminal and civil leniency that 
may undermine the attractiveness of the civil leniency.46
8.2.4 The Interaction between the UK and the EU Leniency  
 Policies
Stephan has identified as problematic the fact that individuals may be 
reluctant to apply for leniency with the European Commission, as it would 
not protect against criminal prosecution at the national level – individuals 
would need to apply for leniency separately at the national level where 
they are potentially subject to criminal prosecution. 47 Stephan notes that 
US enforcement benefits a great deal from predictability that Europe 
the potential leniency applicants and their counselors may incognito ask about the 
features of the policies. See ibid at para 1.4.
43  Furse 2012 pp. 148-150; See also Purnell et al. 2010, pp. 322-325.
44  Furse 2012 pp. 148-150; See also Purnell et al. 2010. p. 322-325.
45  OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases, OFT’s detailed guidance on 
the principles and process, OFT1495, July 2013 - at para 1.3 and 1.4.
46  See Jager 2011. p. 287ff.
47  Stephan 2008b, pp. 22-23; See also the discussion in Frese 2006.
 193
lacks as the civil and leniency programs are not coordinated to a sufficient 
degree – in the US where a firm obtains immunity against fines also the 
managers and employees are covered.48 It could be argued that ‘[h]igher 
sanctions encourage the self-reporting of infringements in the US because 
the corporate immunity prize automatically extends to the revealing firm’s 
employees.’49
The OFT notes that worries have been expressed that while firms apply 
for leniency with the EU Commission its employees and managers could 
be susceptible to criminal prosecution in the UK where the infringement 
affected the UK markets. The OFT has sought to eliminate such fears by 
pointing out that most firms that that are able to gain immunity at the EU 
level would also be able to obtain ‘blanket criminal immunity’ for employees 
and managers in the UK by making a separate leniency application for Type 
A immunity. Moreover the would-be leniency applicants can make use of 
the ‘no-names marker’ prior to seeking leniency with the Commission.50 
The OFT however recognizes the possibility that immunity against 
criminal prosecution in the UK would not necessarily be granted in all 
situations where at the EU level immunity could be obtained. This could be 
the case where for instance a preceding criminal investigation in the UK has 
taken place, prompted for example by a type A leniency application. In such 
instances, the Guidance states no-action letters should not be guaranteed 
despite the fact that immunity at the EU level is available. 
If the OFT perceives an effort to ‘game the system’ immunity may 
not be granted: the OFT envisages a situation where type A immunity is 
no longer available and there is the suspicion that subsequently a leniency 
application has been made with the Commission as a means of getting a 
no-action letter in the UK, especially where the Commission would not 
be well-suited to look into the cartel as per the Network Notice. Finally a 
no-action letter may not be issued where a significant period of time has 
elapsed between the leniency applications first to the Commission and 
afterwards to the UK authorities.51
With regard to the above, Furse has noted however that such a refusal 
to grant leniency could be contested on the basis that it would break the 
UK’s obligation of sincere cooperation in the EU context. Moreover Furse 
takes the view that it is not the probable course of action since the OFT 
needs to concentrate on the most important priorities and considering the 
OFT’s lack of experience in criminal prosecutions it seems implausible that 
48  Stephan 2008b, pp. 22,23,32,33.
49  Stephan 2008b, p. 33.
50 OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases, OFT’s detailed guidance on 
the principles and process, OFT1495, July 2013at para 8.2.
51  OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases, OFT’s detailed guidance on 
the principles and process, OFT1495, July 2013 at para 8.6.
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where the firm has obtained immunity at the EU level its employees would 
face criminal prosecution in the UK.52 
To sum it up, it appears that [i]n the absence of effective coordination 
of civil and criminal leniency programmes in Europe, increased criminal 
enforcement on the national level may risk discouraging leniency applications 
to the European Commission.’53
8.2.5 Bounties as an Incentive to Come Forward
The inherent secret nature of cartels may be addressed with the introduction 
of a system where bounties are offered in order to induce information 
that establishes the existence of the infringement of competition laws. It 
stimulates the financial motives of the one that comes forward rather than a 
motive for vengeance. Buccirossi and Spagnolo have suggested that bounties 
could be funded by the fines that the other cartel members are subject to. 
54 Bounties as an incentive for whistle-blowers are being used in the United 
Kingdom and in Korea. 55 The Korean Fair Trade Commission for example 
has said that the rewards provided for the informant improves the detection 
possibility by further destabilizing the cartels.56 
While the UK employs criminal sanctions against cartelists it has also 
introduced monetary rewards for the informants. It has been argued that 
what spurred their introduction was the smaller number of whistle-blowers 
than what the OFT had expected.57 The benefits that would accompany 
bounties have been identified to be the following: firstly as a tool to crack 
cartels besides leniency, secondly increasing antitrust litigation instigated by 
damage seekers by virtue of more detected cartels, thirdly it could save the 
resources of the Competition authority. 58 According to Whelan Bounties 
could effectively facilitate intelligence collection. The downside is that 
52  Furse 2012 p. 151.
53  Stephan 2008b, pp. 32-33.
54  Baker 2001, p. 708; Buccirossi and Spagnolo 2005, p. 25, 47, 48.
55  Whelan, 2011 p. 232; See more regarding the financial rewards offered by the OFT 
at http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/cartels-and-competition/cartels/rewards. Last 
visited on the 6th of June, 2011.; See the Press Release by the Korean Fair Trade 
Commission at http://www.ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/rewardsystem.doc. Last visited on the 
6th of June, 2011.
56  A Press Release by the Korean Fair Trade Commission, ‘ A Reward of 66.87 
million won Paid to Informant of Welding Rod cartel’ at www.ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/
informant_reward.doc Last visited on the 6th of June, 2011.
57  The OFT offers rewards amounting up to £100,000,  for more details see 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/OFTwork/competition-act-and-cartels/cartels/rewards#.
UguMdqVQVUQ . Last visited on the 14th of August, 2013. ; See Kar Nicole et al. 
2008.
58  Riley 2005, p. 391.
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courts could hold information acquired through bounties as unreliable as 
the potential whistle-blowers could provide false evidence in the form of 
documents or testimony or make overstatements in hopes of a financial 
reward. Therefore the authorities need to check both the reliability of the 
evidence and the trustworthiness of the informant.59
While both bounties and leniency can be employed under an 
administrative antitrust enforcement regime arguably the major benefit 
that the criminal regime would bring is the motivation of the individuals to 
come forward in the face of personal criminal sanctions. The criminal regime 
would induce witnesses to come forward with additional evidence provided 
that they are so incentivized.60 In support of such a view commentators have 
underlined the fact that big international cartels such as the lysine, carbon 
rods, vitamins and citric acid cartels were first investigated in the US.61
Whelan has identified the following arguable benefits of offering 
financial rewards under a criminal regime: firstly, arguably under a criminal 
regime the bounties could also be more favorably viewed by the judiciary 
than under an administrative one –  this view draws on the perception that 
pursuing criminal offences justifies more robust measures than regulatory 
violations. Secondly the unlikely possibility that companies would take turns 
in becoming whistle-blowers and being rewarded monetarily is arguably 
also lower under a criminal regime as individuals are subject to custodial 
sanctions. 62 
This author subscribes to the view that while bounties may not be 
the bedrock of a sound anti-cartel regime, they could provide an effective 
complement to the leniency program – even more so under a possible 
criminal regime. Yet they should definitely not be the top priority for 
jurisdictions that lack individual sanctions, but may be considered when 
the regimes have reached a more mature state.
8.3 INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING CARTELS 
8.3.1 Introduction
The OFT works together with the Serious Fraud Office in pursuing 
cartels. The Serious Fraud Office has not however been involved in such 
investigations yet to any great extent.63 Margaret Bloom, the former Director 
59  Whelan 2011, p. 232.
60  Lawrence et al. 2008, p. 23; Whelan, 2011 p. 233.
61  Baker 2001, p. 709; Whelan 2011 p. 233.
62  Whelan 2011 p. 233; Wils 2007, p. 30.
63  Furse 2012 p. 124.
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of the OFT’s Competition Enforcement has noted that if it is determined 
that the case merits criminal prosecution, from the beginning the collection 
of evidence will observe the criminal law standards. Therefore the decision 
whether to pursue the civil or criminal route should be made quickly. While 
initially the civil and criminal cases could be pursued side by side, eventually 
the criminal cases will have to be concluded prior to the civil case, so as to 
avoid undermining the criminal trial. Bloom however argued that what is 
lost in time in is gained in deterrence.64
While in Scotland the Lord Advocate is charged with the task of 
prosecuting, the cartel offence prosecutions under s 188 are started in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland by the Serious Fraud Office or the 
OFT as per s190(2).65
The Territorial Requirement
By way of introduction one may pay attention to the territorial requirement 
enshrined in s190(3) of the Enterprise Act of 2002 which must be met to 
launch investigations:
s190(3): ‘No proceedings may be brought for an offence under section 188 
in respect of an agreement unless it has been implemented in whole or in part 
in the United Kingdom.’
The Explanatory notes accompanying the Enterprise Act indicate that 
a cartel agreement may be implemented by way of an email or a phone call 
from abroad.66 In any event foreign individuals are caught by the offence, 
where it is implemented in the UK.67 As Furse notes the European Arrest 
Warrant, which is convenient for extradition purposes, does not seem to 
cover the cartel offences.68
However it seems since the introduction of the cartel offence that 
the dual criminality requirement has been met and individuals could be 
extradited to the US.69
8.3.2 The Requisite level of Evidence in criminal cases
A prosecutor must provide a certain amount of evidence to show that the 
law has been violated. It has been argued by the detractors of a criminal 
64  Bloom Margaret, ‘Key Challenges in Public Enforcement’ A speech to the British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 17 May 2002. p. 8; See also Furse 
2012 p. 127
65  Furse 2012 p. 132
66  See the Explanatory Notes to the Enterprise Act of 2002, at para 412
67  Furse 2012 p. 130
68  Furse 2012 p. 130
69  Furse 2012 p. 131
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anti-cartel regime that the standard of proof would be more difficult to 
satisfy and thus securing convictions would be undermined. Under the 
administrative regime the antitrust authority must prove its case as per the 
standards of administrative law and escapes the more burdensome standards 
of criminal law. Whether this is sensible from a resource point of view is a 
pertinent question, since allocating the resources exclusively to administrative 
enforcement could be viewed to be more cost-effective –Whelan illuminates 
the underpinning of the argument in the following fashion: ‘a criminal 
conviction may become so difficult to obtain in comparison to a civil/
administrative ruling that in allocating resources to the criminal efforts one 
sacrifices in effect successes under a civil/administrative regime in favour of 
failures under a criminal one.’70 
The Swedish 2004 committee pointed to difficulties regarding higher 
standards of proof under a criminal trial which might mean that the deterrent 
effect would not materialize. 71  Similar conclusions were drawn by a Finnish 
committee that never proposed any individual sanctions. 72 Also a Swedish 
commentator Nils Wahl argued that under a criminal anti-cartel regime the 
authorities would find it harder to detect cartels due to higher standards of 
proof that need to be met in order to secure convictions. 73 Wagner-von Papp 
has on the other hand pointed out in the German context that criminal law 
standard of proof is observed in the administrative antitrust proceedings.74 
In Ireland with its criminalized anti-cartel regime the required legal standard 
in terms of evidence is ‘beyond reasonable doubt.’75
Reindl has pointed out that the costs emanating from a criminal 
regime do not necessarily derive from incarceration only, but perhaps more 
importantly from the fact that courts would have to decide the cases – the 
prosecutor would have to satisfy higher standards of proof to send people 
to prison as opposed to a situation under an administrative regime where 
possibly only one authority could investigate and adjudicate and finally also 
impose the sanctions. 76 
Under an administrative regime the required standard of proof is ‘proof 
on the balance of probabilities’. Under a criminal regime a reasonable person 
must have no reasonable doubt that the person is responsible for the alleged 
act to secure a conviction. However Whelan had advanced the argument 
that with regard to antitrust proceedings the difference between the required 
proof in a criminal case and an administrative one may possibly not be 
70  Whelan 2011 pp. 221-222
71  SOU 2004:131 p. 252-253
72  Kilpailulaki 2010, Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriön julkaisuja 2009. p. 51
73  Nils Wahl’s view on the committee proposal, see SOU 2004:131 p. 271
74  Wagner-Von Papp 2011, under the heading ’Summary and Conclusions’, at para. 3. 
75  Whelan 2012a p. 4.
76  Reindl 2006 p. 121.
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considerable. 77   This was for example noted by the British Competition 
Appeal Tribunal in the Napp case. The Tribunal opined that despite the 
applied standard of proof, whether criminal or administrative, in practice 
the outcome of the case is likely to be the same. The Tribunal reasoned that 
it is difficult to conceive the awarding of a condemning judgment if there 
is a reasonable doubt left.78 
Reindl however notes that even if the difference between criminal 
and civil standards of proofs was not great, judges could draw a distinction 
between cases involving either an individual or a firm, and in case of 
individuals they could be more rigorous. Therefore if condemning judgments 
under a civil regime were more often obtained it might induce greater 
compliance than more infrequent judgments under a criminal regime.79 Also 
the New Zealand Government contemplation argued that under the higher 
standards of proof of a criminal anti-cartel regime, getting condemning 
judgments could be hard.80 
It may be noted that according to the General Court the European 
Commission does not have to cite evidence ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ for 
a finding of an infringement and the following imposition of substantial 
fines.81 The ECJ has said that the Commission should provide ‘sufficiently 
precise and coherent proof.’82 Thus it could be presumed that the standards 
of evidence are more robust in jurisdictions when criminal sanctions are 
enforced.83
However it has been suggested that as the EU competition law is of a 
penal nature the standard of proof could be likened to the one pertaining to a 
criminal case. Article 6(2) ECHR does not shed light on the matter nor does 
the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. It seems that a case 
depends on the dictates of the national law. Thus as Whelan has pointed out 
the strength of the standard of proof argument to oppose a criminal regime 
is eroded when the difference between the criminal and administrative 
standards is not significant. Uncertainty in this respect obtains in the UK 
and is perhaps present at the EU level as well.84 In light of the foreoing, it 
77  Whelan 2011 p. 222
78  Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings 2002, The UK Competition Appeal Tribunal, 
paragraph 108. 
79  Reindl 2006 p. 123.
80  Ministry of Economic Development, Cartel Criminalisation: Discussion Document, 
January 2010 p. 32; See also Reindl 2006 p. 124.
81  British Plasterboard plc v Commission of the European Communities, Case 
T-53/03, at para 64
82  Compagnie Royale Asturienne des Mines SA and Rheinzink GmbH v Commission 
of the European Communities 28 March 1984, Joined cases 29/83 and 30/83 at para 
20
83  Whelan 2012a, p. 4.
84  Whelan, 2011 p. 224
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seems that the standards of proof argument alone should not obstruct a 
criminalization project. 
8.3.3 The Right Against Self-Incrimination
The European Court of Human Rights has recognized in its case law the 
right against self-incrimination and the right to silence despite the lack of 
express wording in Article 6 ECHR.85 The Court has further put forward 
that both of these rights are acknowledged by the international standards 
and are at the core of a fair procedure as per article 6.86 They protect the 
defendant from the inappropriate compulsion that authorities might exercise 
and aid to prevent injustices.87 Yet it must be born in mind that this does not 
affect the compulsory powers of the authorities and the evidence acquired 
through such means.88 
However the case law of the European Court of Justice is inconsistent 
in this regard as it decided in 1989 in the case Orkem v. Commission 
that ECHR article 6 does not prevent the commission from requiring an 
undertaking to supply all information and documents despite the fact that 
they may lead to the recognition of antitrust activities. The Commission is 
not entitled though to require the undertaking to supply it with answers 
that include the admission of the violation, which is the obligation of the 
commission to prove.89 
Curiously this approach has been further confirmed by the General 
Court of EU (the former Court of First Instance) in 2001 – the approach 
is contrary to the ECHR case law.90 After the Funke judgment article 6 
ECHR has definitely been determined to include the right against self-
incrimination. Moreover it has been pointed out that under the Saunders case 
the privilege against self-incrimination is wider than under the Orkem case. 
Under Saunders one may refuse to give directly incriminating information 
or even exculpatory comments or factual information.91 
85  This was decided by the European Court of Human Rights in the Case of Funke v. 
France. Strasbourg 25 February 1993. See paragraph 44; Whelan, 2011 p. 224
86  See Case of John Murray v. The United Kingdom, Strasbourg 8 February 1996, 
paragraph 45; Whelan, 2011 p. 224
87  Case of Saunders v. United Kingdom, Strasbourg 17 December 1996, paragraph 68; 
Whelan, 2011 p. 224
88  For example incriminating documents may be found through a warrant. See 
Saunders v. United Kingdom Strasbourg 8 February 1996, paragraph 69; Whelan, 
2011 p. 224
89  Case C-374/87 Orkem v. Commission of the European Communities (1989). 
Paragraphs 34 and 35.
90  See Case T-112/98 Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v Commission of the European 
Communities. Paras 66-67.; Whelan 2011 p. 225
91  Whelan, 2011 p. 225
 200
It has been pointed out however that the distinct difference between 
the ECHR case law and that of the ECJ is that the former concentrates 
on natural persons, whereas the latter operates with cases that are of 
administrative nature, tackling undertakings.92 
If custodial sanctions were introduced for example in Finland for 
competition law violations the interpretation of the European Court 
of Human Rights under Saunders concerning the right against self-
incrimination would have to be observed under criminal antitrust 
proceedings. Under the current administrative proceedings the right against 
self-incrimination is already observed, but the extent to which is applies 
needs more clarification.93 
Under a twin-track model, where administrative and criminal antitrust 
enforcement exist in parallel a wider interpretation of the right against self-
incrimination under the criminal regime could hinder the investigation 
under the administrative regime if natural persons would in fear of personal 
criminal proceedings not communicate all the information that they possess 
against an undertaking.94 This problem is tackled by the Enterprise Act of 
2002.95 The Enterprise Act provides amendments to the Competition Act of 
1998 so that evidence acquired under the civil regime may not be used by the 
criminal prosecution, as the defence rights under the civil regime are not as 
robust. Section 198 of the Enterprise Act inserts s 30 into the Competition 
Act of 1998,96 which seeks to prevent self-incrimination, which could take 
place as a result of the compelled oral statements as per the Competition 
Act of 1998, in the following fashion:
‘A statement made by a person in response to a requirement imposed by 
virtue of any of sections 26 to 28 may not be used in evidence against him 
on a prosecution for an offence under section 188 of the Enterprise Act 2002 
unless, in the proceedings- (a) in giving evidence, he makes a statement inconsistent with it, and(b) evidence relating to it is adduced, or a question relating to it is 
asked, by him or on his behalf ’
Thus the possibilities of the authorities to acquire information from 
the suspect under a criminal regime are limited, although the compulsory 
investigative powers under criminal law are available.97
92  Wils 2003b, p. 13.
93  The Memorandum by the Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy for a 
New Competition Act. (2010). p. 40.
94  Whelan, 2011, p. 225.
95  See Enterprise Act of 2002. Section 198; Competition Act of 1998 Sections 26-28.  
96  Furse 2012, p. 128.
97  Whelan 2011, p. 226.
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In contrast in Sweden the 2004 committee said that information 
gathered prior to the suspicion of a criminal offence may be fully used in 
subsequent criminal proceedings while not infringing Article 6 ECHR. 
According to the committee information that has been acquired through 
compulsion could be used as evidence in criminal proceedings if it’s not the 
only or main evidence – however when the Competition Authority took 
measures in parallel with the criminal proceedings, it should in particular 
observe the right against self-incrimination.98
The Norwegian Government Bill noted that if the Authority has 
come into possession of incriminating evidence against individuals in the 
course of a corporate investigation, the protection of the right against self-
incrimination could be questioned and may not have been observed and 
therefore the obtained evidence could not be used in criminal proceedings 
against the individual.99 
Whelan has noted that the criminalization of cartel conduct in the EU 
member states where the right against self-incrimination is more keenly 
observed under a criminal regime (than under the administrative regime), 
could also hamper administrative investigations, since natural persons 
might be reluctant to provide evidence against firms, if the same evidence 
is potentially subsequently employed in a criminal prosecution where the 
natural persons are defendants. As Whelan notes, in order to avoid the 
apparent negative impact on the administrative regime one possibility is to 
guarantee the natural person that such evidence obtained from them, by the 
exercise of compulsion, under the administrative regime will not be used 
against them in a criminal case. As a result the criminal investigation has 
more limited means to acquire information from the defendant.100 In light 
of the foregoing it seems that Swedish envisaged approach would have been 
inferior to the UK one since the administrative proceedings could have been 
compromised if individuals would not provide any information to evade 
problems in relation to a potential subsequent criminal case against them. 
To sum it up, if lawmakers were to consider a parallel civil and criminal 
anti-cartel enforcement regime in Finland for example, the contemplation 
should take heed of the UK approach that provides protection regarding 
statements obtained under the civil regime.
98  SOU 2004:131 p. 245
99  Norwegian Government Bill at para 4.4.2
100  Whelan 2011 pp. 225-226
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8.3.4 The Availability of Robust Investigatory Methods
The intrusive surveillance powers have been hailed as one of the hallmarks 
of a successful criminal anti-cartel enforcement regime. 101 Wils has set 
five conditions that must be met before a criminal anti-cartel regime can 
presumably be successful – one of those conditions was that sufficient 
investigatory powers must be available.102 Whelan has pointed out that the 
robust investigatory powers under a criminal regime could also potentially 
compensate for the potential problems that the increased defense rights 
pose.103 
For example wire-tapping and covert surveillance could produce crucial 
evidence that would not have been obtained if the criminal investigatory 
powers were not available. However these rights are limited by the protection 
of privacy, as is set out in Article 8 ECHR.104 Spagnolo and Buccirossi, 
who have sought to underline the benefits of rewarding whistle-blowers 
rather than introducing a criminalization of cartels, have acknowledged the 
improved detection that would occur as a result of stronger investigatory 
powers.105 Further in the United States it has been recognized that partly 
the US enforcement success owes to the application of traditional criminal 
law investigatory techniques in the field of antitrust by the US department 
of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).106 
With respect to Ireland, Massey has indicated that previously, before the 
adoption of the Competition Act 2002 the competition authority suffered 
from ‘limited investigation capacity.’  The prosecutions were hampered and 
while the Gardai launched investigations the Gardai was met with people 
who were very unwilling to cooperate. The introduction of a custodial 
sanction up to 5 years provided the possibility of arresting persons for 
interrogation. 107 
Incidentally, regarding Ireland Furse noted that despite more robust 
investigatory methods since 2002 in 2012 it appeared that prosecutions had 
been launched against six cartels, and yet the initial goal was to prosecute 
one case per year.108
The Danish 2012 committee noted that the investigatory tools play an 
important role. The investigatory tools available to the authorities in cartel 
cases had not been on par with investigatory tools available for investigating 
101  Wils 2005a p. 149.
102  Wils 2005a p. 149.
103  Whelan 2011 p. 234.
104  Whelan 2011 p. 234.
105  Buccirossi and Spagnolo 2005, p. 23, 48.
106  Baker 2001, p. 693.
107  Massey and Cooke 2011, under the heading ’Conclusion’ at para 3 and footnote 96; 
See also Furse 2012 p. 175.
108  Furse 2012 p. 176
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other white collar offences that may attract prison sentences.  For instance 
wire tapping, had not been available. It was said that the lack of more robust 
investigatory tools could severely impede the detection of cartels, since 
cartels are secretive and the agreements are entered verbally. The advantage 
of adopting prison sentences against cartelists is that thereby more robust 
investigatory tools would become available which in turn could increase 
the detection rate.109
Arguably the more robust investigatory methods in turn would 
enhance the deterrent effect and would improve the risk of detection.110 
The committee assessed the various sorts of investigative powers that would 
be particularly fitting in the anti-cartel enforcement context. 111  
It was noted that the cartelists possibly seek to leave nothing in 
writing that would indicate the existence of an agreement. Instead they 
could exchange details regarding the cartel on phone – if howerver the 
offenders were subject to prison sentences up to 6 years wiretapping would 
be available. It was noted that the availability of the custodial sanctions of 
such length would provide the police with the possibility to secretly listen 
in on conversations carried out by the suspects in restaurants or conference 
rooms.112 The prison sentences would also make it possible for the police to 
monitor people, for instance by taking photos of them while they meet for 
lunch, whereby the police will have the evidence that the given individuals 
have communicated.113 Further, the prison sentences up to 6 years or more 
would allow the installation of programs on computers that enable data 
reading, thus providing the police with the contents of a computer, for 
instance email exchange and other documents on the computer.114 
In the UK the cartel offence may also be investigated with the help of 
techniques that are usually used to unravel serious crime. Such investigative 
techniques are not available in the UK when infringements of administrative 
nature are examined under the Competition Act 1998. 115
The Enterprise Act, which amended the s 32 of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000, defines substantial powers that the now 
replaced OFT had available to investigate cartels, prescribed in the ss 
193–199 – these powers have not been used to the extent that was originally 
predicted: while the British Airways case was brought to daylight by whistle-
blowing, in the Marine Hose cartel it was the US authorities that benefited 
109  ’Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 37.
110  ’Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 41.
111  ibid. p. 199
112  ibid. p. 200
113  ibid. p. 201
114  ibid. p. 201
115  Whelan, 2011 pp. 234-235
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from the covert measures.116 The powers may be exercised if the conditions 
in s 192 are fulfilled, s 192 reads as follows: 
‘1 The OFT may conduct an investigation if there are reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that an offence under section 188 has been committed.
2 The powers of the OFT under sections 193 and 194 are exercisable, but 
only for the purposes of an investigation under subsection (1), in any case 
where it appears to the OFT that there is good reason to exercise them for the 
purpose of investigating the affairs, or any aspect of the affairs, of any person 
(“the person under investigation”)’
Based on the cited academic opinion and the positions taken by 
Governments and committees this Author tends to view the availability 
of robust investigatory tools essential and under a criminal regime they 
could substantially facilitate the cartel cracking pursuit of the Competition 
Authorities in Finland and Sweden. 
8.3.5 The Marine Hose Cartel
The only case that thus far has attracted prison sentences in the UK is the 
Marine hose cartel – it is a curious case, not only because it involved a US 
plea bargaining agreement, but also due to the argumentation used by the 
UK Appellate Court. 117
The Background
In short, the defendants accepted offers of plea agreements in the US and 
appealed the case in the UK in order to seek reductions in the sentences. 
The Appellate Court in the UK gave a ruling, which may be problematic. 
As the defendants were bound by their US plea bargaining agreements, 
which meant that while the defendants sought reductions, the reductions 
could not exceed a certain threshold due to the US plea bargaining 
agreement – this baffled the UK Appellate court which was critical of the 
plea agreements, questioning the appropriateness of the situation where the 
plea agreements constrained the argumentation of the defence counselors, 
116  Furse 2012 p. 129
117  It may be noted that if the defendant is found guilty the following terms apply as set 
out by s190(1) of the Enterprise Act(a) conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a fine, 
or to both; (b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine 
not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both. 
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but the Appellate Court refrained from giving a ‘concluded view’ in the 
absence of argumentation by the defence counselors.118 
The Implications of the Ruling 
Furse paid attention to the fact that while the Appellate Court touched upon 
the question of mitigating the sentences it referred to the good character 
of the defendants, and that guilt was without hesitation acknowledged 
– moreover the court noted that the defendants had sought to assist the 
authorities, at once entered guilty pleas, lost incomes, and the financial 
implications faced by the defendants would be felt by their families.119
Further the court said that ‘we were much pressed with the argument 
that this case could not conceivably be one of the worst cases of its kind’. 
The Appellate Court believed that the trial judge must have used as a basis 
the sentence close to the maximum allowed by law, and since it should be 
employed only with regard to the most egregious offences, the Appellate 
Court took the position that the trial court was mistaken. 120 The Appellate 
Court had also pointed out that defendants did not directly benefit from 
the cartel profits.121 The Appellate Court acknowledged that it could have 
possibly further reduced the sentences, beyond the reductions that were 
made, if the submissions were not as restricted as they were.122
In Furse’s view the position of the Appellate Court is problematic, as 
the court obviously viewed the graveness of the offence such that it did not 
merit the employment of the harsher sentences available, and as a result the 
deterrent effect could be impaired. The references by the Appellate Court 
to the fine character of the defendants and the assistance they offered to the 
authorities seem unwarranted, especially since the cartel which had been 
deliberately maintained at least for 8 years, sought to purposefully escape the 
eyes of the authorities which may be deemed as a conspicuous sign regarding 
the awareness of the defendants that the activities were unlawful. On the 
other hand the cooperation between the defendants and the authorities may, 
more than anything, be indebted to the looming penalties and indisputable 
evidence that the prosecution had against them. 
Moreover, it is not probable that high-ranking executives would have 
anything but a clean previous record and a fine character. Such executives 
118  2008 EWCA Crim 2560 2009 UKCLR 247 at para. 28; For further treatment 
regarding the plea agreement see Furse 2012 pp. 208-210; See also Case H-07-487-
03, United states of America v. Peter Whittle, District Court, Southern District of 
Texas Houston Division.
119  ibid at para. 29; Furse 2012 p. 133.
120  ibid at para. 30.
121  ibid at para. 21; Furse 2012 p. 133.
122  ibid at para. 31; Furse 2012 p. 133.
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are likely to assist the authorities as they have the advantage of receiving 
good legal counseling.123
Wils has argued that the judges and juries must be inclined to convict 
as one of the essential conditions of a successful fight against cartels.124 
The abovementioned question regarding the willingness of the judges and 
prosecutors to convict and pursue cartel offenders respectively has been 
raised in the debate of criminalizing cartels.125 The Irish and US experience 
seems to confirm that courts do not readily impose prison sentences, 
especially since the white collars’ outward appearance varies from that of 
the average street criminal.126 The Marine Hose Cartel may be deemed a 
further indication of such judicial attitudes in Europe. 
Reindl too argues that the support of judges and prosecutors is vital. 
He draws on the Norwegian experience, where the Competition Authority 
has in earnest pursued cartels for a significant period but in vain, arguably 
due to a lack of support from the prosecutors.127 In Taiwan the staff’s lack 
of support at the Competition Authority itself was so powerful that only 
after two years had passed since the introduction of the criminal regime its 
operation was called to a halt. 128 
Reindl has pointed out that the US Antitrust Divisions long-lasting 
commitment during the second half of the 20th century to rigorous antitrust 
enforcement occurred simulatenously with a surfacing social consensus 
that the answer to high crime rates should be the increasing use of prison 
– thereby Reindl argues that not only the campaign launched by the US 
Antitrust Division was sufficient for the alleged success of the US regime, 
but even a more widespread support was needed. Where such support is 
absent the building of an effective criminal regime against cartels would 
arguably take longer.129 
Based on the above it seems that a favorable prosecutorial and judicial 
opinion is an important part of a successful introduction of a criminal anti-
cartel regime. It too should be considered in Finland and Sweden if the 
adoption of individual criminal sanctions was contemplated.
123  Furse 2012 pp. 134-135
124  Wils 2005a p. 150
125  Beaton Wells and Ezrachi, 2011 p. 21; Whelan 2007, p. 38; Jenny 2011, p. vii; 
OECD, Cartel Sanctions against Individuals DAF/COMP(2004)39. p. 112; Wils, 
Wouter. ‘Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?’ Presented 
Amsterdamissa 17-18. February 2005. p. 42; See also Beaton Wells and Ezrachi 
2011, p. 21; Reindl 2006, p. 127; Kovacic 2006, p. 54.
126  Calvani and Calvani 2009, p. 137.
127  It may be noted that another Wils’ condition was that there must be ‘a dedicated 
investigator and prosecutor’. See Wils 2005a p. 148
128  Reindl 2006, p. 119; see OECD Hard Core Cartels. Third Report on the 
Implementation of the 1998 Recommendation, 2005.  s. 28
129  Reindl 2006 p. 120; See also Kovacic 2011, p. 68.
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8.3.6 Prosecution in Ireland
In contrast to the UK experience Massey and Cooke reported in 2011 that 
the number of convictions for cartel conduct in Ireland amounted to 33. 
They noted that while the level of fines imposed was modest ‘the ratio of 
guilty pleas to full defences would suggest that the seriousness with which 
the offences will be regarded by the courts and their potential for punitive 
jail terms is getting through to the business community and may be having 
a deterrent effect.’130 Massey has said that ‘(g)iven the ratio of convictions 
secured to acquittals the criminalization initiative would appear to have 
been successful.’131 It seems that the level of condemnation concerning cartel 
conduct that has appeared in the Irish case law is noteworthy especially when 
considering the Appellate Court’s reasoning in the Marine Hose cartel case 
that was discussed in the section immediately above.
The Case of Duffy
One important case in Irish anti-cartel enforcement is the price-fixing case 
of Duffy.132 McNally has pointed out that the case reflects the severe position 
the Court took regarding cartel conduct, and featured the comments of 
the Judge indicating that from now on individuals could look for time 
in prison in similar cases and set out guidelines that could be observed in 
the future sentencing of white-collars. For the first time one individual 
also went behind the bars for 28 days as a result of not paying a fine of 
€80.000 that was prompted by the cartel.133 The case involved the Citroën 
Dealers Association (hereinafter CDA), while the individuals and companies 
subject to proceedings were its members.134 The CDA, which was formed 
in 1995, operated a scheme that through ‘mystery shoppers’ had monitored 
the members of the cartel in an attempt to prevent any deviations from the 
fixed prices, and if such deviations were found a fine would be imposed 
upon the infringing member.135
With a view to judicial attitudes the advocates of a criminalized regime 
against cartels may consider the ebaboration of Mr Justice McKechnie and 
find it encouraging that Mr Justice McKechnie in the case DPP v Duffy and 
Duffy Motors said the following: ‘…this type of activity, of which price fixing 
is probably one of the more heinous examples,’ and ‘I warned that, because 
of the activity’s harmful effects on the public, those involved would have 
130  Massey and Cooke 2011 under the title ’Conclusion’ at para 1.
131  Massey 2012 p. 167.
132  Director of Public Prosecutions v Patrick Duffy and Duffy Motors (Newsbridge) 
Limited [2009] IECH 208.
133  McNally 2010, p. 116; Furse 2012 p. 181
134  Furse 2012 p. 181
135  See Furse 2012 p. 182; D.P.P. –v- Duffy & Anor [2009] IECH 208, at para 6, 9
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to take note that any lead in period for leniency could not be prolonged. I 
anticipated that the serving of a custodial sentence was near at hand. Two 
years on, I say once more that if the first generation of carteliers have escaped 
prison, the second and present generation almost certainly will not.’136
As Furse Noted, Judge McKechnie said cartels entail ‘odious practices’ 
and are ‘”hard-core” infringements of competition law’.137 Judge McKechnie 
also said that he had put forward regarding cartels in a previous case the 
following: ‘(t)his type of crime is a crime against all consumers and is 
not simply against one or more individuals. To that extent it is different 
from other types of crime: And while society has an interest in preventing, 
detecting and prosecuting all crimes, those which involve a breach of the 
Competition Act are particularly pernicious. In effect, every individual who 
wished to purchase, for cash, a vehicle from these dealers over the period 
which I have mentioned were liable to be de-frauded, and many surely were 
by the scheme and by the practices which unashamedly this cartel operated. 
These activities in my view have done a shocking disservice to the public 
at large.’138 In order to reinforce his arguments the judge also cited other 
scholarly literature.139 
While it was advanced as a mitigating factor regarding the defendant 
that he had ‘[t]the unblemished reputation’,140 the judge noted that ‘the 
ongoing and continuous nature of the cartel crimes would tend to suggest 
that the acts complained of were not, in fact, out of character. The accused 
was not a man of generally good character who committed an unfortunate, 
foolish or impulsive act. Whatever his public persona, which I have no 
doubt was a positive one, he was, in private, deliberately engaging in 
wanton criminal conspiracy against the greater public with the intention 
of defrauding them for financial gain. For five years, being the period of the 
indictment (in fact the Association operated for almost nine), he involved 
himself in the significant ongoing efforts which are required by the operators 
of criminal cartels. Operating a cartel is not a once off criminal act. It is not 
done on the spur of the moment. It is continuous and requires high levels 
of planning and organisation. A person seeking to successfully implement 
a price fixing agreement decides every day to go into work and therein to 
commit and conceal a criminal conspiracy. That person, typically will be 
well educated, businessly astute, either owns the business or has risen to 
senior management, and almost certainly will have done a value benefit/ 
136  See Director of Public Prosecutions  V Patrick Duffy and Duffy Motors (Newbridge) 
Limited [2009] IEHC 208 at para 67
137  Furse 2012 p. 182; D.P.P. –v- Duffy & Anor [2009] IECH 208, at para 22
138  The previous judgment that the judge was quoting was DPP v Manning, February 
9, 2007 , High Court, unreported; D.P.P. –v- Duffy & Anor [2009] IECH 208, at 
para 23; Furse 2012 p. 182
139  D.P.P. –v- Duffy & Anor [2009] IECH 208, at paras 24, 25, 26; 
140  D.P.P. –v- Duffy & Anor [2009] IECH 208, at para 45
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detection appraisal. He then proceeds, indefinite as to duration, ceasing 
only when confronted. For that person whose persona is representative of 
carteliers, it is very difficult to say that such behavior is out of character.’141 
Indeed as Furse pointed out ‘[t]he judge took a firmer position than that 
adopted by the English Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, in R v Whittle, 
Allison and Brammar.’142
McNally noted regarding the outcome of the Duffy case however that 
it was regrettable that once again an individual engaged in cartel conduct 
escaped the unsuspended custodial sanction.143
It may be mentioned that in the case DPP v Manning, Manning was 
subject to charges holding that ‘he aided and abetted the Irish Ford Dealers 
Association and its members in the implementation of agreements to fix 
the selling prices of Ford motor vehicles…’.144 The sentence received by Mr. 
Manning has been regarded as too lenient.145 
In another price-fixing case, the defendant Michael Flanagan, had 
not pleaded guilty and was subsequently subject to a jury verdict which 
unanimously found the defendant guilty.  While the defendant was subject to 
a fine of €3,500, judge Groarke said ‘(t)hose engaged in cartels and involved 
in the fixing of prices are doing so only with the motivation of greed, and 
with nothing to be gained but financial profit. That is why the legislature 
takes such a serious view of it…I could well see circumstances where persons 
convicted by a jury could be subjected to terms of imprisonment’.146
One defendant, J.P. Lamber entered a guilty plea and received a 
sentence of a 12-month suspended prison term and a fine of € 15,000. Judge 
Delahunt pointed out that ‘(w)ithout your talent, acumen and knowledge 
of this business, the kind of distortion before the court today could not 
have functioned to any sort of significant level.’147
Finally, also the attitudes of the jury are important for the attainment 
of convictions. Whelan points out that juries have shown a willingness 
to pronounce defendants guilty in Ireland, thereby exposing them to 
possible custodial sanctions. Whelan particularly refers to a case, where 
a 2-year prison sentence was imposed on Mr. Hegarty, as a result of a 
jury conviction, whereas most convictions in Ireland are obtained via 
141  D.P.P. –v- Duffy & Anor [2009] IECH 208, at para 47; Furse 2012 p. 184.
142  Furse 2012 p. 184.
143  McNally 2010, p. 141; Furse 2012 p. 186
144  See to this effect Competition Authority, Annual Report 2006 p. 12.
145  See Curtis 2007, p. 47; See also Furse 2012 p. 181.
146  See to this effect Competition Authority, Annual Report 2006 p. 8; See Also Furse 
2012 p. 179.
147  See to this effect Competition Authority, Annual Report 2006 p. 9; See also Furse 
2012 p. 179.
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guilty pleas.148 Subsequently Whelan pointed out that the argument that 
juries would not convict individuals in the context of a criminalized cartel 
regime is weakened. In addition Whelan said that the case showed that the 
jury members accepted the moral wrongfulness of cartels or alternatively 
that despite criminal penalties being at stake they did not regard moral 
wrongfulness of the conduct as a prerequisite.149
To sum it up, it seems that the Irish experience of a criminal anti-cartel 
regime has been a more positive one than the UK experience. The judicial 
attitudes seem to be more favourable in Ireland in terms of criminal anti-
cartel enforcement.
Ireland and Regulation 1/2003
Incidentally, one may note a possible conundrum in the Irish context: 
Massey and Cooke have identified a possible problem with art 3 of 
Regulation 1/2003 in the Irish context: art. 3 sets out that: ‘where the 
competition authorities of the Member States or national courts apply 
national competition law to agreements, decisions by associations of 
undertakings or concerted practices within the meaning of Article 81(1) 
of the Treaty which may affect trade between Member States, they shall 
also apply Article 81 of the Treaty…’. The same duty applies with regard 
to art. 102 TFEU (prior to the last renumbering art. 82). Since the Irish 
regime criminalizes infringements of national law and EU competition law, 
Massey and Cooke say that in cases where indeed all the cartel members 
are based in Ireland, but nonetheless possibly the large-scale cartel could 
have an effect on the trade between Member States, a situation would be 
brought about where two criminal prosecutions would be launched, under 
both the national and EU provisions. Also Furse acknowledges this as a 
potential problem with the Irish criminalization model.150 Indeed it appears 
that this possible problem could support the UK position of keeping the 
cartel offence separate from the national competition law. 
8.3.7 The Disclosure of Evidence and its Effect on potential  
 Civil Leniency Applicants
One pertinent question is to what extent the evidence provided in the 
leniency applications should be subject to disclosure. The disclosure may 
148  See Whelan 2012d p. 179; See also http://www.tca.ie/en/Enforcing-Competition-
Law/Criminal-Court-Cases/Home-Heating-Oil.aspx, last visited on the 31st of 
January, 2014.
149  See Whelan 2012d, p. 179.
150  Massey and Cooke 2011 under the heading ’Conclusion’ at para 6; Also Furse 2012 
p. 187  
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have a bearing on the incentives of the potential future leniency applicants 
to come forward. While the matter may be relevant to the defence rights 
in a criminal trial, where the defendants should have the access to any 
material in the hands of the prosecution that could exculpate them, another 
compelling question is whether this could further allow the private claimants 
the access to the leniency applications, thus perhaps seriously damaging 
the attractiveness of the civil leniency programs in the eyes of the potential 
leniency applicants. 
The UK Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 as revised by 
the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the linked Code of Practice require that 
the ‘used and relevant unused’ material is fully disclosed to the defendants. 
Unavoidably such material contains information obtained from the leniency 
applicant, normally statements made in the leniency application when such 
statements may be relevant to the criminal case in question. Where witness 
statements have been made by individuals who have received the no-action 
letter, it will normally be required that the issuance of the letters is disclosed. 
However the protection of identities of the recipients is pursued ‘for public 
interest immunity where necessary.’151
Both Furse and Purnell et al. have paid attention to the implications 
that the disclosure obligation of the criminal prosecution may have on 
the potential civil leniency applicants.152 Since leniency is an important 
detection tool, the concern expressed by several commentators should not 
be overlooked.
Furse has pointed out that the perception seems to be after the Airlines 
(British Airways) case that the information in the civil leniency application 
is something that the defence of an impending criminal case must have the 
access to.153
The matter of disclosure is essential since leniency programs are 
effective detection tools and in connection to that one important aspect of 
leniency is that the information is kept undisclosed as much as possible – 
the leniency applicants may for instance have been extensively questioned 
by the competition authority.154
Also in light of the obligations derived from the Human Rights 
Conventions the disclosure of certain information in the hands of a 
prosecutor or third parties may be important for defence purposes (see 
ECHR art. 6, the right to a fair trial). This is a matter that arose in the 
UK in relation to the unreported case R v George, Crawley and Others 7 
December 2009 (the Airlines case), where the obligation of the OFT to 
151  OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases, OFT’s detailed guidance on 
the principles and process, OFT1495, July 2013 at para 7.11
152  See Furse 2012 p. 135ff; Purnell et al. 2010. P. 319ff.
153  Furse 2012 p. 148
154  Furse 2012 p. 138
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disclose and acquire information in the hands of certain companies not 
parties to the criminal trial was touched upon.155 
The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act of 1996 provides in 
s23, where the production of a code of practice is required to the effect 
‘that where a criminal investigation is conducted all reasonable steps are 
taken for the purposes of the investigation and, in particular, all reasonable 
lines of inquiry are pursued.’ The Code of practice stated subsequently the 
following: ‘In conducting an investigation, the investigator should pursue 
all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether these point towards or away from 
the suspect.’156
In addition the Attorney General’s Guidelines on Disclosure state that 
‘where the investigator…believes that a third party…has material…which 
might reasonably be capable of undermining the prosecution case or of assisting 
the case for the accused, the prosecutor should take what steps they regard as 
appropriate…to obtain the material.
If…the third party declines or refuses to allow access to it, the matter should 
not be left…if…appropriate, then the prosecutor…should apply for a witness 
summons causing a representative of the third party to produce the material to 
the Courts’.157 
The abovementioned was relevant in the case R v George, Crawley 
and Others, and the court had ruled in favor of disclosure, requiring the 
OFT to disclose the material in question and obliging the OFT to acquire 
information from third parties.158
Disclosure and Private Litigation
The matter of disclosure has arisen also in relation to private litigation, in 
a way that is linked to the present discussion regarding the rights of the 
defence, especially in the United States, where the private claimants may 
be awarded treble damages.159
In one case the US district Court considered the disclosure of 
documents that were in the possession of the European Commission, but 
rejected the disclosure. The US Court reasoned that by maintaining secrecy 
future potential leniency applicants are better induced to come forward. 
The unbroken secrecy also incentivizes the openness of those subject to 
investigative measures, thus contributing to the goal of the European 
Commission to bust cartels – the US Court noted that the cartel cracking 
155  For citations from the unreported case R v George, Crawley and Others 7 December 
2009, see Purnell et al. 2010 p. 319; Furse 2012 p. 135ff; 
156  Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, Code of Practice. At para 3.5
157  Purnell et al. 2010, pp. 318-319; Furse 2012 p. 135; Attorney General’s Guidelines 
on Disclosure 2005, at paras 51-52;  
158  Purnell et al. 2010, p. 320.
159  Furse 2012 p. 139
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ability of the European Commission could suffer if the foregoing was 
ignored by the US courts.160
Along the same lines the Director-General for Competition at the 
European Commission has stated, in relation to the National grid case, 
where private litigators sought compensation and wanted the disclosure 
of leniency related information, that strong confidentiality relates to the 
information provided by the leniency applicants, as the information acquired 
is very important to the Commission. The information protected from 
disclosure in the Commission’s view includes information that particularly 
was made ready by the leniency applicants to be handed to the Commission 
with a view to the cooperation requirements of the leniency program. In 
contrast documents outside the mentioned scope, can be disclosed in the 
Commission’s view, for instance any prior information that the leniency 
applicants had, is not protected on this view.161
As Furse notes in the Pfleiderer case the Court paid attention to the 
possibility that potential leniency applicants may not come forward in the 
fear of exchange of information between the Commission and the national 
Competition Authorities as per articles 11 and 12 of Regulation 1/2003. 162 
For instance the defendants could seek to obtain such exchanged information 
that has ended up in the hands of the OFT, which could undermine not 
only the UK anti-cartel regime, but also that of European Commission and 
other Member States’ anti-cartel regimes.163 
Inter alia the ECN model leniency programme provides that ‘the 
exchange of statements (oral or written) between CAs is limited to cases 
where the protections afforded to such records by the receiving CA are 
equivalent to those afforded by the transmitting CA.’164
In the Pfleiderer case165 information that had been produced by the 
leniency applicants was sought by the private claimant Pfleiderer. The 
160  In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation, 
US District Court, Eastern District of New York, August 27, 2010. At paras 29-30. 
P. 9; See Furse 2012 p. 140
161  National Grid Electricity Transmission plc v ABB Ltd and others 2011 EWHC 
1717. At para 16.; See Furse 2012 p. 141
162  Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt at para 27; In this regard see also 
the more recent case, C-536-11 – Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie AG 
and others and Commission Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for damages under national 
law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and 
the European Union, Strasbourgh, 11.6.2013, COM(2013) 404 final. See also the 
discussion under section 10.2 in this work. 
163  Furse 2012 p. 141
164  CA stands for competition authority, see ECN Model Leniency Programme as 
revised in November 2012. para 52; Furse 2012 p. 141
165  Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt, 14 June 2011. 
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German Court had asked the ECJ whether such information should be 
disclosed to the victims of the cartel to bring private damages claims.166
The Court tackled Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003 which provides that
‘1 For the purpose of applying Articles 81 EC and 82 EC the Commission 
and the competition authorities of the Member States shall have the power to 
provide one another with, and use in evidence, any matter of fact or of law, 
including confidential information.
2. Information exchanged shall only be used in evidence for the purpose of 
applying Article 81 EC or Article 82 EC and in respect of the subject-matter for 
which it was collected by the transmitting authority. However where national 
competition law is applied in the same case and in in parallel to Community 
competition law and does not lead to a different outcome, information exchanged 
under this Article may also be used for the application of national competition 
law.’ 
While Article 35 of Regulation 1/2003 requires that the terms of the 
Regulation are effectively observed,167 the ECJ pointed out that, despite 
Guidelines that had been produced, no binding EU law existed regarding 
the disclosure to private claimants and therefore the member states get 
to decide themselves as per national law whether the victims of cartels 
should have the access to the leniency information, while simultaneously 
observing the EU law, whose application must not become ‘impossible 
or excessively difficult’ and in particular the effective application of art. 
101 TFEU and 102 TFEU must not be impaired by national rules. 168 
The leniency programmes, according to the court, could suffer if private 
claimants gained the access to the leniency documents, arguing that it is 
realistic to assume that the leniency applicants may not come forward if they 
fear that leniency information will be disclosed or exchanged as provided 
by art. 11 and art. 12 of Regulation 1/2003.169 The Court acknowledged 
however also the right of the victims of cartels to seek redress, which bolsters 
the EU competition law.170 The court said that the advantages of disclosure 
need to be compared with the interest of the victims to get compensation, 
and that such weighing of the interests should take place in each individual 
case separately as per the national law.171 
Finally the Court said that the EU law, including Regulation 1/2003, 
does not prevent the victim of a competition law infringement getting access 
166  Ibid at para 18
167  See the discussion in Furse 2012 p. 142
168  Case C-360-09 at para 23-24
169  ibid at para 26-27
170  ibid at para 28-29
171  ibid at para 30-31
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to leniency documents, while seeking redress, but the national courts must 
strike a fair balance between the abovementioned contradicting interests.172
As Furse notes, since national courts have the right to balance the 
interests between private damage claimants and the interest of the leniency 
programs when considering disclosure, it seems that when the balance 
has to be struck between the interests of the leniency program and the 
defence rights, the balance must be even more in favor of the defence as 
the defendants could face prison sentences.173 To tackle this problem, Furse 
proposes that the cartel offence could be prosecuted by one authority, while 
the maintenance of the civil leniency was taken care of by another body 
separately. Furse points out that the access of the defendants to leniency 
information could legitimately be denied only when such information has 
not been used to launch the criminal proceedings, yet the possibility lingers 
that the information protected is germane from the point of view of the 
defence. Alternatively a law could be passed to the effect that the leniency 
information is protected, which however could be challenged.174 
It may be noted that certain material that has been disclosed during the 
criminal proceedings to defendants does not mean in the OFT’s opinion 
that the material could be further disclosed to the public. The OFT refers 
to the prohibition in the Enterprise Act which provides in part 9 section 
241(2) that certain information that is disclosed without making it public 
‘must not be further disclosed by the person to whom it is so disclosed.’ 175
Yet, as pointed out by Furse, the disclosure for the purposes of a criminal 
trial itself, may not be central,176but what is problematic is as Purnell et al. 
point out that if the material is disclosed during a criminal case, it is not 
easy to argue why the private claimants should not get the access to the 
information as well, notwithstanding part 9 of the Enterprise Act of 2002, 
which restricts disclosure.177 
8.3.8 The Institutional Structure
As the Hammond and Penrose report, hailed as prescient by Purnell et 
al.,178 recognized it is of importance to pick carefully the body that is to 
prosecute criminal cartels under a criminal anti-cartel regime. Should the 
prosecution be carried out by the OFT without the assistance from an 
172  ibid at para 32
173  Furse 2012 pp. 144-145
174  Furse 2012 p. 145
175  OFT, Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases, OFT’s detailed guidance on 
the principles and process, OFT1495, July 2013at para 7.13; Furse 2012 p. 151
176  Furse 2012 p. 145
177  Purnell et al. 2010, p. 322.
178  Purnell et al. 2010, p. 314.
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outside organization (‘the in-house option’) or should some other body 
be entrusted with the task? 179  The Government White Paper had taken 
the view that the OFT should be the chief criminal prosecutor due to its 
experience in busting cartels.180
The Hammond and Penrose report listed the merits and demerits of 
an in-house option. The merits of the in-house option included the fact 
that the OFT could be in charge of the prosecution and that managing 
the newly found criminal leniency could be smoother. Further the OFT 
could straight away draw on its experience in competition law matters. The 
inner assignment of tasks could be such that the investigators of the case 
are isolated from the ones having the power to alternatively prosecute or 
drop the case.181 
Yet the Hammond and Penrose report identified significant demerits 
with the in-house option that emanate first and foremost from the point of 
view of efficiency, but also relate to openness, accountability and fairness.182 
The report paid attention to the concern that while the OFT was experienced 
in competition law, it lacked experience in criminal prosecution, and a 
criminal law team would have to be built from the very beginning. It was 
predicted that the number of prosecutions would not exceed 10 annually, 
and therefore it would not be effective in terms of the costs to build such 
a team focusing purely on a few cases.183 The team would have to consist 
of prosecutors who are very skilled and knowledgeable especially about 
questions related to disclosure, whistle blowing, covert surveillance and 
evidence, which could be relevant with regard to immunity. In light of the 
foregoing, it could be difficult to enlist lawyers with sufficient proficiency.184
Another demerit of the in-house approach in the view of the Hammond 
and Penrose report is that the prosecutors in a small team may have the 
propensity to become detached from the mainstream developments of 
criminal law, despite perhaps having a keen knowledge of a given field of 
criminal law. But even a more compelling problem could be if the lawyers 
were inclined to become attentive to the policy pressures of the agency, 
developing a sort of solicitor –client relationship, instead of exercising an 
independent role. Even if the agency welcomed the foregoing, the Hammond 
and Penrose report points out that the policy aims of the agency would not 
be well served if the misuse of the prosecution establishment brings about 
179  Hammond and Penrose report 2001 at para 3.1.
180  Department of Trade and Industry, ‘Productivity and Enterprise, A world Class 
Competition Regime’ July 2001, at para 7.38
181  Hammond and Penrose report 2001 at para 3.4.
182  ibid. at para 3.5.
183  Hammond and Penrose report 2001 at para 3.6.
184  ibid at para. 3.7.
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failures and therefore a bad reputation.185 Such fears received support from 
the criminal enforcement officials.186
The option of entrusting instead the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) with 
the task of prosecuting cartels found favor with the Hammond and Penrose 
report.187 The reasons that spoke against the in-house option speak in turn 
in favor of the Serious Fraud Office undertaking the prosecution. The 
Serious Fraud Office has a considerable team of experienced prosecutors 
who have participated in significant criminal cases, and have a history of 
operating disclosure and issues related to the misuse of process. The SFO is 
answerable to the Attorney General and has prior experience of performing 
in conjunction with other regulators. Furthermore from the perspective 
of fairness, openness and accountability, according to the Hammond and 
Penrose report, this would be a sound option.188 
The previous responsibilities of bringing fraud cases of the Serious 
Fraud Office would suit cartel prosecutions. The Serious Fraud Office is 
comfortable overseeing teams comprising people of various disciplines, such 
as lawyers and police officers - such experience could prove very valuable 
in cartel prosecutions that may involve economists, investigators, lawyers 
and accountants.189
The Serious Fraud Office, the Hammond Penrose report noted, has also 
the benefit of having the power to compel answers to questions presented 
while investigations are being pursued.190 While the Director of the Serious 
Fraud Office would under this option be assigned the task of determining 
whether to prosecute, it could be done in cooperation with the OFT.191 
The Hammond and Penrose report also pointed out that the relationship 
between criminal immunity, that would be granted by the prosecution, and 
the civil leniency policy of the OFT would have to be resolved, but was 
185  ibid at para 3.8.
186  ibid. at para. 3.9.
187  Compare with Sweden where a committee envisaged that the Economic Crime 
Authority (the Authority charged with white-collar prosecution) should undertake 
the criminal prosecution of cartels – this however, it was deemed, could undermine 
the position of the Swedish Competition Authority. SOU 2004:131 Konkurrensbrott 
- En lagstiftningsmodell p. 254
188  Hammond and Penrose report 2001 at para 3.14.
189  The Serious Fraud Office contemplated also the possibility that the OFT personnel 
well versed in competition matters could join the team under the Serious Fraud 
Office if criminal investigations were launched and that such OFT personnel could 
be temporarily transferred to the Serious Fraud Office – the OFT personnel could 
ensure in cooperation with the Serious Fraud Office that the criminal prosecution is 
not compromised. ibid at para. 3.15.
190  ibid at para. 3.16
191  ibid at para. 3.17.
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persuaded by talks with the OFT and the Serious Fraud Office that matters 
related to this are not insurmountable.192 
The option including the Serious Fraud Office would mean additional 
costs if it has to handle cartel cases with the needed primacy. However the 
costs would not be significant, as the teams to prosecute and other means 
are already available. The Hammond and Penrose report therefore argued 
that this would be a less costly option than the one that would have a new 
prosecution team developed within the OFT.193 While the Serious Fraud 
Office viewed the cartel offences such that it could prosecute them, the 
Hammond and Penrose report, suggested this should be made explicit in 
the legislation to ensure adequate resources and primacy.194 
Below the exploration of the Airlines case and its collapse will 
demonstrate how the institutional structure has faired in the context of 
the criminal cartel prosecution in the UK. 
8.3.9 The Airlines (British Airways) Case
The collapse of the case R v Burns (Airlines case) has seemingly had 
unwelcome consequences – the possible root causes of the debacle and how 
the scenario played out will need to be touched upon in more detail below. 
Purnell et al. pointed out that the collapse shows that the points 
made by Hammond and Penrose, concerning the risk that a small number 
of prosecutors at the OFT could become cut off from the mainstream 
developments of the criminal law were predictive: the OFT did not observe 
the duty of disclosure - not disclosing witness interviews was a mistake 
that according to Purnell et al. would probably not have been made by an 
experienced prosecutor. 195 The Condor report by the OFT acknowledged 
the criticism it had received, singling out effects on reputation and a heavy 
burden on the taxpayers in terms of costs.196
The defendants in the case were subject to prosecution due to a 
suspicion that in relation to transatlantic flights the defendants had fixed 
fuel surcharges.197 The specifics relating to the case were the following: 
192  ibid at para. 3.18; Compare with Sweden where it was argued that the relationship 
between the Competition Authority and the Economic Crime Authority Authority 
should be institutionalized in order to avoid any misconceptions, to this effect see 
SOU 2006:99 p. 566.
193  ibid at para. 3.19
194  Further it was argued that it should also be made explicit in the Bill that the OFT 
could also prosecute cartels, for instance due to an occurrence of a heavy caseload see 
ibid. at paras. 3.20-3.21.
195  Purnell et al. 2010, p. 325.
196  Regarding the findings of the Condor Report see below, OFT, Project Condor 
Board Review, OFT 2010 p. 9; see also Furse 2012 p. 153; Joshua 2011 p. 129.
197  See R v George 2010 EWCA Crim 1148 at para 4; Joshua 2011 at p. 140
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‘Martin George, Andrew Crawley, Alan Burnett and Iain Burns, between 
1st July 2004 and 20th April 2006 dishonestly agreed with each other and 
with Paul Moore, William Boulter and Steven Ridgway to make or implement 
arrangements relating to at least two undertakings, namely British Airways 
and Virgin Atlantic Airways, which directly or indirectly fixed the price for the 
supply by British Airways and Virgin Atlantic Airways in the United Kingdom 
of passenger air transport services.’198
The charges were brought in 2008. 
Firstly, it may be mentioned that the selection of the cases for 
prosecution by the OFT has also been subject to criticism. For example in 
a bid-rigging case that had come to the awareness of the OFT no individuals 
were singled-out for prosecution despite the prior intention of prioritizing 
the construction industry as an object of enforcement.199
Stephan has argued that the British Airways was not a good case to 
select for the purposes of showing dishonesty.200 The defendants fiercely 
challenged the charges, and the British Airways even promoted one of the 
executives who was the target of the OFT prosecution.201
The Virgin Atlantic Airlines, which had made a leniency application, 
initiated the whole scenario – its employees got no-action letters.202 The 
criminal case however against the British Airways employees was dropped 
by the OFT in May 2010. In the press release announcing the collapse of 
the case, the OFT said that it had recently gotten a significant amount 
of electronic material that had not before been available to the OFT or 
the defence, and considering that the trial was underway and a significant 
amount of the newly-found material was obtained, the OFT acknowledged 
that from the perspective of the defendants it could be unjust to proceed 
with the trial. The OFT said that while the Virgin Atlantic had handed 
electronic evidence to the OFT early on, the Virgin Atlantic had failed to 
hand over a large part of the material, and the OFT had become aware of the 
omission only once the trial had commenced. The OFT was confident that 
in the absence of such a delay, it would have been highly likely that the trial 
proceedings could have continued. The OFT acknowledged carelessness, 
but pointed out that the criminal regime was comparatively new and that 
the technique of dealing with leniency applications against a backdrop of 
parallel criminal and civil enforcement was still in progress.203 The material 
that the Virgin produced only after the trial had begun, contained roughly 
198  See R v George 2010 EWCA Crim 1148 at para 4
199  Joshua 2011 p. 141
200  Stephan 2011b, p. 10
201  Stephan 2011b p. 10; Financial Times, BA sales chief on price-fixing charge to join 
board, November 28, 2008; Furse 2012 p. 155
202  Furse 2012 p. 154
203  ’OFT withdraws criminal proceedings against current and former BA executives’, 
OFT Press releases 47/10, 10 May 2010. 
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some 70000 emails, which were previously deemed permanently corrupted 
files.204
The course of events leading to the collapse of the case may be explained 
differently than what the OFT has:205 Joshua has pointed out that after 
the OFT having upsettingly failed to live up to the required standards of 
disclosure and being accused of yielding to the Virgin’s counsels, the judge 
doubted the possibility that the defendants could get a fair trial. It may be 
noted that the OFT had prepared its case for four years and subsequently 
the case collapsed prior to any witness hearings - the suspects simply were 
acquitted.206 
Purnell et al. point out that the cartel activity in the airlines case was of 
such value that the Serious Fraud Office could have undertaken it as the case 
would have fulfilled the criteria of acceptance of the Serious Fraud Office. 
In the Enforcement regime contemplated by the Hammond and Penrose 
report and which later got its material form to some extent in the division 
of tasks between the OFT and the Serious Fraud Office, the former was 
supposed to undertake preliminary investigations and to handle criminal 
immunity, whereas the latter would investigate and prosecute cases that 
fulfill its acceptance criteria. 207 
The OFT itself stated in its Guidance on Powers of investigating criminal 
cartels that the Serious Fraud Office would prosecute cases where the nature 
of the fraud is serious or complicated. To fulfill such conditions the case in 
question should be worth at least £1 million, and liable to be publicized, 
while the combined skills related to investigation, accountancy and the 
legal perspective would be needed. 208  The Hammond and Penrose report 
had argued that the sum of £1 million or more is a good indicator as to 
the seriousness of the case.209 If the OFT singles out a case meeting the 
aforementioned criteria it will forward the information to the Serious Fraud 
Office who makes the decision whether to pursue the case, the Hammond 
and Penrose report envisaged. 210
In light of the above it seems that the division of tasks between the 
competition authority and another authority entrusted with the criminal 
prosecutions may be crucial to the success of criminal prosecutions and 
should be seriously considered. 
204  Purnell 2010, p. 318.
205  Joshua 2011, p. 129; Furse 2012, p. 155.
206  Joshua 2011, p. 129; Furse 2012, p. 155.
207  Purnell et al 2010, p. 315, 317; Hammond and Penrose Report 2001 p. 45.
208  OFT, ‘Powers for investigating criminal cartels’ OFT515, January 2004. At para 
3.18.
209  Hammond and Penrose report 2001, p. 45.
210  OFT, ‘Powers for investigating criminal cartels’ OFT515, January 2004, at para. 
3.19.
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The Civil Enforcement of the Airlines Case
The Airlines case was pursued both through the criminal and the civil 
track.211 
Those who are concerned that civil enforcement could suffer once the 
criminal anti-cartel regime is introduced may consider the following: In 
a Press release issued in 2007, the OFT told that the British Airways had 
agreed to pay a fine of £121.5m. The British Airways acknowledged that it 
had engaged in collusion with the Virgin Atlantic, which determined the 
fuel surcharges of long-haul passenger flights. As a result the surcharges 
peaked at £60 for each ticket while initially the price of the ticket was at £5. 
The British Airways said that the collusion took place from August 2004 
until January 2006. The OFT had recognized that the Virgin Atlantic met 
the criteria for full immunity. The British Airways had admitted that not 
less then six times the firms had communicated with each other regarding 
the surcharges.212 In 2011 the OFT announced its statement of objections 
concerning the civil investigation into the matter. It was sent out both 
to the British Airways and the Virgin Atlantic. After the collapse of the 
criminal prosecution the OFT had scrutinized the leniency position of the 
Virgin Atlantic, but stated that the immunity would not be cancelled, as 
absent was the ‘non co-operation’ of the Virgin Atlantic which would have 
justified such a move.213
Finally, in April 2012 it was reported in the press that a fine of £58.5m 
against the British Airways was secured as a result of a settlement. The 
original fine of £121.5m had been adjusted after the collapse of the criminal 
prosecution.214 
All in all it may be concluded that the UK experience with the criminal 
anti-cartel prosecution has not been a positive one thus far.
211  Furse 2012 p. 153
212  OFT press release 113/07, August 1, 2007.
213  OFT Press release 120/11, November 8, 2011. ; Furse 2012 p. 156
214  OFT Press releases, ‘British Airways to pay £58.5 million penalty in OFT fuel 
surcharge decision,’ April 19, 2012.  See Chan Szu Ping 2012.
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8.3.10 Project Condor Board Review – the OFT’s account of the  
 Collapse of the Airlines case
The OFT has produced a board-led enquiry into the matters relating to the 
failure of the airlines case, whose findings will be briefly recounted below. 
The Review by the OFT board had the task of assessing the conditions that 
ended in the OFT making the decision of not presenting evidence at trial 
in the case R v Burns and others and in light of such a review to produce 
proposals regarding the criminal anti-cartel regime. 
One of the findings of the review was that the test provided in the 
Code for Crown Prosecutors was satisfied from the evidential and public 
interest perspective and before 7 May 2010 no proof was found regarding 
an omission in this respect and the resolution not to give evidence 10 May 
2010 was right. Further the review took the view that the case was not 
suitable for the Serious Fraud Office.215 
The failure in the case emanated according to the review from ‘a 
highly unusual combination of factors’ and it was argued that the OFT 
‘had made mistakes’. No proof was found as to the negligence on part of 
anyone or as to the competence of the OFT to undertake criminal cases of 
a complicated nature. The review took the position that the shortcomings 
concerned the processes and it was pointed out that even in the absence 
of such inadequacies the possibility of a failure persists since prosecuting 
criminal cartel cases is challenging and unavoidably a certain amount of the 
cases collapse. It was recognized that the case was not the best possible to be 
selected as the first challenged criminal case and involved a ‘steep learning 
curve.’  One problem identified from the perspective of the prosecution 
was the trustworthiness of the witnesses who themselves were involved in 
the suspected violation and were granted immunity in relation to a cartel 
whose membership consisted of only two parties.216 
A further obscurity was singled-out in respect of the responsibility of 
the OFT to disclose and obtain documents that the defence might need, 
and further the extent of such a responsibility regarding the legally privileged 
documents. In this particular case a farther-reaching disclosure was required 
at trial than had been predicted.217 The report said that separate persons 
215  See OFT, Project Condor Board Review, OFT 2010 p. 1
216  ibid. p. 1-2
217  It was pointed out that the leniency applicants’ awareness as to the possibility of 
disclosing witness material, including legally privileged information, in the course 
of criminal proceedings should be ensured.  It was said that while this could deter 
would-be leniency applicants from coming forward, on the other hand the leniency 
applicants benefit a great deal, especially financially from leniency. The board review 
called for more senior management involvement at the OFT regarding cases of 
similar caliber as the Airlines case, and moreover there should be an evaluation of the 
risks involved on a continuing basis – the handling of the case ‘often appeared to lie 
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should have exercised the functions of the investigator and the disclosure 
official and the electronic evidence should have been scanned or taken hold 
of in the very beginning.218
With regard to the above, a number of commentators have alluded 
to the problems related to immunized witnesses in terms of reliability in a 
case where there are only two parties. As Furse notes, the leniency applicant 
under its cooperation obligations has to provide the OFT with the evidence 
incriminating its fellow cartel member. It is likely that the defence in the 
Airlines case would have contested the reliability of the immunized witnesses 
who had also admitted to having been dishonest (a requirement to obtain 
immunity), it could be questioned whether dishonesty was admitted only 
to secure immunity – the criminal prosecution of the OFT depended upon 
such a witness. Furthermore as Furse notes, in the Airlines case the party not 
benefitting from leniency was an important competitor of the immunized 
witness – it is then understandable that the jury might be doubtful in such 
circumstances as to the trustworthiness of the witnesses.219 
Furse has drawn a compelling parallel between the airlines case and a 
US case United States v Stolt-Nielsen SA et al., where the DOJ relied heavily 
on evidence produced by a leniency applicant whose report of the events 
was incongruous, and who in exchange got immunity and had a motive 
to seek revenge against a competitor, that had incriminated the leniency 
applicant previously (the DOJ, which according to Furse had never before 
cancelled a corporate leniency application did it in this particular case). The 
employer of the leniency applicant (the witness) had attested that the witness 
would ‘say whatever he needed to get his own release, his own immunity.’220 
These events partially led to the collapse of the case pursued by the DOJ.221
All this proves is the precarious position of a criminal prosecutor who 
relies on immunized witnesses in its prosecution. Therefore it seems to be of 
utmost importance to have a body well-versed in criminal law to undertake 
cases of similar magnitude as the Airlines case – the board review itself 
acknowledged as described above that the extent of disclosure obligation 
was not predicted. Furthermore the OFT’s board led review identified ‘a 
steep learning curve’ for the OFT since the introduction of the criminal. 
Indeed also Reindl has pointed out that arguably before the benefits of 
criminal cartel enforcement are likely to occur, the costs of such a system 
may take place.222 Thus patience may be one of the virtues required of anyone 
undertaking the criminalization project.
some way down the organization. A vagueness of management obligations was also 
recognized, see ibid p. 2,3,5
218  ibid p. 3
219  Furse 2012 p. ,148, 158; Joshua 2010. p. 1; Crowther 2011. 
220  United States v Stolt-Nielsen SA, NO. 06-cr-466, November 29, 2007. p. 25
221  Furse 2012 p. 159
222  Reindl 2006, p. 126.
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8.4 CONCLUSION
The OFT in the UK has the exceptional position of being able to grant 
immunity against criminal cartel prosecution to the whistle-blower – the 
underlying rationale is that protecting consumers from cartels weighs 
heavier than punishing the perpetrators who enter into cooperation with 
the authorities. In this author’s view such reasoning is persuasive, especially 
with regard to hard-core cartels.
After the collapse of the Airlines case the OFT perhaps tellingly revised 
its Guidance on its leniency policy, which expressly stated that the leniency 
applicants should provide both incriminating and exculpatory material 
whenever available – the inclusion of this requirement may owe to the 
airlines case that had faltered specifically due to a failure to disclose evidence 
to the defendants.
The cartel investigations may be pursued both through the civil and 
criminal track in the UK. The OFT has expressly acknowledged the inherent 
difficulties of maintaining the parallel criminal and civil routes, which should 
be carefully considered by any jurisdiction considering the introduction of 
a criminal anti-cartel regime.
Worries have mounted that the defence could claim access to the civil 
leniency applications, which could pave the way for the private claimants 
seeking disclosure of the leniency applications, thus ultimately damaging 
significantly the attractiveness of the civil leniency program.  This particular 
matter arose in the Airlines case, where the OFT should have obtained and 
handed over to the defence certain evidence - it may be argued that due to 
the lack of experience of criminal prosecution, the OFT failed to discharge 
its disclosure obligation. 
If either Finland or Sweden were to adopt parallel criminal and civil 
cartel enforcement regimes the implications of the possible disclosure of 
the leniency material needs to be contemplated.
It has been proposed in the literature that one possible solution could 
be the management of the civil leniency by a body separate from the one 
carrying out the criminal prosecution – subsequently the latter could not 
have availed of the leniency information to launch criminal proceedings, 
and therefore giving some grounds to refuse the disclosure – this however 
requires further enquiry.
Another lesson learned from the UK experience is that of the 
institutional structure of the criminal anti-cartel regime. The Hammond and 
Penrose report had rejected the ‘in-house’ option, (the building of a criminal 
prosecution team within the OFT), inter alia due to the possibility that the 
prosecutors could become detached from the mainstream developments in 
criminal law – an accurate remark when considering the OFT’s failure to 
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disclose relevant material.  In the Finnish and Swedish contexts this implies 
that the Competition Authority should not be exclusively entrusted with 
the criminal prosecution. 
The OFT-led Condor Review into the collapse of the airlines case 
acknowledged that mistakes had been made along the way. The Review 
inter alia noted the problems related to the trustworthiness of immunized 
witnesses in a cartel consisting of two members only, the defence particularly, 
might challenge the reliability of the witnesses that have admitted to 
dishonesty as part of the leniency program. The Condor review further 
acknowledged a ‘steep learning curve’ on part of the OFT regarding criminal 
enforcement. Certainly this indicates that if a criminal cartel regime was to 
be introduced in Finland or Sweden, enforcement success overnight should 
not be expected.  
Another important discussion that has been undertaken in the UK 
is the usefulness of the plea bargaining agreements in the disposal of the 
cartels cases, the UK does not employ a system of plea bargaining similar 
to the one in the US. It has been observed that most criminal cartel cases 
in the US are disposed of by means of plea-bargaining, while amnesty is 
reserved for the first informant. 
It seems that it is vital that a criminalization project is not undermined 
by a lack of prosecutorial or judicial support. It would be problematic if 
courts were reluctant to convict white-collar whose appearance tends to 
be more favorable than that of an average street criminal. In the UK the 
Appellate Court in the Marine Hose cartel case cited the good character of 
the defendants, which may reflect problematic judicial attitudes. The Irish 
experience appears to offer a more successful story in terms of a criminalized 
anti-cartel regime – something, which could be explained in part by judges 
who seem to view cartel offences severely – a fierce judicial perception was 
exhibited for instance in the case of Duffy. Admittedly a string of suspended 
sentences have been handed out by the Irish Courts. Yet based on the 
number of guilty pleas in Ireland it may be argued that business people 
acknowledge that Courts’ have harsh attitudes towards cartels.
The only case in the UK to attract prison sentences, the Marine Hose 
cartel, was actually the result of a US plea bargaining agreement. Considering 
the level of difficulty of acquiring sufficient evidence in a criminal case, it 
seems that plea-bargaining could ameliorate the situation by engaging the 
runners-up to leniency. 
All in all, the UK lessons provide some valuable insights into the 
operation of a parallel civil and criminal anti-cartel regime – perhaps above 
all it may be noted that the UK has explicitly refused to forsake the thus 
far unfortunate endeavor. 
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9  Criminalizing Cartel    
 Conduct and the Lack of  
 a Crown witness system:  
 A Nordic Perspective 
In the US context an official of the Swedish competition authority Claes 
Norgren recognized the value of ‘a crown witness system whereby the 
suspected company representative may get amnesty if sufficient information 
and cooperation is provided, not only about own involvement in the alleged 
cartel but also about the other cartel members.’ According to him such 
an arrangement in Sweden would be unacceptable ‘on legal and moral 
grounds.’1 Amnesty means that immunity against criminal prosecution is 
granted to the first cartel member that reports the cartel.2 Norgren further 
went on to say that under a parallel criminal and civil regime especially the 
functioning of the leniency program is a matter of concern – if leniency is 
impaired the net result according to him might be on the negative side.3 
While this chapter touches upon leniency programs in the Nordic 
context, it will also have a look at plea-bargaining. Plea-bargaining could 
offer a way to upset the stability of cartels beyond leniency, as it makes the 
chances of a penalty greater. The cartel members would face the possibility 
that a fellow cartelist cooperates with the officials providing additional 
information even after the immunity recipient has disclosed the principal 
ingredients of the cartel. Thus plea-bargaining could be seen to be relevant 
in terms of deterrence. 4 It may be mentioned however that while the 
primary aim of leniency programs appears to be the detection of cartels 
and the production of evidence, the chief purpose of plea-bargaining would 
seem to be the facilitation of prosecution.5 Both a crownwitness system 
and plea-bargaining are foreign to the Nordic legal context and contradict 
for instance the principle of mandatory prosecution, as they would either 
1  Norgren 2006. 
2  Amnesty refers to the Leniency Program Operated by the DOJ, and the terms 
‘amnesty’ and ‘leniency’ will be used interchangeably hereinafter, see Lawrence et al. 
2008, p. 17, see footnote 2.
3  Norgren 2006.
4  Lawrence et al. 2008 pp. 23-24; see also Furse 2012 pp. 151-152.
5  Lawrence et al. 2008 p. 22. 
 227
result in immunity against prosecution or a sentence reduction following 
whistle-blowing or a guilty plea.6
Whelan also acknowledged that some jurisdictions, such as Sweden, 
face problems in relation to the principle of mandatory prosecution, 
which does not allow much prosecutorial discretion, which means that 
introducing criminal antitrust sanctions are liable to impair the operation 
of the administrative leniency programs.7 
A Finnish committee that prepared the most recent Finnish Competition 
Act noted in its memorandum that the leniency program would be most 
likely impaired if the natural persons would not be granted immunity against 
criminal prosecution, because firms would be reluctant to apply for leniency 
if their executives are exposed to criminal prosecution thereby. 8 In the 
German and Swedish contexts the same matter has been discussed. 9 
Especially the principle of mandatory prosecution seems to be 
contradicted if the immunity provisions are introduced. 10 Also the positions 
of the principles of legality and equal treatment could be perceived difficult 
if the whistle-blower gets immunity against criminal prosecution. 11 As per the 
Nordic tradition, in the context of penal sanctions, expressing disapproval is 
more important than the confession by the perpetrator. 12 Indeed the Swedish 
Government explicitly rejected to weigh the possibility of introducing 
a crown witness system in the context of a proposed criminalization of 
the cartel conduct. 13 Andersson and Legnerfält have pointed out however 
that while a prison sentence is a more serious sanction than a director 
disqualificiaton order, it may be questioned from a principled perspective 
why immunity is available against director disqualification orders, but could 
not be introduced in terms of prison sentences. 14 
6  See SOU 2006: 99 pp. 530-533; Kuoppamäki 2012 pp. 73-74; Oikarinen 2012 
p. 744; Incidentally, according to Wagner-von Papp the German arguments against 
granting immunity are ‘(1) that they infringe the rule of law, because they prevent 
imposing the sanction that justice requires; (2) that they infringe the principle of 
equality; (3) that they infringe the principle of mandatory prosecution; (4) that 
they destabilize the public trust in a just legal order; (5) that deals with criminals are 
immoral; and (6) that such provisions foster unreliable evidence.’ See Wagner- von 
Papp 2011, under the heading ’iii. Mandatory Prosecution v Principle of Expediency 
– Leniency and Immunity.’
7  Whelan 2013b, p. 148.
8  Kilpailulaki 2010, Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriön julkaisuja 2009. p. 51
9  Regeringens proposition 2007/08:135 p.146; SOU 2004:131 Konkurrensbrott - En 
lagstiftningsmodell p. 253; Wagner-Von Papp 2011, p. 175, see also footnote 123.
10  Vollmer 2006, p. 259.
11  See Wagner-Von Papp 2011, p. 176.
12  See Kuoppamäki 2006, p. 66; Regeringens proposition 2007/08:135. p. 151; See 
also HE 58/2013 vp, ’Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle syyteneuvottelua koskevaksi 
lainsäädännöksi ja syyttämättä jättämistä koskevien säännösten uudistamiseksi.’ p. 4.
13  Regeringens proposition 2007/08:135. p. 151.
14  Andersson and Legnerfält 2008 p. 617.
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Notably, the 2004 committee was instructed not to propose a 
crown witness system in combination with a criminal regime – thus no 
countervailing benefits would be available under a criminal regime according 
to the committee.15
While the 2004 committee was in favor of retaining the leniency 
program, it was stated that its value as a cartel detection tool would be 
impaired if a criminal prohibition was introduced.16  One of the most 
important factors for a successful leniency program is its transparency – 
the potential leniency applicant needs to know beforehand what are the 
advantages of applying for leniency and he must be able to rely on obtaining 
such a lenient treatment. Transparency according to the committee is best 
achieved in the North American fashion that grants complete immunity 
against sanctions.17
The committee further noted that one possibility would be that the 
decision to prosecute the cartel offence would depend on the consent of the 
Competition Authority.  In this way the individuals could evade criminal 
sanctions if their employer, the firm, has also obtained leniency. However the 
committee acknowledged that this would closely resemble a crownwitness 
system and would not conform well to the instructions that the committee 
itself was given. Moreover, it would be problematic from the perspective of 
the principle of mandatory prosecution. 18
Wahl pointed out that its common to countries which employ an 
effective criminal anti-cartel regime that in conjunction a crown witness 
system is operated which draws on the conflicting interests of the cartels 
members. 19 In Wahl’s view where such rules are absent a criminal anti-
cartel regime is not effective. Wahl argued that no positive international 
experiences were to be found of the sort of a proposal that the 2004 
committee had brought forward. 20  
Wahl further took the position that the leniency program is the single 
most effective tool available to the competition authorities and the 2004 
committee proposal would effectively deprive the Swedish Competition 
Authority of this mechanism. 21  
In contrast recently in Denmark the revised leniency rules observed the 
preceding committee contemplation, granting immunity against criminal 
15  SOU 2004:131 p. 253.
16  SOU 2004:131 p. 245; In Slovenia too, the leniency program concerned at first only 
the administrative regime, while a criminal regime existed in parallel but as Jager 
explains the problem was acknowledged and a proposal regarding the introduction of 
leniency related to the criminal sanctions was proposed see Jager 2011, p. 287.
17  SOU 2004:131 p. 247.
18  SOU 2004:131 p. 248.
19  This environment has been described by Baker, see See Baker 2001, p. 709.
20  Nils Wahl’s view of the committee proposal, SOU 2004:131 p. 271.
21  SOU 2004:131 pp. 272-273.
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prosecution only to the first applicant while the runners-up would be subject 
to the rules of the Penal Code regarding settlements.22 A majority view (10 
members) in the Danish committee was that immunity against custodial 
sanctions should automatically be granted to the first leniency applicant.23
The Danish Committee noted that in contrast to a number of other 
countries there had been an absence of leniency applications in Demark. 
It surmised that this state of affairs could owe to the fear of the potential 
leniency applicants of being marginalized in the business community or to 
a difficulty of investigating violations. On the other hand the committee 
acknowledged the possibility that the sanctions, which were available were 
not adequate in terms of deterrence. The committee acknowledged that 
the lack of leniency applications may also be explained by a low number 
of cartels in Denmark, but pointed out also that it is improbable however 
that there would be less cartels in Denmark than elsewhere.24 Most of the 
Danish committee members were of the opinion that custodial sanctions 
would reinforce the leniency program. That individuals would risk going 
to jail, would make the incentive to blow the whistle more compelling. 25
The Danish committee noted that in the absence of a revision the 
leniency provision would have concerned only the imposition of criminal 
fines and the normal sentence reduction rules in the Penal Code would 
concern the custodial sanctions. Subsequently the leniency applicant could 
not have ascertained in advance whether he would be subject to custodial 
sanctions or fines. Such an omission to modify the rules concerning leniency 
would in the committee’s view have undermined the leniency program 
since there would not have been the needed foreseeability for the potential 
leniency applicant.26 
Thus the Danish committee envisaged a leniency program that 
would grant immunity against custodial sanction only to the first leniency 
applicant, while the runners-up to leniency would not be covered: it would 
22  See Forslag til Lov om ændring af konkurrenceloven og straffeloven, October 26th, 
2012  p. 11; The immunity against criminal prosecution takes the following shape 
in the Danish Competition Act, provision 23 a. –(1): ‘Anyone who acts in breach of 
Section 6 of this Act or Article 101(1) TFEU by entering into a cartel agreement shall 
upon application be granted withdrawal of the charge that would otherwise have led to a 
fine or imprisonment being imposed for participating in the cartel, in case the applicant, 
as the first one, approaches the authorities about the cartel, submitting information that 
was not in the possession of the authorities at the time of the application…’ Further 
the subparagraph 11 of the same provision spells out that ‘[a]n application from 
an undertaking or an association shall automatically cover current and former board 
members, senior managers and other employees provided that each person satisfies the 
requirements…’. See the Danish Competition Act, Consolidation Act No. 23 of 17 
January 2013.
23  ’Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 47.
24   ’Rapport fra udvalget om Konkurrencelovgivningen’ March 2012, p. 36.
25  ibid. p. 40.
26  ibid. p. 211.
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be outside the prosecutor’s discretion in exchange for cooperation to grant 
the runners-up to leniency more lenient treatment. While the prosecutor 
may take into account the cooperation, it is up to the court to decide 
whether a sentence discount should be granted. This model would give 
an incentive to be the winner of the leniency prize. However the lack of 
foreseeability for the runners-up to leniency was regarded as a drawback. 
Yet others may be induced to cooperate in the face of punishments.27 
Moreover such a design of the leniency program would follow the models 
employed in the UK and US in the sense that the leniency prize is granted 
to the first applicant only.28
The recent Norwegian Government Bill on amending competition 
laws29 was preceded by a committee elaboration. It had noted that the 
employee who on behalf of the company had applied for leniency may in 
the process provide information that exposes himself to a custodial sanction 
up to 6 years. The committee pointed out that the number of leniency 
applications in Norway had not been great and said that the effectiveness of 
leniency may be affected depending on the risk that the individuals run. 30 
The Norwegian committee suggested that in order to boost predictability 
the leniency program should cover also the employees of a firm that obtains 
immunity against prosecution. 31 
The Norwegian committee observed that the Competition Authority 
had given out a communication in an attempt to corroborate the 
predictability of leniency – the committee however took the position 
that this was an inadequate response since the individuals were still left 
exposed to prosecution. The Norwegian committee envisaged that either the 
prosecution would only take on a case if asked by the Competition Authority 
or alternatively that individuals would be immunized if employed by the 
company qualifying for leniency. 32 The committee ended up favouring the 
latter option due the greater predictability that it would provide.33  
27  ibid. p. 213.
28  ibid. p. 214.
29  See the Norwegian Government Bill under para 4.2.1.
30  See the Norwegian Committee Report under para 6.3.2.; The Ministry dismissed 
the claims regarding a small number of leniency applications in Norway. See 
Government Bill at para 4.4.3.
31  See Government Bill at para 4.2.2.; Committee Report at para 6.3.3.1.
32  Government Bill at para 4.2.5.; Committee Report at para 6.3.3.4.; The 
Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and 
Environmental Crime (ØKOKRIM) noted that while the four years leading to 2008 
had brought two leniency applications, in contrast once the Competition Authority had 
produced the communication the number of leniency applications was higher between 
2008 and 2011. See Government Bill at para 4.3.
33  Governmnet Bill at para 4.2.5; Committee Rerport at para 6.3.3.4; What is more 
this way the Competition Authority as an administrative body would not have to 
exercise prosecutorial discretion, but instead the outcome would be determined 
by a statutory provision. Also former employees would gain immunity under the 
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The Ministry however rejected the committee proposal on grounds 
that it would allow the white-collars to escape punishment when they 
have committed serious violations and would not observe the tenets of the 
Norwegian criminal policy and criminal law. The Ministry favoured a model 
that would make the criminal prosecution of an individual dependent on 
the Competition Authority’s request or alternatively would be prompted 
by a strong public interest. The Ministry’s position reflected the division 
of tasks between the Competition Authority and the Prosecutor already 
observed.34 Under such a model the prosecutor could independently of the 
Competition Authority bring charges if this is called for by a strong public 
interest. The Ministry said that the notion of a compelling public interest 
however refers to a high bar for prosecutors to take action. 35
The Ministry argued that the committee’s proposal sought to boost 
the effectiveness of leniency while it overlooked the objective of deterrence. 
36 The committee had inter alia referred to a Norwegian survey of lawyers 
who ranked individual liability as a top measure against competition law 
infringements and supported the notion of increased deterrence as a result 
of an improved leniency program in conjunction with individual liability. 37
While the Ministry recognized the importance of the leniency program, 
it said that it sought to increase the employment of custodial sanctions in 
an attempt to create deterrence and noted that custodial sanctions had not 
been used. In particular the Ministry wanted to step up the investigation 
of responsible individuals.38 
This would represent an exception to the rule of mandatory prosecution.39 
It was noted however that since in practice this model had already been 
adopted there would be grounds to depart from the rule of mandatory 
prosecution. Such grounds could be derived also from the predictability 
that is called from the perspective of individual liability in the context of 
leniency the Ministry argued.40 
committee proposal, since also former employees can boost the fight against cartels 
and if they may be exposed to sanctions they are less likely to cooperate. Further, it 
would not make sense if the current employees who are likely to be more culpable 
escape penalties while former eployees would not, it would neither make sense that 
by sacking employees the company could effectively determine who is covered by 
leniency. See Government Bill at para 4.2.5.
34  Government Bill at para 4.4.
35  Government Bill at para 4.4.2.
36  Government Bill at para 4.4.2.
37  Government Bill at para 4.4.3.
38  Government Bill at para 4.4.3.
39  Government Bill at para 4.4.2.
40  Government Bill at para 4.4.2.
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All in all, the conventional wisdom seems to be that the whistle-
blower should receive automatic immunity.41 It would seem to be tolerable 
to introduce immunity provisions in relation to the cartel whitle-blower 
who played a key role in cracking the cartel. 42 This author and it seems 
that all the discussed jurisdictions acknowledged that individual criminal 
liability in the anti-cartel context should be introduced only in conjunction 
with whistle-blower immunity. It appears that the Danish and Norwegian 
attitudes concerning whistle-blower immunity against criminal prosecution 
in the anti-cartel context have become more accommodating. 
9.1 THE INTRODUCTION OF A SYSTEM OF PLEA 
BARGAINING 
Matikkala has previously predicted that it is possible that in time the negative 
attitudes regarding a crown witness system may soften. 43 One indication 
of such a general tendency may be that the 2011 Programme of Prime 
Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Government suggested that adopting a system of 
plea bargaining should be considered. Indeed the Bill regarding a system of 
plea bargaining in Finland, which will be discussed below was passed into 
law on May 1st, 2014.44
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has several times 
convicted Finland of protracted proceedings – especially the proceedings 
related to white-collar offences have been time-consuming in Finland.45 
Plea bargaining seems to have its primary catalyst in the ever more complex 
and time-consuming criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the more complex 
and costly the criminal proceedings are in a country, the more commonly, 
it appears, plea bargaining is being employed. 46 Prior to the twentieth 
41  See Wagner- von Papp 2011, under the heading ’iii. Mandatory Prosecution v 
Principle of Expediency – Leniency and Immunity,’ at para 4.
42  Ibid. at paras 5-6.
43  Matikkala 2009, p. 287.
44  Programme of Prime Minister Jyrki Katainen’s Government, 22 June 2011. p. 40; 
A consultation exercise by the Finnish Ministry of Justice regarding the introduction 
of plea bargaining in Finland revealed that roughly 1/5th of the respondents were 
in favor of some form of limited plea bargaining, another 1/5th of the respondents 
were neither in favor nor against and the rest of the respondents rejected the idea. 
The number of responses amounted to 29. See Oikeusministeriö, Arviomuistio 
syytteestä sopimisesta (plea bargain) Lausuntotiivistelmä, 2010 p. 11; Regarding the 
Finnish Bill on plea bargaining see HE 58/2013 vp, ’Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle 
syyteneuvottelua koskevaksi lainsäädännöksi ja syyttämättä jättämistä koskevien 
säännösten uudistamiseksi.’ P. 4
45  HE 58/2013 vp, ’Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle syyteneuvottelua koskevaksi 
lainsäädännöksi ja syyttämättä jättämistä koskevien säännösten uudistamiseksi.’ p. 9.
46  Combs 2002, p. 8.
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century the great majority of the criminal cases within the common law 
jurisdictions faced jury trials instead of guilty pleas. Before the mid 19th 
century plea bargaining was actually a seldom-occurring event. Guilty pleas 
were regarded to be insufficient. It was only the first decades of the twentieth 
century that plea bargaining agreements became widely used in the US. A 
drastic increase in their employment had taken place during the decades 
ensuing the American Civil War.47 In 1908 roughly 50 per cent of the cases 
were disposed of through plea bargaining and already by 1925 90 per cent, 
a figure which has remained static until this day.48 
The Finnish Government Bill recognized the US origins of plea 
bargaining and that characteristically ultimately the Court reviews the 
plea bargaining agreements and gives the sentences. Also other common 
law countries and notably more recently several civil law countries such as 
France, Germany and Estonia have adopted systems of plea bargaining. The 
Government Bill noted that also Denmark and Norway employ their own 
kinds of systems of plea bargaining.49 
The Finnish Government Bill pointed out that until now the guilty 
plea by the perpetrator has not provided much grounds for a reduction of 
the sentence.50
Arguably the plea bargaining agreements bear resemblance to the 
civil settlements that seem increasingly popular in the UK and in Europe 
– for example the European Commission employs a procedure settling 
cartels.51 Wils has pointed out that the leniency reductions and settlements 
operated by the European Commission are closely linked to the US plea 
bargaining agreements, since both mechanisms facilitate simultaneously the 
investigation and the disposal of the cases.52
It may be noted, that more specifically plea bargaining refers to the 
compromise reached between the prosecution and the defendants, who admit 
guilt in order to gain a reduction in the sanction (simple plea bargaining). 
Other forms of plea bargaining include charge bargaining where for instance 
as a trade-off one charge (of many) is discarded where the defendant enters 
a guilty plea. Fact bargaining refers on the other hand to the discriminatory 
introduction of facts in exchange for admitting guilt. 53
47  Combs, 2002 p. 12.
48  Combs, 2002 p. 13 footnote 32.
49  HE 58/2013 vp, ’Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle syyteneuvottelua koskevaksi 
lainsäädännöksi ja syyttämättä jättämistä koskevien säännösten uudistamiseksi.’ P. 4
50  HE 58/2013 vp, ’Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle syyteneuvottelua koskevaksi 
lainsäädännöksi ja syyttämättä jättämistä koskevien säännösten uudistamiseksi.’ P. 5
51  Lawrence et al 2008. p. 18; Furse 2012 p. 152; See also Commission Regulation 
(EC No 622/2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, as regards the conduct 
of settlement procedures in cartel cases. 
52  Wils 2008b, p. 9.
53  Lawrence et al 2008 pp. 19-20.
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More recently a Working group in Finland in an unprecedented 
move proposed adopting a system of plea bargaining.54 The previous 
debate concerning plea bargaining had laid much weight on the legal 
principles in a way that perhaps was not helpful for a discussion regarding 
the criminal policy.55 The negative attitude concerning plea bargaining in 
Finland according to Oikarinen was prompted especially by the principles 
of mandatory prosecution and ex proprio motu, the latter meaning that the 
Court should on its own initiative protect the rights of the parties, a duty 
which is independent of the preferences of the parties.56 
The aforementioned Finnish Government Bill suggests that the Criminal 
Investigations Act and the Act on Court Proceedings in criminal cases should 
be amended in order to introduce rules concerning plea bargaining.57 Due to 
the significant shift in attitudes that have also hindered the introduction of a 
crown witness system in the antirust context, it seems appropriate to outline 
some of the changes brought about by the Government Bill concerning plea 
bargaining and the possible implications.
An amendment to the criminal investigations act would in Chapter 
3 section 10a provide inter alia that the Prosecutor could decide upon 
the recommendation of the leading investigating police officer58 that the 
preliminary investigation would not concern all the offences committed 
when it is suspected that the perpetrator has committed several offences 
if the perpetrator has entered a guilty plea and thus contributed to the 
investigation and no public or private interest requires that the preliminary 
investigation should be conducted.59 The prosecutor could subsequently 
demand a sanction according to a more lenient penalty scale. Importantly 
the foregoing would only apply to offences that carry a maximum custodial 
sentence of 6 years, except for offences that target life and health, children 
or sexual offences.60 
54  Oikarinen 2012 p. 742; Finnish Ministry of Justice, ‘Syyteneuvottelu ja syyttämättä 
jättäminen’ 26/2012.
55  Oikarinen 2021 p. 746.
56  Oikarinen 2012 p. 744.
57  It may be noted that there is no accurate Finnish expression for the concept of plea 
bargaining, see HE 58/2013 vp, ’Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle syyteneuvottelua 
koskevaksi lainsäädännöksi ja syyttämättä jättämistä koskevien säännösten 
uudistamiseksi.’ p. 4.
58  Oikarinen has pointed out that possibly due to the introduction of plea bargaining 
the prosecutor should instead of the senior police officer assume the leading role in 
the investigations especially when it comes to white-collar offences. Oikarinen 2012 
p. 760-761.
59  See also Oikarinen 2012 p. 748.
60  HE 58/2013 vp, ’Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle syyteneuvottelua koskevaksi 
lainsäädännöksi ja syyttämättä jättämistä koskevien säännösten uudistamiseksi.’ p. 1.
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9.2 POSSIBLE DEMERITS OF PLEA BARGAINING
The system of plea bargaining has been subject to criticism due to the 
possible impairing effect on the defendant’s legal protections.61 Linna and 
Oikarinen have said that the one crucial question is whether the defendant 
can give up his right to a fair trial and under what conditions.62 The 
defendant would need to consent to the summary court proceedings that 
involve his guilty plea.63
Linna, who has has viewed plea bargaining almost inherently 
problematic from a due process perspective, has underlined the importance 
of the defendant entering the plea bargaining negotiations voluntarily and 
knowingly. Further, the plea bargaining agreement itself should have its 
basis in the factual evidence available to the prosecutor, based on which 
the defendant is able to make an informed decision on whether to enter 
the guilty plea.64 
Lawrence et al. note that the problems arising from plea bargaining 
are related to the independence of the judiciary and the rights of the 
defendants.65 
Detractors may also argue that as a result of such a system innocent 
individuals are persuaded to enter guilty pleas. Lawrence et al. point out 
that the budgetary constraints may guide the prosecutors so that plea 
bargaining agreements are offered only once the likelihood of a condemning 
judgment is heightened. The inclination of an innocent individual to enter 
guilty pleas could be decreased by preventing the prosecutors from offering 
unfettered reductions in the penalty. 66 The critics could also say that as a 
result of the availability of long prison sentences, the system could produce 
distorted plea bargaining agreements when compared to civil settlements: 
The unpredictability regarding the length of the prison sentence could 
incentivize the defendant to enter an agreement with the prosecution. 67 
A further worry is that the doubt as to the standard sentence may 
induce the defendant to reveal too much. However setting predetermined 
public reductions could offset concerns regarding the uncertainty as to the 
extent of the penalty.68 
61  Oikarinen 2012 p. 754.
62  Linna 2010 p. 260; Oikarinen 2012 p. 755.
63  HE 58/2013 vp, ’Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle syyteneuvottelua koskevaksi 
lainsäädännöksi ja syyttämättä jättämistä koskevien säännösten uudistamiseksi.’ p. 
14.
64  Linna 2010 p. 227; Oikarinen 2012 p. 754.
65  Lawrence et al 2008, p. 18.
66  Lawrence et al. 2008 p. 26; Linna 2010, p. 207.
67  Lawrence et al. 2008 p. 26.
68  Lawrence et al. 2008 p. 26.
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One downside to plea bargaining is also that as a witness the defendant’s 
integrity could be questioned.69 Further, the practice could be likened to 
bargaining between the state and the offenders, and it could be problematic 
from the perspective of the principles of equality and legality.70
Lawrence et al. note that while there may be an attempt on the side 
of the defence to exploit the system to their own advantage by strategically 
choosing the time when to enter the plea bargaining agreement, it must 
also be recognized that strategic planning on the side of prosecution and 
defence, permeates the whole judicial system even in the absence of plea 
bargaining.71 
An important aspect of the defendant’s legal protections is the right 
against self-incrimination in the context of plea bargaining. Linna argues 
that despite efforts to observe the right against self-incrimination, at the end 
of the day one may always ask whether the offer by the prosecutor is such 
that it leaves little choice but to enter a guilty plea. The most notable risk 
would be that an innocent person would have to choose between a guilty 
plea and a fully-fledged trial and would be persuaded to enter the guilty plea. 
This situation could be avoided by determining the culpability in advance 
in a similar fashion as is done at trial. Linna says that the infringement of 
Article 6 ECHR in terms of inappropriate pressure may only be escaped if 
prior to concluding the plea bargaining negotiations the prosecutor is already 
in possession of evidence sufficient for a conviction. 72 The gap between the 
outcomes depending on whether the defendant opts for a trial or a guilty 
plea, should not be so huge that in reality one cannot speak of a voluntary 
decision.73  It may be noted that the amendment (as per the Government 
Bill) to the Finnish Criminal Code in Chapter 6, section 8a provides that 
the court must announce what the sentence would have been in the absence 
of the guilty plea.74
As Oikarinen points out, the Finnish Working Group proposal on plea 
bargaining (and along the same lines the Government Bill that followed it) 
sought to alleviate the due process concerns associated with plea bargaining 
by ensuring that the prosecutor does not merely rely on the guilty plea of 
the defendant, but has evidence beyond that as well. Oikarinen notes that 
if the prosecutor does not have sufficient evidence to prosecute the case, the 
defendant should not be induced to enter the guilty plea.75 The Working 
69  Lawrence et al 2008 p. 24; Linna 2010, p. 261.
70  Matikkala 2009. p. 287; See also Wagner-Von Papp 2011, p. 176.
71  Lawrence et al. 2008 p. 27.
72  Linna 2010 p. 253-254; Linna questions whether any resources would be saved after 
all as a result of introducing a system of plea bargaining. See Linna 2010 p. 253-254.
73  Linna 2010 pp. 253-254, 260, 261.
74  See Oikarinen 2012 p. 757.
75  Oikarinen 2012 p. 755-756; HE 58/2013 vp, ’Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle 
syyteneuvottelua koskevaksi lainsäädännöksi ja syyttämättä jättämistä koskevien 
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Group had also proposed that as a starting point the defendant should always 
have legal assistance available and the prosecutor would have to observe also 
evidence that is favourable to the defendant.76 
As was observed in the Government Bill,77 the European Court of 
Human Rights has also addressed the due process questions in the context 
of plea bargaining: the ECtHR has said that plea bargaining agreements are 
not in violation of the ECHR and indisputably benefit the defendant, the 
injured party and the ‘administration of justice.’78 In another decision the 
ECtHR has said that while plea bargaining is more frequently used in the US, 
the European legal systems provide for reductions in sentences in exchange 
for a ‘guilty plea’, which may necessitate the existence of an understanding 
between the defendant and the prosecutor as to the content of the guilty 
plea – the Court said that it may not be viewed as ‘oppressive conduct’ and 
thus in violation of art. 6 ECHR that the judge or the prosecutor lets the 
defendant know beforehand what the sentence would be in the case that the 
defendant entered the guilty plea or alternatively if the defendant did not 
enter the ‘guilty plea’. Article 6 ECHR could be violated, the Court said, 
when the sentence following the guilty plea would be so different from the 
sentence that would follow if the defendant did not enter a guilty plea that 
it could be regarded as putting inappropriate pressure on the defendant to 
enter a guilty plea, while the defendant is innocent – in such circumstances 
the right against self-incrimination could be impaired or Article 3 could 
be violated (the ban on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment) if the defendant perceives the guilty plea as the sole means to 
escape the penalty.79 The ECtHR noted that it is up to the defendants to 
säännösten uudistamiseksi.’ p. 45.
76  Finnish Ministry of Justice, ‘Syyteneuvottelu ja syyttämättä jättäminen’ 26/2012. 
p. 52; The prosecutor must explain the contents of the sentence proposal and other 
related matters as per Chapter 5 b, section 3. As per section 4 the Court would have 
to observe the tenets of the proposal regarding the sentence if it agrees with the 
sentence proposal, provided that the defendant has entered the guilty plea and there 
is no reasonable doubt left regarding the accuracy of the guilty plea and that the 
defendant voluntarily entered it. Oikarinen 2012 p. 757.
77  Government Bill, HE 58/ 2013 vp s. 10
78  HE 58/2013 vp, ’Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle syyteneuvottelua koskevaksi 
lainsäädännöksi ja syyttämättä jättämistä koskevien säännösten uudistamiseksi.’ 
P 10; see the European Court of Human Rights, Fifth section decision as to the 
admissibility of Application no. 39672/03 by Nikolay Milanov Nikolov against 
Bulgaria 28 September 2010, under the title ’The Law’ at para 11. 
79  HE 58/2013 vp, ’Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle syyteneuvottelua koskevaksi 
lainsäädännöksi ja syyttämättä jättämistä koskevien säännösten uudistamiseksi.’ P 
10; ECHR, Fourth section, partial decision as to the admissibility of application nos. 
24027/07, 11949/08 and 36742/08 by Babar Ahmad, Haroon Rashid Aswat, Syed 
Tahla Ahsan and Mustafa Kamal Mustafa (Abu Hamza) against the United Kindom, 
6 July 2010. At para 168. 
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enter plea bargaining agreements and judges in the US seek to ensure that 
the defendants enter such agreements of their own free will.80 
As a curiosity it may be mentioned that due to the time-consuming 
proceeding the Council of Europe suggested already in 1987 that its member 
states should widen the scope of prosecutorial discretion whenever possible. 
It referred to the requirements of article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. The Council of Europe specifically mentioned that 
countries with the tradition of mandatory prosecutions should note the 
recommendation.81 This was reiterated in an explanatory memorandum of 
the Council of Europe in the year 2000.82 
It may also be feared that procedural safeguards of the defendants suffer 
as a result of a plea bargaining agreement, the plea bargaining agreement 
may require that the defendant agrees to refrain from claiming his rights. 
In order to alleviate such worries, the court could have a look at the plea 
bargaining agreement and at least ascertain that the defendant with full 
knowledge agreed to the terms of the agreement.83
Linna has viewed the Working Group proposal in a rather positive 
light.84 Linna has noted that the proposal by the Working Group did not 
suggest that the agreement between the prosecutor and the defendant would 
accurately prescribe the sentence that the Court will impose – thus while the 
Court would have to adopt a more lenient scale of penalties with a view to 
its sentence consideration85, it would not be bound by the plea bargaining 
agreement. The Government Bill indicated that the defendant must be 
informed that the Court is not bound by the sentence proposal made by the 
prosecutor. Yet the sentence proposal should indicate the kind of sentence 
that the prosecutor proposes and the severity of the sentence, something that 
may be indicative of the future practice Linna says.86 The Court is however 
bound by the type of offence prescribed in the plea bargaining agreement.87 
80  The Court found in this particular case that it was not inappropriate for the 
prosecutors to talk about the potential sentences with the defendant beforehand, 
see ECHR, Fourth section, partial decision as to the admissibility of application 
nos. 24027/07, 11949/08 and 36742/08 by Babar Ahmad, Haroon Rashid Aswat, 
Syed Tahla Ahsan and Mustafa Kamal Mustafa (Abu Hamza) against the United 
Kingdom, 6 July 2010, at para 169.
81  Council of Europe, RECOMMENDATION No. R (87) 18 OF THE 
COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS TO MEMBER STATES CONCERNING THE 
SIMPLIFICATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1987 p. 3
82  Council of Europe. Explanatory Memorandum 2000. Retrieved 04 14, 2011, from 
https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.Cmd
BlobGet&InstranetImage=1465390&SecMode=1&DocId=838058&Usage=2. See 
paragraph 3.; Wils 2007, pp. 36-37.
83  Lawrence et al 2008, p. 26.
84  Linna 2012 p. 129.
85  The imposed sentence may not exceed ¾ of the ordinary sentence.
86  Linna 2012 p. 129; See also HE 58/2013 vp p. 25.
87  HE 58/2013 p. 32; Linna 2012 p. 129.
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On the other hand the fact that the Court needs to indicate the sentence 
that would have been handed down in the absence of the guilty plea, in 
Linna’s view prevents the possibility that the sentence imposed within the 
framework of the more lenient penalty scale would not differ from the 
sentence that would be given in the absence of a plea bargaining agreement.88
Importantly the Government Bill sets out that if plea bargaining fails 
or if the Court would not hand down a decision in accordance with the 
sentence proposal, the statements given in the course of plea bargaining or 
the Court proceedings by the defendant may not be employed as evidence.89 
Despite the foregoing Linna points out that the fact that the defendant had 
entered plea bargaining negotiations, that were never concluded, could be 
perceived to reflect culpability.90 
9.3 THE MERITS OF INTRODUCING A SYSTEM OF 
PLEA BARGAINING
Arguments have in the UK context been put forward that besides granting 
full immunity to the leniency applicant, introducing a system of plea 
bargaining could be beneficial in anti-cartel enforcement. Plea bargaining 
agreements could be offered to cartel members who do not qualify for full 
immunity.91 Currently such a system is absent in England and Wales.92 
Furse pointed out that US style plea bargaining is not available in 
Ireland either and quoted a report which said that while ‘charge bargaining’ 
may be entered by the defendant it ‘will not result in certainty about a 
particular sentence, except insofar as the charges pleaded to define the outer 
limits of range of sentence that may be imposed.’93 While Ireland has a Cartel 
Immunity Programme, with respect to the cooperative second and third 
leniency applicants leniency in terms of custodial sanctions or fines may 
not be granted. While the courts have it in their discretion to take note of 
the cooperation provided by applicants who do not qualify for immunity, 
88  Linna 2012, p. 129.
89  HE 58/2013 vp, ’Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle syyteneuvottelua koskevaksi 
lainsäädännöksi ja syyttämättä jättämistä koskevien säännösten uudistamiseksi.’ p. 
15.
90  Linna 2012 p. 130; See also Lawrence et al. 2008 p. 25; See also Stephan 2008b, p. 
23.
91  Furse 2012 p. 151; Wardhaugh 2012a, p. 588.
92  Lawrence Jon et al., ’Hardcore Bargains: What Could Plea Bargaining Offer in UK 
Criminal Cartel Cases? Competition Law Journal, 2008. p. 17.
93  Galbreath 2010, p. 8; Furse 2012 p. 172.
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the degree of reduction in the sentence is not predictable and as Furse notes 
that it is regrettable.94
Scott Hammond has said in the US context that despite the fact that 
plea bargaining is occasionally portrayed in a less flattering light, in cartel 
cases it is rarely criticized. Among the beneficiaries of plea bargaining 
are, according to Hammond, the government, the parties to the case, 
the judiciary, the injured parties and the public at large as the defendants 
cooperate promptly. 95 
In the US in most cartel cases the defendants who do not qualify 
for amnesty enter plea bargaining agreements.96 Beaton-Wells pointed 
out that US antitrust enforcement owes to the system of plea bargaining 
and sentencing guidelines that give a good idea to the defendants and the 
prosecutors how things will turn out if a guilty plea is entered. Indeed 
the cases where the DOJ has been forced to proceed to a trial, it has been 
successful in less than half of the cases. This negative outcome of the trial 
cases, Beaton-Wells points out, is a result of the dependence on the evidence 
provided by the immunized witness (the first runner up to the leniency 
prize), whose testimony may not be perceived as the most reliable one.97
The defendants are normally offered either type B or type C agreements. 
The former may be altered by the Court while the defendant cannot pull 
out from the agreement irrespective of the changes made by the court.  In 
contrast the type C is binding on the Court.98 Hammond has noted that 
90 percent of the defendants accused of antitrust violations during the past 
two decades have agreed to plea bargaining arrangements.99 
Stephan said that the US enforcement is greatly facilitated by the plea 
bargaining agreements. While informal settlements are available in the UK, 
they cannot be compared with the definitive direct settlement in the US100 – 
subsequently every case in the UK will be disposed of by means of a trial.101 
Stephan argues that the appeal of the plea bargaining agreements 
is reflected in the foreigners who have on their own accord returned to 
the US only to be imprisoned in accordance with the plea bargaining 
agreement.102  Reindl has pointed out that the grand jury investigation 
94  Furse 2012 p. 175; Galbreath 2010, p. 7.
95  Hammond  2006, p. 2; Furse 2012 p. 152
96  Lawrence et al. 2008, p. 17.
97  Beaton-Wells 2011. Under the heading ’E. Uncertain Outcomes’ at para 1.
98  Lawrence et al. 2008 p. 28.
99  Hammond 2006, at para 1. 
100  Stephan takes the position however that a sustained success of the UK criminal 
cartel regime may at the end of the day depend on the competition authority’s 
impact on the general public’s awareness regarding the harmful nature of cartels, as 
such awareness would induce compliance and corroborate prosecutorial efforts, see 
Stephan 2008 p. 33
101  Stephan 2008 p. 4.
102  Stephan 2008 p. 24.
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benefits the prosecution and makes it ‘relatively easy to obtain indictments 
against a defendant’. This in turn induces the defendants to enter plea 
bargaining agreements. As a result the prosecution rarely has to meet the 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’ threshold.103 The Hammond and Penrose report 
had also noted that the US enforcement record owed to the system of plea 
bargaining that the UK lacked.104 
According to Stephan a further incentive for the defendants to enter 
plea bargaining agreements, considering the possibility of private actions, is 
that the amount of information that is subject to publicity may be limited 
as per the plea bargaining agreement. Plea bargaining agreements allow also 
the concurrent settlements of ‘corporate and individual liabilities’. Having 
entered the plea bargaining agreement the defendants also give up the right 
to contest the case. The plea bargaining agreements may even entail specifics 
that relate to the location of the prison and available facilities, which may 
include luxuries such as tennis courts.105 
From the point of view of defence it may be appreciated that as a result 
of a plea bargaining agreement the case could be speedily resolved, while 
there is a discount in the sentence, and the terms of imprisonment may even 
be subject to negotiation. As Lawrence et. al point out the foregoing may be 
equally important to certain defendants as the duration of the sentence. 106 
In consequence the DOJ is able to ensure the regular enforcement of 
the offence, since the laborious trials and appeals are avoided – this leaves 
vacant resources for further use. Stephan has pointed out however that while 
the plea bargaining agreements secure a certain level of enforcement in the 
US, a system of plea bargaining with the US characteristics is not what he 
advances in the UK context with respect to all cartel cases. He notes that 
the system in the US has been accused of being unfair, and is the product 
of a long evolution and is infused with idiosyncrasies that originate in the 
US legal culture.107
On a more general note Reindl argues that the US system cannot easily 
be transplanted in Europe. Subsequently the expected benefits of a criminal 
anti-cartel regime might not materialize in Reindl’s view.108
Stephan notes that since the apparent US success in pursuing cartels 
may be attributed to the system of plea bargaining, it is possible that the 
UK lacking such a system will not be able to bring many criminal cartel 
103  In addition Reindl notes the uniquely strong investigatory powers in the US, 
namely, ’grand jury subpoenas, grand jury investigations and indictments,’ and a 
competition authority that prosecutes and does not have to depend upon public 
prosecutors, Reindl 2006, p. 118.
104  Hammond and Penrose 2001 p. 30.
105  Stephan 2008 pp. 23-24.
106  Lawrence et al. 2008 p. 25; See also Stephan 2008b, p. 23.
107  Stephan 2008b, p. 25.
108  Reindl 2006, p. 119.
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cases.109 It may be mentioned that defendants, who were UK nationals, 
entered plea bargain agreements in the US also in the Marine Hose cartel.110 
Furse takes the view that while the courts do not embrace plea bargaining 
in the UK, the overall approach is nowadays more accommodating. In 
the case R v Goodyear111 the judge pointed out that the judge himself 
should not be included in plea bargaining.112 The UK Government however 
recently rejected plea bargaining in the context of anti-cartel enforcement 
arguing that implications for the criminal justice system should be cautiously 
examined.113 It may be noted that the Serious Organised Crime and Police 
Act 2005 s 73 provided the possibility of reducing the sentence of the 
defendant in return for assisting the prosecution. 
According to Lawrence et al. the meager use of plea bargaining in the 
UK owes in part to the absence of predictability regarding the penalty that 
the Court will impose on the defendant - in contrast the US Sentencing 
Guidelines arguably offer such predictability.114 Lawrence et al. argue that 
while the system of plea bargaining in the US is affected by factors that 
do not apply in the UK, a system of plea bargaining could offer notable 
advantages in the UK context.115
As Lawrence et al. point out that by empowering the OFT to grant 
criminal immunity to the first leniency applicant to come forward, as the 
first prosecutorial body to have this power in the UK, it seems that it was 
acknowledged that this measure is needed in the fight against cartels.116 
Following that line of thought it may be argued, especially in the long term, 
that from a deterrence perspective plea bargaining could be desirable: cartels 
are intrinsically instable and introducing plea bargaining could further 
capitalize on that feature: arguably under a system of plea bargaining the 
possibility of a conviction becomes greater, even if full immunity cannot be 
obtained and the cartel has been detected, because the probability remains 
that a fellow cartel member cooperates with the authorities.117
The prosecution could benefit from plea bargaining since it could more 
easily access evidence and dispose of cases. Proving a case ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ is challenging and the risk of failure if the case proceeds to court 
trial is remarkable. As a result of plea bargaining the defendant might even 
be incentivized to cooperate with regard to an ongoing investigation in 
109  Stephan 2008b, pp. 25-26.
110  See the discussion in Stephan 2008b. 
111  2005 EWCA Crim 888 at para 67ple.
112  See Furse 2012 p. 152.
113  BIS, Growth, Competition and The Competition Regime, Government Response to 
Consultation, March 2012. at para 7.40
114  Lawrence et al. 2008 p. 32-33.
115  ibid. p. 38
116  Lawrence et al. 2008, p. 18.
117  Lawrence et al. 2008, p. 23-24; Furse 2012 p. 152.
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exchange for further reward.118 Considering the noteworthy collapse of the 
Airlines case the importance of the foregoing from the point of view of the 
prosecution is arguably compelling.
In the Finnish context Jaakko Rautio of the Ministry of Justice has in 
a memorandum listed some advantages of plea bargaining including the 
facilitation of obtaining evidence.119 Oikarinen however predicts that the 
prosecutor continues to carry a heavy burden of proof especially with regard 
to the accuracy of the defendant’s guilty plea.120 
Lawrence et al. argued as well that allowing bargaining in criminal 
cartel cases is useful inter alia because it would diminish the costs related 
to enforcement, something that could be desirable from the perspective of 
the limited resources available. 121 
Similarly the Finnish Government Bill noted that resources would 
be saved in terms of the preliminary investigation, the workload of the 
prosecutor and the court proceedings: the Government Bill pointed out 
that due to scarce resources cases could actually be treated discriminatorily, 
meaning that where one case is investigated another one is not. 122  
Especially the investigation of serious white-collar offences is resource-
intensive the Government Bill noted.123 It was argued that due to the 
complexity of the white-collar offences, adopting plea bargaining would 
be advantageous.124  
As a result of the proposal it was argued that more resources would 
be left to detect offences that otherwise could go unnoticed, which in turn 
would benefit deterrence, presumably even more so than the severity of the 
sanctions.125  The defendant would be incentivized to enter a guilty plea 
since the proceedings would be expedited and he would get a reduction 
in the sentence. If the prosecutor may commit to a reduced sentence, the 
118  Lawrence et al. 2008, p. 24.
119  Rautio, Jaakko, ‘Resursseja säästävä menettely, jossa rikoksen varhainen 
tunnustaminen voisi läpinäkyvässä menettelyssä johtaa rikoksesta muutoin seuraavaa 
rangaistusta lievempään rangaistukseen’ OM 20/41/2009, 15.1.2010.  p. 13-14.
120  Oikarinen 2012 p. 760.
121  Lawrence et al. 2008, p. 18.
122  HE 58/2013 vp, ’Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle syyteneuvottelua koskevaksi 
lainsäädännöksi ja syyttämättä jättämistä koskevien säännösten uudistamiseksi.’ 
p. 11.
123  HE 58/2013 vp, ’Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle syyteneuvottelua koskevaksi 
lainsäädännöksi ja syyttämättä jättämistä koskevien säännösten uudistamiseksi.’ P. 12
124  HE 58/2013 vp, ’Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle syyteneuvottelua koskevaksi 
lainsäädännöksi ja syyttämättä jättämistä koskevien säännösten uudistamiseksi.’ P. 14
125  While the proposal would reflects the concept of sentence bargaining and count 
bargaining , it does not cover charge bargaining or fact bargaining, see HE 58/2013 
vp, ’Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle syyteneuvottelua koskevaksi lainsäädännöksi ja 
syyttämättä jättämistä koskevien säännösten uudistamiseksi.’ P. 13
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defendants would subsequently be induced to enter the guilty pleas and the 
improved predictability would benefit the defendants.126 
In contrast Oikarinen has noted that it may be doubtful whether the 
white-collars are sufficiently incentivized to enter guilty pleas. For instance in 
terms of the tax fraud offences, most of the prison sentences were suspended. 
Subsequently the appeal of entering plea bargaining negotiations for the 
white-collars lies essentially in the less-time consuming proceedings. It is 
possible, as Oikarinen says, that only the availability and enforcement of 
harsher penalties, especially unsuspended custodial sanctions could make 
plea bargaining more attractive for the white-collars in Finland.127 
Linna on the other hand has questioned the potential of a system of 
plea bargaining to influence the white-collars who seek to retain the illegal 
profits – entering the guilty plea would mean that such profits would be 
lost by the perpetrator.128
Furhtermore, it is possible to argue that as a result of reducing the 
penalty by way of a plea bargain the deterrent effect is impaired. As a 
counterargument a larger amount of prosecutions could offset such a 
problem. Further it is not obvious that the deterrence generally is impaired 
as a result of plea bargaining as at the end of the day much turns on the 
given content of the plea bargaining agreement:  As Lawrence et al. note the 
European Commission Decision in relation to the gas Insulated Switchgear 
cartel recognized that ‘Japanese and European providers of GIS coordinated 
the allocation of GIS projects worldwide, with the exception of notably the 
USA and Canada’ and the US is land where plea bargaining is particularly 
used – thus such an observation may alleviate fears of a weakening deterrent 
effect. 129 
Vuorenpää has pointed out that the general preventive effect inter alia 
depends on the certainty that sanctions are imposed and the legitimacy of 
the criminal justice system.130 On a more critical note Oikarinen says that 
while plea bargaining may reinforce the former, the legitimacy of the system 
could also suffer if the public perception is that the white-collars receive 
126  HE 58/2013 vp, ’Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle syyteneuvottelua koskevaksi 
lainsäädännöksi ja syyttämättä jättämistä koskevien säännösten uudistamiseksi.’ p. 
11.
127  Oikarinen 2012 p. 761
128  Linna 2012 p. 130.
129  See Summary for publication of Commission Decision of 24 January 2007 relating 
to a proceeding under Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, Case COMP/38.899 – Gas Insulated 
Switchgear. Official Journal of the European Union C 5/7.; For more anecdotal 
evidence, made known by a DOJ official, that seems to indicate that cartels have 
specifically avoided operations in the US see Hammond Scott, ’Cornerstones of an 
effective leniency program, ICN Workshop on Leniency Programs, Sydney Australia. 
p. 8; Lawrence et al. 2008 p. 25-26; See also Baker 2001, p. 709.
130  See Vuorenpää 2007, p. 26; Oikarinen 2012 p. 761-762 footnote 54.
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special treatment and that everyone is not treated equally.131 Lawrence et 
al. point out that while concerns may be expressed that perpetrators do not 
get their ‘just deserts’ by way of plea bargaining as they get more lenient 
treatment as a result, it is also true that the condemned conduct may not 
have even been uncovered in the absence of plea bargaining. Further rather 
then the duration of the prison sentence, it appears that it is the actual 
imposition of one that counts to many.132 
It seems in light of the above that there are good grounds to introduce 
a system of plea bargaining in Finland, a system that could potentially also 
enhance the fight against cartels and perhaps more importantly it may reflect 
a shift in attitudes that hindered the introdution of a crownwitness system, 
whose absence was previously a strong argument against the a criminal anti-
cartel regime in Finland. 
By way of conclusion, despite its demerits, on balance, this author 
would add a system of plea bargaining to Wils’ list that seeks to present the 
criteria of a successful criminal anti-cartel regime.133
131  Oikarinen further notes that for certain offences such as the drink-driving offences, 
the creation of the deterrent effect is not categorically dependent on the kind of 
penalty that is available – imposing a driving ban may be much more effective than a 
fine or even a suspended prison sentence, see Oikarinen 2012 p. 762.
132  Lawrence et al. 2008 p. 26.
133  For the list see Wils 2005a p. 148ff.
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10 Some Considerations    
 regarding Private Actions as  
 an Enforcement Tool
A study by Deloitte and commissioned by the Office of Fair Trading sought 
to identify the factors that make companies comply with competition law. 
The surveyed 202 UK companies ranked private damages actions as least 
important, behind inter alia corporate fines and prison sentences.1 Ironically 
perhaps, the European Commission has especially sought to revamp the 
sanctioning system by making private damages actions more readily 
available and increasing the level of fines. 2  The aforementioned ranking of 
perceived deterrence by the companies casts a shadow on the approach of 
the Commission to lay emphasis on private damages actions. 
As Wils has pointed out the Commission White Paper on damages 
actions separates the tasks assigned to public enforcement on the one hand 
and the task assigned to private enforcement on the other hand. The White 
Paper advocated improved possibilities for private claimants to pursue 
damages when EU competition law rules were infringed. In contrast the 
Commission also stated the need to ‘(…)preserve strong public enforcement 
of Articles 81 and 82(…)’3 In Wils’ view public enforcement is better from 
the perspective of penal justice and deterrence, but cannot take the place 
of private enforcement when it comes to reparation.4 This approach, Wils 
argues, is  supported by the case law of the ECJ and the general court of 
the EU.5 One may also point to economic principles, such as the Tinbergen 
1  Office of Fair Trading, ‘The deterrent effect of competition enforcement by the 
OFT, A report prepared for the OFT by Deloitte,’ November 2007 OFT 962. p. 5, 
72.
2  See Khan Aaron 2012 p. 78; Also the ECJ said regarding the right to damages 
that ‘[t]he existence of such a right strengthens the working of the Community 
Competition rules and discourages agreements or practices, frequently covert, 
which are liable to restrict or distort competition.’ See to this effect Pfleiderer AG v 
Bundeskartellamt case C-360/09 At para 29.; In Finland a court recently awarded 
record damages in relation to the so-called asphalt cartel, in a judgment handed 
down on 28th of November 2013. See to this effect Helsinki District Court, 3rd 
division, L 09/49467. For further discussion see Kalliokoski and Virtanen 2014.
3  COM(2008) 165 final, Brussels, 2.4.2008. p. 3.
4  Wils 2009 p. 15.
5  Wils 2009 p. 16.
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rule, which postulates the use of separate instruments for separate objectives, 
to validate such an approach.6 
The acceptance of treble damages and not allowing the passing-on 
defence when cases are brought by direct purchasers arguably reflects the 
deterrent approach by the US antirust law.7 The passing-on defence concerns 
a situation where a party buys products at a cartel price, subsequently passes 
the cartel price on to its customers, and whether such a buyer could still 
claim damages in the absence of harm to himself or whether the cartelist can 
invoke the passing-on defence.8 Historically instead of public enforcement, 
treble damages have played a major role in the US, and still today outside 
the hard-core cartel area they serve a deterrent function.9 Such a model of 
multiple damages and denial of passing-on defence, as it could unjustly 
enrich buyers was rejected by the White Paper in the EU.10
Wils, Calvani and Whelan have argued that the private actions alone 
are not sufficient to deter hard-core cartels. Arguably the private actions 
are plagued by the firms’ inability to pay sums that would be sufficient 
from a deterrence perspective, which in essence means that they share the 
same insolvency cap problem associated with the optimal Beckerian fines. 
Wils further underlined that private actions do not introduce individual 
accountability, which is beneficial for the operation of leniency.11
10.1 COULD PRIVATE ACTIONS DETER MORE THAN 
CRIMINAL PENALTIES?
While it has been said that the DOJ’s criminal enforcement rarely 
is scrutinized in the US, and mostly is acclaimed for its efforts,12 US 
commentators Lande and Davis, however, argued that private actions in 
the US context have substantial benefits and have argued that their deterrent 
effect is greater than that of the criminal sanctions – they point out for 
example that the DOJ has not been particularly eager to litigate cases where 
the law or evidence is not completely clear.13 
Lande and Davis referred to their own study of 40 cases, where 13 of 
the cases concerned cartels, suggesting that 25% of private actions were 
indebted to DOJ enforcement. Moreover Lande and Davis pointed out that 
6  Wils 2009 p. 17.
7  Wils 2009 p. 17.
8  Whish and Bailey 2012 pp. 310-311.
9  Wils 2009 p. 18.
10  COM(2008) 165 final, Brussels 2.4.2008. pp. 7-8; Wils 2009 p. 19.
11  Wils 2005a, p. 148; Calvani and Calvani 2011, p. 197; Whelan 2007 p. 36.
12  Beaton-Wells and Fisse 2011b, p. 278.
13  Lande and Davis 2010, pp. 31-32, footnote 104. 
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inducement to leniency may be increased by the fact the plaintiffs can only 
seek limited damages from the successful leniency applicant.14 
Lande and Davis wanted their methodology of determining deterrence 
to be conservative and used USD 2 million as the value of deterrence for 
one year spent in prison (which they actually thought is too high) and 
then further trebled it to $6 million due to the possible greater deterrent 
effect of individual penalties. They sought to direct attention to the fact 
that ‘valuing a year’s worth of life at $6 million would mean that a 20 year 
prison sentence would be valued at $120 million, a figure far in excess of the 
amount that society places on an individual’s life.’15 They acknowledged the 
possibility that the time might be valued differently by an average person 
than a price-fixer.
In their rebuttal regarding the argued superior deterrence value of 
private actions, Werden et al. pointed out that USD 5,6–7,0 billion were 
obtained in damages in the aforementioned 13 cartel cases, with a sum of 
USD 3,9–5,3 billion being recoveries from the vitamins cartel alone, which 
according to the DOJ officials was first investigated by the DOJ.16 
Werden et al. referred to the powerful investigative tools that are available 
under the criminal regime. They asserted that the criminal investigative tools 
make the Antitrust Division much better positioned to detect a cartel than 
the plaintiffs. They further argued that civil suits may rely on the liability 
established by the criminal conviction and the cooperating whistle-blowers, 
making the case easier for plaintiffs seeking damages and that the sanction is 
more likely to be imposed with the help of leniency, as leniency destabilizes 
the cartel due to the knowledge that only the first to blow the whistle will 
be granted leniency. The whistle-blower may also provide the prosecution 
with evidence that would have otherwise been unattainable.17
The success of the leniency policy, according to Werden, Hammond and 
Barnett, gets support from the fact that ‘over ninety percent of fines imposed 
for Sherman Act violations since 1996 can be traced to investigations assisted 
by leniency applicants.’18 
Coffee’s article in 1983 suggested that private actions have not greatly 
increased detection rates in light of empirical evidence and are therefore 
not such an important complement to public enforcement. Coffee wrote: 
‘a recurring pattern is evident under which the private attorney general 
14  Lande and Davis 2012, p. 5.
15  Lande and Davis 2010, p. 20, see also footnotes 70, 71 and 73.
16  Werden et al. 2011, p. 228, 232.
17  Werden et al. 2011, p. 207, 225, 233, 234; As has been discussed elsewhere in this 
thesis it seems that the introduction of criminal penalties could positively affect 
the operation of leniency programs as the individuals within a corporation may have 
an increased incentive to apply for leniency when they risk jail sentences, see to this 
effect the discussion under section 8.2.2 .
18  Calvani and Calvani 2011, p. 197; Werden et al. 2011, p. 224.
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simply piggybacks on the efforts of public agencies – such as the SEC, the 
FTC, and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice – in order to 
reap the gains from the investigative work undertaken by these agencies.’19 
 Werden et al. claimed that the defendants have paid more in an effort 
to escape jail than what was estimated by Lande and Davis to be the dollar 
equivalent of disutility of one year locked up in jail and further argued that 
Lande and Davis did not take into account the stigmatizing effect of criminal 
sanctions nor the loss of future income.20 In response Lande and Davis said 
that Hammond, Werden and Barnett did not provide data on the possible 
stigmatizing effect of prison and the loss of future salary. 21
When either fines or privates actions do not create sufficient deterrence, 
it can be the individuals employed by the corporations that decide to abstain 
from cartel activity due to the risk of getting jailed. Consequently an accurate 
picture of deterrence cannot be obtained through a mere look at the figures 
that Lande and Davis presented the aforementioned DOJ officials asserted.22 
Both sides to the debate however were in favour of the availability of an 
array of methods to tackle cartels.23
The author of this thesis subscribes to the view that collapsing prison 
sentences to monetary equivalents for the purposes of comparing the 
deterrent effects of private actions and prison sentences is not convincing 
and tends to think that private actions cannot replace individual sanctions 
as a method of creating deterrence – not considering the stigmatizing effects 
of criminal sanctions would seem to be problematic. Further, more powerful 
investigatory tools are available under the criminal regime and the private 
claimants may benefit from criminal convictions that establish liablity and 
also from the cooperation of the whistle-blowers.
10.2 THE COMPLEX INTERACTION BETWEEN 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT
Whish and Bailey pointed out that at the EU level the Commission with its 
more robust investigative powers has better opportunities than the private 
parties to uncover competition law violations. In addition the experience 
19  Coffee 1983, pp. 220-223.
20  Werden et al. 2011, pp. 228-229.
21  Lande and Davis 2012, pp. 3-4; See Bauer 2004, p. 307; Wils 2005a, p. 143.
22  Werden et al. 2011, pp. 228-229.
23  See Werden et al. 2011, p 207; Lande and Davis 2010,  pp. 9-10 footnote 49.
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gained thus far and available resources make the Commission better placed, 
as does the leniency program as a detection tool. 24 
As a result of public enforcement efforts, findings of antitrust violations 
emerge, which then support follow-on actions. Stand-alone private actions 
on the other hand do not benefit from the results of public enforcement.25
The European Commission has sought to improve private enforcement, 
but in the meantime one should bear in mind that for example inundating 
decisions with information to improve the conditions for follow-on actions, 
thus empowering private claimants regarding a given violation or allowing 
third parties access to information beyond the decision, could hamper the 
functionality of the leniency program, if potential leniency applicants refrain 
from cooperation due to a possible disclosure of the leniency applications. 
Further provisions regarding the business secrets could be infringed if access 
was granted.26 The ECJ has elaborated on the difficulty of attaining a balance 
between the two objectives, in the Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt case.27
Wils has also argued that claimants should not have the access to 
the public enforcement files during the course of the investigation by 
the authority to prevent undesirable disclosure, such as information on a 
forthcoming inspection.28 
The Commission White Paper suggested that private claimants should 
never have the access to the corporate statements.29 Cartelists submit 
corporate statements that contain their information in relation to the cartel 
when they apply for leniency. As Wils notes, the corporate statement is 
the voluntary production of the cartel member, which serves anti-cartel 
enforcement, in the form of detection and conviction and subsequent private 
actions. If it were not for such an optional act by the cartel member, the 
corporate statement would never have materialized. On such grounds it 
seems reasonable to argue that the claimants should not have the access to 
the corporate statements, as this in turn could make the incentive to apply 
for leniency stronger, and arguably enhances public enforcement.30 
The more recent Commission Proposal characterized the leniency 
programs as ‘key instruments in detecting cartels.’ In an attempt to protect 
the appeal of leniency programs both at the EU level and at the national one 
the Commission handed down a proposal suggesting that the leniency prize 
winner’s joint and several liability should be restricted to damages caused to 
24  Whish and Bailey 2012 p. 305.
25  Wils 2009 p. 19.
26  Whish and Bailey 2012 p. 305.
27  See Case C-360/09 see especially para. 31, where the ECJ points out that the 
national courts are left with the ’weighing exercise’.
28  Wils 2009 p. 23.
29 See European Commission, ’ White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules’ COM/2008/0165 final p. 10; Wils 2009 p. 23.
30  Wils 2009 p. 24.
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his direct or indirect purchasers or in the instance of a buying cartel to his 
direct or indirect suppliers. There is a qualification however: ‘the immunity 
recipient remains fully liable as a last-resort debtor if the injured parties are 
unable to obtain full compensation from the other infringers.’31
One way to induce compensation by the perpetrator is to reduce the 
amount of fines when compensation is provided on a voluntarily basis or to 
grant immunity on the condition that redress is made within the bounds of 
possibility, as is done in the United States. This could however undermine 
the deterrent or retributive value of the sanction if the amount of reduction 
is on par with the amount of the compensation. Therefore arguably the 
reduction should be less than the amount of the compensation.32 
Wils has pointed out that the private litigants’ interest and the public 
interest may vary from each other and due to better resources public 
enforcement should bear the responsibility regarding the substantive 
antitrust law and its formation.33 In this regard Richard Posner has argued 
in the US context that the private actions have not been beneficial for the 
‘antitrust doctrine’ and that private claimants have been successful in a way 
that has dismayed the scholarly observers of the antitrust laws. The kinds 
of cases brought by private parties would arguably not have been brought 
by the public agency.34
Wils has argued that leniency should not shield from follow-on actions, 
as it would be unfair – the victims of the infringement should still have 
the right to compensation. While granting leniency applicants protection 
against damages actions might further increase the number of the leniency 
applications, it seems the preferable approach would be to incentivize the 
potential leniency applicants by way of higher sanctions that the leniency 
applicants could then escape.35 
Wils further noted that compensation with a penal aim, such as the 
treble damages, is problematic from the perspective of the ne bis in idem 
principle, which is a principle of the EU law, and may not allow damages 
that exceed the amount of full compensation.36
31  European Commission Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, Strasbourgh, 11.6.2013, COM(2013) 404 final, 2013/0185 (COD), 
Explanatory Memorandum,  pp. 16-17.
32  Wils 2009 p. 24-26.
33  Wils 2009 p. 28.
34  Posner 2001. p. 275.
35  Wils 2009 pp. 30-31.
36  Wils 2009 p. 26.
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10.3 THE EU INITIATIVES ON PRIVATE 
ENFORCEMENT
The EU commission has tried to step up anti-cartel enforcement via 
private enforcement.37 The resources to prevent minor competition law 
violations are not abundant, and private actions against them could boost 
enforcement.38 Private enforcement was deemed underdeveloped in 2004 
by a comparative study commissioned by the European Commission, as 
only some 60 damages actions had been brought at the time.39 Wish and 
Bailey contended that such a figure is misleading due to frequent out of 
court settlements that take place privately.40 
In 2008 the Commission published a White Paper41  on the matter, 
which was accompanied by a commission staff working paper42 and an impact 
assessment43  which estimated that each year cartels may cost the victims from 
5,7 billion euros to 23,3 billion euros. 
Historically private enforcement in Europe has been lackluster. The 
Commission has much desired to step up private enforcement.44 According 
to the Commission Green Paper private enforcement served deterrent 
purposes.45 While the Green Paper emphasized such a deterrent function 
the White Paper seemed to lay more emphasis on the compensatory nature 
of private enforcement.46
The Commission White Paper inter alia pointed out the need to 
compensate the injured parties, but rejected multiple compensation,47 
proposed collective redress brought about for example by a consumer 
association48, the interests of the leniency applicant should be protected 
37  See Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper, ’Damages actions for 
breach of EC antitrust rules’, Brussels, 19.12.2005
38  Kanniainen and Määttä 2011. p. 59.
39 Ashurst,., ‘Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringements of 
EC competition law’, 31 August 2004. p. 1.
40  Whish and Bailey p. 296.
41  See European Commission, ’ White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules’ COM/2008/0165 final. 
42  SEC(2008) 404.
43  SEC(2008) 405 para. 45; See also Whish and Bailey 2012 p. 327.
44  Whish and Bailey 2012 p. 295.
45  Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper, ‘Damages actions for 
breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672 final. p. 3.
46  This is the perception of Wils, see Wils 2009, p. 15; See also Whish and Bailey 
2012, p. 297.
47  COM(2008) 165 final, p. 7-8; Whish and Bailey have specifically singled out the 
mentioned points in the White Paper, see Whish and Bailey 2012 p. 327.
48  ibid. p. 4.
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viz-a-viz the fellow cartelists49 and that EU-wide disclosure rules regarding 
evidence should be introduced50.
The White Paper further proposed that private parties should be able 
to rely on the decision by the National Competition Authority as proof in 
their follow-on actions for damages in other EU member states. As Wils 
pointed out it would not be sensible to litigate the same infringement again 
for the purposes of damages, as there is already a finding of its existence.51 
The Commission issued a consultation document in 2011 on the 
matters concerning collective redress. It singled out some relevant principles 
that should be observed while designing the EU scheme for redress. 52 
The document underlined the need for effective redress: such a regime 
should produce certain and fair results in a reasonably timely fashion and 
simultaneously keeping an eye on the rights of the litigants.53 
The victims of the violation should get adequate information regarding 
the opportunity to collectively seek for redress and of the representative 
bodies that should advance their interests.54 
The consultation document also underlined the need to prevent ‘abusive 
litigation’, that perhaps plagues the US regime where class actions are brought 
in circumstances where the case might be unmeritorious. The Commission 
argued that the reasons for the unmeritorious cases lie in the multiple 
damages that may be sought in the US, the possibility for almost anyone 
to act on behalf of a group of victims, the availability of contingency fees 
(the remuneration the attorney gets in the event of a successful pleading)55 
for lawyers and generous discovery rules.56 Accordingly the Commission 
argues that there should be no economic inducement towards unmeritorious 
litigation. For example the loser pays principle could provide protection 
against such cases.57
49  ibid. p. 10.
50  ibid. p. 5.
51  ibid. p. 5; Wils 2009 pp. 20-21.
52  See SEC(2011) 173 final, ’Towards a Coherent European Approach to Collective 
Redress’ Brussels, 4 February 2011. 
53  Ibid. p. 7.
54  ibid. p. 8.
55  See “contingency fee.” The Oxford English Dictionary.  2nd Edition revised, 2005.
56  See SEC(2011) 173 final. p. 9.
57  ibid. p. 9.
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10.4 PRIVATE ACTIONS AS A METHOD OF 
ENFORCEMENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
10.4.1 Sweden
The Swedish Competition Act (2008:579) provides in Chapter 3, art. 25 
that when the substantive provisions of the act in Chapter 2 (art. 1 or 7) or 
Articles 81 or 82 (now art. 101 and 102 TFEU) are infringed intentionally 
or negligently, the undertaking responsible must reimburse the damage 
that was brought about by the infringement. The right to damages must be 
invoked within 10 years from the occurrence of the damage. 
Both businesses and consumers that have been the victims of a cartel 
may claim damages in Sweden. There should be an adequate link between 
the damage and the violation of the Competition Act – the plaintiff bears 
the burden of proof in this regard.58 A class action may possibly be invoked 
under the Swedish Group Proceedings Act (2002:599).59 In the Swedish 
case law competition damages actions have been very rare.60 The general 
rule in Sweden is that the financial state of the victim should be restored to 
a level equivalent to the one that would have existed in the absence of the 
infringement.61 Such an approach may be taken to exclude the possibility 
of multiple damages.
It has been suggested in the Swedish context by Levinsohn and Lidgard 
that increasing the number of private actions is unlikely to solve the problem 
with cartels. The American style private enforcement of competition law 
infringements would require fundamental changes in the Swedish law. 
Private actions in Sweden have their basis as a legal tool for individuals, 
but are not an actual tool for the general public they argued in 2002. Public 
enforcement, which adopts sanctions in accordance with the overall aims of 
competition law against competition law infringements was deemed better 
placed to serve the public interest in effective competition. It follows that 
the fight against cartels should be corroborated with sufficient resources 
that tackle the grave competition law violations and with more effective 
sanctions.62 
With regard to the Swedish context Nils Wahl argued on the other hand 
that in order to increase the risk of detection private parties should have 
improved possibilities to claims damages. In Wahl’s view too the stepped up 
private enforcement should take place in conjunction with monitoring by 
58  Wetter Carl et al., konkurrensrätt, 4. Ed. Thomson Reuters, 2009. p. 865.
59  Lag om grupprättegång (2002:599); Wetter et al, 2009. p. 866.
60  Wetter et al. 2009. p. 867.
61  Wetter et al. 2009 . p. 871.
62  Levinsohn and Lidgard 2002, p. 85; See also Lidgard 2009, p. 47.
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the public authorities. Wahl further added that the sanctions should reflect 
the harm in order to create a deterrent effect and that the level of sanctions 
was not sufficient in Sweden for the leniency program to function properly.63 
Finally, the Swedish 2006 committee said regarding the new 
Competition Act that damages claims corroborate public enforcement, 
but the foremost function of private actions is to compensate the private 
parties.64
10.4.2 The UK
In the UK the government White Paper on the World class competition 
regime, argued that private actions are necessary. The injured private parties 
should be able to raise charges against the offenders to get compensated. 
Moreover the private resources will support enforcement. 65  Before the 
relevant ECJ case law, the right to claim damages in case of a violation of 
the EU competition law rules, was recognized in the UK.66
The UK white paper pointed out that in the US the authorities may 
focus their resources on the pivotal cases, as private claimants relieve the 
enforcement burden of less critical cases.67 
Under the UK law, however for instance the US style multiple damages 
are not available as follows from a High Court decision, which stated that 
they would run counter to the ne bis in idem principle.68 
In 2007 the OFT published a discussion paper regarding private 
actions.69 It suggested inter alia that representative bodies should be able 
to pursue the interest of consumers in the form of standalone actions, 
contemporaneously however follow-on actions on behalf of consumers were 
allowed under the Competition Act of 1998.70 
63  Wahl Nils, Optimala sanktioner inom svensk konkurrensrätt, Konkurrensverket, 
Stockholm 2006. p. 6-7.
64  SOU 2006:99 pp. 462-463.
65  Deparment of Trade and Industry, ‘A World Class Competition Regime’, July 2001.  
p. 47.
66  As Wish and Bailey said, under the Competition Act damages are available although 
this is not manifestly mentioned: section 60(2) sets out the obligation to observe 
the consistency with the EU case law (Crehan and Manfredi) and the possibility 
for a follow-on action under section 47A (inserted by section 18 of the Enterprise 
Act) and 58A (inserted by section 20 of the Enterprise Act) based on a finding of a 
violation. See Whish and Bailey 2012 pp. 306-307
67  Deparment of Trade and Industry, ‘A World Class Competition Regime’, July 2001.  
p. 47.
68  See Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis etc. [2007] EWHC 2394, 19 Ocbtober 
2007. para. 52;  Whish and Bailey 2012. p. 312.
69  OFT discussion paper on damages, ’Private actions in competition law: effective 
redress for consumers and business’, Discussion paper, April 2007. OFT916.
70  Ibid. p. 4, 9.
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After the discussion paper, a recommendation by the OFT was issued, 
which sought to improve conditions for redress for instance by allowing 
standalone and follow-on actions by representative bodies71, but also to 
prevent a culture of litigation – fears during the public consultation were 
expressed that cases without merit are brought by representative bodies, 
and that damages would gain a punitive nature.72
Improvements of private enforcement in the UK have been recently 
elaborated on in a governmental consultation document,  ‘A Competition 
Regime for Growth: A Consultation on Options for Reform’.73 The emphasis 
was however on public enforcement. The aspects regarding the interaction 
between private actions and public enforcement were ignored.74 In a 
subsequent public consultation paper ‘Private Actions in Competition Law: A 
Consultation on Option for Reform’ private enforcement was characterized as 
complementary to public enforcement, and it was argued that this function 
will materialize in limited situations.75 The Consultation paper however 
acknowledged that: ‘In some circumstances, private actors may be better 
placed to know where anticompetitive behaviour is causing them harm 
and are best placed to weigh up the relative costs and rewards to them of 
pursuing an action’.76 Consequently the Government emphasised the need 
for improved conditions for private actors to pursue damages cases.77
In January 2013 the Government issued its response to the consultation 
paper, ‘Private Actions in Competition Law: A consultation on options for 
reform – government response’. The Government had decided amongst other 
things that representative bodies should be allowed to bring cases. Such 
representative bodies would be the consumer or trade associations, but for 
instance law firms would not be allowed to be the representative bodies.78 
The government decided to introduce measures acting against unmeritorious 
damage claims, rejecting the multiple damages. The contingency fees would 
not be allowed, and the loser would have to bear the costs (loser pays rule).79
71  OFT, Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and 
business,’ Recommendation from Furse 2012 Office of Fair Trading, November 
2007, OFT916resp p. 2.
72  OFT, Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and 
business,’ Recommendation from Furse 2012 Office of Fair Trading, November 
2007, OFT916resp. p. 12, 21.
73  BIS, A Competition Regime for Growth: A Consultation on Options for Reform, March 
2011. P. 57, Para 5.49 ff.; 
74  See the criticism of this omission by Wardhaugh 2012a, p. 576.
75  BIS, ’Private Actions in Competition Law: A Consultation on Option for Reform’ 
April 2012. para. 3.5. p. 9
76  ibid. p. 10.
77  ibid. p. 10.
78  BIS, ‘Private Actions in Competition Law: A consultation on options for reform – 
government response’ January 2013 p. 34.
79  BIS, ‘Private Actions in Competition Law: A consultation on options for reform – 
government response’ January 2013. p. 40, 63.
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In sum, all this is in line with the European approach that most 
importantly seems to reject the punitive US style damages, and emphasizes 
the compensatory nature of damages.
10.4.3 Ireland
In Ireland the Competition and Mergers Review Group contemplated the US 
treble damages, which have a deterrent purpose and further induce private 
claimants to pursue cases. No such provisions were suggested in Ireland 
however. They were seen as foreign in the Irish regulation environment, 
where damages actions’ central aim is to compensate, and it was thought 
that damages actions could bring about ‘wasteful litigation’.80 
Now the section 8 of the Irish Competition Act 2012 explicitly states 
that where the domestic competition rules in section 4 or 5 or art. 101 
or 102 TFEU were infringed, a ruling on the violation by a court will be 
res judicata for the purposes of subsequent proceedings, which may then 
concern actions by private parties.81 As a result the private parties may be 
better induced to seek damages, as the causal relation between the damage 
and violation has been already proved, while merely the actual damage needs 
to be established. The violation of the competition law itself does not need to 
be shown by the private party, as the finding of court provided such proof. 
Whelan argues that the amendments may improve private enforcement, 
and if further deterrence is created, the public enforcement benefits from 
the private actions as well.82
10.4.4 Finland
The Finnish Competition Act sets out in section 20(1) that where firms 
intentionally or negligently infringe the relevant prohibition in the act, 
they must reimburse the victims. The Tort Liability Act applies to damage 
cases, concerning inter alia the settlement of damage cases and the joint 
several liability.83 Prior to the Competition Act of 2011, only businesses 
could seek for damages, whereas now importantly also other stakeholders, 
80  The Competition and Mergers Review Group, 2000. p. 79.
81  See Competition (amendment) Act 2012 , An act to amend the Competition Act 
2002; to amend the companies act 1990, and to provide for matters connected 
therewith, 20th June, 2012.; Whelan 2012d, p. 175, 178.
82  Whelan 2012d. pp. 180-181; See also Calvani and Carl 2013, p. 23.
83  Kanniainen and Määttä 2011 p. 94; As per the Competition Act, section 20(3).The 
claimants must raise charges before ten years have elapsed since the occurrence of the 
violation.
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such as consumers explicitly have the right to compensation.84 The cartel 
members are responsible on a joint-and-several basis for the damage, bar 
the cases where a given cartel member under the court ruling is not liable 
for full damages.85 
The Courage and Manfredi rulings by the ECJ may further corroborate 
the case for damages where the EU competition law rules have been 
infringed.86 
In Finland few private actions have been brought. Reasons contributing 
to this tendency include the dispersed nature of the damages among a 
large number of people, the costs of legal proceedings and the evaluation 
of the damage. Allowing class actions could possibly alleviate the problem 
associated with the dispersed nature of damage. Further, evidentiary 
problems exist as usually the defendant holds the relevant information 
regarding the occurrence of the infringement.87 
Kuoppamäki notes that private actions serve both a reparative and 
preventive purpose in Finland.88 As a general rule the compensation should 
cover the damages, but no more (ban on enrichment), and the passing-
on defense is accepted. The claimant may be reimbursed for both direct 
and indirect damages, while he bears the burden of showing the extent of 
damages.89 
84  Kuoppamäki Petri 2012 p. 96; While the damages may have their legal basis in art. 
20 of the Finnish Competition Act or in Tort Liability Ac art. 5(1), damages may 
also be awarded where there is an explicit contractual relationship between the victim 
and the cartel member. A breach of contract may arise where the customer is the 
victim of a cartel, which then has determined the amount of payment dictated in the 
contract, which would violate the principle of loyalty, which requires the observance 
of the interests of the contracting party. Moreover a contract is void as per art. 8 
of the Competition Act, when it violates the substantive provisions of the Act. See 
Kuoppamäki 2012 p. 98; Due to considerations of reasonableness the amount of the 
damages may be adjusted as per the Tort Liability Act (412/1974) Chapter 2, section 
1(2). When the damage is the result of a deliberate act, however, the damages should 
be fully compensated, unless special circumstances should otherwise dictate. See 
Kuoppamäki 2012 p. 99.
85  Kuoppamäki 2012, pp. 99-100.
86  Kuoppamäki 2012, p. 95; See Judgment of the Court of 20 September 2001. 
Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Other, 
C-453/99.; See also Vincenzo Manfredi and Others v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni 
SpA and Others Joined cases  C-295/04 to C298/04, 13 July 2006. Paragraph 
61: ‘It follows that any individual can claim compensation for the harm suffered 
where there is a causal relationship between that harm and an agreement or practice 
prohibited under Article 81 EC’.
87  Kanniainen and Määttä 2011. p. 94.
88  Kuoppamäki 2012 p. 97.
89  Kanniainen and Määttä 2011 p. 94, 96; Kuoppamäki 2012 p. 97; Kuoppamäki 
has pointed out inter alia that there must be an adequate causal connection between 
the damage and the violation of Competition Act. Generally the plaintiff should 
establish both liability and the amount of damages. Kuoppamäki notes however that 
follow-on actions are based on the condemning judgment. See Kuoppamäki Petri 
2012 p. 95, 97.
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As Kuoppamäki points out, for one to effectively exercise his or her 
right to compensation, the required level of proof with regard to damages 
and liability should be such that it is viable to lodge damages claims.90
10.5 CONCLUSION
Based on the Deloitte survey study in the UK companies view private 
enforcement as the least important measure to induce compliance with 
antitrust rules. The scholarly opinion on the deterrent effect of the private 
actions is divided. Several commentators have however argued based on the 
economic notion of deterrence that private actions as a tool of deterrence 
are plagued by the same compelling problem as corporate fines, namely 
the insolvency cap. 
Moreover in the European context damages awarded have traditionally 
more of a compensatory rather than punitive nature, and multiple damages 
have been widely rejected in Europe both at the EU level and at the Member 
State level – multiple damages may run counter to the principle of ne bis 
in idem.  
Therefore based on the foregoing, it seems that private actions do 
not present a viable alternative to individual sanctions. The private actions 
should be facilitated to the extent that they do not unreasonably prejudice 
public enforcement, which seems to play a key role in the detection of 
cartels. The approach of increasing the role of the representative bodies 
appears commendable for many reasons. Most importantly it reinforces 
the right to compensation. 
The Irish law considers findings of a competition law infringement as 
res judicata for the purposes of follow-on actions. The author subscribes 
to the view that while abusive litigation should be avoided the standard of 
proof for establishing the infringement should be such, that one can viably 
pursue damages. 
90  Kuoppamäki 2012 p. 98.
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11 Conclusion
As was stated in the introductory Chapter of this thesis the author attempted 
to assess in the European setting by way of a comparison the relevant 
arguments either for or against the introduction of individual criminal 
liability in the anti-cartel context. At one end of the spectrum was Finland, 
which lacked all individual accountability, whereas the rest of the countries 
subject to comparison held individuals accountable to varying extent. In 
Sweden however natural persons were not subject to custodial sanctions. 
It followed from the comparative approach employed in this study, 
that the emphasis of the discussion shifted to a certain extent depending 
on the jurisdiction in question, thus reflecting the points of problems that 
had specifically been singled-out as particularly compelling at the national 
level. Indeed the comparative nature was the fundamental underpinning 
of this study and influenced the overall treatment of the subject-matter. 
In this final Chapter the author will walk the reader through the 
arguments identified as crucial to a criminalization project in Europe and 
presents the results of the study.
11.1 THE OPTIMAL DETERRENCE ARGUMENT
The optimal deterrence theory has been advanced as a robust argument 
in favour of introducing criminal sanctions against individuals who have 
engaged in cartel conduct – this reasoning is derived from the fact that 
it appears to be infeasible to impose the optimal fine on the infringing 
company. However the underpinning of the optimal deterrence theory, 
namely that the actors are rational profit-maximisers, has not been proven, 
which makes it difficult to rely on this argument alone to justify criminal 
sanctions against cartel conduct. 
Beaton-Wells and Parker noted that ‘the strongest predictor of 
knowledge and perceived likelihood of detection and enforcement was 
agreement with criminalization.’1 Subsequently deterrence may hinge on 
the individual’s ‘normative appraisal of the law and its enforcement,’ which 
appears to undermine the optimal deterrence argument with its rational 
profit-maximizing individuals.
One may point out that the assumption made of rational actors does not 
take into account the influence of informal norms. It is equally true however 
that the available evidence cannot flatly reject the optimal deterrence theory 
1  Beaton-Wells and Parker 2012, pp. 12-13.
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and the assumption of rational actors. Whelan has pointed out that cartelists 
may have multiple intentions that may include an attempt to avoid layoffs, 
which would not materialize without the extraction of the overcharge. It 
boils down to the question whether the actus reus was intended.
Measuring the deterrent effect appears to be beyond reach. Yet it does 
not warrant the conclusion that such an effect is absent. Indeed several 
jurisdictions have recognized that introducing individual accountability 
could be beneficial in terms of deterrence. 
11.2 THE MORAL CONTENT OF CARTELS
The principle of ultima ratio dictates that only the most reprehensible 
conduct merits criminal prohibition. One argument concerning cartel 
conduct holds that due to the moral value of such behavior that by some 
accounts amounts to theft, which arguably is a mala in se offence, criminal 
sanctions are called for. Moreover the delinquency of cartels relates to the 
fact that they defy the whole market economy.  
It seems that price-fixing could inter alia infringe the moral norms against 
cheating, deceiving and stealing, but the viability of the aforementioned 
concepts in the context of cartel activity is not beyond criticism. If rationality 
in the sense assumed by the optimal deterrence theory was proven, it would 
theoretically support a case to argue that the persons engaging in cartel 
activity intentionally infringe the said moral norms and subsequently would 
support the idea that from the perspective of retribution criminal sanctions 
are called for.
On the other hand there are those who view cartels as mala prohibita 
crimes, which would suggest that the legitimacy of criminal law could suffer 
if cartels were subject to criminal penalties. However one should not ignore 
the possible educative function of criminal law, which could shape public 
perceptions of the prohibited conduct. Criminalizing cartel conduct would 
send a distinct signal and could attach a stigmatizing label to the conduct, 
which in turn could induce compliance. 
It has also been suggested that cartels share the penal value of tax fraud 
and insider trading which are subject to criminal penalties, thus inviting 
the argument that the coherence of the criminal justice system calls for a 
criminal ban against cartels. This argument was acknowledged for example 
in the Danish and Swedish contemplations. 
Criminal measures should particularly target very harmful conduct, 
while the moral wrongfulness of a given conduct is not absolutely necessary 
for the introduction of a criminal prohibition. Regarding the harmfulness 
of the cartel conduct it was noted that cartels clearly bring the sort of harm 
that could justify criminal sanctions. According to one conservative estimate 
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harm brought about is in the billions of dollars annually. Consumer products 
tend to be subject to at least a 10% markup. 
Moral wrongfulness however remains important in terms of the 
legitimacy of criminal law. It is crucial how the public, after having become 
aware of the nature of cartel conduct, sees it. It may be noted that the 
Australian and UK public surveys showed that in the minds of the public 
cartels had a heavier link to the moral aspects than the economic ones. 
11.2.1 Judicial Attitudes
Another point that may make a criminalization project a shaky endeavor 
is the lack of prosecutorial and judicial support, which may be crucial to 
the success of a criminal anti-cartel regime. Courts may not be willing 
to convict the cartelists who tend to look more sophisticated than your 
average street criminal. Such judicial attitudes were witnessed in the UK 
trial of the Marine Hose cartel where the Appellate Court referred inter 
alia to the good character of the defendants, and would have been willing 
to reduce the sentences, but was prevented from doing so due to a US plea 
bargaining agreement.  
As opposed to the UK experience, in Ireland several convictions have 
been reported and it has been suggested that the number of guilty pleas 
indicates that the business people acknowledge that cartels are treated 
severely by courts. 
In the case of Duffy the judge severely condemned cartel conduct. The 
judge inter alia appeared to ignore the previously untarnished reputation 
of the defendant. However the defendant was handed a suspended prison 
sentence in that case – the Irish courts have frequently awarded suspended 
sentences, and there remains to be a case where an individual is actually 
sent to prison. An individual who failed to pay a fine went to prison for 
28 days. Yet the Irish experience thus far appears to be a more positive one 
than the UK one. 
Ireland has recently increased the maximum prison term to 10 years.2 
This move has been criticized, since it could be argued that relatively short 
prison sentences would bring about an adequate deterrent effect against 
white-collars and that more emphasis should be laid on enforcement rather 
than the severity of sanctions. However it has also been said that the higher 
sanctions could send the message to the judges to award unsuspended 
sentences – this author tends to find such reasoning convincing, where the 
judicial attitudes are problematic. 
2  It may be mentioned that this increase followed an IMF bailout package that 
required the strengthening of competition law enforcement.
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11.3 EU ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT 
In light of the principle of coherence it may be noted that while the EU 
has sought to introduce an EU-wide criminal ban on market abuse, there 
is no indication of a similar prohibition in terms of cartels. This may cast 
into doubt the commitment to the idea of a ‘consistent and coherent’ EU 
criminal policy. Disregarding the principle of coherence may undermine 
the moral message sent by criminal law and could subsequently dilute the 
potency of criminal law. 
The European Commission argued that the lack of coordination 
among the EU Member States with regard to minimum rules on market 
abuse was problematic – by analogy one could argue that precisely the lack 
of coordination of cartel regulation across Member States is a source of 
difficulties.
It could be beneficial to introduce criminal measures against cartels 
across the EU member states and also at the EU level since in the absence of 
such rules for instance the information exchange between the EU Member 
States and the Commission could be undermined. Moreover if cartels were 
not criminalized at the EU level, it could inter alia undermine the leading 
role of the Commission as the enforcer of the cartel laws if cartel detection 
fared better at the national level. 
Art. 12(3) of the Regulation provides for information exchange between 
the national competition authorities in the enforcement of Article 101 
TFEU. The Swedish committee argued that the Swedish participation in 
the information exchange could be hampered if a criminalized regime was 
introduced in Sweden. The exchanged information may also be used in the 
enforcement of the national competition laws. However the information 
received may not be used as evidence if the sending state does not have 
sanctions similar to the receiving state or if the evidence has not been 
collected in a way that this on par with the standards in the receiving 
state. While the transmitted information may not be used as evidence, it 
could be employed as intelligence. Such intelligence received from states 
with administrative regimes could prompt cartel investigations in states 
that have criminalized regimes – individuals and companies in the former 
jurisdictions could then be more reluctant to cooperate unless if they qualify 
for leniency. The Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of 
Competition Authorities provides protection for the leniency applicants 
against the employment of exchanged intelligence, and the OFT for instance 
has said that due to the spirit of the aforementioned Commission Notice 
intelligence received would not prompt criminal investigations. Yet the 
foregoing specifically appears to support the argument that an EU-wide 
approximation of the sanctions and leniency programs is called for, which 
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would then facilitate the information exchange between the EU member 
states. 
For the time being, it appears that cartel conduct could not be 
criminalized at the level of the EU institutions: the introduction of the 
Lisbon Treaty made Article 83(2) TFEU the apparent legitimate legal basis 
for criminal measures and it provides only for the adoption of directives. 
Art. 83(2) TFEU may be deemed the most legitimate option due to the 
availability of the so-called emergency brake, which allows a member state 
to opt out if ‘fundamental aspects’ of its criminal justice system could 
be affected. In this respect the doubts regarding the EU’s criminal law 
competences relate to the requirement in Article 83(2) TFEU that there 
should be a sufficient level of prior harmonization in the relevant field. 
However it appears to be possible to argue that any prior non criminal-
measure may be adopted virtually immediately prior to the criminal measure 
to satisfy the requirement of Article 83(2) TFEU. 
At the end of the day the Treaty could be amended in an attempt to 
criminalize cartel conduct both at the EU level and at the Member State 
level.
Under the current framework criminalizing cartels at the EU level 
would be problematic: Art. 6 ECHR provides that anyone, who is subject 
to a criminal charge should be tried ‘by an independent and impartial 
tribunal’. The Commission which exercises investigatory, prosecutorial 
and adjudicatory functions would not seem to fulfill the aforementioned 
requirement set out in art. 6 ECHR.  The decisions of the Commission are 
however subject to a review by the General Court which may be deemed 
an ‘independent and impartial tribunal’.  While that may suffice under an 
administrative regime, it would not if custodial sanctions were imposed, since 
art. 6 ECHR would require that already the first instance to tackle the case 
would be an ‘independent and impartial tribunal’. Subsequently if cartels 
were subject to a criminal prohibition at the EU level, the Commission 
could no longer exercise the adjudicatory function – thus warranting the 
argument that for the foreseeable future a criminalization project may be 
more appropriate at the Member State level. 
Moreover, if an EU-wide criminal cartel prohibition was adopted, it 
has been pointed out that the consistent application of competition law 
across EU Member States could become impaired. This problem could arise 
if the criminal offence was enforced at the Member State courts, which in 
turn would make it difficult for the Commission to see to the consistent 
application of the cartel laws, as the Commission does not have a standing in 
national courts. Alternatively, it has been proposed that a possible European 
Public Prosecutor could be entrusted with the task of prosecuting in Member 
State Courts. 
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If the EU does not move to criminalize cartel conduct, there is 
the possibility that individual Member States could introduce criminal 
prohibitions against cartels. Arguably the decentralization of anti-cartel 
enforcement has provided the Member States with sufficient experience to 
adopt criminal regimes.  In light of the thus far failed UK criminal anti-cartel 
enforcement, the argument that the cartel criminalization project should 
be left to the resourceful member states is however undermined since firstly 
the member states lacking a criminal regime might be more reluctant to 
adopt one after the UK debacle and secondly since the UK problems could 
partly be blamed on the absence of an EU harmonization. 
While contemplating a criminalization of cartel conduct at the EU level 
one should bear in mind that the EU competition policy targets actions that 
have an effect on Member State Trade. Thus cartels of lesser significance 
would not attract criminal liability at the EU level. In such a context if the 
national mode of enforcement was administrative individuals would escape 
criminal liability. Arguably a criminal anti-cartel regime at the EU level in 
connection to Article 101 TFEU would be feasible only if Members States 
had criminalized regimes as well.3 
Vice versa, it would be impracticable if national rules provided for 
criminal liability and individuals would be subject to custodial sanctions 
whereas larger cross-border cartels would only be subject to corporate fines 
in the absence of criminal liability at the EU level. This could hardly be the 
objective of a ‘coherent and consistent’ EU criminal policy.
From a cost point of view, the policy makers and public would do 
well to bear in mind that the results of a criminal anti-cartel regime may 
not become visible in the early stages of such a regime. The competition 
authorities across Europe would have to have sufficient resources to recruit 
competent staff members. As the Union law does not determine the required 
resources, the Member States themselves have to undertake this evaluation. 
There may be added costs brought about by art. 6 ECHR, which requires 
that ‘everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum 
rights: (a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands…’ 
– Individuals might find themselves subject to prosecution in Member 
States whose language they do not speak. Moreover legal assistance free of 
charge should be provided. 
While it has been argued that more robust investigatory powers under 
a criminal regime could contribute to the reduction of needed resources, it 
is also true that one cost of a less material form is the possibility that once 
introduced the criminalized regime would not take momentum, perhaps 
because cartel conduct would remain unaffected or the criminal rules would 
3  For the purposes of a criminalization of cartel conduct across Member States art. 
103 TFEU as a legal basis seems problematic, since it concerns art. 101 TFEU. 
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not be applied – the result could be the weakening of the legitimacy of the 
criminal sanctions. 
Moreover, due to the seeming democratic deficit of the EU, there is 
some merit to the argument that introducing criminal measures would more 
appropriately be an undertaking for the EU member states alone, without 
the interference of the Union. This approach could support the legitimacy 
of criminal law, since elected national bodies are at the core of legislating 
laws at the national level. 
While one should prevent the excessive use of the EU criminal law 
measures by giving due regard to the essentiality requirement in Article 
83(2) TFEU, this authors tends to subscribe to the view that an EU led 
harmonized criminal regime against cartels would appear to be necessary. 
One could argue that the experience of the current administrative anti-cartel 
regime may suggest that more robust measures are called for. 
In the foreseeable future the criminalization project may remain 
something for individual member states at least due to practical reasons. 
In the longer run it appears however that the cartel criminalization project 
should be one for the whole Union, as criminal measures may be the last 
resort tool that are required to address cartels.
11.4 DIRECTOR DISQUALIFICATION ORDERS AND 
PRIVATE ACTIONS
While the OECD has recommended that its member countries step up 
their enforcement against cartels the European Competition Commissioner 
has rejected such a move at the EU level fairly recently. One school of 
thought has suggested that in order to instill individual accountability in 
the European antitrust landscape, perhaps instead of adopting criminal 
sanctions, one should consider the possibility of introducing DDOs. It 
might be argued that avoiding the more seismic shift to criminal sanctions, 
one is giving due respect to the ultima ratio principle, namely using criminal 
law only as a last resort. In that sense an approach favouring DDOs as a 
method of introducing individual accountability could be commendable. 
For instance Sweden explicitly rejected a criminal anti-cartel regime, 
while it adopted DDOs. In constrast in the UK the Government was of the 
view that the DDOs could not take the place of the cartel offence. Arguably 
criminal sanctions carry a stronger deterrent effect than DDOs, for instance 
the DDO may be just a way to retire while the company could reimburse 
the individual for any loss of salary. Moreover DDOs could only target 
directors, but not other perpetrators. One concern is that DDOs would 
disproportionately apply to the directors of small companies. A study of 
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surveyed businesses by Deloitte also indicated that companies considered 
criminal sanctions as weightier than the DDOs.  It has been suggested in the 
literature that for the companies DDOs are more of a ‘cost’ than a penalty.
What is more, if DDOs are viewed as a criminal sanction under ECHR 
law, individuals could still have recourse to the full array of legal protections 
in a similar fashion as under a criminalized regime, thus making it harder for 
the authorities to obtain information from individuals (due to art. 6 ECHR 
and the right against self-incrimination) – thus making it questionable 
whether from a practical point of view one should favour DDOs over 
individual criminal sanctions. DDOs could also affect the information 
exchange between MS authorities due to the restriction set out in art. 12 
in Regulation 1/2003. 
On the other hand there are those, such as this author, who see the 
DDOs as a valuable complement to criminal sanctions, but not the panacea 
for the absence of individual liability. While directors, whose conduct has 
amounted to negligence (i.e. failing to instill compliance), may not be caught 
by a criminal prohibition, they could become subject to a DDO. However 
various sources in the UK, Finland and Sweden have noted the difficulty of 
monitoring the individuals subject to DDOs. If individual Member States 
chose to adopt DDOs, one should bear in mind also that, since the EU law 
does not recognize DDOs, the imposition of a DDO in one Member State 
would not prevent the director in question from assuming a managerial role 
in another Member State that lacks similar sanctions. 
Regarding private actions as a cartel cracking tool, it was noted that a 
UK survey study viewed them as least important. Further they appear to 
be beset by the insolvency cap in a similar fashion as the corporate fines. It 
also seems that multiple damages would be inappropriate in Europe, they 
could conflict with the principle of ne bis in idem. Thus it appears that while 
private actions are important especially from a compensatory point of view, 
they are not a viable alternative to individual criminal sanctions. 
11.5 THE DESIGN OF THE CARTEL OFFENCE
The UK Enterprise Act criminally prohibited cartel conduct in an attempt 
to increase deterrence. The Penrose and Hammond report had noted that 
competition law experts favoured a criminal prohibition of horizontal 
cartels, but would exclude vertical agreements from the scope of the offence. 
Basically the Act, which has been already amended, prohibited individuals 
from dishonestly entering into arrangements with each other, including 
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price-fixing, output restriction, market sharing or bid-rigging. Thus the 
Act targeted the so-called hard-core cartels. 
Similarly, regarding the scope of the envisaged criminal cartel offence, 
the perception of the Swedish 2004 committee (which produced a green 
paper) was that the criminal measures should target only the most serious 
violations, such as price-fixing, market sharing and output restrictions. The 
committee further argued that the normal offence should attract a prison 
sentence. The majority of the Danish committee on whose proposal the 
revision of the Danish Committee Act was modeled on also took the view 
that custodial sanctions should be introduced against hard-core cartelists. 
The Danish committee argued that vertical agreements should be excluded 
from the scope of the offence. It also noted that white-collar offences 
generally incorporate the mental element of intentionality. 
 The Swedish 2004 committee noted that criminalizing all-inclusively 
conduct that is liable to cause damage is problematic since the criminal 
prohibition should also observe foreseeability and legal certainty. While it 
would be possible to criminalize only bid-rigging cartels, the 2004 committee 
suggested that also other types of hard-core cartels should be covered. In 
contrast to the aforementioned Nordic policy choices or contemplations, 
Ireland has ended up criminally prohibiting also the abuse of a dominant 
position. In the meantime bid-rigging cartels are not subject to custodial 
sanctions in Ireland.4 The aforementioned difference concerning the abuse 
of a dominant position invites the question whether a possible criminal 
prohibition should cover them. An underlying distinction that can be made 
is that while cartels conspire, dominant firms exercise a unilateral act, thus 
warranting the argument that cartels more appropriately merit criminal 
sanctions. Moreover in terms of an abuse of a dominant position, there is 
a thin line between legitimate and illicit conduct, which leaves it open for 
the defence to argue the former. A criminal prohibition against the abuse 
of a dominant position would not be likely to meet the requirements of 
legal certainty, since it would be difficult for firms to determine in advance 
whether their conduct falls within the scope of the prohibition. Moreover 
the implications of erroneous impositions of custodial sanctions would be 
costly. Furthermore, a criminal prohibition could have a chilling effect on 
legitimate conduct. Indeed it seems reasonable to argue that the criminal 
prohibition should cover only the so-called hard-core cartels.
Whether vertical agreements should be subject to Article 101 TFEU 
prohibition has been subject to debate. While hard-core cartels resort to 
the combination of market power, vertical agreements do not.  Moreover 
vertical agreements may for instance improve the quality of services. Various 
4  A further distinction is that Irish defendants get to resort to a provision similar to 
art. 101(3) TFEU as a defence. 
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commentators have thus taken the position that vertical agreements should 
remain outside the scope of a criminal prohibition. In Ireland however 
vertical agreements are subject to a criminal prohibition. In the UK and 
Sweden committee contemplations noted the possible pro-competitive 
effects of vertical agreements. The Swedish committee noted that singling-
out the vertical agreements that should fall within the scope of the criminal 
prohibition would be difficult. The Swedish committee rejected the idea of 
criminalizing vertical agreements due the possibility that economic analysis 
is required – something which would not make it feasible to criminalize 
even very serious cases of vertical restrictions. Thus it appears that a criminal 
cartel offence is better off excluding vertical agreements.
The Swedish committee envisaged that the possible criminal offence 
should also cover the violations of art. 101 TFEU, after all Sweden should 
apply the same sanctions to enforce both the EU and national competition 
laws. The committee assumed that Regulation 1/2003 would not apply 
when natural persons are targeted for criminal prosecution, since firms are 
already subject to fines. 5
In contrast, one important point of discussion in the UK has been 
whether the cartel offence is national competition law for the purposes 
of Regulation 1/2003. If answered in the affirmative, simultaneous EU 
proceedings would halt national criminal proceedings.6 For instance a 
British Court has adhered to the perception that the cartel offence is not 
national competition law for the purposes of Regulation 1/2003: Whelan 
explained that the Court ‘held that the Cartel offence is outside of the 
scope of Regulation 1/2003 as it is not a “national competition law” 
within the meaning of that piece of EU legislation: the Cartel offence 
does not involve a decision whether a given agreement is valid or rendered 
invalid for infringement of Article 101 TFEU.’7 The recital 8 of Regulation 
1/2003 says that ‘…, this Regulation does not apply to national laws which 
impose criminal sanctions on natural persons except to the extent that such 
sanctions are the means whereby competition rules applying to undertakings 
5  In this respect in Ireland in the context of regulation 1/2003 worries have mounted 
that a cartel whose members are exclusively based in Ireland, but which could have 
an effect on Member State Trade, could attract prosecutions as per the national and 
EU provisions, since the Irish regime criminally bans the infringements of both 
national and EU competition law. In this sense one could argue that the UK way of 
separating the cartel offence from the national competition law appears sensible.
6  The Swedish 2006 committee noted that since the European Commission took 
the position that the Economic Crime Authority would fall within the scope of 
Regulation 1/2003, the competence of the Economic Crime Authority would be 
dependent on the Commission assuming proceedings as is set out in art. 11(6) of 
Regulation 1/2003 – this would mean that the national competition authority could 
no longer proceed with the case.  
7  Whelan 2012b, p. 599 footnote 52; see IB v The Queen 2009 EWCA Crim 2575 at 
para 34.
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are enforced,’  which may support the UK position. However art. 3(3) 
of Regulation 1/2003 says that it does not ‘preclude the application of 
provisions of national law that predominantly pursue an objective different 
from that pursued by Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.’ It has been put 
forward that the aforementioned recital 8 only gives further details regarding 
art. 3 of Regulation 1/2003 and subsequently that art. 3 is applicable to 
national laws that for the most part do not have a differing objective from 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. It appears to be somewhat implausible to 
argue that the UK cartel offence has a predominantly different objective 
from Article 101 TFEU. Indeed the UK cartel offence sought to improve 
deterrence due to the perceived inadequacy of corporate fines. Wils argued 
that the cartel offence is ‘a means whereby competition rule applying to 
undertakings are enforced.’8 However at the end of the day it is the European 
Court of Justice, which may ultimately settle the question. It seems that 
the foregoing further reflects the need for an EU-led action and that for the 
time being the UK may have chosen the sensible path.
The Swedish 2004 committee argued that it could be subject to an 
examination whether a criminal cartel offence should cover concerted 
practices. The committee pointed out that the difference between an 
agreement and concerted practices is vague and argued that also the latter 
should be subject to a criminal ban lest the preventive effect be impaired. 
The Danish criminal prohibition covered also concerted practices as does 
Article 101 TFEU. As opposed to that the UK cartel offence does not 
cover concerted practices due to reasons related to legal certainty. The UK 
Government took the position that concerted practices should be excluded 
from the scope of the offence, since there should be a meeting of minds, 
beyond what the notion of concerted practices implies. Indeed the UK 
approach may be favoured since it is preferable that cases where doubt 
remains as to their unlawfulness stay outside the scope of the criminal 
offence.9
Another question is what the mental element should be like in the 
cartel offence. It has been pointed out that the dishonesty requirement 
became a part of the UK cartel offence to display the moral wrongfulness 
of the offence. In the UK the dishonesty element was dropped while the 
requirement of intention to enter the cartel agreement was retained. While 
one could argue that the cartel offence should incorporate an element that 
goes beyond merely the intention to enter the cartel agreement, the argument 
8  Wils 2005a p. 133; See also Department of Trade and Industry,  A World Class 
Competition Regime July 2001. In particular at para 7.2. 
9  Whether the cartel offence should be accompanied by inchoate liability for 
attempt was rather convincingly rejected by the Swedish 2004 committee which 
pointed out that as the cartel offence involves the entering into an agreement or its 
implementation, the point of completion of the offence lies early, thus criminalizing 
only the completed offences would suffice. 
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that the greatest delinquency resides in the cartel agreement itself which is 
known to be harmful and unlawful seems reasonable, both in relation to the 
mens rea and actus reus elements. The secretive nature of the cartel seems 
to add to the reprehensibility of the cartel conduct. This author takes the 
view that while the word ‘agreement’ could capture the delinquency, adding 
the word ‘intentionally’ would speak for the awareness and determination 
and should subsequently be incorporated in the definition of the cartel 
offence. This reasoning seems to be in line with the Swedish 2004 committee 
contemplation and the revised UK cartel offence.
The recent amendment to the Enterprise Act dropped the dishonesty 
requirement from the cartel offence.10 While the dishonesty requirement 
may have sought to reflect the blameworthiness of the cartel offence, the 
problem is that there was no consensus among the public regarding the 
blameworthiness of cartel conduct, thus leaving room for the defendants 
to argue that their conduct was not reprehensible. The Government argued 
that dropping the dishonesty requirement will make prosecution easier and 
will improve deterrence. The Government pointed out that the prosecution 
will still need to establish intention (mental element) after the revision of 
the offence in conjunction with the physical element11 and acknowledged 
the need of an explicit mental element in the offence, but argued that 
even without the dishonesty element the harm caused by cartels, which 
is internationally recognized, warrants custodial sanctions up to 5 years. 
The UK Government opted for a choice which included not only the 
removal of the dishonesty requirement, but also excluded from the scope 
of the offence agreements that were made openly.12 The advantage of that 
approach is that it would not require the assessment of the economic effects 
to obtain convictions13 – when the dishonesty requirement was a part of the 
offence, the defendant could put forward the argument that he believed that 
Article 101(3) TFEU exemption would apply, which in turn could have 
affected the jury’s assessment of dishonesty. From the perspective of art. 
101(3) TFEU, the Government chosen option could be favorably viewed 
since if the exemption under the aforementioned provision is pursued while 
10  Prior to the amendment the dishonesty requirement had barely been tackled in the 
case law.
11  It appears that the Irish offence lacks a description of a mens rea element.
12  In order to avoid the dilution of criminal law and unfair labeling, it has been 
argued with regard to the UK cartel offence that it could be associated with immoral 
conduct such as deception. This association is facilitated by the nature of cartels as 
something hidden, which exacerbates the false supposition of the customers that 
unrestrained competition obtains. 
13  The British Airways case implied that the dishonesty requirement opened the 
gateway for the introduction of economic evidence, allowing defendants to say that 
they thought the conduct was not harmful and therefore not dishonest. It may be 
noted that the Irish regime allows the introduction of economic evidence during 
court proceedings.
 272
attempting to avoid also criminal sanctions, one should make the agreement 
public prior to implementation. 
The actus reus (the objective element) in the criminal offence refers 
to the harm brought about by the offender.14 One may ask whether the 
definition of the cartel offence should draw on the harmful effects of the 
offence. This Author subscribes to the view that designing an offence that 
draws on the harm brought about may not be favoured since linking the lack 
of competition to damages would be difficult in practice. The harmful effects 
of cartels may usually be presumed. It would not be sensible to require that 
in order to establish criminal liability the harm would have to be proven. 
In a way this boils down to the question whether the prohibition should 
target the conduct or the results. It appears for instance that the UK follows 
a model that prohibits the conduct. Indeed prohibiting conduct seems 
to call for more naturally criminal sanctions due to the moral evaluation 
involved whereas assessing the market effects is more appropriately dealt 
with under the civil regime. With respect to a criminal offence, it appears 
that prohibiting conduct is beneficial also in terms of legal certainty. 
11.6 CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE ROLE OF 
THE COMPETITION AUTHORITY
The criminalization of cartel conduct could also have a bearing on the role 
of the Competition Authority – indeed the cartel criminalization project is 
a demanding endeavor and one should not narrowly focus on the possible 
benefits, such as increased investigatory powers or a strengthened leniency 
program, since the determination of the role of the competition authority 
may be fraught with difficulty. The collapse of the prosecution of the British 
Airways case appears to highlight this point. 
The performance of the Competition Authority will be important 
under a criminal anti-cartel regime. The reputation of the Authority is 
valuable: whether business people consider the competition authority fair is 
also important as attitudes towards compliance may depend on procedural 
justice. In Germany worries have mounted regarding the possibility that the 
effective role of the German competition Authority would suffer in the event 
that public prosecutors took on criminal cases.15 Indeed public prosecutors 
elsewhere have been reluctant to take on cartel cases. 
14  Alternatively the cartel offence could draw on the cartel profits. The Swedish 2004 
committee noted that it usually is the case that cartels go after profits, which would 
make it redundant to incorporate a requirement of profits in the definition of the 
cartel offence. 
15  Wagner-Von Papp 2011, under the heading ’ii. The Division of Competences: 
Efficient Bundeskartellamt v Inefficient Prosecutors’ at paras 1-2.
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In the UK the Hammond and Penrose report had acknowledged early 
on that it is important to carefully pick the body that is going to undertake 
criminal prosecution of cartels. The report noted that the OFT alone could 
be entrusted with the task or alternatively another body could be designated 
with the task of prosecution. The advantage of the former option is according 
to the report that the OFT could draw on its competition law experience. 
However, problematically the OFT lacks criminal law experience. Another 
problem identified by the report was that the prosecutors inside the OFT 
could become detached from the mainstream developments of criminal 
law or could bend in face of the policy pressures of the agency instead of 
having an independent role. The report favoured the option that would 
entrust the Serious Fraud Office with the task of prosecuting cartels, since 
it had a considerable team of experienced prosecutors that have criminal 
law experience. While the option entailed additional costs since the SFO 
would have to treat the cases with the needed primacy, the costs would not 
be considerable as the prosecution teams are already available. Therefore this 
would be a less costly option than building a new team within the OFT. 
It seems that the risk of prosecutors becoming detached from the 
mainstream developments of criminal law was borne out by the British 
Airways case as the OFT did not observe the duty of disclosure – not 
disclosing witness interviews was a mistake that an experienced prosecutor 
may not have made. This prompted the judge to doubt whether the 
defendants could get a fair trial. Remarkably the OFT had prepared its 
case for four years and yet the case collapsed prior to any witness hearings. 
The value of the case was such the SFO could have undertaken it. This 
appears to signify the importance of clearly defining the respective roles 
of the bodies that take part in the investigation and prosecution of cartels. 
Indeed, the Swedish 2006 committee especially underlined the importance 
of formalizing the relations between the Competition Authority and the 
Economic Crime Authority in the event that a criminalized regime against 
cartels was introduced.16 The downside is however that the independence 
of the Competition Authority would be undermined. On the other hand 
there may be some synergy benefits involved. 
All in all, the outcome of the British Airways case was not encouraging 
for those who favour the criminalization of cartel conduct. The OFT 
prepared a report which assessed the prosecution in the aforementioned case 
and acknowledged that mistakes took place while a number of uncommon 
factors were involved. It was noted that the trustworthiness of the witnesses 
may come into question when the witnesses themselves had taken part in 
the infringement and obtained immunity in a cartel where there were only 
16  Incidentally, it may be noted that in the US a model has been adopted where one 
agency (the DOJ) undertakes both the investigation and prosecution.
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two members – and the precarious position of the prosecutor who relies 
on the evidence produced by the leniency applicant. It seems to confirm 
the need for a body, which has experience in criminal law.  The Condor 
Board Review noted that the OFT had ‘a steep learning curve’ with the 
criminal prosecution. The Condor Board Review acknowledged that the 
extent of the disclosure obligation was not predicted. Despite the hardships 
encountered in the UK cartel prosecution, the UK has expressly rejected 
discarding the cartel offence. 
Instead of entrusting the public prosecutors with the criminal 
prosecution the 2004 committee suggested that the Swedish Economic 
Crime Authority should take on the task. The Swedish committee pointed 
out that the investigations would require the participation of the Prosecutor 
from the very beginning.  Experts from other authorities, such as the tax 
administration are on secondment to the Economic Crime Authority. To an 
extent this approach resembles the UK one, where a specialized authority 
(the Serious Fraud Office) undertakes the prosecution instead of the public 
prosecutors. Yet one should note that crucially the enforcement task in the 
UK is a shared endeavor between the OFT and the Serious Fraud Office. 
To sum it up, in light of the UK experience one may commend the Swedish 
proposal to entrust the Economic Crime Authority exclusively with the 
enforcement of the cartel offence.
11.6.1 Parallel Administrative and Criminal Regimes
The current Author tends to think that due to reasons related to effectiveness 
it is unlikely that the administrative anti-cartel sanctions against companies 
would be dropped in Finland or Sweden in favour of a regime that would 
exclusively rely on criminal enforcement. Rather it seems that corporate 
fines would exist in the foreseeable future alongside any envisaged individual 
criminal penalties. 17
Since administrative enforcement has been the chosen mode of anti-
cartel enforcement in Finland and Sweden it seemed appropriate to examine 
the rationale behind the administrative enforcement to see if any lessons 
can be derived therefrom. It may be noted that while Germany has a 
more systematic approach, Finland and Sweden have a patchy collection 
of administrative sanctions. It seems that such a lack of coherence is 
not desirable. Due to the absence of a coherent system in Finland, the 
introduction of the administrative anti-cartel enforcement was not preceded 
by a thorough evaluation of the pros and cons of criminal enforcement as an 
alternative. Minor offences, attracting on-the-spot fines, remain under the 
17   See Whelan 2013b, p. 147; See also OFT, An Assessment of Discretionary Penalties 
Regimes, OFT 1132, 2009 at para. 1.4
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criminal justice system, which arguably reflects the need for an overhaul of 
the Finnish system of sanctions – such an overhaul should include rethinking 
concerning anti-cartel enforcement. 
It seems that administrative anti-cartel enforcement has been spurred 
by effectiveness considerations prompted partly by enforcement at the 
EU level, which is administrative in name at least. Indeed Finnish and 
Swedish commentators have argued that the EU which lacked explicit 
criminal law competence prior to the Lisbon Treaty, prompted to some 
extent the adoption of administrative sanctions at the national level due 
to their perceived effectiveness and the idea that they would live up to 
the EU requirement of effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions in 
the implementation of EU measures at the Member State level. It seems 
that while the legislators valued the supposed effectiveness, they failed to 
appreciate the demands of proportionality and coherence as the patchy 
collection of sanctions appears to demonstrate. Indeed Furse argued in 
the UK context that precisely the absence of an EU harmonization was to 
some extent to be blamed for the difficulties in the UK criminal anti-cartel 
prosecution18 – the argument is notably strengthened by aforementioned 
Finnish and Swedish discussion regarding a patchy collection of sanctions. 
Regarding the appeal of the administrative regime, it may be said that it 
appears to be less resource-intensive. Furthermore, one rationale has been the 
attempt to curb the inflation of criminal law. High punitive antitrust fines 
could however at least to some extent defeat the purpose of the last resort 
principle, which dictates that criminal sanctions should be the ultimate 
measure.19 
There was for instance the fear for higher standards of proof under a 
criminal justice system: indeed it could be argued that from a resource point 
of view allocating resources exclusively to administrative enforcement might 
make more sense, since due to the presumably higher standards of proof 
under the criminal regime, securing a conviction would be more resource-
intensive than under the administrative regime. Whether the possible higher 
standards of proof under a criminal regime should impede the introduction 
of a criminalized anti-cartel regime has been discussed both in the Swedish 
and UK contexts. A plausible point was made by the British Competition 
Appeal Tribunal, which said that irrespective of the applied standard of 
proof (criminal or civil), the outcome of the case might not be dramatically 
affected. Ultimately however the standards of proof may depend on the 
dictates of the national law. It appears that the argument of higher standards 
18  Furse 2012, p. 223.
19  The problem of presumably low cartel detection rates could possibly be addressed by 
introducing increasingly punitive antitrust fines, which may however conflict with 
the principle of proportionality.
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does not present one with grounds that would warrant the rejection of a 
criminal anti-cartel regime. 
Furthermore, the Swedish committee predicted that the criminal 
investigation would be need to be prioritized, subsequently delaying the 
administrative inquiry which would be put on hold pending the criminal 
preliminary investigation. If the case attracts criminal prosecution, in the 
UK context it has been noted that the collection of evidence would observe 
criminal law standards from the beginning. The argument has been made 
however that the deterrence gain would be worth the delay.  Furthermore, 
in the Swedish context provided that the Economic Crime Authority was 
primarily responsible for the investigation, the Competition Authority could 
not conduct meanwhile dawn raids.
Another argument that has been used to dilute the attractiveness of 
criminalizing cartel conduct is the possibly wider notion of the right against 
self-incrimination under a criminalized regime. Under the Finnish regime 
the right against self-incrimination is already observed, but the extent of 
the protection needs to be clarified. One important point of comparison 
between the Swedish committee deliberation and the UK design of the 
offence in this respect was that while the Swedish committee envisaged that 
evidence obtained prior to a criminal suspicion could be used in subsequent 
criminal proceedings, the UK provides that evidence acquired under the 
civil regime will not be available for the criminal prosecution due to the 
less robust protections under the civil regime. This way the administrative 
investigations would not be compromised either, since natural persons who 
may be interviewed by the competition authority, do not have to fear that 
their statements could be used against them in possible subsequent criminal 
proceedings. The UK approach preserves the integrity of the civil leniency 
program and may therefore be preferred.
It has been argued that the aforementioned possible strengthening of 
the defense rights could be counterbalanced by more robust investigatory 
powers available under a criminalized regime. Indeed several commentators 
and jurisdictions appear to have acknowledged the practicability of such 
powers in the fight against cartels. For instance the recent Danish committee 
argued that the investigatory tools in the cartel context were not on par 
with those available for the investigation of other white-collar offences. 
It seems that the more robust investigatory tools that depend on the 
introduction of custodial sanctions provide a fairly strong argument in 
favour of criminalizing cartel conduct. 
The total costs of a criminal anti-cartel regime were estimated to amount 
to some 44 million Swedish Crowns per annum (approx. 4,5 million euros). 
The 2006 committee however took the position that assigning resources 
to criminal enforcement would not be warranted since they could be also 
allocated to the already existing administrative regime. 
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Indeed in Ireland it appears that in the early 2000s the Competition 
Authority had not been able to launch timeous investigations due to a lack 
of resources. The cartel cases tend to be resource-intensive due to the time-
consuming nature of the trials. In Sweden it was noted that the Economic 
Crime Authority would need more resources to tackle cartel cases. Also 
in the UK it was argued that the British Airways case revealed that the 
investigative authority may need more resources, and that this question was 
not tackled by the reform of the cartel offence. The Hammond and Penrose 
report acknowledged the costs if the Serious Fraud Office was included 
in the enforcement endeavor, but estimated that the costs would not be 
considerable as the prosecution teams were already in place. 
Despite the resources needed, it seems that the case has been made in 
favour of individual criminal sanctions.
On a different note, one possible difficulty is that parallel enforcement 
could produce disparate case law since both general courts and the Market 
Court would deal with the cases, the Swedish committee noted. In the UK 
context too it has been argued that more attention should have been paid to 
the underlying problems related to parallel criminal and civil enforcement. 
The Swedish committee also highlighted the poor track record of parallel 
enforcement in Sweden. Actually, it has been suggested that arguably the 
Irish criminal anti-cartel enforcement regime has been more successful than 
its UK counterpart due to the lack of parallel enforcement. Also in the US 
civil and criminal proceedings are not pursued in parallel. The OFT itself 
has acknowledged that parallel enforcement involves difficulties. 
In the UK discussion another point of importance has arisen, namely to 
what extent evidence provided by the leniency applicants should be subject 
to disclosure – this question is relevant especially in terms of the leniency 
applications produced under the administrative regime, as disclosure may 
affect the attractiveness of becoming a whistle-blower.  Leniency being an 
important cartel detection tool has prompted commentators to identify 
the foregoing as a source of concern: The British Airways case implied 
that information provided in civil leniency applications must be available 
to defendants in a criminal case. Yet one important aspect of the leniency 
program is that the information provided by the leniency applicant is 
kept undisclosed as far as possible. The question may become even more 
compelling if private claimants attempt to gain access to information 
provided by the leniency applicants. A balance should be struck between 
the interests of private claimants and the interests of the leniency program 
by the national courts – while the weighing of the competing interests is 
conducted in terms of the defendants and the leniency program, it seems 
that the balance must be in favour of the defendants who could be subject 
to custodial sanctions. If the defendants get the access to such information 
it may not be easy to deny the private claimants the access. One possibility, 
 278
as was raised in the literature, could be that a separate body took care of civil 
leniency, to prevent the criminal prosecutor making use of such evidence 
and thus giving possibly grounds to reject a disclosure. 
While acknowledging that if the criminalization bandwagon is jumped 
on without carefully considering all the aspect of such an endeavor the 
existence of parallel administrative and criminal regimes could become 
the Achilles heel of a criminalization project, one may also note the 
Swedish contemplation on insider trading: the contemplation rejected the 
decriminalization of insider trading. It was explicitly said that the swiftness 
of the administrative proceedings does not serve as a reason to tilt in favor 
of the administrative mode of enforcement. It was argued that criminal law 
should shape the society’s perceptions in relation to the prohibited conduct 
and that it is preferable to adopt a definition of the criminal offence that 
requires a lesser degree of negligence than to lower the standards of proof 
by introducing administrative sanctions instead. By analogy, one might 
rethink anti-cartel enforcement in a similar fashion. The incoherence of the 
current system of sanctions is manifested in the complete lack of individual 
accountability in terms of hard-core cartels. Moreover it seems that the 
administrative corporate fines are already of a penal nature. At the end of the 
day the justification for an exclusively administrative mode of enforcement 
against cartels seems vague. With respect to individuals it appears that 
administrative sanctions should be properly adopted only against minor 
offences. Cartels as an egregious violation of competition law do not seem 
to fall within that category. 
11.6.2 The Ne bis in idem Principle
Regarding the principle of ne bis in idem the Swedish 2001 committee 
put forward that it is a counterargument against a criminalization of cartel 
conduct. Once a verdict has been given by a court, it would infringe the 
ne bis in idem principle to continue pursuing a case. The Swedish 2004 
committee noted that since the competition law fines may be considered a 
penal sanction under the ECHR law (which appears to have been confirmed 
recently by the ECtHR), it means that Article 4 of the protocol no. 7 
of the ECHR could be infringed if a firm is subject to competition law 
fines while the owner of the company is subject to a criminal sanction. 
The 2004 committee acknowledged however that such a situation is likely 
to arise rarely, since the close relationship between the company and the 
individual in a way that would prompt the ne bis in idem principle would 
be exceptional.  
It seems appropriate to separate the conduct of the firm and the natural 
person: thus punishing both the individual and the company would not 
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infringe the ne bis in idem principle. This appears to be the prevailing 
approach. As opposed to that a sole proprietorship is run by the individual 
who would be subject to both the competition law fine and the criminal 
penalty. Due to the broad interpretation of the word ‘undertaking’ an 
individual may constitute an undertaking for the purposes of the EU law 
and thus be subject to both fines and a criminal punishment which would 
bring about the infringement of the ne bis in idem principle. In Finland a 
related discussion has concerned the imposition of a tax surcharge and the 
prosecution of tax fraud. As opposed to the previous case law of the Finnish 
Supreme Court, now the defendants are not protected merely against 
successive proceedings, but also against parallel proceedings regarding the 
same matter – this approach was prompted by the recent case law of the 
ECtHR, which dictates that if the facts are identical or to a great extent the 
same, the second violation may not be prosecuted. More recently the Finnish 
Supreme Court has changed its position in a way that is consistent with 
the ECtHR case law. Indeed all this means is that the facts of the case need 
to be carefully assessed to determine whether the ne bis in idem principle 
is operative and if answered in the affirmative and if the administrative 
proceedings were first assumed, the criminal proceedings have to be 
dropped. In the aforementioned scenario the individual who constitutes 
the undertaking would merely be subject to the administrative proceedings. 
In sum it seems the possible criminalization of cartel conduct would not be 
severely hampered by the ne bis in idem principle, since conflicts would be 
rare and could be solved by dropping the latter prosecution. 
11.7 THE LENIENCY PROGRAM
One important cartel detection tool is the leniency program. Both Finland 
and Sweden have spurned a leniency program that would provide immunity 
against criminal sanctions, which served as a major reason to reject the whole 
criminalization project. 
Indeed one of strongest arguments against a criminalization of cartels 
in Finland, Sweden and Germany has been the mandatory prosecution 
principle and thus the absence of a crown witness system. Both from a 
moral and legal perspective, it appears that such a system has not been 
given the green light. Thus while these countries currently operate a civil 
leniency program, it could be severely impaired if the employees of the 
company which is benefitting from leniency could face custodial sanctions. 
It has been argued that criminalizing cartels in the aforementioned countries 
could only take place if individuals were given immunity against criminal 
prosecution, where the company enjoys immunity against corporate fines. 
However the Swedish Government for instance explicitly rejected the idea 
 280
of contemplating the introduction of a crown witness system in connection 
with the anti-cartel context alone. 
In Denmark in contrast however the recently revised anti-cartel regime 
introduced immunity against criminal sanctions for natural persons. The 
Danish committee members were of the opinion that this would also boost 
the leniency program, since individuals risking custodial sanctions would 
have an increased incentive to blow the whistle: in the absence of individual 
accountability employees of the firm may be less inclined to cooperate. 
The situation may be upended if individuals themselves run the risk of 
custodial sanctions: the interests of the firm and the individuals would 
collide. For instance under the UK regime the type A immunity is offered 
to an individual who applies for it, but neither his fellow-workers nor the 
firm will benefit from it.  Thus individuals could provide the authorities 
with the needed evidence, and the evidentiary problems associated with 
a criminalized regime could be alleviated. While some civil law countries 
may be wary of granting immunity against criminal prosecution, also in 
the UK the OFT has been in an exceptional position in the sense that it has 
had the powers to grant immunity against criminal prosecution. The OFT 
has argued that the interests of the economy justify such an arrangement: 
it is more important to detect the cartels than to punish the individuals 
who inform the authority of the existence of the cartel – this is the sort of 
reasoning that the current author finds convincing. 
11.7.1 A System of Plea Bargaining
Recently a system of plea bargaining was introduced in Finland, something 
which may previously have been unthinkable.  This may reflect the possibility 
that in the Finnish context attitudes in relation to a crown witness system 
may be more approving these days.
In the anti-cartel context the advantages of introducing a system of 
plea bargaining have been discussed, since it could be desirable to provide 
the cartel members who do not benefit from immunity the opportunity 
to enter plea bargaining agreements. For instance in the US defendants 
frequently enter plea bargaining agreements – when the DOJ has been 
compelled to take a case to trial it has succeeded in less than half of the cases. 
Arguments in favour of a system of plea bargaining have been presented 
especially in the UK. This would help the prosecution to evade a situation 
where it would have to meet the ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard, which 
makes the criminal prosecutions challenging. In the UK the Government 
acknowledged that plea agreements could induce defendants to guilty pleas, 
but argued that it could have an adverse effect on the criminal justice system 
and would require a thorough consideration. 
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The concerns related to plea bargaining may touch upon the rights 
of the defendant and his or her chances of getting a fair trial and whether 
innocent individuals are persuaded to enter guilty pleas. The European 
Court of Human Rights has however said that plea bargaining agreements 
do not violate the ECHR and may benefit the defendant. The Council of 
Europe had already in 1987 suggested that its member states should widen 
the scope of prosecutorial discretion where possible.
Arguably while the leniency program destabilized the secretive cartels, a 
system of plea bargaining could further capitalize on the destabilizing effect 
thus possibly increasing the deterrent effect. The UK British Airways case 
demonstrated the challenging nature of criminal prosecutions, and perhaps 
underlined the point that plea bargaining could be beneficial in the fight 
against cartels where the cooperation of the defendants could significantly 
facilitate the prosecution. Thus a system of plea bargaining may be an 
integral part of a successful criminal regime against cartels, something that 
crucially should be considered prior to the introduction of a criminalized 
anti-cartel regime. 
11.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
All things considered, criminalizing hard-core cartel conduct and introducing 
custodial sanctions remains a project that should eventually be on the agenda 
for all modern economies, including Finland and Sweden – this reasoning 
is warranted inter alia by the integrity of the criminal justice system. One 
should not however rashly proceed with such a vast project without carefully 
considering all the components of a regime lest the project become an asset 
turned into a liability. Crucially a failure regarding one or a few components 
may undermine the whole project, as the UK experience may confirm. 
It is central from the perspective of the ultima ratio principle to show 
the seriousness of the violation. In the gravest cases criminal law alone 
could communicate adequately the blameworthiness of a given conduct: 
the benefits of free trade are obliterated by cartels. Cartels impair one of the 
core pillars of our society, the market economy on which individuals depend 
in an attempt to ensure their own welfare. Indeed bold disobedience to the 
whole system appears to be at the core of what is delinquent about cartels.
Overcriminalization critique concerning a possible criminalization of 
cartel conduct seems to ignore the educative function of criminal law. The 
public may come to denounce behavior that was previously perceived to 
be neutral in moral terms – one may think of the environmental offences 
for instance. Indeed public opinion could be shaped by experts’ views in 
complex fields of law. 
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A ‘consistent and coherent’ EU criminal policy and a national one for 
that matter, with regard to cartels should promote uniformity: the credibility 
of the criminal justice system is supported by criminally banning violations 
of a similar penal value. Arguably the relative penal value of cartels calls 
for a criminalization of such conduct. While a criminal prohibition should 
stand the test of the ultima ratio principle, it seems that cartels warrant 
the ultimate condemnation provided only by criminal law. What is more, 
it appears that other measures would not produce the stigmatizing label 
on a par with criminal measures. While the optimal deterrence theory 
cannot be relied upon alone to back a cartel criminalization project, it may 
remain a point of continued interest in the cartel criminalization debate 
due to its theoretical appeal. Proving conclusively the deterrent effect of 
criminal penalties may be beyond reach, but both anecdotal evidence and 
various efforts to estimate the deterrent effect suggest that one may favor the 
introduction of a criminalized anti-cartel regime in an attempt to introduce 
individual accountability which is currently completely absent in Finland.
All in all, there are several commentators and jurisdictions that rightly 
acknowledge the value of a mixture of measures being available in the 
fight against cartels, including director disqualification orders, fines and 
also custodial sanctions.
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